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RELIGION

IN CONNEXION WITH

A NATIONAL SYSTEM

OF

INSTRUCTION.

THEIR UNION ADVOCATED, THE ARGUMENTS OF NON-RELIGIONISTS
CONSIDERED, AND A SYSTEM PROPOSED.

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PREFACE.

SHOULD nations, in providing instruction for the young, combine the lessons of the Bible with the imparting of secular knowledge?

This question presupposes that nations should provide instruction for the young,—a proposition which I have endeavoured briefly to explain, qualify, and maintain in part of the pages that follow. The point is an interesting one, but not that which is my main object.

Let us come to the consideration of the great question calmly and fearlessly. For myself I know that I am anxious to attain a knowledge of the truth, and to act upon it when it is attained. I have had occasion, in the discharge of my professional duties, to think long and anxiously on the question, not with a view to speculation, but to immediate practice. I have come to the conclusion that nations ought to combine most intimately religious with secular instruction. My reasons are contained in the work before the reader.

Of those who have publicly embraced the opposite side, some have done so, it is not to be doubted, from a conviction that, in advocating their peculiar views, they are doing God service. Others seem as undoubtedly opposed to His cause. If they could, the very word Religion would

be blotted out from our language ; and they use the present opportunity to oppose in safety what they dared not openly attack, because this would involve the loss of professional reputation and gain. A third class, with no fixed principles of any kind, have espoused this cause, in consequence of their usual leaders having done so, or because some of the doctrines promulgated in its defence are plausible, and seem to be liberal—or because it is new—or from any other motive that leads credulous and shallow men to adopt certain opinions, it would be impossible for them to tell why.

As far as regular controversy is concerned, the opponents of religious instruction have hitherto had the field almost entirely to themselves. This may have resulted from a variety of causes. The doctrine seems not only unsound, but withal so untenable, and therefore so harmless, that no one has thought it worth while to make a serious effort to oppose it. An answer involves so much of humiliating thought, as to what is actually performed in the way of religious instruction, that the subject in its minute developments is turned from as unpleasing and ungracious. And, besides, he who advocates the incorporation of gospel truth with the daily ongoings of the schoolroom, must expect hard names, to which no man will expose himself willingly and without good cause.

And, in truth, there is good cause. Religious knowledge is but sparingly imparted to the young of our land. Though the efforts made to remove that scanty portion have not yet been successful, we must be on our guard against fresh assaults. A knowledge of the reasons why we should prize this engine of good will incite us to a more strenuous use of it. And I will venture from

experience to affirm that the more we use, the more highly we shall prize it.

The following pages, then, are designed to put the reader in possession of data from which he may calculate the importance of the combination of religious with secular instruction. It is my object also to enable him to see the substance of all that has been written on the other side of the question,—that, judging between us, he may decide for himself.

I have been the more emboldened to attempt to do my countrymen this service, because they will naturally inquire What are the sentiments of Teachers themselves? My brethren of the profession are, of course, not responsible for my statements or reasonings; but I am happy to be able to assure the public, that, if the Legislature deigned to consult us, the Endowed Teachers of Scotland,—though that, to be sure, would be unprecedented, the thought occurring to very few that a teacher knows any thing of his own craft,—we should unanimously respond, that to deprive us of our Bibles would be to condemn us to the doom of Samson,

“O dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon.”

I am urged on by another consideration. If I prove a weak champion, my weakness may rouse a giant to contend. My defeat is not that of my cause, and it may stir up the strong ones to take the field. As when the skirmishers of an army fall back upon the main body, their retreat only rouses the flower of the host to grapple with the foe,—so I may serve, if I am discomfited, to call to action the mighty men of valour to overthrow the enemies of eternal truth.

It would, at the same time, be doing injustice alike to

my object and to my work, to represent them as wholly, or even principally, controversial. We must answer those who are opposed to us, if we expect a general and effectual response in our favour. But there is something more to be done. We must not only dislodge the enemy, but cultivate the ground, which he would, but for us, desolate. War is an evil at the best. But those engaged in it would be fiends if their sole object were to destroy.

Controversy should be indulged in not so much to remove error as to plant truth. And in this case the truth calls upon us not only to acquiesce but to act. My great consolation and support in the disagreeable task of impugning the arguments of others, has been, that thus only could I reach the point of enforcing on the nation the great duty of instructing the young in the religion of Christ.

I have, accordingly, aimed at uniting on one common ground all the sincere and judicious lovers of our "youth-head." If I have failed, let the sincerity of my desire, and the object to which my wishes are pointed, atone for what I can truly call an involuntary failure.

I humbly trust, at the same time, though I confess this to have been a subsidiary object, that I have thrown out considerations which may help to stimulate all to a more faithful use of the Sacred Record, alike in our family instructions and in our hours of solitude.

HADDINGTON, 21st July 1840.

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RELIGION

IN CONNEXION WITH

A NATIONAL SYSTEM

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CHAPTER I.

Hopes of realizing a System of National Education—Difficulties which ought to repress Expectations unreasonably sanguine—Difference between various Uses of the Term Education—Education used in Three Senses—In which Sense to be understood in this Inquiry—Evil of confounding these—First Difficulty, from the domestic Education of the Poor—Instruction substituted as the proper Term of Inquiry instead of Education—Second Difficulty, the probable Non-attendance of many from the Indifference of Parents—Third Difficulty, the Employments of the Working Classes—Fourth Difficulty, Human Nature.

I ENTER upon this interesting subject with stronger hopes of seeing realized the wishes entertained by all friends of our common country, than it seemed a very short time ago rational to cherish. The feelings of all classes have at last so far united, that there appears to be a universal desire to consider the subject impartially, and with a view to its practicability. The immense importance of the object has long had an effect the very reverse of what might have been expected from theory, but perfectly accordant with the whole practice of human nature.

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We are apt to enter at once on any project which seems to be simple, and of little consequence in itself. The result appears trifling, as well as the efforts necessary to its attainment; but we are liable to gaze with admiring supineness on any enterprise of "great pith and moment." The object to be gained appears so vast, that, except in times of excitement, leading to strong national impulses, we anticipate insurmountable difficulties in reaching it; and thus, frequently, what ought to stimulate, serves only to deter us. To educate a whole nation appears an achievement so mightily important, that, while we admire the prospect, we shrink back from the actual effort. We can speak and write in terms of the most fluent applause about the thing, supposing it to be achieved, which we hesitate from attempting in action to realize. How much writing and talking has there been about all great undertakings before the attempt has been fairly made,—and how astonished are we to find the real difficulties so much less than the magnitude of the desired result has led us to expect!

I hope, in the course of the remarks which I shall venture to make on this subject, to be able to develop somewhat fully one of the leading objects to be aimed at, in a measure affecting the whole of our vast empire. But, in the mean time, let us dwell for a little on some considerations affecting the desirableness and necessity of such a measure, neither concealing its difficulties nor fearing to urge its claims. In doing this, and anticipating the probable results of a judicious system of national education, we must guard against expecting too much,—especially at first. Even were we to behold now the whole machinery devised, put together, and working, we ourselves need not look forward to see any thing like the realization. Generations must pass away before we can hope for the full development of those effects to which every philanthropist looks forward as a great source of comfort, and a strong motive to persevering exertion. In

considering the causes which operate in this manner, we find one of them associated with an error, which it is expedient for us to notice and remove at the very threshold of our inquiry.

It is easy to see how the term Education has, by its manifold application, been misunderstood. The following remarks are drawn from Scotland, where a boy generally attends his teacher only a few hours each day, and is at home during the rest ; but they are applicable to all other cases. We have, in this country, a body of men professionally set apart to train in various degrees the minds of the young. When a parent, even in a rank of life where better things might be expected, consigns to a teacher the conducting of a boy's early career, in some respects he feels as if he were relieved of all responsibility. With that instinctive affection which prompts him to love, and those rational cares which press him to look forward to the future welfare of his child, he has perhaps spent many a sleepless night, and revolved many an anxious thought, as to how and where his child is to receive instruction. He may not be conscious of any very specific aim which he has in view, and he may not distinctly perceive the ground on which he ought to form his decision ; but he has a vague notion that education is something which is indispensable ; he feels the advantage derived by himself from mental culture, and the disadvantages which have resulted from that culture not having been more extended. This, generating a sense of responsibility, weighs upon him, and, in many cases, he is urged on by the idea of dignity accruing from having a child at school. At last the matter is settled, the boy is placed under the care of his teacher, and from that moment till some change of pursuit is apparently necessary from the lapse of years, the child is no more a care to the parent on this head. To procure for him a certain *quantum* of various kinds of instruction is in his view to educate him ; and the boy is said to have had a good

education, who has been taught a variety of branches by one teacher or more. In this way the term Education comes to be limited to the instructions received at school ; and when we speak of the benefits to be derived from a national education, we are led to confound those derived from a prescribed system taught to all in schools supported by the nation, with all the circumstances that, occurring out of school, tend, perhaps much more than school-instruction, to form the character. Now, if national education mean this, there seems to be no reason but one why we should not expect, in one generation at least, the full harvest of our educational exertions. This other reason I shall consider immediately. As *it*, however, would not operate universally, so there might be expected the partial realization of all the benefits anticipated. But supposing this notion to be an error, as it undoubtedly is, we can only expect, even after a generation shall have passed away, the partial realization of *some* of the anticipated benefits. That it is an error is apparent from the following considerations :—

A boy spends only a short space of time in school, but his mind is becoming fully formed nevertheless. Education, in the widest sense in which it can be and is sometimes used, is employed to denote all the preparation by which a human being is fitted for another state,—or all the circumstances in his condition preceding his death. But, in a more common sense, it is used to signify all the preparation, whether domestic or scholastic, which fits a youth for active life,—or all the events in a man's life preceding his entering upon the active discharge of duty. In this sense, which is no uncommon one, are included not merely the hours spent in school, and in preparing for it, but the hours spent in play, in society ; in short, all the hours wherein the incipient man's mind is in any way actively employed. Nay, though a boy were never to receive an hour's instruction at all, he is in this sense receiving an education just as much as he who is reared under the

most eminent masters, and with the most scrupulous care ; so that a badly educated man is not, in this view, a man who has received inadequate and scanty instruction, but a man who has in any way been badly prepared for discharging aright the duties of life. The errors and deficiencies in the mind may not arise from any errors or deficiency in the instructions given in school, but from the events connected with the play-ground, his home, his parents, and his companions. But this, in spite of its having been pointed out again and again by writers on education, is not distinctly perceived ; and even writers on education, having once stated the distinction, dismiss it too often from their reasonings, and proceed as if the statement were the removal of all difference. I hope to be able to keep it in view myself, and to remember that I am now to discuss, in national education, not the training of the nation in its full extent, but only that which is connected with the schools and their instructions. We have then three senses, and there may be more, in which the term Education is used ; the most extended and the least common, being that denoting the full training which fits a man for a future state, or all the circumstances in his condition preceding death ; the most restricted, that applied to the intellectual and moral training connected with actual teaching ; and a common and more extended sense, being that whereby we mean the training that fits a youth for taking a part in the duties of life, or those events which precede his entering on those duties,—I mean the time when he begins to act for himself. The confounding of these two last especially leads to many misconceptions and practical errors on this subject. The parent, thinking that his son's education is intrusted wholly to the schoolmaster, feels all sense of responsibility lifted from his own shoulders, and cares little more about the matter till a fixed term of years revolves, and the boy comes to an age when he should be removed to another department of study, or to some other pursuit. In the choice of his companions the parent leaves

the boy alone,—in his course of optional reading he leaves him alone,—in all other matters but those pertaining to the school he leaves him to himself,—and in school he intrusts him, without inquiry, to the teacher. After he has gone through stated classes for a certain number of years, the father says, I have given my son the best possible education. If his hopes fail, he says, It is strange, considering the excellent education he has received!—all the while confounding the instructions which he has received at school with the whole bent and habits that his mind has been allowed to take. He does not consider that the teachers, however skilled in giving instructions in the various departments of learning, may never have made the moral state of the minds of their pupils a matter of consideration,—that the youth may have spent his leisure hours in forming idle and malicious habits,—that he himself may never have either set him a good example or endeavoured to check him in his course,—and that he may have even looked on at the progress of mischief with an approving smile and the remark,—Boys will be boys. How common is it for the young to hear their parents talking over their bygone exploits when children, recounting with glee feats of mischief and cruelty, and with a sigh remarking that, Boys have no spirit now-a-days! All this is a part of education, but it is not formally derived from set instructions. A boy, acting on principles which he has heard approved of and chuckled over by his seniors, is astonished to find himself punished for what he has been taught to consider an act of commendable spirit, and instead of acquiring fixed notions of right and wrong, he is tossed about till he has no principles at all. He hears his friends laugh at some runaway from school,—they dwell on the details of the provocation, and applaud the spirit of the deed. He tries the same; and, if he succeed, he is probably destined to use his father as he has done his teacher,—set his authority at nought. If not, he becomes unsettled in his principles and loses hold of all fixed

standards of virtue and vice. He is told never to use violence,—to be mild and gentle ; and he is teased almost to phrensy by domestic taunts of cowardice if he do not, like a bull-dog, fight with every animal that comes in his way. The parent in loud tones reproaches him for his want of spirit, and the epithet of *coward* drives him on to the commission of actions for which he is perhaps flogged by his master ; but he sees the smile in his admiring father's eye, who nevertheless thinks it decent to affect a frown. Such are the conflicts, in even what may be considered favourable circumstances, between education in the more extended and education in the more restricted sense.

But the evil becomes doubly apparent when we proceed to treat of the classes more likely to be acted on by any system of national education. Here, almost all that is done at school as to the forming of the mind, may, not in part only, but altogether, be undone at home. The lessons of duty, moral obedience, gentleness, temperance, truth, respect to the rights of our fellow-men, inculcated on the best system in school, may in a great measure be lost and destroyed by the pernicious influence of evil example. Even in the best cases, how difficult is it to render permanent the effects of a correct system of training, and how much more difficult must it be to fix them in the mind when they are opposed and counteracted by an immense domestic force ! The philanthropist looks forward to the time when the amusements of all ranks will be intellectual and innocent ; but he mistakes if he expect that result speedily from any system of national education. Even in the classes where there is abundance of leisure, and daily toil does not unfit for receiving pleasure from intellectual exertion, how much is there of frivolous in amusement,—how much waste of time about empty nothings,—how much of mischief and of vice from activity of mind misdirected ! We cannot expect that things will be better in the houses of the poor ; we must expect them to be worse. There is a necessary limit to the instruction given to most classes,

and the range is not wide which the educationist can traverse with regard to the poor. The working classes must leave school before they have fully reaped the benefits or felt much of the stimulating effects of intellectual exertion. Even the well-educated boy but rarely shows at first much inclination to read in the only way which is accompanied with profit or pleasure,—that is, with the exercise of thought. Most works abound in words which, in their full import, are unknown to the young reader, and yet a knowledge of their full import is necessary to the sequel being understood. The habits of steady application, necessary to the enjoyment of intellectual pursuits, have not been fully formed. The parents of the working boy give him little encouragement, because they have no relish for such employment themselves. They may, and often do, throw obstacles in his way, and he may, at the very outset, be driven from the initiatory steps by household brawls and household misery, to say nothing of intemperance and vicious indulgences of various kinds. He has difficulty in procuring books, and he has not been taught self-denial in body to obtain the means of mental indulgence. All these difficulties stand in the way of forming the habits of the working classes, so as to lead them to partake of the results of education. The reading and other training which they get at school are so far good, as they keep the young from acquiring bad habits,—as they employ the time usefully,—as they bestow some of the pleasures arising from intellectual exercise and moral culture. But children are not well educated, in the wider sense of the word, if good education stop here. It must be carried forward to active life, fashioning their aims and guiding their conduct ; it must sweeten their hours of toil, and delight their hours of leisure ; it must become incorporated with their nature,—be an active habit and a constant companion. Now, it is not difficult to see, that if we were to begin to-day a system of national education, however sound in theory and efficient in practice, we should have to contend, not only with difficulties arising from the

pupils, but from the parents likewise, and from the whole system of domestic economy. These we cannot expect fully to overcome at once, and this is a drawback of immense importance on all our hopes of immediate benefit.

In connexion with the distinction already made, which is of sufficient importance to merit the notice I have given it, and to obviate all risk of misconception either on my own part or that of my readers, I shall hereafter use the term *Instruction* whenever I shall have to treat of the mere discipline,—using discipline to denote the moral teaching and training of whatever kind,—and lessons enforced and given in school ; and *Education* when I speak of the whole events that precede a youth's entering on the active duties of life,—the period when a young man generally leaves school to earn a livelihood.

There is another evident difficulty in the way of our soon participating in the complete benefits of any scheme of national instruction, and which has already been alluded to,—that arising from the unwillingness of parents to send their children to school. It is well known that in Prussia penalties are inflicted on those parents who do not accept for their children the instruction provided for them by the state, or provide it themselves. If it be deemed so indispensable that all shall be immediately instructed, that the evil arising from non-instruction counterbalances the difficulties connected with a compulsory system, some regulation of the kind is indispensable ; for many parents care nothing at all about the instruction of their children, nor will they put themselves to the slightest trouble in the matter. If, on the other hand, the immediate organization of the means be all that is required, and if we are disposed to wait for the gradual and voluntary working of a general system, rather than for its immediate and compulsory working, we shall abstain from *direct* penalties at least. There is another view, of course, in which the question must be regarded : Is such a system of compulsory instruction practicable, having regard to the feelings of the

nation? Considering that there are still enemies of national instruction, that the feelings of few are so strong as to lead them to overlook every difficulty, that many supporters of it are timid and wavering, and that the great bulk of those whom it is intended immediately to benefit are indifferent, I do not see that it would be advisable to have recourse to penal enactments. We must not, at first at least, encumber ourselves with new difficulties. Let us secure to parents of the humblest fortunes the means of rational instruction for their youth; and if in the progress of years we find the offer not accepted as we would wish, it will be time enough then, and much more consistent with the genius of our laws and constitution, to reconsider the matter with the view of giving it greater efficiency. We shall then have fewer difficulties to contend with; and, when the benefits of the system are more fully understood by those at whose good we principally aim, we shall then have the general concurrence in enforcing that which is felt to be the common interest of all.

But if we are to search for moral motives strong enough to induce a general love of instruction, and if we are to be taught by experience, we must go to religion. "It was religion," says Dr Chalmers, and all history corroborates his statement, "in Scotland which gave the first impulse to education. John Knox and his associates convinced the popular understanding of this country that the Bible was the genuine record of communication from God to man; and that within the four corners of that book there were the words which were able to make them all wise unto salvation. It was this that inspired them with a universal desire to possess the faculty of reading, that they might unlock the mysteries of the Scriptures, and acquire that knowledge of God, and of his Son Jesus Christ, which is life everlasting. It was this which created a universal demand for education among the people of Scotland. Therefore we ought never to forget that religion is the parent of our schools; that if these schools, by an act of

rebellion, should cut off the authority of their parent ; if they should ever forget and disown their first progenitor, to whom they owe their birth and being ; all the blessings and glory which they ever conferred on our land will depart from it."

A third difficulty as to the adult population, is that arising from the nature of the employments in which the working classes are engaged, and the hours necessarily devoted by them to labour,—a difficulty which we can never hope fully to remove. Great praise is due to those who are exerting themselves, by mediating between the employers and the employed, to secure to the one party the unrestricted use of their capital and their skill, and to the other a fair remuneration for their labour, and moderation in the demand made on their time and exertion. But no scheme that has been proposed,—except perhaps sundry wild and impracticable notions that have been broached by the seeming friends but real enemies of the working classes,—has contemplated that they shall have on their hands so much time as is enjoyed by those who are otherwise employed. In the exertions that are making to secure the young sufficient time for instruction, there can be little doubt of ultimate success. Here we have the laws of nature to support us, and they were never perseveringly urged in vain. Hence we fear not for the young, but, at the same time, are of opinion that, so far as time for intellectual improvement is an element, the adult classes engaged in manual labour must have inferior opportunities to the classes otherwise employed, and cannot consequently be expected to have so much enjoyment. To every one who reflects that the greater the exertion in intellect and the longer it is pursued the more it is enjoyed,—that so true is this, that often the intellectualist will sacrifice health and life itself to his favourite pursuit,—that the love of learning has "an appetite which grows with what it feeds on,"—it will be apparent that this is another cause why we should moderate our expectations.

How Utopian, besides, to think that the working man, after a day of hard bodily exertion, can return from his labour as willing or as able to indulge in self-cultivation as he who has spent his time—even granting it to be the same in duration—in light labours which have not exhausted the body, and which have given the mind a zest for new occupation from its being in full exercise and only seeking a change of employment ! True, these considerations do not prevent the prospect of a partial self-culture even in the most unfavourable cases ; for we already know in our own land, that there are hundreds of working men who, after the expiration of their hours of daily toil, in mechanics' institutions and at home, turn from the duty of providing for their body to the delightful privilege of feeding their mind. And in our rural parishes, where a certain amount of instruction and intelligence is universal, how often does the hard-working man, leaving the fields, spend his evening in conning old ballads, old tales, or, more useful far, *Boston*, *Bunyan*, and the Bible ? All Scotland, in her rural wards and non-manufacturing towns, bears testimony to the same fact, and proves at once the possibility and the desirableness of a regular system of national instruction.

There are now few enemies of such a system ; but there are many timid friends. Let such dwell on these thoughts. Some are timid, because they are apt to be led away by the dread that the difficulties are insuperable. They are not so. It would be folly to deny that they are great ; and I have endeavoured to state them such as they are. But the experience of Scotland for many centuries, and of England for some years, sufficiently proves that such instruction may be bestowed on the working classes as shall accompany them through life, diffusing its charms over their homely toils. Others are timid, because they are not sure whether, if a national system were proved to be practicable, it were at all desirable. They have not made up their minds whether it may not lead to violent poli-

tical changes and commotions. Now the thoughts already offered may, on consideration, reassure these. The working classes are to a certain extent instructing themselves; and it is much better to take instruction into our hands for their permanent benefit, than to leave it to work its way in disorder and imperfection. Besides, whether we instruct them or not, we cannot retard their education; and future reasoning will develop more fully what I here venture in anticipation to hint, that the nation is bound to see that they are not only well educated, but properly instructed. Above all, their fears will vanish when we examine the ground of them. This they will find to be, that in the state superiority depends on the superior cultivation of the mind, and they fear lest a levelling of instruction should lead to a levelling of all ranks and distinctions, so essential to the well-being of a nation. Now they will see that the classes doomed to toil never can, in the main, reach the same instructional level with those less severely taxed to labour. Such alarmists will find, from Captain Hamilton's "Men and Manners in America," that so evident is this, and that so convinced are many of the working classes themselves of it, that the Workies, an American association of workmen having for its object to secure equality, finding it impossible to carry out their wild notions of general equality without equality of instruction, and, at the same time, being unable from the necessity of daily toil to attain the instruction of the other ranks of their fellow-citizens, have formed a plan not to instruct themselves more, but to cause others to instruct themselves less. This is sheer madness; but it shows the conviction, even in their minds, of the truths just stated.

There is one circumstance which, perhaps more than all the rest, ought to teach us moderation in our expectations, though it is one which will not be so universally conceded as the preceding, I mean **THE NATURE OF MAN**. In the ranks of those who are pressing forward to the attainment of this great object, are some who hold that,

in course of time, when all are instructed, morality and order and peace will be established ; in other words, that the nature of man is perfectible, and that a perfect system of instruction, persisted in for generations, will bring about a perfect race, free from the vices which degrade the present day. This is so pleasing a dream, that it would be a pity to disturb it, were it not that it militates against truth, and it is our interest, as well as our duty, to maintain truth wherever we find it. It is clearly our interest in the present case, for, unless we proceed on sound views of the human mind, our system and details will be unsound. It is our interest,—for our sanguine hopes will end in disappointment, and drive us back, it may be, in despair. It is our duty,—for the truth or falsehood of the statement does not affect a mere theoretical exposition of human nature, but our whole practice in treating it. If I regard, as a being capable of perfection in this life, the child intrusted to my care, I must act in a manner totally different from that which I should adopt if I were to consider him capable of rising more and more above imperfection, but incapable of reaching complete perfection. It is my duty, because this statement militates against what I believe to be God's Word ; and by admitting it even in possibility, I am, by that admission, admitting the possibility that God's Word states a moral untruth. However pleasing, then, and however flattering to my pride as belonging to the race of man, I cannot for a moment admit such a view into my provision for universal instruction. We may, to be sure, nay we must, both in our own case and in the case of others, aim at perfection as our standard ; but while we take it as our standard, we shall be very foolish if we expect ever to reach it. Let me not be mistaken. Perfection is a term which one man may use in a sense different from another. It may mean perfection in the eyes of man, or perfection in the eyes of God. If the advocates of perfectibility mean the former, I doubt if even it be attain-

able; at all events, I do not know any mere man in whose case it has been exhibited. It may mean relative perfection, that is less of imperfection in one man than in another. And I suspect that it is from a mixture of these two meanings that the doctrine of perfectibility misleads its few advocates. Reason and Scripture tell us that perfection in God's sight consists in doing, not some things, but all things to his glory; and in this view I doubt not that there is no one who will maintain that this has ever been attained.

This much I have thought it necessary to say in the mean time, reserving further notice, because I hold it a sacred duty to abide, in the cultivation of the human mind, by the hopes which the Scriptures hold out from the views given there of human nature. But the very depravity of human nature is that which most loudly calls us to the rescue. It is vain, in the present constitution of things, to look forward to the time when there shall be no wrong, no sin, and no suffering; but it is in our power to use the means for diminishing crime and misery. All experience teaches us, that the utmost amount of even the best education yet reached by man, in circumstances the most favourable, has never succeeded in rooting out, in either individuals or communities, the sin and shame of neglected duties and violated laws. But the same experience teaches us that, where the proper means have been properly used, these evils have been moderated and confined. Thus are we led to infer, that while we need not expect that national instruction will change the nature of man, it will supply sufficient incentives to habits of comparative innocence, and, checking the outbreakings of open vice, lead not certainly *to*, but *towards* perfection,—perfection not our hope, but our standard and our aim.

CHAPTER II.

Common Defence of the Want of a National Provision for Instruction in England—Proposed Comparison between England and Scotland in Town and Country—Theorists apt to underrate and overrate Instruction, in Respect to Quantity—Sources of these Mistakes—Statement of Difficulties affecting the Question—"Instruction not seemingly essential to moral Worth and Prosperity"—Solution—"Instruction seems to have some Effect on the Amount of Crime, but doubtful what"—Solution—Other Circumstances than Instruction must be taken into Account—Perfectibility—Overrating as to Quality—Systems do not produce different Results, as might have been expected—How?—Important Truths deduced—Instruction should be universal—Directed to proper Objects—Athens—France—Ignorance not safe—Hence Danger of underrating as to Quality—The Quality will determine the Employment—"Politics?"—No, Religion—Deductions from a Comparison between rural Lowland Scotland and other Countries—Characteristics of Scotchmen—Manifestations—Modifications by Instruction.

It were needless to speculate on the causes which led to the manifest difference existing between Scotland and England as to the national provision for instruction. It often happens that events are brought about by the force of mere circumstances, which afterwards, incorporated as the part of a system, require and find a defence, whether good or bad, as if they sprung from motives,—those things which were purely casual being then considered as an end effected by means intentionally employed. Whether, however, the difference now treated of arises from fortuitous circumstances, or is the effect of design, the defenders of things as they are consider themselves bound to find a motive. We are told, accordingly, that in England a man is provided with the means of acquiring religious knowledge by the church, and that as the mass are thus trained

in the principles of the Christian religion, all that they require besides, is to be provided with as much secular knowledge as shall enable them to gain a subsistence. This is secured by the various trades and callings in which they are bred. Thus time and eternity are provided for; and they have no need for more. Reading and writing would not make them more moral, but might endanger their morality. They are incapable of acquiring such a degree of information as would lead them to enjoy literature or science, and the only use to which they would put learning, would be to read obscene or seditious prints, and to acquire the slang of infidelity and political agitation.

If such be the effect of popular instruction, then is the state bound, not only to refuse, but to discourage it. But, happily, it can be shown—and that on a large scale—that such is not the effect. We can compare England and Scotland in two aspects. We have England comparatively uninstructed every where; Scotland instructed in the country, but in this respect nearly as destitute in her towns as England. By comparing uninstructed England and the same uninstructed portion of Scotland, we can see if the effects be the same; and we can compare the rural districts of England and those of Scotland, and mark if the effects be different.

Nay, lest objections may be made against any error that might arise from contrasting nations of various temperaments, we may compare Scotland at different periods of her history, and view these in connexion with education.

In making such comparisons, and, indeed, in speculating as to the effects of instruction at all on communities, there are deductions to be made which the sanguine theorist is very apt to overlook; and these deductions regard both the quantity and the quality of instruction. We are all prone to mistake the effects of instruction on the human mind, to undervalue as well as to underrate them.

We take two individuals. The one has received the elements of instruction, the other has not. They are both

in the same neighbourhood, in the same rank of life, and in circumstances, so far as regards wealth, nearly the same. Although there is a difference in their instructional training, it has produced no visible effects. In conversing with them we do not find the one more intelligent than the other. The general moral bearing of both is the same ; and in all outward respects, there seems to be no difference. Hence we are apt to infer, that the one has not been benefited by instruction, nor the other injured by the want of it. To add to this consideration, we often find the unlettered man superior in intelligence, *status*, and moral worth, to his better trained fellow. Hence, we rashly conclude, that instruction adds nothing to a man's intelligence, moral worth, or enjoyment. This arises from a twofold blunder. Whether we are inclined to advocate the cause of instruction or not, we are apt to leap to our conclusions too hurriedly, from the very numerous phases which instruction and its effects present. In our induction we are apt to limit the number of cases, taking those which are favourable to our own views, while we either overlook the others altogether, or account for them as exceptions. Now, in a question of this kind, it is absolutely necessary to examine into the cause and the number of the exceptions. The non-instructionist, looking at the number of unlettered men in his own neighbourhood who are sensible, moral, and well to do in the world, and at the number of others who are inferior in intelligence, morality, and outward prosperity, takes it as a general rule, that to certain classes instruction is positively injurious. He will do well if he look for the cause why he himself, and others of a grade higher, are not included in this rule, and why the limitation extends only to certain classes, and would be inapplicable farther. If he pursue this question, he will find that his induction has been defective,—that he has omitted in his estimate of human enjoyment sundry very important elements,—and that he has compared not men of similar minds, but men in whom

there is an essential difference irrespective of instruction. The other blunder is, that he views instruction as affecting individuals, not communities. If, leaving his own neighbourhood, he stretch his inquiries to the mass, he will find his rule become the exception, and his exception the rule. He will find that—with exceptions—instruction is essential to the intelligence, the moral worth, and the prosperity of a people.

The instructionist is also bound to look at the exceptions to his general rule, and their causes ; and he will find that, while the general effect of instruction is to benefit, this is not universal. In inquiring into the cause, he will learn to concentrate his views, and act according to the dictates of a wise experience, not of a random enthusiasm. He will learn not to overrate the benefits of instruction. There is a danger in underrating, but there is also a danger in overrating. The danger in the former, is that we do not act at all ; in the latter, that we act with indiscriminate haste. The cause of both is hurried conclusions from insufficient examples, combined with adherence to theoretical views.

If we regard “ a little learning as a dangerous thing,” we shall startle at the proposal of that little being put into the hands of the people ; and if, besides, we know one or two uninstructed men who are worthy and sensible, we are confirmed, and seek to deny the dangerous boon. If, again, we view ignorance as so fearful a calamity that the least removal of any portion of it is an unmixed good, and if we think on what we ourselves should have been without instruction, looking, moreover, at the communities where instruction has been successful, we contend for knowledge to be imparted, however small the quantity attainable, and of whatever kind, provided it be not directly demoralizing. Then, to support these views, statistics are had recourse to. The one side appeals to the annals of crime, and attempts to show that the majority of criminals can neither read nor write ; while those on the other take

up their tables, and try to prove that a great proportion can do both, and that the most atrocious criminals are often the best instructed. The one points to districts where ignorance prevails in alliance with vice; the other triumphantly produce tables where vice prevails in connexion with instruction.

How perplexed and tangled is the philosophy of the human mind! There is such a want of wisdom in an immoral life, that we think, if we bestow instruction the immorality will of course vanish. We bestow the instruction, but the immorality still remains. We have not cut off the spring, we have only, perhaps, changed its direction,—perhaps not even that. Let us not, however, despair; for there *is* a close connexion between knowledge and virtue, could we but find the link. Every virtuous mind has, to a certain extent, acquired knowledge, whatever its source may have been.

Yes this is one part of the answer to the puzzle. These thriving men whom you, the non-instructionist, have selected as specimens of ignorance,—moral ignorance,—are not ignorant. They have not been formally instructed, but they have worked out for themselves the effect of instruction. Reading, and writing, and ciphering, and a knowledge of the more familiar parts of history, of moral and physical science, which, in the longrun, must be the apparatus for instructing the masses, produce in their highest effects two results,—the formation of habits of thought, and a store of delightful recreation. The latter the non-instructed select have not, the former they have. Without wishing to decry the latter, it is the former, the use of the mind, that has raised these men. They have come to the same result, but in a different way. The same strong will which has overcome the difficulties of life, shows itself in its general moral strength. But you cannot expect to find *all* men such. These have probably been reared in favourable circumstances, without strong temptations to crime at first, yet combating difficulties sufficient to exercise, but not to

overcome, their love of good. They prove that instruction is overrated when it is deemed essential to the making of every man a good citizen, but prove nothing as to the mass of men.

And this introduces us to another element which affects instructional speculation. We would be apt to imagine that nothing would be easier than the solution of this question. We take the records of crime in a district, and inquire how many of those receive instruction who are of the age requiring it, and we compare the tables, and here we think lies the solution. But we are mistaken ; for in another district, with a greater quantity of instruction, we have greater crime, and in another, less. We feel that somehow or other, instruction has to do with crime, but in what respect we cannot make out, or we conclude that it increases it. We are right and wrong. Instruction has to do with crime, instruction increases it, and yet instruction diminishes crime. All here is confusion from not perceiving that crime is undefined,—that the circumstances of the country are generally not taken into account,—and that instruction is a complex term, comprehending much that may do good, and much that may do evil. The annals of crime give a very imperfect notion of the happiness, the morality, or the knowledge of a people, except in very strong cases of extreme vice. A people, all ignorance, may live in circumstances where crime—that is, a violation of the law of God requiring to be punished and suppressed by the hand of man—is not called forth, and yet there may be no purity of mind. We may go to some land in the “sunny south,” where the inhabitants care for nothing but the simplest fare, and where the scarcely scratched earth easily produces it, and we shall find little theft, little drunkenness, little violence ; but yet we may not safely conclude that they are a moral people. There may be no regard to God, no love of man ; there may be the foulest impurity and the most degrading vice. Yet their annals are written fair

without one blot of blood, or rapine, or drunkenness. You may contrast it with the best-instructed and most moral country under heaven, and you will find in one month more crimes in the well-instructed, than during one year in the ignorant land. Even in the same district you have crimes varying from period to period, but not according to the instruction given, for that may be uniform. Another element then enters, which it is easy to detect in its existence, but not in its quantity. It is the means of human subsistence. An ignorant country, with these in abundance, may turn that very abundance to abuse and vice, and yet be free from crime. An instructed country, with sound principles of virtue in the mass, may find many of her sons, under the pressure of straitened means, driven to the commission of lawless deeds. And how complicated does the whole inquiry become, when you reflect that, instruction leading to intelligence, and intelligence to extended commerce, and commerce to wealth, and wealth to temptation, you have to unravel all this before you get at the solution of this most important question !

If the human mind were perfect, we could be at no loss for an answer to the question respecting instruction. Morality is so clearly our interest, as well as our duty, that we are prone to believe that the more the mind is enlightened by any kind of knowledge, the purer will it become. Hence it is perfectly consistent in some educationists to advocate the question of national instruction as a matter wholly beyond controversy, maintaining, as they do, that the mind is perfect in as far as it contains, even in its present state, all the germs of perfectibility within itself, requiring only instruction to bring them to maturity. According to them, you have only to tell a child what is best for him, and give him habits accordingly; and the child, when a man, will most surely obey. You tell a child that drunkenness is a violation of a law of nature, and you give him no potion withal to try ; and the child, acquainted with this law, and trained to temperance, is

rendered temperate for life. You tell him that the pursuit of knowledge is the highest and most delightful exercise of his nature, and you accustom him to such pursuits,—and the child, become a man, will never engage in any thing but the pursuit of knowledge. Reason and morality are, according to this theory, so combined, that, as you cultivate the reason, the morality advances, until you get the perfectly moral man entirely guided by reason, enlightened to the utmost by a knowledge of nature's laws, and trained by habit to obey them. The smallest advance, accordingly, is valuable. Enlighten by instruction a little, and you render moral a little. Give a little more enlightenment, and you have a little more morality ; and so on, till you obtain perfect enlightenment. But as you cannot bestow on the masses perfect enlightenment, bestow on them what you can. The little you give them,—never mind though it do not directly affect their morals at all,—will refine them, will make them acquainted with the laws of nature, and will render them virtuous and happy.

Would that it were so ! Amiable instructionists ! can you not realize somewhat more of this spirit in society—in the world—in yourselves ? Thou worthy follower of this philosophy, who knowest that the infraction of the laws of temperance produces disease and misery, shunnest thou the wine-cup ? Ah ! I doubt that that nervous shake, and that dull filmy eye, and these parched lips, tell of last night's excess. Thou sayest thou wert not trained to temperance. Look at that little one of thine own, whom thou hast for years been teaching it, and whom thou hast practically taught to restrain his appetite : thou art stirring for him the odious mixture which he must now swallow. Wherefore ? “ He *would* overeat himself at his cousin's birthday-feast.” Pity this, but never fear—human nature is perfectible !

It is not so. Human nature,—strange that it is necessary in the nineteenth century, the sixth millennium of a sinful world, to announce it,—is neither perfect nor perfectible.

What ought to be the results of instruction on the mind so constituted are not the results, constituted as the mind is. It is dangerous to hold this doctrine of perfectibility, were it for no other cause than the delusion affecting instruction; and it furnishes a striking instance of the danger of error in theory. It is the duty of the friends of truth to attack error wherever it is found, and not to shrink from the task on the plea that it is harmless. We might be inclined to smile at the notion of perfectibility, were it not that there is a tendency to draw deductions from it which fearfully affect the common interest. Nor can we smile when we remember how repugnant it is to the Word of God. No man with impunity fosters error, and least of all that which stands exposed in the light of revelation.

Let us beware then of either underrating or overrating instruction. It can do much, but it cannot do all that has been predicated of it. The consideration that it adds nothing to individual happiness or prosperity, or the general good, has never been urged but by those who were led away by special cases, or by narrowing their views as to the amount of the instruction that can be easily conferred, and the great effects springing from even a little instruction generally and properly given. They have taken too low an estimate of the effect of instruction, because they have considered it as acting only on the intelligence and not on the morals of a people. Others have over-rated instruction, because they have thought that intelligence and morality are inseparable. On the contrary, they are too often separated, and instruction of a certain kind is antagonistic to true morality.

I have already stated that the results of instruction intellectually considered are twofold, bringing about habits of thought, and opening up sources of employment for that thought. If these results be attained, it does not matter, in the main question, how. It is very true that the best method of attaining these results furnishes a subject of most interesting and useful inquiry; but, judging from

results, there appears to be a great overrating of quality which jars like dissonance. You will find one man exalting in the highest terms the Scottish national system, which, according to him, has produced the most extraordinary fruits, and has exalted the national character. It has produced a race of intelligent, moral, and enterprising men,—it has rendered famous a poor and sterile land. Yet, to your great surprise, you will find this very man, while treating of the quality of instruction, lauding a certain system which assuredly has not been prevalent in Scotland, abusing every other, and asserting that the system,—which yet according to his former self produced all these results,—generally pursued, is all uselessly mechanical, a complete damper of intellect, and almost useless, if not positively injurious,—defective, if not hurtful. Nay, if you inquire for yourself, and ascertain what the one system is, and what the other, you will be disposed perfectly to agree with him. And here is another of the puzzles in education. You instruct in totally different ways two youths, the one on the old, and the other on the new system. Are the results different, other things being equal? No; you will find them both pursuing the same intellectual employments, with the same pleasure and the same success.

Has this ever struck the reader? He has been accustomed to hear the praises of the intellectual system, justly lauded by all, and yet he finds that the people of Scotland, almost universally trained in a different method, have been in the times that are past the praise and the wonder of all men. If he has never been struck with this, let him reflect on it now, and confess that questions on the subject of instruction are not so easily answered as he had imagined. Let him learn this practical lesson,—not to dogmatize, nor listen credulously to others who do so, on themes beset with difficulties of all kinds.

In seeking to solve this difficulty we shall find that there is a tendency, both in the case of individuals and of

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the masses, to overrate as well as to underrate the advantages, not only of instruction generally, but of this or that kind of instruction. The faculties seek exercise as their legitimate enjoyment, and if you open up the springs of knowledge, these faculties will, in whatever way set at first to work, continue to pursue their desired end, though only, as to the generality of men, in circumstances not positively unfavourable. I would not be understood to detract from the interest of the question as to the best method of opening up these faculties, more especially as that question has much more of a moral than an intellectual bearing. But facts confute all our *à priori* speculations as to the probable intellectual advantages of certain kinds of instruction, especially in certain circumstances. One advantage, and I do not deny that it is a great one, attained by that system of instruction which aims at rendering the path of knowledge smoother than it was before, is, that isolated individuals will probably, from their own acquired tastes, proceed as they have been taught to begin, and add to their store of information by acting on the principles of active exercise, from which they have derived so much delight,—though even that is not certain. But, both in this and in the other case, we shall assuredly have a beneficial result, provided you have minds similarly instructed brought into contact, and exercised spontaneously on a proper subject of great common interest. This, I think, goes far to furnish a solution to some of the difficulties above referred to. If a young man be thrown upon the world in a sphere of life where his companions are illiterate, the best system of instruction can do no more than render it probable that he will persevere in seeking to cultivate his mind. If, again, he be thrown ill-instructed, we shall admit among a mass all of them similarly instructed, but still so far aroused, he will be forced, through the competition of the minds about him, to do something to keep pace with them. This will be rendered quite sure, if there pervade that mass interest about

some subject of great common importance requiring the use of learning, be it religion or be it politics. The frequent discussion of this question will exercise thought, and thought will lead to reading, and an intelligent race of men will be produced.

It would thus seem that instruction, to be effectual to each, must be general. Here and there, in a country where instruction is not general, an individual may be found who will conquer all difficulties, and through his own energies fight his way to thought and to distinction. But, in general, you do no good, or but little comparatively, to a man, by instructing himself alone, and then leaving him embedded in a population where he is not incited to the exertion of thought and the exercise of his faculties. Nor do you affect the question much in a great country, even by spreading it over a given locality. Dispersion, and the train of events that alters the population of a district, sending the instructed away, and introducing the uninstructed, brings about effects somewhat similar to those produced in a district partially instructed. You must so order matters that those who leave shall find in their new abode the same spirit of intelligence existing in the new mass, and that they who enter shall be similarly imbued. It is well to act on the tendency of the faculties to seek exercise, but this operates only within certain limits; and the pleasures or pursuits of sense are strongly opposed to it. You need something more for the great majority of minds. The mere pleasure springing from mental enjoyment will not lead to this cultivation,—nor will the feeling of power in general cases, for there are in all unlettered communities leading uninstructed minds,—nor, in short, any thing but common sympathy and mutual action. But then, for mutual action, there must be a common object. This is, in truth, the principle on which despotic governments have feared the spread of instruction—and it is no groundless fear. Link masses of men with the freemasonry of a common intelligence, and give them

one common object, and you tighten the bond of their common interest, and widen the sphere of their intelligence. To instruct a population on the one hand, and then send them to fritter away their thoughts on parts and parcels of science or of literature unconnected with any part of moral action, may be thought practicable; but it seems to me to be neither practicable nor desirable. Herein lies the strength and the weakness of instruction. To be effectual, it must permeate the whole body of the people; but if it do this, there is a danger of its misdirection. To elevate the people, it must lead them to act; but it may mislead them as to the object to which their actions should be directed. Mere literary accomplishments and taste will not elevate the character of a people, as witness Athens. What nation on earth ever displayed such exquisite taste, not only in the great models of sculpture and of architecture, on which the world still gazes with rapt admiration, vainly endeavouring to imitate them, but in the perfect skill with which they assigned, in popular masses, the wreath of poetry, of history, and of philosophy? Yet, with all this, point out a nation more nationally demoralized, fickle, cowardly, selfish, a bully when unopposed, and a craven when boldly met—a nation of philosophers without wisdom—of poets without steady patriotic fire, and of historians without national greatness. But this is mere taste, it may be answered, without science. Look then to France. What say you to the state of that people, which regarded science, the training of reason and a knowledge of nature, as the panacea for all moral ills? Do you recognise in their fits of fiendish delight in blood—nay, not fits but prolonged banquets—the sustained horrors of years—the maddening cry after every new priest of Moloch—the crave for change, if murder but effected that change—liberty on the tongue and licentiousness in the heart, the attributes of a people rendered wise by knowledge—calm in the majesty of thought, and with their intelligent unity commanding the respect of astonished

Europe? Nor let us dream that dull ignorance is safe. It may be so in times of plenty and of non-excitement; but let the season of trial come, and you have nothing wherewith to ward off the poisonous shafts of seditious proselytism. It is folly to call the lion harmless, because, well fed at times, he roams not, nor stirs up the forest with his angry roar. It is folly to speak of the innocent sea, because you behold it reposing calm as a child asleep. Instruction of the best kind may not render a people secure from the wild burst of political fury goaded on by misrule and want. But it will go as far as any thing can to render a people calm till the exigence has passed away. In times of quiet, among an uninstructed people, the solitary instructed peasant has but little to stimulate him; and, unless he be an extraordinary man, he falls into the ranks of his unlettered neighbours. His instruction does him little good, because he is not acted upon by the mass, nor even, if he be instructed in sound morality, can he restrain them in times of uproar, the probability being that he will reluctantly join them. Not so,—not reluctantly the merely instructed, and without the restraints of religion. Then is the time for them to rub up the faded splendour of their half-tarnished lore,—to ply the arts of the demagogue, and to use sacred knowledge as a lever to uproot altars and thrones.

It cannot, on the other hand, be too carefully remembered, that the kind of instruction is, in another aspect, not a secondary but a primary subject of importance. You cannot expect any beneficial results from a partial system of instruction, for that does not leaven the mass, and gradually falls away. You must instruct the whole, if you wish to have a thinking people. But be cautious, for you are placing an instrument of fearful power in the hands of a people, sure to stimulate each other, and banded together in one common union—the most powerful of all, that of intelligence. Do not vainly dream that they will confine their researches to the gases, to the earth's *strata*,

the moon's phases, or the products of commerce. Already you may see symptoms of what they will do. You find mechanics' institutions drafting off their members to anti-corn-law associations, and the lectures of science giving place to the lectures on socialism. You must find employment for the tremendous instrument. You must give it something to do. What? All our doings are conversant about this world or the world to come. Excited minds, combining and seeking something to do, constantly crying out, like the Demon of the Ettrick Shepherd, for "Work! work! work!" if they seek it in this world, end in political unions, trades unions, and the other channels where their energies may effervesce. All history testifies that this is not safe. It tells that the sound theory of government is known to but few,—that even though it were known to all, theory is one thing and practice is another. As in natural philosophy the student derives all his reasoning from pure mathematical *data*, which he works out, knowing that he must allow for the physical subtractions over which his reasoning does not extend but which must be learned by experience, so does the sound politician keep his eye steadfastly on theory, while his notions are modified by experience. But the mass of men are all for the theory, and would neglect the experience. Human nature is capricious, fickle, and deceitful; but the mass of pseudo-politicians found on human nature as if it were perfect, uniform, and sincere. Hence the danger of an instructed country expending its energy on politics, each crude notion uttered and re-echoed by millions of mouths, till, by the din, the furies of a half-knowledge be roused, skilled to destroy, but all untaught to renovate in wisdom. With what then must we employ the faculties enlightened? Expediency of the highest order, combined with our highest duty, answers, Instruct the people in religion. Make it your foundation, your shaft, your capital; let it raise its stately head to the clouds, and fix its basis deep as the centre of the earth. Political commotion may lash against it, but it will

stand firm,—the winds of angry passions may howl around it, but will not stir one leaf of its glorious tracery. God's blessing will descend on our land, and our people, loyal, will be instructed, intelligent, and free.

I do not wish here to engage in the controversy which awaits me on this subject. I shall soon appeal to facts to prove my reasoning. I only now lay down the propositions which I think are deducible from the experience of Scotland compared with that of other nations.

I. There is the highest probability that any system of national instruction, but one, is unsafe. II. There is a certainty that national instruction of a certain kind is not only safe, but in the highest degree desirable. III. That system is one which produces activity of thought, furnishes with stores of knowledge to feed and employ that thought,—pervading all classes with its spirit, and keeping up the closest union at every step between intelligence and the morality of the Bible.

The Scottish nation in its best,—that is, in its Lowland rural state,—is pre-eminently reflective and calm. That this is not the natural characteristic of the people more than that of the other portion of the island, is apparent from the fact that they are descendants of the same race, that previously to the era of instruction, the population was one of the fiercest in Europe, and that in their popular outbursts, which even instruction cannot always repress, as well as in their more regular affrays with England, they have ever manifested what might be expected from Saxon blood in such circumstances.

In the annals of history little is generally written concerning the people. Kings, and princes, and lords, are paraded ; but the condition of the great bulk of the people is scarcely referred to, except to mention them when they dare to revolt, and then we hear of them only in their moment of excitement. It is almost ludicrous, for instance, to watch the fretful pathos with which Clarendon contrasts the nobles who fell on the side of the king with the obscurity

of the lowborn officers engaged against him. But the glimpses which we have of the bulk of the people of Scotland in their early history do not give us a favourable impression of their general character ; as, indeed, how could they ? Bound ever “ to follow to the field some warlike lord,” the vassals of a tyrannical king or still more tyrannical baron, the only merit, which they seem never to have relinquished, was an unconquerable love of freedom and attachment to national independence. While noble after noble was found base enough to sell his country’s rights, and barter the independence of the country for interest or revenge, the people remained firm. It is to them that we owe the freedom of Scotland. Engaged in almost constant wars, repelling the invader, or attacking in their turn, sometimes victorious, at others obliged to flee to the inaccessible parts of the country, leaving the open land to be pillaged and desolated, they were a bold, fierce, and intractable people. Half measures were distasteful in their eyes ; and while England, led by Henry VIII., shook off the authority of the pope, but placed in its stead that of the sovereign, the more impetuous sons of the north, demolishing images, and removing all traces of the hated ecclesiastical dynasty, rushed to the signing of the League and Covenant, triumphing finally over Episcopacy, with a spirit that no opposition could overcome, and a perseverance founded on a persuasion of right. The good seed was, however, only sown. Yet how much is contained in the following words, quoted from the dedication of the first English Bible printed in Scotland, to King James VI., dated the tenth day of July 1579 :—“ O quhat difference may be sene betwene thir daies of light, quhen almaist in euerie priuat house the buike of God’s lawe is red and vnderstand in oure vulgaire language, and that age of darknes quhen skarslie in ane haill citie (without the clostres of the monkes and freyres) culde the buike of God anes be founde, and that in ane strange toungue of latine not gud but mixed with barbaritie, used and red

be fewe, and almaist vnderstand or exponit be nane." (M'Crie's *Melville*, vol. i. p. 466.) And this, too, at a period when the church alone maintained the schools. But the troubled state of the country prevented from producing their full fruits the wise schemes of the founders of Presbyterianism for the instruction of the people. From the time that the first provision was made by the authority of parliament in 1633, till it was confirmed in 1696, after the Revolution, with but two brief intervals, the country was plunged in all the commotions attending the strife between Presbyterianism and Episcopacy, the wars with Charles I. and with Cromwell, and the unhappy renewal of the ecclesiastical contest. From the era of the Revolution, or rather from that of the Union,—for it was then, for the first time after the virtual destruction of her national independence by the removal of James VI., that the enterprise of Scotland had any thing like fair scope,—we can trace the operation of the Scottish instructional system with something like certainty. Make all the deductions that you will, in estimating the effect of the opening afforded to commercial spirit and enterprise. The same opening was, afterwards, left to Ireland; while England had enjoyed many advantages for a century before, which had enabled her far to outstrip Scotland in all that refines a nation. I speak not here of the glories which Scotland has won in almost all the departments of literature and science,—nor do I speak of that astonishing progress in general prosperity indicated by the fact, that, while her revenue at the Union, including the taxes then imposed, was £160,000, her revenue for 1838 was £4,692,724, her tonnage increasing immensely during the same period,—but of the moral state of her instructed people, compared with that of uninstructed England. To take a general glance, who does not know that in times of agricultural pressure or political excitement, while the population of England has gone to excesses of every kind, that of Scotland has remained quiet and peaceful? It cannot be said that Scot-

land has not had the same causes for excitement. In the seasons of distress she shares to the full with her wealthier neighbours ;—her greater skill in agriculture does not arrest the hand of Providence in seasons of general calamity and sterility ;—and of late years the people of Scotland have been tempted to greater political transports than that of England, from the much greater extension of political privileges : yet we never hear in Scotland of the incendiary burning to the earth the farmer's stores ; of the maniac crowd that hails as their Saviour a madman,—the invulnerable redresser of Britain's wrongs ; nor of other outbreaks similar to those that, in England, have shown the practical evils of national ignorance. Scotland has, in her rural districts, her follies, her faults, and her crimes ; but it is impossible, even on a general survey, not to be struck with this difference, so emphatically calling for an extension and improvement of what has already effected so much good. In analyzing more minutely the characteristics superinduced by instruction, the effects become still more apparent. It is granted that error may arise from taking specimens from either country favourable to the view of the theorist,—a Burns or a Cobbett ; but they who know any thing of the two, both in detail and in the general development, have never differed on the subject.

CHAPTER III.

Mr Hill's Statistics of Education—Estimate of rural Districts of England and Scotland—Rural Districts of Scotland—Comparison as to Crime, Wealth, and Pauperism—Drunkenness—Political Tumults, Riots, Incendiarism—New Statistical Account of Scotland—Two Parishes, worst and good—General Deduction from Old and New Statistical Account—General Assembly's Educational Report—Reasons for confiding in Mr Hill's Account—Rural England—North of England—Letter from John Grey, Esq., Magistrate for the County of Northumberland—Communication from J. C. Blackden, Esq. of Ford Castle, Northumberland—From the Rev. W. S. Gilly—Southern, Midland, and Agricultural Districts—Report of the British and Foreign School Society for 1831—Private Account of Newport Pagnell—Statement from Morning Chronicle of House of Correction, Lewes—Statement of Dr Chalmers—Fletcher of Saltoun's Account of Scotland in 1698—Defoe's Account of extraordinary Improvement in 1717—This owing much to Instruction—Objections answered—Conclusion seemingly certain as to rural Scotland and rural England.

THE statistics of education have been inquired into with great pains by F. Hill, Esq., the present inspector of prisons in Scotland, and the results embodied in a work published in 1836. Mr Hill, an Englishman, who has himself been concerned in education, writes with great caution, and indulges in none of those generalities and conjectures which render statistics worse than useless. He is evidently one of those who think no sort of instruction effectual but that connected with what is called useful knowledge, and hence he is by no means warm in praise of the schools of Scotland. Yet nothing can be more marked than the difference deducible from his work as to the state of instruction in the rural districts of England and those in Scotland. Even he says (vol. i. p. 284), "There can be no doubt that in Scotland the rural population, at least, is

much better educated than the same class in England ; though it must be admitted that neither the amount of instruction given nor the number of recipients justifies the opinion usually entertained on the subject in this country.”—And again (p. 288), “ It is impossible with the evidence before us to form any thing like a precise idea of the point which education has actually reached, but we think we are perfectly safe in concluding as we have done, that as regards the rural population at least, Scotland is far in advance of this country.” * * *

“ Education is not compulsory by law, but in many parts it is looked on as a necessary of life, and public opinion would strongly condemn a man who did not send his children to school. Professor Pillans gives the following evidence on this point and some others connected with it :

“ ‘ Is it the uniform practice for parents to send their children to school? Almost universal, wherever they can : I think the exceptions to the habit are very rare indeed, and can only exist in Scotland among the most depraved part of the population. In the country districts, I should say, there is no such thing ; a man would be looked upon as a monster who could keep his child from means of instruction within his reach.’

“ ‘ Is there any compulsion used for that purpose? None.’

“ ‘ Has it not frequently happened that parents have submitted to great privations in order to enable their children to receive education? Yes ; I believe it is an object which a Scotchman seldom loses sight of, both when he thinks of marrying and settling in life, and at every future period, the laying aside of a sum for the education of his children.’

“ ‘ Do you trace the consequences of that habit among the people of Scotland in the character of the labouring people of that country? I think very decidedly : and that we owe the morality of our rural districts in particular almost entirely to that habit, handed down from father to son ; so

that we have scarcely any rural population who are not perfectly aware of the importance of education, and not willing to make sacrifices to secure it for their children.' ”

In comparing the moral condition of Scotland with that of England, he writes with the same caution (vol. i. p. 291), “ It would be difficult to find a country which has made such rapid progress in the diminution of crime, the establishment of general security, the increase of public wealth, and the diffusion of comforts, as Scotland ; and this, be it remarked, has been concurrent with increased and increasing attention to the education of the people.” And again (p. 294), “ To proceed to a comparison between the state of the people of Scotland and that of the people of England :—and at present as regards crime. We have before us the returns of the convictions and sentences in Scotland during the last three years. For reasons already mentioned, we consider such returns as but a poor index of the amount of crime,—indeed, as often no index at all. In Scotland, however, as in Massachusetts, the laws are efficiently administered, quite as much so we believe as in England : some information may therefore, perhaps, be gleaned by comparing the returns for the two countries. We hope that at no distant period measures will be taken to construct authentic registers of all crimes committed, without regard to the non-detection of the offenders ; and then we shall have the means of indisputable comparison. One fact which speaks very well for Scotland is the very small number of cases in which the terrible punishment of death is inflicted. In England and Wales the average number of executions during the last three years is forty-one per annum : In Scotland it is two ; whereas, if the number were in the same proportion to the population, as in England and Wales, it would be seven. * * *

“ We observe that the number of persons convicted of murder in Scotland is greater in proportion to the population than in England ; the average numbers for the last three years being in England fourteen, and in Scotland

four (instead of between two and three). On the other hand, the number convicted of ‘ shooting at, stabbing, wounding, or administering poison with intent to murder,’ is much greater in England proportionately than in Scotland; though to what extent exactly we are not able to say, owing to the very different classification of offences in the returns for the two countries. The total number of convictions for offences of all kinds is also much greater, in proportion, in England than in Scotland; but many contingent facts must be ascertained and taken into account before any conclusion can safely be drawn from this circumstance.

“ The foregoing imperfect evidence, together with such other facts as have come to our knowledge, is not sufficient to pronounce a judgment upon. We *believe* that there is less crime in Scotland, in proportion to the population, than in England, but we do not feel certain that such is the case.

“ *Wealth and Pauperism.*—We have already had occasion to notice the rapid progress which Scotland has made in the increase of national wealth. Less favoured by nature than England, and starting much later in the career of accumulation, she is indeed still much behind this country; but we have little doubt that in rate of progress she has the advantage. Fifty years ago, a field of wheat near Edinburgh was a novelty attracting thousands of people to see it; and now agriculture is carried to such a state of perfection in East Lothian as to form a pattern to the whole world. In their system of banking, too, which has had a most powerful effect in promoting the national prosperity, the Scotch outstripped us; indeed, it is not till within the last few years that we have shown that moderate degree of wisdom which is necessary for adopting an improvement discovered by others.

“ We have no certain data to go upon, but we believe that both pauperism and mendicity exist to a much less extent in Scotland than in England.

“Drunkenness.—We are sorry that we cannot at present congratulate the Scotch on being a sober people. They are, however, in many respects circumstanced like the New Englanders, who ten years ago were perhaps as much given to dram-drinking as the Scotch are at present ; and we trust that the Scotch will not long allow the stigma of drunkenness to attach to them ; but, following the noble example of the New Englanders, break through their present chains, and rise to their proper position in the rank of nations for sobriety as for all other virtues.

“ Political Tumults, Riots, Incendiarism, &c.—Here the Scotch are certainly before us, notwithstanding the many disgraceful acts which have been perpetrated by the trades unionists of Glasgow and some other towns. We hope it would appear, on investigation, that those who took part in these proceedings, the folly of which can only be exceeded by their cruelty, are principally among the unfortunate crowd of uneducated persons spoken of by Mr Colquhoun. But though the ignorance and violence displayed by trades unions in different towns in Scotland have been as great as those shown by similar bodies in this country, there have been none of those outbreaks among the rural population—none of that barbarous destruction of food and property, which has cast a blot on the character of the English peasantry, such as will require many years to remove.”

From the New Statistical Account, then and now in progress, drawn up by ministers of the established church of Scotland, he selects several specimens.

I purposely take two quoted by him, the one the least favourable he could find, and another more encouraging. (Vol. i. pp. 308, 313.)

“ ‘ TRAQUAIR, PEEBLES-SHIRE. Pop. 630.

“ ‘ Education.—There is only one school in this parish, namely, the parochial. For the last sixty years at least, no other branches of education could be learned in it

besides reading, writing, and accounts. Whether the taste for any thing superior to these, now that they have the opportunity of acquiring it, may arise, time will show. There are perhaps not two individuals in the parish above the years of infancy who cannot at least read; were this otherwise, the people would be utterly inexcusable, seeing that the school-fees are so small; being, for reading, 2s., for reading and writing, 2s. 6d., and for both, with accounts, 3s. per quarter; and seeing, also, that these fees are always paid out of the poor's fund for those who declare themselves unable to pay. We need scarcely add, after what has been said of the liberality of our heritors, that the salary is the maximum, and the parochial teacher has fully double the legal accommodations. The school-fees may amount, perhaps, on an average to £25 per annum. Owing to the great length of the parish in proportion to its breadth, many of the children can scarcely be expected to attend regularly, except perhaps for a short time in summer. Those in its western division find accommodation in the schools of Peebles; while a few families on its eastern borders are more destitute.

“ ‘ A few years ago, a small school library was founded in the parish; at first it seemed to be very popular, but now it is very much neglected. The same thing may be said of a Sabbath evening school or lecture, established principally for young people after having left school and gone to service, as also for the aged and infirm, and mothers of infant children, who could not attend church in the forenoon; but which, owing to the gradual decay of attendance, has in the mean time been discontinued. Popular lectures, on some of the more simple parts of science, were delivered gratis in the school-room two winters ago, and called forth a very crowded audience. They may perhaps be resumed occasionally hereafter.’ ”

“ ‘ *Character and Habits of the People.*—On this point we have no peculiarity to notice, except, perhaps, that our people have scarcely yet learned to accommodate them-

selves to the great change of the times since the close of the late war. There are not wanting families among us, however, whose tables are covered with a plentiful though homely fare, and whose children are never so ill clad as to make their parents ashamed of bringing them up to the house of God. It must be admitted, that all this requires an industry and an economy on the part of both parents which must never be relaxed, and perhaps, too, a little saving before marriage to set the parties up without debt, which is but far too seldom the case in these days of luxury and of vanity.

“ ‘ Wages are not now so high in proportion to the mode of living as they were during that war ; employment is not so steady ; and neither proprietors nor farmers, in general, so able to afford either as formerly. At the same time, the old thrifty habits of domestic industry and economy in families have been forgotten ; by many, every thing is now bought with money. The expensive articles of tea, coffee, and sugar, they can neither easily want nor easily procure. They become, therefore, liable to feelings of discontent, which have, it may be feared, injured the cause of true and vital godliness, and of brotherly kindness and charity in the hearts of many ; for while justice demands the admission that our people are generally intelligent, generous, and respectable in their station, it is doubtful if we can add that they are equally religious. Poaching in salmon in close-time is much practised, having been long winked at by the landholders, from the very small numbers of fish that find their way up the river at any other season.’ ”

“ ‘ JEDBURGH, ROXBURGHSHIRE. Pop. 5647.

“ ‘ *Education.*—The total number of schools in the parish is fourteen, of which three are parochial, and one is endowed by the Marquis of Lothian. The total number of scholars is 950, being about one-fifth of the population ; but of these eighty-seven attend night schools, and sixty-three female schools. The grammar school of Jedburgh

had attained considerable eminence even so early as the commencement of the seventeenth century. The heritors, and especially the magistrates, as appears from the records of the borough, have always been attentive to its interests, and scrupulous in the choice of its rectors ; and their care has been amply rewarded by the character which it has long possessed, and still maintains.'

" ' The inhabitants of this parish are in general intelligent, sober, orderly, and industrious. The bad effects of the reduction of the duty upon ardent spirits have indeed been felt to no small extent ; but happily not to such a degree as to affect the general character of the people. It is, indeed, one of the most striking evidences of the progress of civilisation, and one of the most pleasing effects of a regular government, that in a country formerly the scene of depredating violence, fewer instances of crimes or of punishments have occurred during the last fifty years than perhaps in any other district of equal extent in the kingdom.'

" ' *Husbandry*.—During the last twenty years an immense quantity of waste land has been reclaimed ; and in a short period all that is capable of improvement will be reduced to a state of cultivation.'

" ' *Miscellaneous Observations*.—Since the period when the last Statistical Account was written, the state of the parish has been much improved ; various kinds of manufactures have been introduced, which were then unknown in this district,—farms which were entirely pastoral, now bear luxuriant crops,—the fields have been neatly enclosed with hedges,—waste ground has been planted,—the style of dwelling-houses, both in the town and in the country, is now vastly superior,—the means of communication have been greatly enlarged,—the population has been nearly doubled,—and all classes seem to enjoy a large share of the comforts of civilized society.' "

On the whole matter, Mr Hill says (p. 293), " Forty years ago, a statistical report, somewhat similar to the

present one, was drawn up and published, and this, together with the recollection of the older inhabitants, affords the means of instituting a comparison between the state of things at the two periods; and in every particular, in education, intelligence, moral conduct, means of production, and amount of comforts enjoyed,—an extraordinary and gratifying improvement is manifest.”

The latest account of the parish schools of Scotland is that contained in the valuable report of the General Assembly's Education Committee for 1839. It fully proves the anxiety of the people themselves to procure both more and better instruction. Thus (p. 31), “It will be seen from the abstract submitted, that the parishes have not been remiss in their exertions to find the means of education for themselves; on the contrary, that they have attempted this in every possible mode, and particularly by such provisions as these.

“With one exception, and that the case of a Highland parish, where the poverty of the people is universally great, they have all one school at least within their bounds, and most of them have more, according to the amount of population. And they have not only provided schools of some kind for themselves, but have often endeavoured to advance them in the scale of such institutions, by providing free accommodations for the school and the school-master.”

As I am about to revert to Mr Hill's work, in order to prove the truth of what I have said with regard to England, I may repeat that we have every reason to depend on the accuracy of his statements, as it is evident, from what I have already quoted, that he is anxious to proceed with caution. I may add, that he had abundant public materials at his command, and that he seems to have spared no pains in arranging them, as well as in availing himself of private sources of information. I may moreover appeal to his evidence with the greater freedom, because, from the whole tenor of his work,—so far as we

can judge from his guarded statements,—his leaning is not to a system of national religious instruction (vol. i. p. 238). “From the best evidence we can command, we believe that education is most extensively diffused in the northern parts of England; next to these, in the manufacturing and commercial districts generally; and least of all, in the southern and midland agricultural district. It is well worthy of remark, that, as regards the spread of pauperism, the country may be divided in the same manner. In the north of England the pressure of the poor-rates is least, and in the southern and midland agricultural district it is greatest; while in the manufacturing and commercial district the pressure is at a mean.

“The superior state of education in the north of England is so generally admitted, that it is perhaps scarcely necessary to adduce evidence in support of the statement. The following, however, will, we think, be found interesting, and will serve to strengthen in the mind the connexion between a good state of education and a high standard of morality, comfort, and happiness.

“We insert, in the first place, a letter we have received from John Grey, Esq., a magistrate for the county of Northumberland. Having read with great interest Mr Grey’s evidence before the Committee of the House of Lords, in 1831, on the poor-laws, and feeling certain that no one could have arrived at such enlightened views respecting many of the causes of pauperism, without, at the same time, turning his attention to the subject of education, we took the liberty of writing to Mr Grey, to request that he would furnish us with any information he might happen to possess relative to the state of education in the north of England. In reply, we received the following letter:—

* * * * *

“‘You are not wrong in thinking that I had probably given it [the subject of education] some attention, as

deeply connected with the condition and welfare of the lower orders ; and I assure you, that the opportunity which a short residence in Surrey, Cambridgeshire, and other of the southern counties, afforded me of comparing their peasantry with that of the north, only served more strongly to convince me of the value of education, in elevating the moral character, improving the habits, and conferring the wholesome spirit of independence upon them.

“ ‘ You are of course aware that the parochial system of education in Scotland has brought the means of obtaining it within the reach of the great bulk of its population ; and has, by diffusing knowledge and a spirit of inquiry, led to the establishment of other schools than those supported or aided by public endowments in every considerable village. In this way, the great bulk of the lowest orders obtain a knowledge of reading and writing at least, and many of these push their pursuits much farther ; so that, when talent and inclination combine, and take advantage of the cheapness of education generally in that part of the kingdom, as well as the easy terms on which the classes in the universities may be attended, instances are not unfrequent of men of learning and celebrity having emerged from the peasantry of the land. The late Professor Leslie was an eminent example of this kind.

“ ‘ On the south of the Tweed, too, though there is no established system as in Scotland, whether aided by intercourse, example, or emulation, the education of the lower orders is very general, and sought after with great avidity. Assistance is commonly given by the resident proprietors, or extensive farmers, in providing a school-house, and perhaps a dwelling-house, for the village teacher ; but his payment arises almost exclusively from the scholars themselves. In the village of Millfield, we had a school, consisting of from eighty to one hundred scholars : the school and dwelling-house were built by subscription,

held rent-free by the teacher, and kept in repair by the tenants of the township;—his only emolument, besides the quarterly payment by the children's parents, was £5 a-year, contributed by myself; and that I gave, not because it was necessary for his support, so much as to give me a control over his conduct and appointment. Several other such schools exist in the same parish; and I would say, that of its population brought up within the last twenty years, there is not one who cannot read and write.

“ ‘ Where a taste for knowledge is once spread among a people, and education has become so common as to convey a reproach to those who are destitute of it, I find that it goes on very well without extraneous patronage and support. And generally, I think, it may be inferred, that people will set a greater value on acquirements purchased by their own exertions; and that thus they will employ the time in acquiring them more diligently than when the means are supplied gratuitously. I have known, indeed, in the south of England, where parents were urged to send their children to a school supported by some benevolent individual, that they received the invitation rather as the bestower than the recipient of the favour.

“ ‘ Of the benefits of education, it is hardly needful to treat. I have seen a moral and industrious race of young people issue from the school in Millfield under my own eye; and several youths have been sent from among these, as bailiffs and stewards, to different parts of the United Kingdom, by my recommendation, whose fitness for such situations was mainly attributable to the instructions obtained there. I am at present resident in the south of Northumberland, having under my eye and management the extensive property of the Greenwich Hospital in these parts, consisting of land and lead mines. The miners are, as a body, sober, industrious, and well informed, living in small communities in retired dales, and thus escaping the contamination of large concentrated masses, with a good

deal of time in the evenings, which they employ in reading useful publications from the many village libraries that are established in the district. Until I looked into their manner of life and sources of information, I was surprised at, and at a loss to account for, the well-written and intelligent letters that I frequently received from this class of people.

“ ‘The depression in lead-mining, and consequent pressure upon these poor people, for some years has been great (though now, I am happy to say, their condition is improving); and the manner in which they supported and conducted themselves through it was equally surprising and laudable. The agricultural population here is neither so orderly, so well off, so provident, nor so well educated, as on the Borders ;* arising chiefly from the smallness of the farms, on which labourers are not so regularly employed; and from their being paid in money, to which I ascribe the greater prevalence of drunkenness, a vice hardly known, and regarded with disgust among the regularly hired farm-servants, whose wages are paid in kind, upon the extensive farms in the vicinity of the Tweed.’ ”

The following communication from J. C. Blackden, Esq., of Ford Castle, Northumberland, is of great interest. It is quoted by Mr Hill (vol. i. p. 245) from the Appendix to the Poor-law Report:—“ ‘In taking a short review of my answers to the commissioners’ queries, the advantageous position of our labouring population, when compared with the position of those in the more southern districts of the country, must be manifest. It is impossible to live among them without being struck by their superior intelligence and their superior morality. I am fully justified in making this assertion, by the parliamentary returns of criminal

* “At the time when Mr Grey gave his evidence before the Committee on the Poor Laws, his place of residence was in the northern part of the county; and he gives an interesting and instructive description of the intelligent, sober, thrifty, and contented peasantry by which that district is peopled.”

commitments in the several counties of England, which prove Northumberland to be very much more free from crime than any other county. A principal cause of this, I have no doubt, arises from the education they receive at the schools scattered about the country. In these schools, independent of higher branches of knowledge being taught than is usual, the Bible is the grand schoolbook; which being read in early life, its precepts are valued, retained, and acted upon. In many cottages, besides other religious books, expensive commentaries on the Bible also are found, particularly Matthew Henry's; public places of worship are steadily frequented; and the whole population, dressed in a very superior style of clothing, are every Sunday seen flocking towards them, and form a beautiful and animating scene.' "

There is another communication from the Rev. W. S. Gilly, vicar of Norham parish, Northumberland, who says, —“ ‘ I scarcely know an instance in which the children of an agricultural labourer have not been sent to school, for the most part, at his own expense. There are at this time eight village schools for daily instruction in Norham parish, containing 320 children, whose parents are paying for their instruction at the rate of 2s. 6d. or 3s. a-quarter; besides a free school, containing 27. In all these schools the Scriptures are read daily, and religious instruction is imparted; so that the lessons taught are not on the side of mere scholarship only (although I know several boys of fourteen and fifteen who have made advancement in the higher branches of arithmetic and in practical geometry in these village schools), but of reflection and religion. I believe the parents set a greater value on that education, the expenses of which they defray themselves; they watch their children's progress more narrowly.

“ ‘ It is in these things that we discern the close and inseparable connexion between the moral and the outward condition of the agricultural labourer. From prudence and education results the prosperity of this district; and

it is not here, as in some places, that the absolute plenty of the land, and the relative poverty of the people who live in it, keep pace one with the other. A high standard of character has raised the standard of comfort here ; and for many years useful education, combined with Christian education, has been diffusing its blessings.’ ”

Of the Southern, Midland, and Agricultural Districts, we have the following account (vol. i. p. 265) :—“ Soon after the agricultural riots of 1830-1, the Committee of the British and Foreign School Society instituted an inquiry into the state of education in the disturbed districts. The result showed that a most lamentable ignorance prevailed. We do not infer from this, that the ignorance of the peasantry was the sole cause of the incendiary fires, but we fully believe that it was a necessary link in the chain. Other ingredients were not wanting in the caldron of mischief, but this was required ‘ to make the gruel thick and slab.’ ”

“ The following is extracted from the Report of the British and Foreign School Society for 1831 :—

“ *Agricultural Districts.*—From these communications [those received in consequence of the inquiries spoken of], as well as from information derived from a variety of other sources, your committee are painfully convinced that the country is far from being educated. The state of the agricultural districts generally is very distressing. The most debasing ignorance prevails, to an extent which could not be credited were it not verified by the closest investigation. The facts which have been elicited respecting the moral and intellectual state of those counties which have been disgraced by riots and acts of incendiarism are truly affecting ; and yet they are but a fair representation of the actual state of our peasantry. We call ourselves an enlightened nation, an educated people, and yet, out of nearly seven hundred prisoners put on trial in four counties, upwards of two hundred and sixty were as ignorant as the savages of the desert,—they could not read a single letter. Of the whole seven hundred, only one hundred

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and fifty could write or read with ease ; and (in the words of one of the chaplains to the gaols) ‘ nearly the whole number were totally ignorant with regard to the nature and obligations of true religion.’

“ The information respecting the ignorance of the prisoners in the disturbed districts is given more in detail in a subsequent part of the Report. It is as follows:—

“ **BERKSHIRE.**—Of 138 prisoners committed to Reading gaol, 25 only could write, 37 only could read, and 76 could neither read nor write : 120 were under 40 years of age, varying from 35 down to 18 years.

“ Of the 30 prisoners tried at Abingdon, 6 only could read and write, 11 could read imperfectly ; the remainder were wholly uneducated.”

“ **BUCKS.**—Of the 79 prisoners convicted at Aylesbury, only 30 could read and write.”

“ **HANTS.**—Of 332 committed for trial at Winchester, 105 could neither read nor write ; nearly the whole number were deplorably ignorant of even the rudiments of religious knowledge.”

“ **KENT.**—About one-half of the prisoners committed to Maidstone gaol could neither read nor write ; and nearly the whole were ignorant with regard to the nature and obligations of true religion.”

“ **SUSSEX.**—Of 50 prisoners put on trial at Lewes, 13 only could read and write : 12 could read imperfectly ; only one could read well.”

Then follow details but too confirmatory of the preceding statement. Take but two specimens (vol. i. p. 269).

“ **KENT.**—The following is extracted from the evidence of Mr Hickson, before the Poor-Law Commissioners :—

“ ‘ My observations have been almost confined to Kent, where I certainly was not prepared, some time back, for such a state of semi-barbarism as I have since found within twenty-five miles of London. I had not expected to find in the present day so small a proportion of labourers who possessed the elementary knowledge of reading and writing.

In the parish of Stanstead, I believe not above one labourer in fifteen can read and write. Here and there one or two can read a little in the New Testament; but even these could hardly read the direction of a letter. When the inlets to knowledge are thus blocked up, it is not a matter of wonder that the ideas of this class of men should be very limited; that their conversation should be distinguished by swearing and obscenity, or that they should not have acquired habits of prudence and forecast. The frequency of illegitimate births, and the unconcernedness with which the women will converse to a stranger of the children they have had before marriage, may be mentioned as an evidence of the low state of moral cultivation."

P. 272. "Newport Pagnell, Buckinghamshire.—The state of education in this district appears to be exceedingly low. We are indebted for the following particulars to a friend residing in the neighbourhood of Newport Pagnell, who has taken the trouble to visit the different parishes, and make inquiries on the spot.

"I forward to you, in answer to the inquiries contained in your letter of the 22d ult., the particulars, as far as I am able to obtain them, relative to the educational condition of several parishes round me.

"First, as to that in which I reside, Stokegoldington and Ekely in Bucks.—The population in 1831 was 912, and must now be upwards of 1000. The number of paupers all the year round is 42, and the average number of labourers out of employ and receiving parish allowance is 30. The total cost of the poor this year has been £900. Ten in 100 of the labourers and their wives can read, and 1 in 90 can write, 50 in 100 children can read, and 2 in 100 can write. There is a Sunday school at the church, containing about 80 children, whose attendance, however, is very irregular: reading only is taught. There is also a Sunday school at the meeting-house, of upwards of 100 boys and girls, whose attendance is more regular. The children make much more progress here than at the other

school, and they are clean and orderly ; the instruction, however, is confined to reading. A private teacher of reading, writing, and the first lessons of arithmetic, has ten or twelve farmers' children at sixpence per week.

“ ‘ Gayhurst, with a population of 118, and Lathbury, with a population of 172 (the adjoining parishes), have no school whatever ; nor has Chicherty (population 218), which adjoins Lathbury. Hanslope (Bucks), population 1623, has an endowed school for six boys, to learn reading, writing, and arithmetic ; but the teacher, an old shoemaker, is incompetent to teach either. There are two Sunday schools, in which reading is taught, and one private school for girls. Of the adult labourers and their wives in Hanslope parish, only one in six is able to read, and one in ten able to write.’ After giving the particulars of the state of education in some other parishes, our correspondent sums up as follows :—

“ ‘ In the whole of the above parishes, forming an area of thirteen miles by seven, there is but one school where the children of the poor are taught writing and the elements of numbers.’ ”

I humbly submit that I have made out the superiority of Scotland over England in its rural districts, as to intelligence, moral worth, and happiness, and that, too, in connexion with a particular kind of instruction.

We constantly find, that while, in the annals of crime, guilt is found nearly as much among the instructed as among the ignorant, it is rare in those who are acquainted with the nature and obligations of religion. The following is not an unfair sample of the reports that occasionally appear in connexion with crime. It is derived from the Morning Chronicle of the 7th December 1839, being part of the report of the chaplain of the House of Correction, Lewes, for 1839. Out of 846 criminals, 48 could read and write, 252 could read well, but either wrote badly or not at all, 546 could read ill or not at all ; of the whole number only 8 had any knowledge of Christian doc-

trine, 54 a slight knowledge, 490 had heard of Christ and no more, and 294 had never heard any thing about him. I need not multiply more instances. My point, I hold, is proved by facts irrefragable and consonant with the soundest reasoning.

The effects of instruction in Scotland have been more than once appealed to by various writers, as manifested in a very striking period of her history. I shall bring forward, in confirmation of the general views already stated, the following striking facts, narrated by Dr Chalmers in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, on the subject of a Poor Law for Ireland. In a series of questions respecting the progress of assessments in Scotland, the following passage occurs (Chalmers' Works, vol. xvi. p. 288):—

“15. Were there any circumstances in the internal state of Scotland, and in the state of society, which, in your opinion, impeded the introduction or the progress of assessment at that time?—It appears to me, that the progress of assessments, instead of being impeded, was superseded or anticipated by the progress of education and good habits amongst the people.

“16. In what condition does Scotland appear to have been about the beginning of the last century, and the close of the century preceding, prior to the introduction of the principle of assessment?—In the middle of the sixteenth century there was a very efficient system of Christian instruction in the parishes of Scotland, and it is understood that the country at that time was in a very healthful moral condition; immediately after the Restoration, the act for the establishment of parochial schools was repealed, and there was an attempt to enforce episcopacy upon the Scottish population, which gave rise to what may be termed religious wars, that lasted for nearly thirty years; from the disorder and turbulence of that period, along with the suspension of parochial education, the population seems to have deteriorated very rapidly. There is a most frightful picture .

given of the state of Scotland in 1698, by Fletcher of Saltoun, as appears from the following extract:—‘ There are at this day in Scotland (besides a great number of families very meanly provided for by the church-boxes, with others, who, with living upon bad food, fall into various diseases) 200,000 people begging from door to door. These are not only no ways advantageous, but a very grievous burden to so poor a country; and though the number of them be perhaps double to what it was formerly, by reason of the present great distress, yet in all times there have been about 100,000 of these vagabonds, who have lived without any regard or submission, either to the laws of the land, or even those of God and nature; fathers incestuously accompanying their own daughters, the son with the mother, and the brother with the sister. No magistrate could ever discover or be informed which way any of these wretches died, or that ever they were baptized. Many murders have been discovered among them; and they are not only a most unspeakable oppression to poor tenants (who, if they give not bread or some sort of provision to perhaps forty such villains in one day, are sure to be insulted by them), but they rob many poor people who live in houses distant from any neighbourhood. In years of plenty many thousands of them meet together in the mountains, where they feast and riot for many days; and at country weddings, markets, burials, and other the like public occasions, they are to be seen, both men and women, perpetually drunk, cursing, blaspheming, and fighting together.’

“ 17. Does it appear, from historical records, that that state of things continued long after the date of the work of Fletcher of Saltoun?—It appears, from very distinct historical documents, that that state of things subsided almost *per saltum*, very suddenly, indeed, when the population had leave to repose from the religious persecutions, and the parochial system of education was again general. They were, besides, plied from Sabbath to Sabbath by an efficient

and acceptable clergy, in consequence of which, the transformation appears to have been quite marvellous. The extract I have now read refers to the year 1698. The extract I am about to read refers to a period of time only nineteen years distant, 1717. It is taken from Defoe, the author of *Robinson Crusoe*. ‘The people,’ says he, ‘are restrained in the ordinary practice of common immoralities, such as swearing, drunkenness, slander, fornication, and the like. As to theft, murder, and other capital crimes, they come under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, as in other countries; but in those things which the church has power to punish, the people being constantly and impartially prosecuted, they are thereby the more restrained, kept sober, and under government, and you may pass through twenty towns in Scotland without seeing any broil, or hearing one oath sworn in the streets; whereas, if a blind man was to come from there into England, he shall know the first town he sets his foot in within the English border, by hearing the name of God blasphemed and profanely used, even by the very little children on the street.’ Again (p. 291),—

“ 275. Can you develop a little more fully the historical circumstances of Scotland, during that transition which took place between the period referred to in the description you read of Fletcher of Saltoun, and the period described by Defoe?—It is a very frightful picture that Fletcher of Saltoun gives of the mendicity, when he talks of 200,000 in that state.

“ 276. The question alludes more particularly with respect to the causes which led to the one state of things, and the remedies which were applied to bring society into the other state?—The causes which led to the state of things described by Fletcher, were the religious persecutions which the people underwent for about thirty years, the suspension of our scholastic mode of education; and, I believe, the want of an acceptable and efficient ministry of the Gospel; but, in point of fact, the law of parochial

education was repealed at the Restoration by Charles II., and it was not resumed again till the Revolution, and during that time especially a most criminal and mendicant population had accumulated in Scotland.

“ 277. Therefore, it was to the abstraction of moral causes acting for good, that you attribute the degradation of the people, and to the reintroduction of those moral causes that you attribute their improvement?—Yes; the law of Scotland, favourable as it is to the mode of assessment, is not to be accredited with that improvement, for it took place before the principle of assessment had been introduced into half a dozen parishes.

“ 278. Then you attribute the change that took place to no particular law, but rather to the operation of those causes, that of education especially, which took place after the Revolution?—Entirely to the operation of those causes. In regard to the number of mendicants described by Fletcher, he talks of 200,000, besides a great many getting but a scanty provision from the sessional funds. Now it occurs to me to say, that the number of our paupers at present is very much overrated, even in the Supplementary Report of the General Assembly. It is there stated, that there are 44,000 who were obtaining sessional relief at the time the report was drawn up; now they have made no distinction between the occasional and the regular poor; and among those 44,000, there is at least one-half who do not get so much as 10s. a-year.

“ 279. Does it appear from historical records that there was great increase of demand for the productions of the soil, and increase of demand for labour, after the Revolution of 1688?—I do not think that any very sensible enlargement took place in the economic condition of Scotland till after the year 1745, or the second rebellion; there was certainly a great enlargement afterwards, but it chiefly took place between the years 1745 and 1800.”

It may be said that the improved state of the country or political enactment led to the change. Doubtless,

both of these have their effect, nor is it possible to estimate to what amount. But the former was not striking in Scotland till long after the events referred to by Dr Chalmers, and the effects of the latter are dependent for their efficacy on elements, of which instruction itself is one of the most important.

I am well aware that much has been said of late, both as to quantity and quality, to detract from the praise usually bestowed upon Scotland as an educated country. Of the latter, so far as method is concerned, I have already said somewhat, being of opinion that, where we have universality of instruction and a common theme of interest, the method has more to do with the *moral* state of the question than with the *intellectual*. We ought to hail, therefore, with delight, all improvements in method, as most important; but I do not see, that because something may be done, and is doing, in the way of improvement, we should be ungrateful for the past. So as to quantity. The population of Scotland has in many rural districts outgrown the parochial supply; but the undeniable good done in past times is just an encouragement to act upon the same system—improved, if you will, in details—in time to come.

Those who have the management of these schools are most alive to the improvements that are required for their full efficiency. It is one thing to wish their improvement, and another so to decry them as if we wished their destruction. No one can have read the reports of the General Assembly on the subject of instruction, without seeing that the clergy throughout the land are attending to and introducing the best methods of instruction wherever this is in their power.

The state of the Highlands, where the means of instruction are disgracefully scanty, presents one of those cases which show us that the element of instruction is only one of many affecting the morality as connected with the statistics of crime.

When temptation is rare, and the habits of the people

are such as to make them contented with little, we shall of course, other causes being absent, have little crime. But as modern improvement is introducing into the Highlands more of enjoyment, and more of temptation, we cannot expect this state of things to continue, and we must provide against all evils by increasing the means of instruction. Ireland teaches us that habits of frugality, or even contentment with the lowest means of animal subsistence, will not produce the negative morality of the Highlands. The inquiry thus resolves itself into a multitude of particulars besides instruction—national habits, feelings, religion, politics, population—rendering deductions difficult, and certainty as to each of the elements impossible. But taking the former standard of Scotland, lowland, rural, and instructed, and England, rural and uninstructed, we seem to have *data* sufficient, free from any thing that can mislead, and hence we are able to draw conclusions on which we may rely with perfect confidence.

CHAPTER IV.

Similarity of universal England to urban Scotland—Dissimilarity of universal England and urban Scotland from rural Scotland—Inference hence deducible—Report of Select Committee of House of Commons on the Education of the Poorer Classes in England—Five Parishes of Westminster—Bethnal Green—General Deductions—Summary and Recommendation—Evidence—Dr Kay—John Corrie, Esq.—Descriptions of some of the English Schools—Mr J. R. Wood—Newcastle, British Association, Mr W. Cargill—Bristol, British Association—Scotland—Report of the Factory Commissioners—Mr Colquhoun's Statement to the House of Commons—Increase of Crime in Paisley—Warning as to Educational Statistics—Encyclopædia Britannica—Edinburgh—Principal Lee's Evidence—General Assembly's Education Committee—General Interests concerned in this Question.

WE can easily put the question to another test. No man surely can resist the inference to be drawn from the following statement. We have two large districts of country. One portion of one of them is instructed in a certain way, and the other portion comparatively uninstructed. The former excels the latter as much in all the elements of national prosperity as it excels it in the means of instruction. The whole of the other district,—taking a general survey,—is unprovided with the means of instruction, and is also nearly similar in the amount of intelligence, comfort, and morality, to the uninstructed part of the neighbouring district. We surely cannot be wrong in inferring from the dissimilarity of effects attending dissimilarity of seeming causes, and the similarity of effects attending similarity of seeming causes, that the seeming are the real causes; and that, if you wish to raise urban Scotland and universal England, you must adopt the means, improved as much as possible, but still the same means, which have been shown to bring about such happy results.

To every one acquainted with the large towns of England and Scotland—I have already said enough of rural England—it is hardly necessary to bring any facts to prove my assertions. And yet, not only for the sake of others, but of the well-informed on the subject, a few details may not be useless, to inform some, and to confirm all.

The following facts are derived from the Parliamentary Report of the Select Committee on the Education of the Poorer Classes, which was appointed in 1837, and which reported on the 17th July 1838. Of Westminster, five parishes, with a population of 42,996, had at school, in all 4104, exclusive of 666 attending Sabbath schools, who, for various reasons, ought not to be included in an estimate of general education. Of the 4104, there were 1035 belonging to the opulent classes, 1024 attending dame and day schools, which did not bestow what could be called education, and 2045 belonging to the poorer classes, and receiving something like a good education. Various proportions have been fixed by various statists, as the proportion of the whole population, belonging to the number of those between five and fifteen, who ought to attend school, one-fourth being now generally taken. But the committee consider that one-eighth is the proper number, as regulating the number of the *poorer* classes who ought to attend school, and, as the result of some inquiry, I should conceive one-fifth as the proper proportion of *all* who ought to be receiving at one time the benefit of education. Taking even the Committee's low proportion, we have 5374 as the number of the poor that ought to be at school; but we have only 2045, leaving 3329 or more than a half without instruction. In Bethnal Green parish, with a population of 62,000, which was minutely examined, there were only 3000 children educated, leaving from 8000 to 10,000 utterly uninstructed in their duty to God and man.

In addition to these and similar details of the state of instruction in London and the neighbourhood, the Committee reports :—

"Your Committee now turn to the state of education in the large manufacturing and seaport towns, where the population has increased within the present century. They refer for particulars to the evidence taken before them, which appears to bear out the following results :—

"1st, That the kind of education given to the children of the working classes is lamentably deficient.

"2dly, That it extends, bad as it is, to but a small proportion of those who ought to receive it.

"3dly, That, without some strenuous and persevering efforts be made on the part of government, the greatest evils to all classes may follow from the neglect."

As a general result, we are told that, taking the most favourable view of the state of education in towns, instead of one in four or six, only one in twelve receives any education at all, and one in twenty-four what may be called useful education. In details,—Manchester, one in thirty-five; Birmingham, one in thirty-eight; Leeds, one in forty-one! And this evil is increasing.

We need not wonder at the following summary, embodying the result come to by the Committee :—

"1. That in the metropolis and great towns of England, there exists a great want of education among the children of the working classes.

"2. That it is desirable that there should be means of suitable daily education within the reach of the working classes, for a proportion of not less than one-eighth of the population."

Then follows,—“ Oh! most lame and impotent conclusion !”—

"3. That the amount of assistance afforded by government should be regulated as heretofore,—subject to modifications of their rules, in cases where the poverty of the district is proved to require it, the special ground being reported in each case.

"4. That, under existing circumstances, and under

the difficulties that beset the question, your Committee are not prepared to propose any means for meeting the deficiency beyond the continuance and extension of the grants which are at present made, by the means for the promotion of education, through the medium of the National and the British and Foreign School Societies."

I am induced to offer a very few extracts from the evidence taken by this Committee, to bring before the reader sundry points of some importance in this question, as well as to show the destitution and its effects.

I begin with the evidence of Dr Kay, formerly treasurer to the Manchester Statistical Society, and now a Poor-Law Commissioner, "under whose superintendence," says Mrs Austin, "the school of Norwood for the pauper children of the metropolitan district has been organized. To any body who has seen that most remarkable school it will be needless to insist on the value of Dr Kay's opinion." (National Education, p. 109.)

"Do you think that the parents abandon almost entirely the moral and the secular and the religious instruction of the children into the hands of the masters, when they go to school?—In large manufacturing towns, I am afraid that error prevails to a very lamentable extent.

"What degree of willingness have you found among them to promote the education of their children?—I believe that the operative classes of the north are, perhaps, equal if not superior in intelligence to any other of the working classes in England, and I believe a large portion of the superior artisans would value education, if the means were within their reach, and the opportunities were sufficiently abundant, but among a very considerable proportion a great indifference still exists as to education.

"Do you not think, looking at the state, as described in the statistical account of Manchester, of the humbler classes of the manufacturers there, and in many large towns in Lancashire, and which may apply to many other towns, that the most effectual means which can be taken

to improve the habits and to make them happier and better persons, is to give them *good moral and religious instruction*?—Certainly, *if that education combined religious instruction with moral training*; and that species of secular knowledge that is fitted for their station in life.

“Do you see any other mode by which, difficult as the progress is, and long as it may take to carry it into effect, the state of the general body of that population can be improved?—I think that there are, of course, a variety of subsidiary expedients, which may be resorted to with great utility, for the improvement of the social condition of the operative population, but I think that in the absence of *a sound religious, a correct moral*, and a sufficient degree of secular instruction, extreme embarrassment must be felt in the operation of any other expedient of whatever sort, and I have not great hope of their ultimate success.

“Can you form an estimate of the amount of deficiency in the means of education in any given district, say, for instance, the district of Manchester, with which we have been engaged to-day, with reference to the amount of population?—If, by education, I am to understand what I have previously described, *sound religious instruction, correct moral training*, and a sufficient extent of secular knowledge suited to their station in life, *I should scarcely say that it exists within the limits of my observation.*

“Do you observe in large manufacturing towns a recklessness and improvidence in the habits and feelings of the lower classes, which, without ascribing any undue efficacy to education, you think might have been removed by education, giving them superior feelings and tastes?—Certainly; and, particularly, the poorer classes ought to be taught that permanent happiness is sacrificed by yielding to the impulses of passion and of feeling, and the immediate gratification of present wants. As numbers of the poorer classes acquire skill, they exhibit all those qualities which are adverted to in this question, and thus domestic happiness is greatly improved.”

John Corrie, Esq., magistrate, was among those examined. "Does improvidence and drunkenness prevail among the humbler classes for want of some moral and better education?—There is very little education of any sort; that which there is, is of the most elementary kind, reading and indifferent writing. Most of them, and especially the young, who come before the magistrates, and before the Union Board, are unable either to read or write; they have no knowledge of moral obligation, or very little; many of them have never been at any place of worship.

"Do you not consider that the neglect of any education, both moral and religious, which you describe, must be the source of much crime and cost to the country in consequence, and to the district in which they live?—Undoubtedly.

"Do you not think that a good system of improved education for the humbler classes, although it might, in the first instance, be the subject of some cost, would repay itself by a saving in a few years?—I have no conception of any other means of forcing civilisation downwards in society except education; there is a slight surface of civilisation; there in certain circumstances they have a little education, but the mass have none."

All the accounts of statistical societies in England furnish what would be,—if it were not for the melancholy reflections arising from the fact that such places are deemed and called schools,—most ludicrous details of the nature of many of the schools. These accounts are so very deplorable, that an attempt was made, at a meeting of the British Association in 1837, to question their accuracy, but inquiry brought out their truth too fully. Take as a specimen the following confirmation of these accounts, from the examination of Mr J. R. Wood, who was employed to draw up the statistical account of Lancashire. Of dames' schools, he says, "In many instances they are dark and confined. Many are damp and dirty, and more

than one-half of them are used as dormitory, dwelling, and school-room, accommodating, in many cases, families of seven or eight persons. Above forty of them are in cellars." Of Liverpool, he says, "Of the common day-schools in the poorer districts, it is difficult to convey an adequate idea, so close and offensive is the atmosphere in many of them, as to be intolerable to a person entering from the open air, more especially as the hour for quitting school approaches. The dimensions rarely exceed those of the dames' schools, while frequently the number of scholars is more than double. Bad as this is, it is much aggravated by filth and offensive odours arising from other causes. One master being questioned on the subject of morals, was asked if he taught morals, and he observed, 'that question does not belong to my school, it belongs more to girls' schools.'

"In the poorest schools, no provision is made to teach morals, and many masters have no idea what teaching morals can possibly mean. The generality of teachers, indeed, entertain very imperfect notions on the subject.

"In a garret, up three pair of dark broken stairs, was a common day school with forty children, in the compass of ten feet by nine. On a plank, forming a triangle with the corner of the room, sat a cock and two hens. Under a stump bed, immediately beneath, was a dog-kennel in the occupation of three black terriers, whose barking, added to the noise of the children and the cackling of fowls on the approach of a stranger, were almost deafening. There was only one small window, at which sat the master, obstructing three-fourths of the light it was capable of admitting." It is but right to mention that this description does not apply to the majority of schools; only to some in certain neighbourhoods of Liverpool.

"In a vast majority there is no teaching of moral duties, no moral training at all."

We learn from the same Report, that fully one third of those in Manchester between the age of five and fifteen have

no education at all ; and that out of a population of one district, including Manchester, Salford, Liverpool, and Bury, with a population of 505,000, 56,036 are either ill educated or not educated at all !

In further corroboration, I give the abstract of a report read before the Statistical Section of the British Association in 1838: " On the educational, criminal, and other statistics of Newcastle, by Mr W. Cargill." (*Athenæum*, No. 565.) " The inquiries were commenced last January, and continued with little interruption to the 18th of the present month, and were conducted with great industry and accuracy. The present population of Newcastle was estimated at 64,000, and the number of children between the ages of five and fifteen at 16,000. The number of children receiving instruction of any kind was 8029, the uneducated 7761, or nearly the same proportion destitute of instruction as was found in the Liverpool Report.

" Total number of day schools	128
Ditto of teachers	178
Ditto of Sunday schools	38
Ditto of children attending Sunday schools	5058
Ditto of Sunday schools belonging to Established Church	10
Ditto ditto Dissenters	28
Reading only taught in	29 schools.
Reading and writing in	11 ditto.
Reading, writing, and arithmetic	28 ditto.
Other branches	98 ditto.

" All-Saints' parish was more carefully scrutinized than any other part of the borough. Estimating its population at 20,000, the number of children

Between three and fifteen, was found to be	4352 or 21½ per cent.
Able to read	3007 ... 69 ditto.
Read and write	1935 ... 44½ ditto.
Unable to read	1345 ... 31 ditto.
Unable to write	2417 ... 55½ ditto.

" The number of adults unable to read or write could not be satisfactorily ascertained ; but the number of births registered between July 1, 1837, and March 1, 1838, was found to be 243 ; and 168 of the persons who gave the information made their marks, while seventy-five only wrote their names, many of which were illegible. The

physical condition of most of the schools was stated to be perfectly horrible. They were filthy, dark, ill-ventilated, and miserable; the dames' schools, however, were found to be more clean and orderly than had been expected. The following table shows the statistics of crime in Newcastle, taken from the records of committals between the 12th of October 1836 and the 24th of April 1838:—

	Males.	Females.	Total.
" Under the age of 12	11	11	22
Above 12 and under 14	19	6	25
... 14 17	65	26	91
... 17 21	185	107	292
... 21 30	272	215	487
30 and upwards	205	142	347
Amount	757	507	1264
Can neither read nor write	243	204	447
Can read only	108	125	233
Can read and write imperfectly	377	177	554
Can read and write well	29	1	30 "

And not to multiply examples, at the same time to bring our inquiries down to the last date, the following are the results of a most valuable paper read before the British Association last year, being, "An Analysis of the Inquiry into the condition of the Working Classes in the City of Bristol."—(Athenæum, 621.) Of 10,856 children we have the following details:—

" Children at school—	
Not above 3 years of age	120
From 3 to 14 years old	3,394
Above 14 years of age	222
	3,736
" Children not at school—	
Not above 3 years of age	2,294
From 3 to 14 years old	2,535
Above 14 years old	2,291
	7,120
	10,856
" Children stated by their parents to be able to read and write	2,010
Able to read only	3,934
	5,944
" Unable to read or write under 7 years of age	3,603
Above	1,309
	4,912
" Children able to repeat the Lord's Prayer	6,504
Not able or too young	4,352
	10,856 "

The following is a tabular view of their religious professions, the families being in number 5981 :—

“ Church of England	4,547
Roman Catholics	489
Methodists	223
Dissenters (other)	589
Jews	5
Without any profession	81
Not ascertained	47
	— 5,981 ”

And of their economical state we may have some notion from the following table :—

“ Heads of families depositors in savings banks, or members of benefit societies, or trade clubs	940
Not depositors, nor belonging to any benefit society	4,973
Not ascertained	68
	— 5,981 ”

To give still more strongly a notion of the destitution of this locality, out of the 5981 families, there were 2551 that had neither Bible nor Prayer-book, and 1604 that had no book nor tract at all. We are likewise told, that while there are 3430 families which have religious books, there are 3610 clean and respectable. It would be interesting to know if these *states* have a general connexion with each other in these districts, as they generally have. There are of heads of families in number 9861, 7645 who can read, but only 5122 who can read and write, more or less ; thus leaving 2204 unable, on their own showing, to read, and 4727, or nearly one-half, unable to write,—twelve being unascertained:

I leave the case of England with this account of Bristol, and an expression of anxious wonder as to the time when this country shall provide a remedy for the evils arising from so monstrous a state of things. I have given but a very small sample of statistics, and the fear is that the evil state of matters is rather under than over rated,—for that ambiguous word *education*, which may mean everything or nothing, will mislead the most scrupulous investigator, and answers to such inquiries as those last given will always be, as far as possible, in favour of the persons inquired at.

Need we wonder that, while population has increased

32 per cent. from 1810 to 1832, crime has increased fourfold ?

“O Scotland ! Scotland !” When we turn to the northern part of the island, we are obliged to acquiesce almost entirely in the remark of Mr Hill before quoted. “As respects the urban population, we doubt whether our northern neighbours are at all in advance of ourselves.” Do we wish to know the reason ? **THERE ARE NO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS IN THE TOWNS OF SCOTLAND.** There is undoubtedly a slight difference in favour of Scotland. Many more can read than in England. This was to be expected from the habits of the rural population that throng to the towns, from the influence of example, to a certain extent, and to some lingering trace of the old Scottish appreciation of learning. But the influence of these is fast wearing away, and with its disappearance must come additional crime. Now for evidence.

Hill (vol. i. p. 287). “The gentlemen who went to Scotland as Factory Commissioners were much disappointed at the state of education in such of the large towns as they had occasion to visit, though at many of the villages and small towns which depend on large country factories, they found a state of things which was highly gratifying.

“In reference to the general deficiency in education, the Central Board of Commissioners speak as follows :—

“ ‘ Few will be prepared to expect the statements that will be found on this head [education] in regard to Scotland, where the education of the children is neglected to a far greater extent than is commonly believed, where only a very small number can write, where, though perhaps the majority can read, many cannot, and where, with some honourable exceptions, it seems certain that the care once bestowed on the instruction of the young has ceased to be exemplary. The reports of the commissioners for Scotland, who will be found to have kept this subject continually before their view, are decisive on this head.’ ”

In a statement made on the 17th June 1834, to the House of Commons, by Mr Colquhoun, we have the following melancholy details:—"In Glasgow, about one-fourteenth are at school; Dundee, one-fifteenth; Perth, under one-fifteenth; Old Aberdeen, one twenty-fifth; Paisley (the Abbey Parish, which is nearly one-half of the whole population), one-twentieth. Such is the statement in figures, but let me describe the reality and exemplify the result. Let me take the case of Paisley: thirty years ago, there was not a family in Paisley who could not read, and had not the Bible; all above nine could read, or were at school, whereas by a very accurate scrutiny made in one of the parishes of Paisley, presenting an average picture of the whole, there are in Paisley 3000 families where education does not enter, and whose children are growing up wholly untaught. In Glasgow, there is a population of 20,000 growing up uneducated, and by the intelligent calculation of Mr Brebner, Governor of Bridewell, there are from 6000 to 7000 living by crime, a large proportion of whom are young."

All accounts confirm the decrease of instruction among our urban population, and taking Paisley for an example of the consequences, mark the following increase of crime from the year 1807 to 1835, derived from the New Statistical Account, the writer of which deploras the state of education:—

	1807.	1808.	1815.	1816.	1835.
Breaches of peace	218	267	113	144	583
Theft	4	16	25	40	273
Swindling	2	1	0	2	12
Sabbath profanation	0	13	8	10	172
Vending of base money	0	2	8	7	7
Housebreaking	0	1	2	3	40
Reset of theft	0	0	1	5	17
Street robberies	0	0	0	3	56

The population in 1807 was 31,179; and in 1831, 57,466. Granting all that may be allowed for the in-

crease of population, of wealth, and of temptation, of hard times, and of sudden reverses, this increase of crime is abundantly alarming.

I need surely furnish no more examples. I do not mean to assert that *all* our towns are in as bad a condition as Paisley; but there is too strong evidence that all the large towns of Scotland are deteriorating, and that, if something be not speedily done to arrest the evil, all will follow her example. One warning the reader must keep in mind, in perusing the statistical details of towns, which he does not so much need with regard to those respecting Scottish rural schools. The education in the latter is, to be sure, not always good, but there is some ground for believing that it is rarely grossly defective. But in large towns there is no check. Hence such statements as that made in the last statistical report for Perth: "I have not been able to ascertain with sufficient accuracy, the number of persons, young and old, who cannot read and write. But I am able to state, from personal knowledge, that the number of those is great, whose instruction in reading is lamentably deficient. They are reported to be taught to read, and are rated accordingly. But in general, theirs is the reading of half-educated children. Of the simplest book they cannot make out a page without difficulty and much hesitation. They cannot comprehend aright, therefore, the import of what they are reading."

This applies to England as well as Scotland, and aggravates the wretchedness of the manifest educational state of both countries, as far as the towns are concerned in Scotland, and both town and country in England.

In the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, article "Scotland," (vol. xix. p. 765), the writer infers, that at least $9\frac{1}{2}$ —an evident blunder for $11\frac{1}{2}$ —out of every 100 of the population, are at the same time under tuition, to which he adds the following extraordinary sentence, proving of itself the necessity of making our wants better known: "A larger proportion than is known to be similarly situated, except-

ing in particular districts, in any other country in Europe." If he had written *smaller* instead of *larger*, the sentence would have been unfortunately much nearer the truth. But the parliamentary returns from which his deductions are drawn are not to be depended on, except in the returns for the parochial schools. Numbers of the private teachers made no returns at all to the queries sent—there was an obvious temptation to increase the numbers returned—and there are no means of ascertaining the nature of the education given. But it is strange that at the very time when there was an opinion stated to Parliament, by a committee of its own body, investigating the educational condition of England, that provision should be made for the instruction of at least one-eighth of the population *as requiring public aid*—a Scotch writer should be vaunting of the fact, that considerably less than one-eighth of *all* Scotland, rich and poor, were receiving education. A boasting of only 200,000 uneducated !

Of even Edinburgh, perhaps the best supplied town in Great Britain with the means of instruction, we have the most melancholy information, and that on the best authority. Principal Lee, who, to use nearly his own words, " had been for fifteen years connected with three of the poorest parishes of the city, and had acquired a knowledge of the very lowest of the people, enabling him to speak confidently from personal observation, with regard to their modes of life, their temporal disadvantages, and their still more lamentable destitution of spiritual blessings," gives most frightful details of the condition of the poor of Edinburgh, both morally and physically. In this last point he is fully borne out by Dr Alison, in his late astounding pamphlet bearing on the same subject. In reading the following details, we must remember, that though there are many of our poor in a better position, it is the tendency of these evils to spread, and that something must be done for the very lowest, otherwise they will diffuse evil like a pestilence all around them. As to outward condition, it

is painful to read this statement from his declaration before the Commissioners to inquire into Church Accommodation in Scotland, 18th February 1836 (p. 4). "In answer to query 6, as to the class of persons of which the population is chiefly composed, what are their particular pursuits, their trades, and occupations? They are very various. Some are labourers, some shoemakers, and a considerable proportion are hawkers, the husband going about with goods, and the females with baskets, which certainly is not a very regular course of life, not very commendable always, but there are a great number who seem to have no certain mode of support at all. I have seen much wretchedness in my time, but never have I seen such a concentration of misery as in that parish. There are a great many Irish in it, and some of them are most wretched; *but by far the most wretched are Scotch*. Within the last week, I have been in a house where there were seven in the family, a mother, five daughters, and another girl who seemed to lodge with them, and there was neither chair nor table, stool, bed, nor blanket, in the house, nor any kind of implement or utensil for cooking; all of them, on a cold and stormy day, sitting round a fire containing not more coals than I could hold in my hand. The woman had no means of subsistence arising from her own industry. One of the children, eight years old, had lost a leg; the husband died two years ago. She has the largest amount given from the charity-workhouse, 2s. 6d. a-week, and though she professes to pay only 6d. a-week for her house, the remainder is just 4d. a-week for the support of each individual, exclusive of herself. I found other persons who had not a single blanket on their bed, and some grown-up men of twenty or thirty years of age, whose coats were pawned. One woman said that her husband had gone out with her last shift, and pawned it to get a little bread for them.

"I suppose that a great many of those who do not attend any place of worship, belong to that class?—Yes; they

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cannot attend without clothing. Their wretchedness is such that it cannot be relieved except by some extraordinary means, different from what has yet been attempted, and, no doubt, it is brought on in many cases by themselves. I am told by the missionary, an intelligent man, that he believes that, among those who earn a living by industry, the average income is below eight shillings a-week for a whole family; some elderly persons said to me, that though both husband and wife were working, yet between them they could not make above four shillings and sixpence and five shillings a-week by their united industry."

To confirm the previous statements made as to the difference between rural and urban Scotland, as well as to show the fearful state of things existing in the very heart of our large towns, I quote the following from the same evidence (p. 13):—"But, farther, in country parishes people in general are industrious, and capable of maintaining themselves and educating their families. Few, who are idle or unprofitable members of the community, can be harboured there. It is otherwise with our city parishes. We may find a few of surpassing worth, but they are greatly outnumbered by those who care not for their own souls or the souls of their offspring. I know, by experience, the difference in this respect between a rural parish and a parish in a large city. In the earlier part of my life, I had the charge of a much more numerous parish than I have now, which was partly in the country, and likewise included a royal burgh, containing more than 2000 inhabitants, the whole parish amounting to nearly 3000. I am not aware that I was charged with being inattentive, and I did not think the labour light; but the difficulties and discouragements were few, indeed, compared with those with which I must now struggle, although the population is very considerably less. Besides, the manner in which the individuals of this fluctuating mass are crowded together, sometimes two families night and day in one apartment, leads frequently to a disregard of all

the decencies of life, and sometimes to a kind of intercourse which cannot be thought of without horror. Two cases were recently mentioned to me, one by a house-factor, and another by a manager of the Charity Workhouse, in both of which females had born children to their nearest blood relations. These cases did not occur in my parish, but in the vicinity of it; but even in my own parish, I cannot but be shocked when I see, as I frequently do, the same apartment occupied by two married couples, neither having a bed, nor any place to which they could retire beyond the bare walls."

As for the state of education (p. 9), "Is there a school in your parish?—There are more schools than one, but not a parish school. There was a school attempted to be established on that plan, but circumstances occurred, in consequence of which it was dropt. I have so far endeavoured to keep it up that I pay for the rent of the same place; and there is a master who endeavours to carry it on at his own adventure, but he makes very little by it, because there are numbers in the neighbourhood who receive education gratuitously. There are two Roman Catholic schools in the parish, which are occasionally attended by Protestant children. And great as is the prejudice of many against the use of our catechism in schools attended by others than of our own communion, I find that there are Protestants not the least scrupulous in letting their children attend a Roman Catholic school, where the Roman Catholic Catechism, I am told, is always taught. But I cannot answer for them all. There were some people of this persuasion who would answer no questions at all, and acted in a way that I would not like to characterize.

"Is the Church Catechism generally taught in the schools of the parish?—I am afraid that it is not very much taught in many of the schools.

"It is not necessarily a schoolbook?—No; but in parochial schools I believe it is generally taught, but there are scarcely any schools here that possess that character."

(P. 10.) "In speaking of the improved system of educa-

tion, would you rely on it alone, in addition to the existing means, as sufficient to reclaim to religious habits?—I scarcely would, in the present circumstances; but I think, if it had not been that the system of education has been long inadequate, neither systematically conducted, nor extensive enough to supply the wants of the whole community, I rather think that the people would not have fallen into that state of ignorance and indifference which is so prevalent. If a good system were revived and kept up, it would contribute more than any thing else to the formation of the habit of attending the church, and the observance of religious duties.”

(P. 15.) “There are a few other points, on which I am by no means satisfied with the extent of the information which was conveyed by the answers to some of the questions proposed to me; but I do not know that it can be a great object to the Commission to hear the views which I entertain in regard to some of these matters. I beg only to say, that, in speaking of the want of schools, I had always conceived that such schools as had been long established in this country, in which children, from an early period of life, are accustomed to read the Scriptures, and are taught the principles of Christianity in so comprehensive a book as the Catechism of our Church, are peculiarly instrumental in preparing the minds of the people for receiving benefit from the preaching of the gospel, and the other ministrations of the pastors. Indeed, those who have not become accustomed to the language of Scripture, are in the condition of persons who are quite destitute of the language in which religious ideas must be conveyed. One might as well speak to them in an unknown tongue, in many cases, as speak in the language of Scripture, unless a much greater proportion of time is assigned to the task of the mere interpretation of terms, than can be at all necessary for those who have passed through such a course of discipline.”

The same difference between the town and country is observable in the following extract from the Educational

Report of the General Assembly for 1839 (p. 32):—"But, especially, there can be no doubt, that much has been done for education by the parishes themselves, when it appears that, *excepting in the towns* and in the Highlands, the whole population, notwithstanding the want of any public provision for education, have been taught to read, and the greatest portion of it to write,—the fact having been established by authentic returns made some years ago to the General Assembly's Education Committee."

The question has been hitherto presented very much as affecting the happiness of individuals and their moral well-being. Let me remind all, that this, applied to the great body, is the happiness and security of society. Individual well-being widely extended effects the general well-being, and this reacting secures the prosperity of each citizen. There are some who fear instruction, lest it should, from the knowledge of good and evil imparted, lead the mind, by its natural bias, to choose the latter;—a rational fear, if from instruction be excluded counter-acting influences. There are others who would trust to instruction of any kind;—a rational trust, if the intellect and the will were united. Facts prove both the fear and the trust to be irrational, if, instead of instruction generally, we have a particular kind of it, or if we exclude that particular kind. It has not been in the instructed population of rural Scotland that the present day has found any thing to fear; nor have crimes been confined to the uninstructed any where. We repeat, that the system which alone deserves to be adopted by the nation, is **THAT WHICH TRAINS TO HABITS OF THOUGHT, FURNISHING WITH STORES OF MENTAL EXERCISE AND ENJOYMENT, PERVADING ALL CLASSES, AND COMBINING INTELLIGENCE, AT EVERY STEP OF ADVANCEMENT, WITH THE MORALITY OF THE BIBLE.**

It is to the last part of the proposition that I intend to confine myself, enforcing and explaining it as best I may, convinced of its paramount importance, as a necessary portion of all good education and sound instruction.

CHAPTER V.

In what Sense is the State bound to provide National Instruction ?—

Examination into the Meaning of the Word Right—All States ought to act for the Good of the Community—When States and Communities agree, no Question of Right—Where States and Communities are less or more at Variance, what is the Right of the Community, and who is to determine ?—Various Kinds of Right—Rights generally must be defined in three Particulars to be available—Propositions to be proved in the Claim of Right to National Instruction—First Kind of general Right founded on natural Claims—The Nature of these Claims often indefinite, and specified by Law—Second Kind of general Right founded on Enactments—Third Class of general Right founded on Obligations undefined in one of the three Particulars—Some Inferences deducible from this Class—Application to the Question of National Instruction—Who decide the Nature of the Right in this Country—At present undefined by those who *must* ultimately decide it—Hint as to the Decisions that there is such a Right—Two of the Particulars settled—Necessity of settling the third variously urged.

THIS being the deplorable state of matters in this country, and after all deductions that can be allowed to those whose conscientious fears are aroused by the prospect of a universal system of instruction, I proceed next to inquire what is the duty of the state *generally* in regard to instruction. And as much opposition is often offered to well-grounded claims, not so much on account of their own merits, as from an improper way of urging them, I shall investigate in what sense it may be said that the state is bound to provide for a nation the means of sound and rational instruction.

We need not encumber ourselves with any inquiry into the existence or non-existence of an original compact between the governors and the governed. Much angry discussion might be saved, if all parties were to content themselves with examining into what exists, without per-

plexing the question with, how does it exist? Whether there may have been an implied compact or not, the result will remain the same—the responsibility of the governors and that of the governed. In vague declamation it may do well enough to conjure up the word *Right*,—to use it in a variety of senses, as it best suits the declaimer for the time, but we do not want to have words merely, but to understand what they mean. Now, understanding by the word state, that person or those persons in every country who are possessed of the powers of making, and in the last resort of interpreting and executing the laws, we think that it will not be denied that the power is vested in the state for the welfare of the whole. It does not matter in this view whether God be the immediate source of the right, according to the exploded *jus divinum*, or whether the people, or whatever other party, be so supposed; the avowed object of all states, it does not matter in how opposite a way they may act, is to promote the good of the community. Whether this be the original cause why men form themselves into regular communities, or whether the formation of these arises from a gregarious and social principle in the mind of man, matters not to our present inquiry, since in either case the *fact* is the same, that the state always affects to do that which is best for the community over which it rules. Nor does it matter that gross mistakes are often made, both as to the nature of the measures, and as to those who constitute the community, the former being too often directly injurious, and the latter considered as made up of a small fractional part only. The state and the community may both agree in what are thought to be the best measures, and yet both may be wrong. Here there arises no question as to Right as co-relative with Claim, in which sense I use it, in this inquiry. The state, in exercise of the authority vested in it, adjusts, promulgates, and executes measures which it conscientiously believes will advance the welfare of the country. The community, agreeing in opinion with the rulers,

gives the laws a willing obedience or concurrence, and the question of right does not arise. There may be a question as to whether the community has given its concurrence or not, but this is evidently a question totally different from the former. Then there may be a doubt as to the means employed by the state for effecting the common object, but here the question of right is shifted to another field. To illustrate this, when, in 1802, Napoleon made his famous declaration that England was unable single-handed to cope with France, it is well known that the pride of this country was so much mortified, or that such a burst of patriotism was excited, that the great mass of the people supported the state in the war which ensued. An opponent of this war may argue that it was not for the interest of the community, and he may argue correctly. But between the conscientious ruler, who thought it necessary for the well-being of the British nation to engage in war, and the community which conscientiously agreed with him in opinion, there is no question of right. Again, in the taxes which were levied to carry on that war, the minister who proposed the measures which, in conscience, he believed the least oppressive—that is, most advantageous to his country—clearly enacted what he had a right to do, backed as he was by the conscientious majority of the community. He may have committed a moral wrong in not availing himself of the opportunities which he had for obtaining better information and sounder views, but no one can challenge him as violating any right in acting on his views.

If it be the duty of the statesman, in all cases, to do that which he thinks the most likely to benefit his country, it must, at the same time, be conceded that there are in all cases strong temptations to disregard and violate this duty. The very idea of government involves protection against the wish felt by all men to acquire property and power at the expense of others. Now the statesman himself has this propensity, to say the least, as strong as

other men. How is this to be controlled? *Quis custodem custodiet?* Here intervene two questions of right,—how far subjects have a right, and who is to determine in a case of doubt. Now, it will clear our ground materially in exploring the question as applicable to national instruction, if, adverting to the fact that there are very various meanings of this word *Right*, we endeavour to ascertain what they are, seeing that just as we understand it, shall we be enabled to perceive clearly the force with which we can urge on our own government the settlement of the present question.

It would seem that in government no question of right arises so far as it affects and rests with one individual merely. The barbarous practice of affecting to punish the *felo de se*, is now advocated solely on the ground of deterring others, while sumptuary laws restraining individual indulgences have passed into desuetude in our country, and the ground on which drunkards are punished is the evil done to the community. This, at least, is a general principle avowed by some as self-evident, though that is liable to question.

In all cases of obligation and relative right, there is a principle binding one party to perform or abstain from doing a certain act, constituting a right on the part of another to demand performance or abstinence, and there are thus two parties, the party bound and the party having a right to claim. For brevity's sake we shall call the obligation the *quo*, the party bound the *quis*, and the party for whose benefit the obligation exists the *cui*. Now in all cases of right, however they may emerge, we shall see that if any of these is undefined, while there exists an obligation on some one to do something, or refrain from doing, so as to benefit another, unless we know the one, the thing, and the other—the *quis*, the *quo*, and the *cui*—we are unable either in law or in *foro conscientiae* to enforce the obligation. Hence, in many cases, the state, that the matter may be brought to a proper bearing, assists in enforcing even

natural rights, by defining sometimes the *quis*, sometimes the *cui*, sometimes the *quo*. We can never constitute a right without these three being defined, and from this principle we shall see important practical effects flow.

Our defence for this line of argument is, that it is all the more necessary to define right in a question of this sort, because the friends of the poor, by urging their claims loosely and improperly, lead them to form vague and misty notions, which, going far beyond what the original promulgators intended, have a tendency to convulse the country, and to react, by calling the friends of order to confine within narrower limits the benefits which they were before disposed to confer. Now, I propose to prove that the poor have no right, in all circumstances, to demand from the state gratuitous instruction, that the right arises from the circumstances of society, that the other orders as well as the poor have a right in this latter case to call upon the state to give instruction of a certain sort,—that it is the duty of the state to feel the obligation, and, after examining into the sort of instruction which it is bound to furnish, immediately to act upon the result of its examinations,—and that it is the duty of us, the claimants, to perceive clearly our ground, and to inform the state what and why we so claim. Every one must see the importance of these propositions, and I trust that I may be permitted shortly to state the grounds on which they are based.

We may take for our first illustration, parent and child. Here we have a host of questions of different kinds of right emerging, but one illustration may suffice. There was a time, and that not long ago, when there was no express statute against the exposure of children. But the parent on that account could not abandon his child on the plea of the child's having no legal right to his protection. The state, it is true, for a long time imagined, that the instinctive feeling of affection on the part of the parent would be so strong, that an express enactment was un-

necessary, just as Solon made no law against parricide, on the supposition that so monstrous a crime was impossible. The child had then a natural right to shelter and support which the law maintained. The law was as strong in support of the child's right before as after the enactment, but it was found expedient to embody in words, what before existed in reality, both to proclaim the existence of the evil, and to warn against it. The child had a right prior to the statute, and the statute did not make but only declared the right, and the means to be used in enforcing it. Thus *right*, in one sense, is the possession of a claim founded upon, and naturally springing from, relationships naturally or artificially formed, whether the statute-law actually announce them or not, but recognised by common consent.

Such rights as these abound, of course, in every country. They are the foundation of all law. Before any one enactment can be made in the statute-book, government proceeds on the notion of their reality. Nay, government itself, however framed, proceeds on their recognition as its own charter of existence. It proceeds on the supposition that it is to do certain things, and that the governed are to give obedience. Some may dispute the first part of the hypothesis, that government invariably at its commencement engages to perform certain duties. For we find communities in a rude state where the chief does nothing, or every thing, as he himself feels inclined; but no one doubts that the governed are in a different condition. Whatever may be our theory of government, we are all agreed that the governed are expected to yield obedience; that is, obedience on the part of the governed is the right of the governors. These rights may have two parties or one only bound. In the case of the child, the obligation at first lies all on the part of the parent. In almost all cases, we may safely say, that there exists a right that may in all countries be enforced by law, where the implied obligation is a natural one, except where law expressly

forbids. And herein arises a distinction between natural right enforced by law, and natural right destroyed by law. In the present illustration, we have seen that the child has a right to subsistence, and that the father, if able, is bound to support him, while this natural right may be denied, as among the ancient Romans, where the father had at one time a right bestowed by law to abandon the child, and the child had no claim upon the parent. Thus then natural rights implied and contained in the law's province, we have seen, may be thrown out of the law's protection. But I suspect that we shall find, that in all such cases, the state has regarded them as out of the reach of natural regulation, or has affected at least to act in its duty to promote the well-being of the whole. They are disturbances after all that impede, but do not turn the course of the reasoning already pursued, and leave us still in possession of one definition of right, that it founds a claim springing from relationships naturally or artificially formed, whether the statute-law actively announce them or not.

The laws which regulate any community by statute, should properly enforce those rights which spring from natural feeling, enlightened to the utmost by whatever means of enlightenment. This is not always the case, but it is meant to be so, all governments avowing that their object is the good of the community, which is identical with the former object. In a simple people there will be few and simple combinations of affairs to require the regulation of statute-law. But in a country where manufactures, and commerce, and agriculture abound in all their varied and complex relationships, there will arise a necessity for numerous regulations affecting these. All such regulations give rise to rights.

It will be seen, that in the case of the parent and child, the *quis* and the *cui* are definite, but the obligation, the *quo*, is only so far defined as regards subsistence. This may, in most cases, be safely left to the affection of the

parent ; but in some it cannot. The state interfering to settle the *quo*, must be guided by a variety of circumstances. What may suit one age may not suit another. In one country the means of regular instruction may be altogether wanting,—in another the means of instruction may be scanty. It may not be necessary for the means of support that the child should receive instruction at all,—and thus the natural right, in its extent and kind, requires to be precisely defined before it can be acted upon. Take for further illustration the provisions made for a widow. There exist naturally the *quis* and *cui*,—the *quo* is left by natural feeling undefined. It follows from the natural claim which a wife has for support upon her husband, that his death should not throw her afloat upon the world penniless and unsupported. But while her right to support from her husband's property is undoubted, the *quo* is a fair matter for question. And thus she possesses a right both natural and legal,—a right to support, and to a certain amount of support. Again, in adjusting the supplies that ought to be granted to government for necessary expenditure, there arises a natural right which the state, the *cui*, possesses,—to receive funds from the governed, the *quis*,—but the *quo* in its nature and extent is a fair subject for discussion. Whether it should be this sum or that,—whence it should be derived,—from what branches of manufacture, or commerce, or agricultural produce,—and how it is to be collected, are the subjects of statute-law. And thus again the state has a natural right to support, and a legal right to the extent, the source, and the manner of securing it. And I might thus bring many other instances ; but these will suffice, remarking, that however artificial may be the regulations, they all resolve into a natural obligation, which we dare not disobey without violating the laws of our own nature, implanted in us by God, and sanctioned by his word. Thus, in the case of the widow who has a right to support, which support is interpreted by the state to be, we shall say, one-third

of the property left by her husband, he who, possessing that property, should only give her one-fourth, it being his duty to give one-third, violates not only the law of the state in which he lives, but a natural law which flows from the relationship existing between him and the state. We have thus a second right, which, as we have incidentally noticed already, may be a wrong,—the possession of a claim, founded upon and springing from the positive enactments of the state.

In all these cases the state has to recognise three particulars, the party who is bound, the party to be benefited, and the obligation itself, the *quis*, the *cui*, and the *quo*. When any of these three is wanting, as we have already seen, there can be no natural right enforceable by the state, and the parties on whom the obligation lies may escape even from the censure of their own consciences. But there may and often does exist an obligation on some one to do something to some other, though the one, the thing, or the other, be not exactly defined either by the suggestions of nature or by statute-law. The right or the obligation arising from it exists, but one element necessary for precision is wanting, and it must be left to a principle different from any of those to which we have just alluded to determine the nature of that right in all its bearings. When the *quis* or obligated person is uncertain, and the consequent sense of responsibility is divided or taken away, we all know the result; it is embodied in the homely proverb, "What is every body's business is nobody's business." Hence the necessity of interference by express law in cases of joint ownership of property, of peculiar duties necessary for the business of society, and in other matters which plainly and indubitably affect the public good. Here the statute-law interferes to interpret the natural law, and to enforce what it suggests, by giving the management to a definite individual. In circumstances where the party to be obliged is not defined by natural law or statute interpreting it, which includes a much greater num-

ber of cases, both law and nature are left without means of enforcement. It is a clear law of nature,—enlightened as well as in a rude state,—that out of our abundance we should give to relieve those who are in want. But those who are in want are an undefined body, and it is impossible to limit the supply to be given, or the manner or the individual to be benefited. Hence no law that ever has been made by man can enforce the divine principle, “It is more blessed to give than to receive.” I do not take into consideration the attempts made to enforce this principle by a system of poor laws, because here the *cui* is defined,—it is the population in the immediate district of the occupier of the soil. Besides, this system does not affect many who are able to give out of their abundance, and they are left to an obligation which it seems impossible to enforce, while even they who do compulsorily contribute have, many of them, the means, the open means, to do much more. If, on the third supposition, the *quo* or obligation, in either extent or kind, be wanting in definiteness, we have an obligation which we can reduce to no fixed rule. In the matter of instruction, which, as society is constituted with us, is clearly a subject of natural obligation on the part of a parent in a certain rank of life, a good or a bad system of instruction is so much a matter of opinion, and so undefined, that the interference of any sanction to enforce a particular kind of instruction deemed good, would seem to be a very questionable procedure. So, while in matters of dress, furniture, and general expense, there is a manifest obligation on the part of citizens to suit themselves to their rank and circumstances, sumptuary laws, which have been attempted in many countries, have failed in all. We may define this third class of rights as the possession of a claim founded on obligations actually existing, but indefinite in one of the particulars, the persons bound, the duty to be performed in kind or extent, or the persons to be benefited.

To one or other of these three, all rights may be re-

duced ; and their enforcement depends upon the class to which they belong. The two first are enforceable by every state. In cases where there is a clear and an undeniable violation of natural, even when not forbidden by statute law, as in the case of the exposure of children, redress, or where that is impossible, punishment, as the only means left for the vindication of that natural law, will follow. This class of rights every community is entitled to have enforced by the state. The very hypothesis of a statute law being violated, includes in it the notion of a provision for enforcement. But we stand on different ground with regard to the third ; and in the third, at present, our claims for education at the hand of the state seem to be. In a host of cases we cannot enforce the obligation at all, and in those in which we do, it is by an arbitrary act of the state, which may be wise or unwise, just or unjust, fixing one of the loose and undefined particulars. Thus, in the case of the poor laws, a large class of distinguished economists, admitting the obligation and the right, are of opinion that it is unwise to interfere with the distribution of charity, on the very ground that legal interference is unfitted for cases like this ; and that, being contrary to nature, it dries up the natural impulses which of themselves would enforce right. The principle that constitutes the difference between rights as enforceable and rights as non-enforceable seems to be, that human law can reach only the outward actions ; these it may restrain, direct, or guide. But wherever any thing is left undefined, and consequently dependent on the unforced will, human law loses its control. We are then thrown upon an obligation of a different nature, inferring a different responsibility, and enforced by different sanctions. The man who with griping penuriousness grasps his miserable hoard of ill-gotten wealth, has, notwithstanding the feebleness of the law, as strong an obligation binding him to unlock his coffers and to diffuse abroad the blessings of plenty, as if the law with

severest penalties could reach him and wrench the dross from his grasp. He may not feel the full force of the obligation, but he feels enough of it to know that there is one. He may shelter himself under many a wretched plea—among others the common defence in such cases—that no one has claims on him. Legal claims certainly no one has, but claims the wretched have, and he stands before a tribunal where all such miserable shifts are unavailing. Conscience ever and anon whispers accusations in his ear, and forces him to disgorge a miserable driblet. Yet, to do good by slow degrees is not his way, and often, to the surprise of all, the miser who would not for the world give a farthing each day to the most crying case of distress, has, by one bold effort, sacrificed hundreds to appease a craving conscience. The thousand obligations of courtesy, affableness, and social virtue cannot be reached, from difficulties of defining their kind and extent. Parental kindness in one man is manifested in a different way from what it is in the case of another; and what one man would deem sufficient instruction for his child and sufficient tenderness, another in the same rank would deem to be a doom to ignorance and harshness. Yet there are rights in all these cases, and consequent obligations. From their undefined nature, however, we must leave them to God. The well-instructed enlightened man, acting according to conscience, will seldom be at a loss as to what the obligation is that lies upon him, and will seldom fail to perform it.

We have here a principle which, I may notice somewhat discursively, and with due humility, seems to solve a question in morals,—a principle, the application of which I do not remember any where to have seen made. Moral philosophers often dwell on a difference between justice and the other virtues,—the determinate and the indeterminate virtues, noticing that we admire the latter much more than the former. Thus Adam Smith (in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part ii., § 2., chap. 1.), after stating,

that the want of beneficence does only negative, while that of justice does positive harm, proceeds thus : " And upon this is founded the remarkable distinction between justice and all the other moral virtues which has of late been particularly insisted upon by an author of very great and original genius, that we feel ourselves to be under a stricter obligation to act according to justice, than agreeably to friendship, charity, or generosity ; that the practice of these last mentioned virtues seems to be left in some measure to our own choice ; but that, somehow or other, we feel ourselves to be in a peculiar manner tied, bound, and obliged to the observation of justice. We feel, that is to say, that force may with the utmost propriety, and with the approbation of all mankind, be made to constrain us to observe the laws of the one, but not to follow the precepts of the other." All this is true ; and, like the other statements of this distinguished author, lucidly expressed ; but in all the reasoning with which Adam Smith and others have noticed the difference, they do not seem to me to have hit upon the great principle, that in the actings of justice the mind is almost entirely passive, for here all the terms of the obligation are known ; whereas, in the actings of beneficence and the other social virtues, the mind is almost as entirely active, going forth to seek out the unknown terms of the obligation. The feelings themselves, being natural, are beyond all analysis. No one denies that they exist ; while our approbation as naturally is given to active efforts of good more than to acquiescent habits. Hence we admire the beneficent man more than him who is grateful, and him who is grateful more than him who is merely just. Disapprobation in the same ratio follows the man according to his deficiency ; we reprobate the unjust man because he is deficient in the lowest class of virtues, more than the ungrateful, and we hardly reprobate at all the just man who is not beneficent. But this is not the place to follow out all the consequences of this principle ; it is sufficient at present to remark, that

so universal is what I have stated here, that the more we approach definiteness of terms, the more we lose admiration, and the more we are inclined to enforce the obligation of the law, so that in some states ingratitude is punishable as positive injustice; for here are the *quis* and the *cui*, and the wants of the previous benefactor constitute the *quo*. This last, however, is so vague in most circumstances, that few states act upon this principle, even in cases of ingratitude. Here arises Dr Chalmers' opposition to an assessment for the support of the poor. He argues that a higher set of principles is called into action by all parties if the relief be voluntary and left to natural impulses. And on this reasoning his arguments seem irrefragable, provided one element be conceded,—that is, the sufficiency of a voluntary contribution. There is no doubt that the man who seeks out either the *cui* or the *quo* in support of the poor, is calling into action habits of mind which lie dormant, if they are settled for him by law, and that the benefited in this latter case must receive relief with feelings of a kind totally different, and of a lower nature.

I may notice here, too, in reference to this subject, a mistake of Blackstone, by which he lowers considerably the standard of law laid down by Justinian. Speaking of the immutable laws of good and evil implanted in the mind of man by God himself, he says (vol. i. p. 40, edit. 1766), "Such, among others, are these principles, that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one its due; to which three precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law." And he quotes from the Institutes, 1. 1. 3. *Juris præcepta sunt hæc; honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere*. Not to mention that the principle, *to live honestly*, is repeated in the third, *should render to every one its due*, in a manner unworthy of the philosophic precision of the code, the meaning of the word *honeste*, which we have no authority for supposing to have been altered so much, indubitably in other times was *virtu-*

ously and becomingly—a noble object of law, but it is to be doubted how far enforceable by enactments.

We are taught, and this is the point to which I have wished to come, by a consideration of these three classes, what we have a right to demand from the state in respect to national instruction. All states, however despotic, recognise certain rights on the part of their subjects. The most vague recognition is that of all governments that the state holds power, if not for, at least with a wish to benefit, the people. Every thing done by such a state is the result of its own will to benefit the people. In deeds of injustice, murder, robbery, crime of all sorts, it benefits the people. The people thus benefited sometimes do not receive the favours quite as such, and forcibly deprive their benefactors of power; but in a majority of cases they just transfer the same power to other hands, this occasional and violent transference being the only check to the violation of rights recognised as natural. In other countries absolutely ruled, there is some avowed regard had to the great laws of nature, and statute-law springs not merely from the will of the sovereign, as in the former case, but with that will combined, less or more, with a respect to natural laws. Any violent antagonism to these would probably overturn the government, and this operates as a stronger check than in the other case. In all governments freely constituted, the laws are all interpretations of natural laws, or regulations connected with and springing from them,—at all events not wilfully opposed to them. There may be an occasional violation from error or from party views, but these are checked in different ways, according to the various details of each separate constitution.

I have purposely waved the consideration of numberless questions affecting the theory of government, because they are altogether foreign to my present purpose, which was simply to determine the nature of our right, if we have any, to call upon the state to furnish us with a

national system of instruction, that, knowing the ground of our claim, we may urge it so as best to secure success. And, in this stage of our inquiry, we see very clearly that our right cannot be determined by the statute-law, as no statute exists providing for such a system. It must be a right therefore of either the first or the third class. Who is to determine?

We have seen that, considering the subject generally, there are three forms of government,—that of unmixed despotism, that of despotism with a constitutional check, and that which has the reality of a full check, arising from the possession of freedom. In the first form, the state would, checked only by having the fear of transference before its eyes, determine the question. In the second also, the state would decide, having a regard to natural rights, otherwise hazarding the danger of a revolution. In the third, practically the people, meaning by this term the majority of those who, from influence directly or indirectly exercised, exert control over public affairs. The operation of this influence may be slow, but it is notwithstanding effectual at the last. In the case of the slaves, we all remember how, year after year, the matter hung over till it seemed almost hopeless. But the majority of the intelligent of the country had come to a conviction that slavery was a violation of the laws of nature, and their expression was at last irresistible. It is on this ground that we look forward to a similar result in America. There must be the means used to produce feeling, and consequent expression on the part of the intelligent mass of the people, and then slavery is doomed.

It is the duty of every one who writes upon the present question to enlighten the people on the question of right, seeing that in our country it ultimately rests with them to decide whether there shall be a national system of instruction or not. Parties may differ as to the expediency of the people having this power, but recent events have

shown that they do possess it. Now, while I admit and maintain that there is an obligation on the community to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves a certain sort of instruction, I likewise maintain that it may have been properly a doubtful point whether the state should have interfered in behalf of the community, and above all, that the *quo* in its existence and extent being unsettled, no such obligation exists even now as can be acted upon till that be fixed. That no rank has a natural right to gratuitous instruction is apparent from a case which sometimes happens. A child may have been born, and its parents have died immediately after its birth, leaving no relations bound by natural ties to provide for its subsistence. This child has a clear natural right on the community at large to receive immediate subsistence, and such an education as shall secure to it the means of subsistence in after-life. The state may or may not, according to its views of the good of the community, actively interfere. While it is bound to see that the child be supported and properly educated as far as that is in the power of the state, it is not bound to be actively employed in supplying the means for the maintenance and education. Whether the community do or do not perform the duty unbidden by the state, the state must see it done. We have, I shall grant in this case, whether actively or neutrally, the state in a certain view as the *quis*, and the child as the *cui*, but then we have not got the *quo* settled. All will allow that the child is only entitled to wholesome subsistence, and such an education as can be obtained, fitting it to be a useful member of society. In the question of education, the state may conceive—erroneously conceive,—and the community at large may agree—erroneously agree,—that there may exist a fitting education without instruction. There must be something to limit the term *fitting education*, and this may be the limit. Both parties may think that enough has been done when the child has been taught

practical morality and religion, without even the humblest elements of school instruction, because the natural right of the child is measured by the general conduct of parents in such a community in the humble walks of life, who, from the total want, it may be, of every system or means of instruction, or any other cause whatever, do not include instruction in education.

But such a child has a clear right to be put on a level with the mass of other children as to education, and if, in the general education of children, there be the element of instruction, the right arises ; because it is mere mockery to give present without the means of procuring permanent subsistence, unless it is maintained that the state should immediately take this upon itself, which nobody will assert.

I do not here speak of the propriety or impropriety of the conduct of the state in regard to the fact of the non-instruction observable in many cases where no such emergency occurs as has been supposed. That in truth depends more on the elements of beneficence than of justice, till certain circumstances, to be hereafter noticed, intervene. I urge this to show that there is no such natural right on the part of the poor to demand instruction, as has been urged, while there is a clear natural right on the part of the child so situated to demand fitting education, and if, in the circumstances of this country, fitting education includes instruction, then to demand instruction.

But the state has a right to remain in a neutral condition in this, as well as in all other cases, if it believe that to be the most expedient method of effecting its object, which in this question is the bestowing of instruction on such a child, supposing instruction to be expedient. If it believe that the community will, without its interference, interpose, and that by instructing the child, there will be produced the reacting benefits of beneficence, it is expedient for the state to see that the child be instructed, and yet not actively to interfere.

By these two elements, a partial doubt of the necessity of instruction, and a trust in the sufficiency of voluntary aid, we can account in a great measure, I think, for the past supineness of both state and people, with regard to it, notwithstanding the powerful efforts that have, at various times, been made by men of gigantic attainments, well fitted to rouse a nation from her slumber. It was long held, and is still held by a few,—that the poorer classes, so far from being benefited, are injured by instruction, and that society will be exposed to danger from such a measure,—it was held that the church is the sole instrument proper to train the population to moral and religious duty,—that the remainder of their fitting education of course depends upon their acquiring habits of labour ; and this was acted on to a certain extent. There was a vague hope, in the mean time, on the part of those who thought differently, that the community could supply the defect without the aid of the state. There was thus wanting the *quo*, without which the matter could not be settled, and a vagueness on the part of those who believed in the *quo*, as to the expediency of considering the state as the immediate *quis*.

But it may be asked, are there rights which are natural in one state of society and not in another? I think not as to the *quis* and *cui*, but certainly as to the *quo*. In the case of the child already mentioned, there seems to be little doubt that the subsistence furnished him will depend on natural rights, affected by climate, general habits, and other circumstances.

It does not seem necessary to urge at any length, that all this being granted, the reasoning applies to those children whose parents or relations being alive, are unable to bestow upon them subsistence or a fitting education. We may now dismiss the element of subsistence from the question, which was only introduced to show that a fitting education flows necessarily from it, and which it would needlessly cumber the argument to retain longer. At the

same time we introduce another element. The parents and relatives may not be able to provide the means of instruction entirely, while they may be able in part—and it is only the deficient part which the state is bound to supply.

From all these reasons we draw this proposition. The young of a nation have a natural right on that nation to the best possible education befitting their circumstances, so far as the nation can bestow it, and to the extent that it cannot be obtained from their own domestic resources.

This proposition, while it leaves open for question, Who are such children? and, To what extent are they to be educated? includes this fact, that, inasmuch as it has been proved in the former chapter, that education not including instruction, is in present circumstances unfitting the necessities of the young of our land, we must hold it incumbent on the community to secure them the means of instruction, as included in education, the *quo* of the foregoing proposition. I should have looked with some apprehension on the enunciation of this proposition, lest the word *education* as a matter of right should alarm many, from its including a right to be put in the way of active employment, did I not remember that this is already done by the community, which enforces this branch of the proposition, by seeing or endeavouring to see that all shall have visible means of gaining a livelihood.

Inasmuch, again, as it has been proved by experience that the nation will not voluntarily discharge this obligation; and it being doubtful whether the nation could voluntarily discharge it with a due regard to permanence and efficiency; and it being the part of the state neutrally if that be best, but in all cases actively when the neutral method will not do, to perform this duty, for *nation*—in connexion with right—in the proposition, we must read *state*.

Moreover, it will be clearly seen that all ranks have a claim upon the state for such a measure as a matter of natural right. From our relationship to the governors we

have a natural right to protection, and that the fullest possible, consistently with other natural rights. Now, we have a right to this protection, provided we can show that it is a protection, and that it is possible, and that it does not interfere to an undue extent with other natural rights. The two first are not now disputed ; the last may occupy us a little hereafter.

The proposition, thus viewed, may involve more. If it be the duty of the state to protect the members, and efficient protection depend on efficient instruction, we are in danger, not only from those classes that *cannot* procure efficient instruction, but from citizens in any other class that *will* not. On this branch of the subject I do not profess at all to enter. We have to do now with a certain and wide-spread evil, which requires immediate redress. To prove our sincerity, we must cast away all theorizing, however tempting, which would introduce fresh and puzzling elements into the question.

I have now said enough on this part of my subject, especially as **THE STATE HAS**, both by its declarations and acts, **ADMITTED THE OBLIGATION**.

While this is all well, however, the *quis* being settled—the *cui* being a matter of easy adjustment, and the *quo* being in a certain state of definiteness, being such an education, inclusive of instruction, as is befitting the circumstances of the young, there is no agreement as to what that instruction ought to be. Hence the state admits the obligation, but, on the plea that it is undefined, eludes our claims. It says, We admit that there is an obligation on our part to provide for the instruction of those who cannot provide instruction for themselves, from the inability of the parents to bestow this upon them, or from other necessary causes. We admit that the Kirk of Scotland set us a noble lesson centuries ago, when, acting upon her sense of an obligation undefined as our own, she established means of instruction for all—rich and poor. We admit the force of the example so often pointed out as set us

by the continental states, which, despotic as some of them are, have organized elaborate instructional machinery. But the Kirk of Scotland had this advantage, that she could easily define her gift to the satisfaction of a unanimous people, and the despotism of the continental powers with which we are taunted is the very element that has enabled them to proceed fearlessly in the path of duty. We know, to a certain extent, what our duty is, and what obligation lies upon us. We know that regard to the interests of all classes of the community, to the progress of the nation in useful and elevating knowledge, to the decrease of crime and the increase of virtue, that the state of political feeling, and the rooted vices that have arisen from a long season of deep slavish darkness, call upon us to provide a measure that shall, as far as lies in us, as the members of the state, abate these monstrous evils, and lead to the wellbeing of communities, the prosperity of families, and the happiness of individuals. But we cannot fix on the nature or extent of the obligation under which we lie. It is all undefined, and neither we who are to grant, nor you who seek, are agreed. We must settle this point before we can accede to your wishes. Before you blame us, remember that you too are to blame for your past supineness, and for the controversies which still rage among you.

Yes! We the people of Britain are indeed to blame. We have allowed century after century to pass away, and have left hundreds of thousands to pine for lack of knowledge. It is in vain to cast the blame upon our rulers alone. *Nos, nos derumus*. Let us now endeavour to retrieve this blunder, so far as in us lies. But if we seriously wish to succeed, we must aim at two points.

We must call upon the state to fix the nature and extent of the obligation. There is no doubt that an obligation under the third head of rights is as strong as one under the first. All that is to be done is to remove it from the one to the other. The feeling bestowed on us by nature

to relieve, is vague and unsettled in itself. But it is changed into the first head, and becomes definite, whenever an individual is pointed out or discovered to whom it may apply. The person is guilty of a violation of the law of nature, and of all right, who, knowing that he has incurred a debt, yet carelessly postpones the inquiry as to the amount. The same sense of right which teaches him to pay a debt when the amount is known, stimulates the right-thinking man to inquire into the amount of the debt, that he may know it. The state may long have considered that it owed no instructional debt to the poor. That, we admit, was an error on its part and on ours. It has since acknowledged that the debt is due, but delays payment till it ascertain the amount. It is its duty impartially to weigh the question, and, after coming to a conscientious conclusion, to determine immediately on prompt payment. It is our duty to urge the settlement, and state our demands. We must not be contented with vague outcries for immediate settlement; we must detail the particulars of our claim; we must remember that we have no right—except a very vague one, which any government may evade—till this be done.

In order that the people of Great Britain may come up in a proper attitude to the legislature, we must, in our several communities, make up our mind as to what it is that we demand. That we cannot come to an agreement on all points, is very likely; but still we may, by mutual concessions, not at all involving principle, so far unite as to ensure an immediate answer to our prayer. This prayer should be, that the state shall without delay proceed to the commencing of a national system, and it should be backed by our developing what national system we mean. If we are really in earnest, we shall not hesitate to make some sacrifice of opinion where principle is not involved, and, enforcing an obligation which is not denied, by stating definitely its nature and extent, we shall remove all plea for further delay.

I have endeavoured in what has preceded to state—and that shortly, seeing that the legislature admits the claim, and having been led to dwell upon the subject at all only by the feeling that we endanger our cause by ignorance of the ground of claim, and that injury is done to the poor by inducing them to form vague notions of right—what is the nature of the right possessed by all ranks, on which to found a claim on the state for instruction befitting the circumstances of the young. I shall now proceed to develop more fully what I conceive that instruction is, in one important particular, with the hope that, from a comparison of the views of various educationists, the people may be enlightened, and choose that most conducive to the common good.

CHAPTER VI.

All Instruction has certain great common Principles—Instruction a Part of Education—What are the Objects of Education—One great Object the Glory of God—Natural Claims of Gratitude to earthly Benefactors—To God—Inquiry, Remembrance, Fulfilment of such Claims—Extent of the Claim, as respects earthly Benefactors, as respects God—Connexion of this with Education—Claims of God as the moral Governor—Indirectly and universally recognised—Necessity of special Recognition for stable Morality—Connexion of this with Education—Extent of both Claims—Not to outward Actions merely—Analogy between God and a Father—Difficulty in Education—Removed by Revelation alone.

HAVING established a claim upon the State to furnish a certain system of national instruction—the best possible befitting the circumstances of those whom it is intended immediately to benefit—I proceed so far to answer the question—What is that system? And here it may be expedient to notice that if we fix certain great principles, the details do not so much matter. Practice will be necessary to arrange much of the machinery; and we cannot hope for a perfect system in every particular part at the very commencement of its working. But it is plainly our interest and duty—if it be our interest and duty to obtain the right at all—to agree on the nature of that right as determined by certain great and leading principles. I shall therefore proceed to consider some of the objects of a proper system of instruction which forms a part of a proper education; and having ascertained these, to examine into the branches and the methods which shall best fulfil those objects.

Human nature is the same in all ranks. It has the same strength and the same weakness, the same capacity and the same limits, and in its desires has one great common

end. In inquiring generally into the objects of instruction, it is not necessary to make any limitation. The principles which affect the instruction of the peer, affect to a great extent those of the peasant. In the application of these principles there may be a difference—but none in the principles themselves. If we wish to train the mind of the future monarch, or that of the future handicraftsman, we have to deal with a common humanity. The future duties may be widely different, and the minds may require to be disciplined about different things, but the *rationale* of the discipline is the same, and the minds are, in their nature, the same, and the instructions are given to both on common principles. Instruction, in this respect, is a mighty leveller. Without inquiring into the laws that regulate the transmission of mental powers, and whether the successors of the well-instructed are more capable of improvement than those of the uninstructed, if there be a difference at all, it is so very slight that in practice and in inquiring with a view to practice, we may safely disregard it, just as we correctly employ certain great principles in the instruction of different individuals, whatever be the amount of their respective abilities. As to the different ultimate employments of the different classes, the principles that regulate morals are clearly the same in all ; while, as to intellectual instruction, our demand being for the best possible befitting their circumstances, we must have a reference to what is the best possible in all circumstances, before we approach the limit involved in their situation in life.

This is not the only extension which I shall, in the mean time, employ. Instruction is merely a part of proper education. They are so far identical that the one, as we have seen, is often confounded with the other. Whatever is the aim with which a parent educates his child, it ought to regulate his views as to instruction. As then the objects of both are, in a great measure, the same, Education being the more extensive term, I shall first inquire into

the legitimate objects of education,—principally with reference to religion. The methods of effecting different objects differing in extent, the one including the other, may differ ; but I am not now inquiring into the methods, but the objects.

What are the legitimate objects of Education ?

Take the human mind in all its undirected powers and unwrought wealth and calculate its value. I do not ask you to generalize. At home surrounded by your families, realize if you can, the worth of that bright boy or fair girl that you have just gazed at, sleeping in the unconscious possession of a countless store of wealth—the human soul. Nor do I ask you to single out, with paternal pride, one whom you may imagine destined by Providence to enact great things on the stage of existence. I do not wish you to dwell on one whom fond anticipation may depict as extending the sphere of human usefulness and power, a second Watt—or, as a Newton, untwisting and examining the cord that binds this globe with the mighty spheres that roll in space—or, as a Milton, soaring with more than eagle's wing to the bright regions of empyrean glory. But, bring before you a child in possession of the average amount of inward power and inward worth, and what have you before you ? You have the young Conception gathering in from all nature materials to expand and revel in—a fairy world glittering with gems of every varied hue. You have the young Reason advancing slowly but surely towards the seat of Judgment ; you have the infant Memory busily amassing treasures for future use ; you have the infant Interpreter acquiring the means of communicating fully with things without ; you have the Conscience already pronouncing doom on things of right and wrong ; you have the whole treasures of mind not yet polished, but amassed by God's own hand, and, unlike earthly treasures, destined for immortality. To what object are you to direct the possessor in the working and use of all this untold wealth ?

Ask the man who has without solicitation been endowed with riches and a high station, to whose services or with what view he ought to employ them. His answer, directed by the stirrings of nature, will be—In the exercise of gratitude to the honour of him who has conferred them. And thus I answer the question. Knowing that we have received these gifts, these faculties, these powers, unmeritedly and without service, from God, one great legitimate object of all education is the glory of the Being who has given us faculties to be trained, opportunities of exercising them, and the power and privilege of training the faculties of others to a due and a right exercise. This is an answer written on our hearts, which our Conscience dictates, and of which our Reason almost instinctively approves. This answer, which is no other than that the glory of God is to be the great end to which we ought to direct all education, will not in a vague sense be denied. But as this ought to be the great basis of every system of education, I shall give it a little more consideration than I should otherwise have thought necessary, because, like many other truths, it is too often no sooner admitted than it is dismissed from view.

Both as the only adequate ultimate motive, and often the only proper object, the glory and honour of our great Creator are the proper objects of all education. I have already slightly touched on the moral argument on which this rests. No one denies the obligations of gratitude to an earthly benefactor. He that manifests indifference to the fellow-being who has conferred comparatively small favours upon him, or to him who may have shown only a feeling of kindness, without any outward actings showing its sincerity, is held by all men unworthy of esteem and affection, unnatural and selfish. But we regard as almost positively unjust the man who, indebted for his liberty and enjoyments to the liberality of another, withholds from him the well-earned tribute of respect and affection. Still more when there are other natural claims added—such as

those of parental rule and filial obedience—are we inclined to regard with abhorrence the judiciously and kindly treated subject of beneficence who is utterly regardless of these claims, and shows no disposition even to come into the presence of him who possesses them. But we are apt to inquire with wondering disgust into the sanity of the man who, the recipient of past favours, and absolutely dependent on present bounties, and liable to the penalties of violated laws, shows no disposition to either gratitude or fear. Now, strong as some of these cases are, they are not to be compared with the claims which the Almighty has upon us for our gratitude, our love, and our obedience. I take not into account here at all any thing but the claims which naturally suggest themselves to every man who reflects upon the relationship which exists between himself and God. There is a natural claim upon each man so to reflect. The constant reception of benefits may in part explain the small account which we make of them, but does not diminish the responsibility. Were we to receive from an unknown hand acts of kindness, there is an obligation to inquire as to the individual who has bestowed them. Nor can we do more than just state the obligation ; we cannot resolve it further. It is one of those duties which are founded on and spring from our common nature, which no man will contradict in assertion, however much he may neglect it in practice. It is no answer, then, to the claims of grateful observance to an unknown benefactor, that he is unknown. The fact of his being unknown, after proper and unavailing attempts to know who he is, may be an answer as to the non-observance of grateful expression to the particular individual. But there is first a duty, founded on our common nature, to inquire assiduously as to who is the benefactor ; and, when that question is answered, there springs up the obligation to show gratitude and honour to the being thus discovered. To those who neglect the duty of inquiry, there belongs the guilt of ingratitude ; to those who after inquiry

neglect the due tribute of honour, there belongs the same guilt. The mind of all men reprobates him who, in ordinary matters, outrages such a claim. Nay, not only rational beings are considered worthy of the operations of gratitude, but the horse or the dog which has saved its lord in the strife of battle or the strife of waters, is counted worthy of such manifestations. After we have ascertained our benefactor, one part of our clear duty is the giving his claims a place in our hearts,—in other words, remembrance of him. The non-remembrance of the claims is just as much an act of ingratitude as the neglect when remembered. Thus are we bound by the natural feelings of gratitude to three distinct acts,—inquiry as to who our benefactor is, remembrance of our duty, and the observance of it.

The nature and extent of gratitude,—which is so far beneficial on the mind of the person making the return as it is a voluntary act,—must of course depend on the nature and extent of the obligation conferred. There may arise casuistical questions as to this on each of the three points of right, in matters admitting of doubt. Where an obligation is not clearly defined in the three heads mentioned in the third chapter, we of course find variety of opinion ; but in certain cases there is little latitude, and in some none at all, as the definiteness becomes more or quite distinct. No one denies that the individual is ungrateful, who, being saved from death by another, at the risk of that other's life, will make no effort to preserve the life of his benefactor, at whatever hazard of his own. We may palliate his ingratitude by the consideration of his own hazard, but all men admit him to be ungrateful ; and, above all, we pronounce him to be foully ungrateful, if there be not only no attempt, but no desire,—no earnest longing counteracted only by the love of life, no grappling with difficulty till the overcoming of it be hopeless. We demand of such a man, if not the hazarding of life, at least the wish to hazard it,—if not the braving of the

danger, a feeling that it is only the unconquerable amount of the danger that overcomes the strong claim of obligation. Here may be latent the consideration of duty, the saving of our own life, which, clear and defined, overcomes the less defined sense of grateful feeling. Where we have the benefactor requiring or expecting from the benefited what is clearly contrary to a well-defined moral duty, we do not expect that the latter duty shall give place to the feelings of gratitude, but we almost expect the struggle; we expect that the soul, viewing the one and the other, shall choose the right, but shall view both; we expect the ferment which arises from the regret that one claim should seem to interfere with another. There may be no contest,—there should be no contest,—but we do not look with complete disapprobation on the man whose mind is troubled with the rival claims. He loves not the one less, but the other more. His regret is, not that he has to perform a duty, but that the performance of that duty should interfere with the demonstration of grateful feeling. Sometimes the latter is so strong, that it overcomes the other, not perhaps from a mere feeling of gratitude, but from the higher degree of pleasure arising from performing an action, the duty of which is undefined, than from yielding obedience to claims which are definite and fixed. Where an individual owes all his means of subsistence to one on whom he has no claim, it matters not whether the benefactor require services at the hand of the benefited or not; the obligations of gratitude are paramount, demanding that there be a disposition to serve. In all cases where a benefit is conferred, the presumption is that it is given with the intention to benefit, and this can only be reciprocated by a similar return,—by an intention to serve. That which constitutes the benefit is not so much the favour conferred, as the intention of the bestower; and that which constitutes a due expression of thankfulness is not so much the actual return made, as the grateful feeling of the right-minded recipient.

The benefactor may have no need of actual service, or of actual return of any kind; but that does not lessen the claim upon the benefited to make a return. The benefactor may be so high in station, and possessed of such resources, that those whom he has raised from the dust may be able to add neither to his fame, his wealth, nor his power. Still they are not discharged from the claims of desiring to add to all,—to honour him, to increase his influence, and extend the glory of his name. Still less are they discharged from abstaining from all acts that shall tend to diminish them, or seem to tend. They have no right to say that their protector is so great and so well known that no acts of theirs can injure his honour or his reputation. That may or may not be. They are nevertheless bound by natural claims to honour him, irrespective of the consequences. In return for his affection manifested, they owe him gratitude manifested. And, whether they add to his glory or not, they are bound to wish to add to it, and to manifest that wish so far as manifestation is in their power.

It is easy to see how this irresistibly applies to the right which God has upon us for the exercise of gratitude towards him. To whatever extent we may be indebted to an unknown being, and whatever claim he may have upon us, we are bound to inquire into who he is, and after we have ascertained that point, we are bound to remember his claims and to observe them. We discover,—it does not matter how, and on that point I say nothing,—God to be the donor of all that we possess. The rest follows by resistless inference. Mounting to the source of that divine disposition which has bestowed such blessings, we find it to consist in the clearest love. All our experience in the world within and the world without us testifies, that, however there may be apparent contradictions, the origin of all is God's love to his creatures. We are thus bound by natural claims to admit the moral beauty and force of the claim, "to love Him who first

loved us." We have seen that it is not in the mere benefits conferred, but in the disposition of the bestower, that we are to seek for that which claims a reciprocal feeling. To him who wills much and can do little, we owe more than to him who wills little and can do much. In many cases we can only infer the extent of will from the extent of deed, and hence may unintentionally err in our feelings of gratitude. But in the case of our Heavenly Benefactor, there can be no misapprehension,—no error. We receive from him all, and we owe to him all. Does he confer upon us the gift of life? We should devote all the pleasures of existence, and employ all the powers thereof, in the testifying of our gratitude. Does he confer on us subsistence? In our enjoyments connected therewith, in our using the means which he has appointed us to employ in order to obtain it, we should in the exercise of gratitude seek to praise him. Does he bestow upon us rational powers? We should use them in pursuits befitting us as the creatures of the All-wise God. Does he give us the means of cultivating these powers? No means of cultivation should be employed which have not a constant reference to him as the great source of all good. Does he present us with the pleasures that charm the outward senses, the fragrance of the rose, the perception of soothing thrilling melodies, the gay landscape and the sublime mountain-pass? In the enjoyment of our senses we should gratefully seek and recognise the mighty Giver. Does he give us lofty hopes,—not only the realities of life, but the promise of a happy existence when this life has passed away? We should dedicate to him and to his service entirely those souls which are thus endowed and blessed with prospects so exalted. It does not matter to these claims, that, weak and insignificant as we are, we are incapable of honouring him, and that all our service is worthless. So far as our inclination to honour him can carry us, so far are we bound to honour him. It is on the heart that the sense of obligation lies, and the outward

expressions are valuable or worthless, just as they are manifestations of what is passing in the heart. Thus, too, we may answer the extraordinary objection, that the glory of God is promoted equally *by* the obedience and *through* the disobedience of his creatures, which is just the same objection in other words, amounting simply to this, that his glory is already perfect and independent. With that fact our duty has nothing to do. To do evil *that* good may come, is a maxim universally repudiated in morals,—much more, to do evil *because* good will come. Our duties are duties irrespective of the consequences. True, so far as they may sometimes have regard to consequences, these are involved. But here we are totally unconcerned with the consequences: our duty lies with our motive. Consequences may sometimes make us pause and consider what our motives really are. But, inasmuch as the heart is the seat of gratitude, it is to its intentions we are to look,—and we can all look to our own heart,—whether our actions proceed from ingratitude, or, what is equivalent in this case to ingratitude, whether they have no respect to the claims of God at all.

This obligation lies upon every man. It has been said that the feelings of gratitude are naturally commensurate with the benefits received. Now every man has received all from God, and to Him every man is bound to give all gratitude. The difference of condition makes no difference here in the extent of obligation. The gift of wealth, talents, high station, or other blessings, may confer greater responsibility, if there be a greater all,—which is very doubtful,—for what is the all of one man is in this case not that of another. But as far as regards the duty of gratitude, the claim is the same. Our moral nature acquiesces in the force of the instruction conveyed by the parable of the Talents. The humble cottager may not be required to dedicate as a free-will offering the same sum as his wealthy landlord, but his mite is as acceptable, as coming from the heart. He is not required to abstract

hours from necessary toil to give to the services of his fellow-labourers, and invigorate their families with good counsel, or sooth their distresses, but the time which he can spare he is bound to give. He is not expected to master the learning of ancient days, and ransack the commentaries of modern writers, to enter deeply into the literature of God's word ; but he is bound to read it, and to pray for an understanding heart. It is not his part, in eloquent and heart-stirring appeals, to call upon his fellow-men to obey the dictates of reason and duty, but it is his for God's sake to set a good example, and to drop a word of counsel, and to train his family in the way that they should go. This is an obligation which, enforced by the written Word of God, has its seat in the natural heart. Not Christians alone recognise it: it is the foundation of all religions, be they what they may. In polytheism, where various gifts were supposed to be bestowed by various deities, each god had his separate claim for homage and acknowledgment. The wise man, so called, acknowledging, or affecting to acknowledge, the gift of wisdom as coming from Minerva's hand, raised the shrine to Minerva,—the husbandman, reaping his sheaves, raised high the song of praise to Ceres,—while the blood-stained warrior, fresh from the fight and the victory, consecrated to Mars the trophy, to indicate his homage and his gratitude. In all this they showed the natural working of this principle, misapplied, but still existing in the natural mind. But, above all, men recognised the claim which one supreme Being had upon them for gratitude ; and when, quitting the absurdities of the popular creed, the philosopher conversed with kindred spirits, he scrupled not to pay his homage and acknowledge his gratitude to the beneficent though unknown God.

Such is the claim which God has upon us as a benefactor. And this we must recognise in education as in every thing else. But education has a special reference to it, as well as this general connexion with it. Education has

not only the glory of God as its great object in common with all the actions of our lives, but its immediate intention is to form the mind of man to pursue objects befitting his nature and circumstances, to provide him with right motives. It has to do not only with the outward accomplishments and the intellectual development, but with the whole region of morals. In it the claims of gratitude have clearly a place, and every pursuit which, either in its motive or its end, interferes with the ties of gratitude, is clearly, not only not in the province of education, but ought actively to be driven out. One great business of education is to rear and train this as a great living principle and motive. It ought ever to teach that all our words and thoughts and actions are wrong which have not a reference to the glory of God. What that reference generally is, we shall see hereafter.

But this is not the only ground on which to found the proposition, that education ought not only to have an indirect, but an immediate view to the glory of God. We have hitherto regarded God as a benefactor, and having claims upon us founded on love. We must, besides, regard him as a ruler, and having claims upon us founded on justice. We are thus called upon not only to love but to fear God. Receiving, as we do, every thing from his hands, we might, and alas ! too often do, forget the claims which he has upon us as our benefactor, and we enjoy the gifts of providence, without one thought of the Giver. But we cannot in the same way shut him out of our thoughts as our Ruler. It is very true that our moral nature might have been so constituted that the one might have been done as easily as the other. But we are not so constituted ; and there is evident wisdom in the arrangement. Man has in general a vague feeling of gratitude to a Being whom he supposes to be God ; and, in hearts that are gentle and alive to tender thoughts, there is often an overflow of gratitude to some unseen power, unknown and unsought after, but gratefully recognised, because the

feeling of recognition is for the time pleasant. In very many cases, however, in stern hard-working worldly-minded men, there is not even the tribute of sentimental gratitude to the Being who has created, preserved, and provided for them. They are so wrapped in the world and the things of the world, that their minds never break through the incrustations of self-enjoyment. Their own right hand has done all. This is a deadly state of mind, but society and the business of life are not impeded by it. If there were the same deadness to the existence of God as the moral governor of the universe, an almost universal wreck of society must ensue. Were there the same disregard to God's laws as there is to his mercies, the world could not exist as a habitation for men. Whether this be the reason or not, certain it is that the nature of man is formed so as to manifest the truth, that the great laws of the great moral Ruler are less or more written on every heart. Governments cannot, and do not, attempt to enforce the obligations of gratitude either to God or man,—all governments enforce those of definite duty. The voice of conscience,—the consciousness of the necessity of doing some things, at least, in obedience to the laws of our moral nature, because otherwise the breaker of the law could not expect from others but such infractions as would deprive him of all secure enjoyment,—the dread of universal execration and banishment from the fellowship of man, lead to a practical observance in all men, and a general observance in most, of certain great laws which regard God as a moral ruler. Unless, however, there be a special reference to him *directly* as the Governor of the universe, there is no security for the regular observance of moral law. Men philosophize themselves into a belief that there is a possibility of teaching the perfect observance of moral duties by a regard to happiness, to advantage, or to the beauty and becomingness of virtue. But before the temptations of the world all considerations are found to give way. Anon, immediate enjoyment allures, and

though "distance lends enchantment to the view" of mountains, it takes the feeling of reality from that of happiness. The worldling chooses to-day's enjoyment, however much he may know of to-morrow's remorse. Nor do the thoughts of advantage fare better. He, whose virtue is based upon his hopes of prosperity, may indeed agree, in the main, that "honesty is the best policy," but tempt him much, and he will think his case an exception. Virtue is very lovely to the mind removed from passion and desire; and, calm in his closet, the sage views self-denial as the very essence of the amiable. But in the heat of passion he loses sight of the abstract loveliness of virtue, and chooses vice, not for, but forgetting her hideousness. The thoughts of God as our supreme ruler may not form a sure shield, but they are more effective, both for other reasons and for this, that they include all the others, as all that pleases God is perfect in bestowing happiness, and true prosperity, and loveliness of character.

Education, then, is grossly imperfect without the recognition of God as the supreme ruler. The mingling with the world always brings with it temptations to swerve from duty. Obedience to these brings with it, to the young mind, uneasy feelings which it is unwilling to harbour. It attempts to drown them in a thousand ways—compliance with the ways of the world—future repentance—making progress in the amassing of wealth—not doing much harm—these, and a thousand other pleas are urged by the young immoralist, to still the voice that cries within him, *Thou art breaking the laws of thy God.* How necessary to give him the shield of religion, to accustom him betimes to remember that the eye of his Great King is upon him, to lead him to the recognition of the matchless beauty of a life of perfect holiness! Can we say that we have educated aright the young, unless we have instilled into their minds a truth which has reference not to one action of their lives, but to all? Unless we make it the habit of their minds ever to bear this in

view, we send them forth to combat in their own strength with a host of enemies sure to triumph over their unprotected weakness.

But, regarding the claims of God as Benefactor and Ruler, to be paramount in life, and paramount therefore in education, it is carefully to be examined to what these claims extend. Now, the claims arising from both sources go far beyond the mere outward observances of certain forms of love and obedience. As Benefactor, God has a right to our love, because he loveth us ; as Governor, to our willing obedience, because he holds rightful sway over us. Even if he had not established rules and engraven them on our hearts, and inscribed them in his Word, our relationship to him as the benefited would call upon us to search into what things are pleasing in his sight, that we might do them. And even though we were conscious of no favours received at his hand, the knowledge of his sovereignty would call upon us to obey his behests, and avoid what is contrary to his will. But he stands to us in the double light of Benefactor and Ruler. In this respect the nearest analogy is that so often used in the sacred writings,—the analogy of a father. This earthly relationship conveys the notion of a kind benefactor and wise ruler, and hence the obedience given to a father and expected from a child is different from that given to a mere sovereign and expected from a subject—it is the obedience of the heart, flowing from affection and reverence,—remembrance of many acts of kindness, and submission to the commands of loving wisdom. The child, going forth to the world full of a father's benefits and counsels, scruples, at the recollections of that father's image, to do any deed that shall blot his fair name, or to act so as to bring a frown upon his loved countenance: he bears this about him ; and the more that there is of filial love and obedience, the more will there be of general virtue and happiness. Let the young, then, be taught to bear with them the thoughts of God, the beneficent

Creator and Preserver ; and of God, the Almighty and All-wise Governor. Let the thought be interwoven with all their actions. Let them be taught to love him,—that is, not only to obey him with outward submission, but to cherish his love in their inmost hearts.

But this involves much more than any system of education of itself can give. It involves the complete abandonment of all one's own will when opposed to the will of God. It is an easy thing to teach the young or the old to do God's will when that is also their own ; but to teach them to do God's will when that will is opposed to their own desires and habits, is beyond the power of man to accomplish. We may enforce the claims of God as a benefactor, and there may be a recognition of the claim so long as he demands no active exercise of gratitude in the abandonment of a cherished pursuit or a favoured indulgence ; but when the claims of love towards this unseen benefactor come into contact with strong aspirings after some known and outward good, the unseen yields to the seen,—self must be indulged. We are willing enough to yield obedience as long as it tallies with our own views of pleasure and of propriety, but let passion take the reins, and we overleap all bounds of law. Or even let us, on a vague calculation, conclude that propriety or pleasure is not so much outraged as there is an advantage gained, and self again rules master of the field. It is not enough, and never has been enough, to educate merely on a system of training that teaches men to recognise God as their Benefactor and Ruler. We want something more. We want to renew the heart,—and this, human teaching never has done of itself. It is the basis of another teaching, but no more.

What is that other teaching? We must remember that God has been pleased, as our Benefactor, to reveal himself to us not as such generally, but in a particular way ;—that he has shown himself not only as our Ruler, but by particular sanctions and to a particular end. If

there had been no express revelation, it must still have been our duty, so far as our unaided minds could have led us, to have enforced, as the heathen teachers did,—love to the Supreme Being, and obedience to his commands. We might have mourned over and wondered at the insufficiency of our instruction; but still we were bound to persevere. Now we have no need to wonder. We know why these counsels and these instructions are in vain,—we know that there is a resistance offered to them by the human heart which no amount of teaching can overcome. But we know much more. We have been taught to regard God not only as our benefactor, but as our benefactor in a certain and precise sense. We know him not only as our Ruler, but we know the extent of his sway over us, and the objects of his kingdom. We know, above all, that he has provided a remedy for the very evil of which we have just been complaining. We wish all our young to go forth to the world with their hearts prepared to give up their desires through love for him,—to abandon their will in meek and cheerful submission to his sway, for thus we know that they will become good and happy. But we have never yet found that any men have been able to effect this; and while we are in dismay, God has revealed to us in the blessed religion of Christ the means by which this very change is to be effected,—by which they who know not and love not God are led to know and love him,—and they who were rebels are induced to bow to his authority and yield submission to his laws.

It is not then vague love to a Benefactor nor vague obedience to a Ruler called God, but love and obedience to Jehovah, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ought to furnish the lessons which must be incorporated with the very essence of our system of education. It is very true that all these lessons will not change the heart,—will not implant the love nor enforce the obedience. It is very true that all these lessons are but

means ; but, nevertheless, we are to use these means. It is very certain that unless we use the means, the result will never be effected. This is not, however, an error so likely to occur as the other which has dwelt more in my thoughts,—the dangerous error that it is sufficient in education to lead the mind to the recognition of a Supreme Being, without caring in what particular way he is recognised. The God whom some are pleased to call the God of Nature, is not God except he be the God of the Bible. He is an idol, a phantom of their own, tricked out and decked with some borrowed attributes, but he wants all power over the hearts. It is the Great Being who formed and who knows the heart, to whom we are to have regard in education. His love we wish to be felt, not merely as exhibited in forming the world and ministering to our present wants, but as providing for and securing our eternal happiness. His power we wish to be experienced, not only as manifested in making laws, but in enforcing and so directing them as to make our highest obedience also our highest enjoyment. To his glory we wish all to have respect in their actions, and his will we would have all taught cheerfully to obey.

CHAPTER VII.

One legitimate End of Education, human Happiness—Two Conditions necessary to secure Happiness—Religion alone can secure these—First, Freedom from the injurious Consequences of vicious Indulgence and from an accusing Conscience—Education must have Regard to this—Must therefore teach Christianity, which alone reveals moral Rules in Connexion with the only Source of moral Renovation—Second, Preparation for Affliction—Address to the Young—Preparation for Eternity—Loose Views of Observers of mere outward Morality—Danger and Folly of these, especially with Reference to Eternity—No Education effectual but Christian Education—Contrast between secular Ignorance accompanied with religious Knowledge and Feeling, and Science not so accompanied.

BUT there is still another light in which this consideration may be viewed, deserving some notice. There are many cases in which a regard to God's glory cannot guide us as to our direct procedure, although it limits and controls us. In these cases, we may legitimately, while thus checked and limited, have an immediate reference to another object. Let us see how this acts in regard to religious education.

I take for granted, what it is surely unnecessary to prove by any formal argument, that a legitimate object of all education is human happiness. I need not here enter on any definition of this term, so much used and abused, because no one will dispute the proposition as applying to that state which he himself deems to be happiness. It is all one whether the individual place his delight in gold, in the pursuits of intellect, in social intercourse, or in fame. All men—or at least so immense a majority that we may safely disregard the opinion of the minority—in practice admit that nothing gives them what they can call happiness without two

things,—the possession of their treasures without present annoyance, and without fear for the future. Education, then, having for one aim the greatest possible amount of happiness to the educated, must have in view the removal of these two great barriers, annoyance arising from regret for the past, and dread with regard to the future. It will easily be seen that religion effects—in the highest degree—both of these objects.

The first, it is evident, arises in most cases from our disobedience to the laws of God. A violation of these laws may procure present pleasure,—nay, generally does, for pleasure is the lure in most temptations to violate the law. But I apprehend that most men will admit that this violation destroys their permanent enjoyment, that is, their happiness. And this it does in a variety of ways. It acts injuriously upon their bodies, destroying their health, and unfitting them for even sensual enjoyments. It consigns them to uncomfortableness, uneasiness, and disease. It takes away from them the appetite, and yet, from habit, it dooms them to indulgence as if the appetite still existed. The unhappy man who has been accustomed to seek for gratification only in the unrestrained use of bodily indulgences, finds that he no longer cares for them when he uses them, yet that he cannot do without them,—and that he is forced by long-continued habit to indulge in pleasures for which he despises himself. It injures one element of happiness,—a man's reputation. He sees himself either despised or feared. He finds that his fellow-men either look upon him as a worm, or shun him as a serpent. He finds himself without sympathy, or without respect. His sorrows produce no regret, or bring upon him the charge of folly and improvidence. It destroys his own confidence in his fellow-creatures. He looks upon them either as his victims or his betrayers. Recognising in them his own features, or seeing in them his enemies, he thinks them fit only to prey upon him, or to be preyed on by him. He loses all feelings of sound love to them, and becomes aban-

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doned to selfishness. And his selfishness is without self-respect. He is conscious that he is not acting in a manner becoming the dignity of his nature, and he despises while he indulges himself. He may not always know why he is unhappy, but he is often rendered uneasy by secret longings after a purer state of existence and higher motives of action. He is afraid of looking back, because he sees that all his doings have been dictated by improper motives. He cannot bear to contemplate his present condition, for it is not in a state of improvement. And there is often joined to this, a lowering of outward condition. His wealth becomes dissipated, his employments become distasteful, his means of living leave him, he sinks in his fortunes, he loses even the semblance of friendship, and to secret sources of unhappiness are added open misery and want. Even in cases where there is no manifest and open violation of the great laws of morality recognised by man as essential to the well-being of society, there is—and here we appeal to all experience—a consciousness that the pursuits of time do not, either in their exercise or their result, produce happiness. It is not enough to have the conscience void of offence towards men, and thus to escape the ills above touched on, but we must have a conscience void of offence towards God, otherwise there is not the inward peace that alone can bestow the happiness of which all men are in search.

This fact is certain, however much men may dispute about happiness, that there is none without the due regulation of the moral principles. There may be wealth, and learning, and fame; but without the observance of the distinctions of right and wrong there can be no happiness. If education have for one great aim the happiness of the educated, and if a well-regulated morality be not only important in securing, but absolutely essential to that object, our business is to find the best system of morality, and the best method of teaching and imparting that system. It is of course needless to show that the religion of Christ is that which teaches the highest, purest, and only endur-

ing morality. Having respect to the history of our race and of moral philosophy, we regard it as beyond all dispute, that all present systems of morals are drawn from the maxims of our blessed religion. These are applicable to all ranks and all circumstances; if acted upon, they would change the face of nature, and convert this howling wilderness of unholy passions and actions into a paradise. We surely then need not argue that education, to be effectual, must embrace the precepts of the Christian religion. But much more, this religion is not merely a fuller development of the great moral law written upon the heart. If this were all, would mankind be much benefited by the divine revelation, judging from all our experience of the effect of mere rules? All that could be said of it in this case would be, that what we believed as so probably divine that we acted upon it ourselves, and by it judged others, we knew to be certainly from God. But while our guilt might be greater in disobedience than before, it is to be doubted if the revelation would much influence our practice. We should still be possessed of the same evil preference of self to God,—the same disinclination to give up our own will, and the same disregard of the future when competing with the present. Now, the Christian revelation directs us to use certain means to procure from God a change of motive and bias,—it not only tells us the will of God, but how our inclinations may move in the same direction as his laws. It secures not an obedience dependent on our present hopes and fears or views, but springing from an active and ever-growing habit. As far as morality is an element of happiness, it secures it in motive, practice, and enjoyment. Thus is the teaching of—not religion merely—but of the Christian religion, essential to every system of education which aims at securing the happiness of the human race.

That were a very imperfect system of education which did not contemplate, in reference to the future happiness of the educated, the disturbances of the outward condition

of man, not immediately connected with morality. In looking forward to the young as treading the walks of life, we must foresee their exposure, not only to the distracting influences of temptation, but that they will find—as all have found before them—the thorns of affliction growing in their way. If it be true that they should be trained, not only to discharge every duty, but to do so with the utmost possible regard to happiness, it is surely our part to prepare them to combat with the afflictions of life. It is surely our duty, not only to point out to them the heathen and obvious moralism of the vanity of all human things, and the wisdom of despising them, but, if we can, to go further. And surely we can go further. We can try the realities of life by a test that Socrates and Plato and Zeno never knew. We can estimate the treasures of this world and all that it affords, and we can console for its loss with comfort that God himself has given. We need not gloomily convert education into a prospective preparation for woe. But, seeing that woe will come whether we prepare for it or not, surely the best method is to arm against it. We may say to the young—You are now passing through that season of life when enjoyment is greatest and hope is brightest. Wend on your way with happy hearts, and may you have little to damp these enjoyments, or cloud these hopes! The Almighty has strown around you in exhaustless profusion the means of happiness. This universe, with its bright sun, and its serene moon, and its twinkling stars,—the sea with its dancing waves, and the rivers with their happy waters,—the hill with its lonely musings, and the flowers with their cheerful blossoms,—the fields with their waving treasures, and the trees in their stately pride,—society with its unceasing gratifications,—home with its heartfelt indescribable spell of still contentment,—the parents whose eyes beam fondness,—the friends whose look tells of encouraging anticipation,—the teachers who long to see you treading with steady steps the road to knowledge,—the ready laugh

—the calm hours of concentrated thought and study, ay, and the pensive tear shed over some imaginary wo or some favourite removed,—all incite you to view with the eye of fond delight the world in which you now dwell. And so you should view it. It is bestowed on you by God, and he wills you to be happy in the enjoyment of his gifts. But you must use them rightly. You must remember that happiness here was not the end of your existence, and that your stay here, be it happy or miserable, is intended to fit you for a hereafter. We grieve to disturb the fond dream,—if any among you dream that you can long enjoy even the happiness which you now possess,—but disturbed it will be ; and why not prepare a solace ? Events change, your feelings change, all things human change. Imagine yourselves possessed of all that you think can make you happy,—happy in your parents,—happy in your studies,—happy with your friends,—happy with the world. The happiness could not be secured to you a day, a week, a single hour. Your friends may drop off into coldness or the grave,—you may look for your parents and find them not,—your opportunities of study may be shortened,—and the world may reject you. But whether all this happen or not, one thing is most assured,—you yourselves will change. You are destined for something far more noble than to go down the stream of life a gilded bauble dancing on the rippling waters. And your souls will tell you so. The world and all its enjoyments may ever continue the same ; but you will change, and crave and crave for something more. Till you obtain this, the longing of your soul, you can never be happy. You may perhaps doubt the truth of this. You may shake your heads and say, Oh no,—with my dear father and my loving mother,—with my friends, my books, my quiet home, and my rational amusements,—I can never change. At least so have said thousands before you. Of all those who have acquired more matured years there is not one among your friends,—I trust a goodly number,—who will not tell you as I

have told you. They will assure you that they once thought as you think,—that they have enjoyed the pleasures of life,—its natural beauties and its social delights,—but that these all leave a void in the soul. Even if this were not the case, what folly to be so fond of that which to-day you possess, and from which you yourselves may to-morrow be taken away for ever ! Is this a groundless thought ? No ; we have seen, full oft, the fond and the affectionate and the eager boy, the delight of a neighbourhood, and the hope of an expectant family, the joy of a mother's eye, and the pride of a father's heart,—we have seen such a one to-day, gay and active, the life of all around him, and, by the noon-tide of the morrow, stretched in the embrace of a sleep from which he shall not awake till the morning of the resurrection. Do I say this to sadden you ? No. There is a study, the sources of whose pleasure are inexhaustible,—which displays a friend unchangeable,—which gives happiness that knows no decay. Unless pure and undefiled religion influence the life of man, it becomes a muddystagnant pool, teeming with monsters, and scattering pestilence around. Under the balmy yet powerful influences of God's word, the waters are refreshed, the reptiles are swept away, happiness is in every gentle ripple of the stream, till at last it mingles with that immortal river which gladdens the city of our God. Seek ye this instruction—prize it—and apply it. As long as you live it will make you as happy as this life may be,—for even with religion the probationary trials of this existence must all work their course,—it will certainly keep you from stagnant hopeless misery, and it will go with you to the narrow tomb. “ Wisdom is the principal thing ; therefore get wisdom, and with all thy getting get understanding.”

There is, to dwell more fully on a topic here glanced at, a future, before which all present things sink into insignificance, and which is of infinite importance to the young as well as to us all. If man were destined to act

a part merely on earth and then to exist no more,—even in that case, the lessons of morality would be essential to his happiness. But these lessons become of fearful importance, when we come to consider that in education we are concerned in training *immortal spirits*. The sanctions of religion have a most peculiar force in this aspect. The man who has a view only to this world and its prosperity and its enjoyments, knows full well that his standing in the world and his advancement in the procuring of the means of self-indulgence, depend much on his outward show of virtue. And hence, whatever may be his inclinations, he never openly violates the rules of conventional morality. Secret sins he may indulge, and he may give free scope to his disposition in enjoying those pleasures which men in general pursue, and therefore do not censure. He neither drinks to intoxication, nor lies grossly, nor steals, nor murders, nor openly defrauds his neighbour, for he knows that such actions would expose him to condign punishment, and render him ultimately an outcast from society, whose applause or whose sufferance at least he covets. But his heart is beyond human cognizance. As long as the world, judging by his exterior, pronounces him a moral man, he is contented. This is all he aims at, because the world is all that he deems necessary for his happiness. He may be at times visited by dire compunctious thoughts, that this is not enough. But he soon gets rid of them by fresh pursuit of pleasures, by self-applause of his fancied virtue, and by the practices of those around them. He forgets that his fellow-men are right in judging well of him by his outward acts, for they have no other test,—they cannot know his heart. He forgets that there is a Being who judges not by the outward actions, but of the motives from which they proceed—of his heart. Were he to reflect seriously that, in a few years, the pleasures of the world will vanish from his grasp, and his fancied excellence be brought to a test different from that by which he has been hitherto tried,

he would examine into the state—not of his standing with the world, but—of his standing with God. And, in all cases, whether of the moral man thus described or of the open profligate, there is constantly, though not visibly influential, a dark cloud hovering over and blackening all enjoyment. Men can shut out the future judgment from their minds in its recognised futurity, but they cannot shut it out in the vague oppressive feeling of its constantly-felt approach. Even though it never acted thus to destroy the certainty of present happiness, our knowledge that it inevitably awaits all, teaches us in regard to the permanent happiness of society, to give it a prominent place in all our educational schemes. To educate a child for the world that now is, without regard to the life that is to come, is infatuation so blind that it merits our severest censure and our pity. To affect to guide the mind, and yet only to guide it as to a few moments without respect to a whole lifetime, is nothing to the folly of excluding from education the view of eternity. Were we to say that we had educated our children when we had taught them three letters of the alphabet, we should not be so egregiously foolish as we are when we say that we have educated our children and yet have taught them only a few things of the present world. Their happiness—their eternal happiness ought to be our great object. Can we permit them to go forth into a world of temptation without the shield furnished by the thoughts of death, of judgment, of a never-ending hereafter? Can we send them into the midst of scenes of suffering and affliction, and leave them without the consolations which the bliss of heaven distils into the cup of human sorrow? Can we see them commence a career which is to be finished at the longest in a few short years, without teaching them the truths that belong to an endless existence when that career is ended? Education, without a view to eternity, is the grossest folly that ever betrayed the children of men into a belief that time is eternity and that the world is God.

In this matter we must have recourse, not to the mere vague teaching of a religion, but of the *Christian religion*. It is only through it that we have any sure knowledge of the history of eternity. Life and immortality have been emphatically brought to light through the gospel. By it we have been confirmed in our belief that the doings of time have the closest connexion with our future condition. Eternity itself has been revealed to us; and it certainly sheds a light of infinite importance on the affairs of this preparatory world. We are by it taught that it is not sufficient to avoid gross and flagrant outrages which bring down the scorn and the condemnation of the world. We are informed that we ought not to rest on deeds of practice having for their object success in life, a fair name, and a store of this world's wealth. The inquiries of our souls as to our future state have met with an answer of awful import. We are informed that our whole life on earth is but a state of training for a life that shall never end. We are informed of the high requisitions made by the law of God,—that we are to love him with our whole hearts, and to love our neighbours as ourselves. We feel that, judged by this standard, we are both helpless and hopeless. Then are we shown a way to attain pardon and acceptance, forgiveness for the past, and holiness rendering us meet for entering upon the joys of heaven.

The Christian religion alone teaches this; and its lessons are indispensable in education. The natural religion which enforces moral obligation without regard to a hereafter, acts upon part of our nature only, and must fail in imparting any moral strength. The highest degree of virtue ever attained by man, with all the aids of religion of the best and purest kind, has ever been after all imperfect. Much more must be and has been imperfect any virtue inculcated by mere temporal moral teaching. If we admit the possibility of a natural religion that has a respect to the future, it must necessarily be full of doubts and fears. It appeals to a future state, but cannot tell

what that future state is. It enforces morality by sanctions; but the nature and extent of the sanctions are unknown. If the Almighty is to be contented with imperfect obedience, with what degree of imperfect obedience is he to be contented? If he is to accept of repentance, of what kind is it, and how far will he accept? Even if I give an obedience which I admit to be imperfect, but yet hold to be a kind of obedience now, how do I know that to-morrow I shall not be found in a rebellious attitude against my God? What is my security not only against the pains of punishment, but against myself? All these and other similar questions are unanswered by any system of merely natural religion, and a door is opened for the entrance of darkest fears, all destroying happiness. It is surely rational for us to be concerned about our future state. If we do not blame the merchant who teaches those under his charge to provide for the coming demands of the next week, but rather praise him, we surely shall not blame but rather praise him who accustoms the young to look forward to the coming demands of eternity. This is so essential that we ought never to dispense with it in education; and yet it is very apt to be overlooked by us with regard to the young, because we are apt to overlook it with regard to ourselves. I call upon all who profess to believe the record of our religion to answer whether we are not bound to keep this constantly in view. I call upon them to declare whether it be not true what I have stated, that the beings educated are immortal beings,—liable to the penalties of a broken law,—unable in their own strength to keep its enactments,—possessing no means in themselves of procuring the divine forgiveness and favour. I call upon them to agree with me that we have no security for the moral wellbeing of society, but that afforded by the Scriptures of truth, that we have no hopes of a happy eternity but those which they reveal. If they agree with me in these points—as they must—I ask them if it be not the extreme of folly to affect to

teach morality by insufficient means, when we have placed at our disposal the appliances of a perfect method? I ask them if it be not the blindest disregard to the future, to content themselves with limiting education to the things of this world as the end, and to the knowledge of this world as the means, when this world is the infinitely smaller portion of future existence? Here let us make a stand. We must not be contented with the mere acknowledgment of this as a truth not to be disputed, or so universally received that it is not worth urging. It is a lamentable fact that, universally as it is received, it is not universally acted upon. I am not now discussing the much disputed question as to religious instruction,—that discussion yet awaits us. I am treating merely of the general question of education. Yet let each man honestly ask himself how far he is at this moment rearing his own children with a view to their eternal welfare,—how far he is postponing that question or waving it altogether, leaving these concerns to the minister or to chance. Let him ask himself how far he is using means to make his child a child of God. Is he half as anxious that his family shall please their Creator—shall receive the teaching of the Holy Spirit—shall be interested in the redemption of his Son—as that they shall please men and acquire the elements of knowledge useful in life? In cultivating their minds, does he endeavour, with prayerful efforts, to show them how they should glorify God in all things, how they should obey him, how much need they have of spirits renewed, and wills moulded after the fashion of the Eternal? Does he carefully inquire, not merely into the extent of their knowledge of things temporal, but of truths eternal? Is he anxious that the teacher shall be a pious man as well as an accomplished scholar? Does he leave to accident the instructions that are bestowed upon his children in connexion with the world to come, while he shows the most rational anxiety about those connected with this world? It will not do to say that all these

considerations are dictated by enthusiasm or priestcraft, or are needlessly precise. If the Christian religion be founded in truth, I defy man to controvert the position laid down. In education, we have not to do with part of the mind of a youth, with part of his training, but with his whole training. We are responsible to society for the moral as well as the intellectual part. We are responsible to God for all. We are not responsible for our success, but we are bound to use the best appliances within our reach, and these are derived from and connected with the religion of Christ.

Let us view in a picture, the reality of which occurs every day, the effects of the two systems, and then let us judge more vividly of the difference. I do not, I may mention previously, by any means intend to advocate the bliss of ignorance. I merely use the contrast that we may the better inquire into the cause of happiness, seeing that it is not to be found in mere knowledge.

Let us look at humble life, and visit the peasant's cottage. Here we shall often find a happiness which will in vain be sought in the stately mansion of the man of science. With knowledge sufficient to guide him in all his proceedings in life, instilling into his children the duties which they owe to God and man, he keeps the noiseless tenor of his way, almost unconsciously happy in the exercise of all that is required of him. He cannot dwell with glowing language and in scientific terms on the influences which the sun exercises on the planetary world,—he cannot decompose the air into its elements, or quote with learned rapture whatever has been sung by bard inspired, even of the things most familiar to the eye and ear,—but he knows what is required of him; and whether in the field, or in the barn, or in the workshop, he has perfect knowledge of all that is to be done and all that he can do. No day, no hour passes away unimproved by him, and his family in smiling plenty around him tells of successful industry and a comfortable home. Contentment smooths his

brow, and the happy hum of inward and intense gratitude often moves his blithesome lips. Look at the appearance presented by the man of knowledge and his family. Are there the same or similar marks of happiness there? Let the scowling looks and the puckered brow,—let the unruly family with their snatches of fevered enjoyments, and their nervous dread of a tyrant's punishment,—let an irregular household and brawling contests “from morn to noon, from noon to dewy eve,” answer the question. Yet there knowledge has reared her standard. The philosopher has penetrated secrets of nature which the sages of ancient time never knew,—he can calculate the return of comets,—he has dissected nature,—he has viewed all the nations of the earth in their rise, their progress, and their decay,—he can enumerate the products of every various clime, its religion, and the state of its morality. He can reason most convincingly on the benefits derived from liberty and the laws which ought to regulate the commerce of a nation; but he is not contented, and he is not happy. How is this? His knowledge is great,—equally fitted to his exalted station, as the poor man's knowledge is to his humble lot. Let us inquire into the cause. Few will advocate the absurd notion that happiness such as is experienced on earth is found only in the poor man's lowly cot. Blessed be God, the road to true happiness is open to all, and its throbbings may be felt in the breast that is covered with the gossamer-like lace, as well as in that which is covered with homespun of surpassing coarseness. Too often, likewise, is the home of the poor the abode of wretchedness, of the fearful misery which want adds to wickedness. But since knowledge is often accompanied with misery, and ignorance with happiness, some other element must constitute the essential ingredient of the portion which all men desire. What is it that, in the case which we have supposed, constitutes the difference in other respects? Both have the degree of knowledge required for the discharge of their

worldly duties,—but the one has a knowledge higher far, hopes more divine, and prospects which brighten every step that he advances to the grave. The peasant and the philosopher both know that they must die. The former has been taught, and he believes, that the world is given him by God for enjoyment and preparation,—that the duties which he has to perform now fit him for higher duties hereafter,—that the morality which he practises now in the pleasures which that practice affords, is giving him a foretaste of a delight unspeakable which he shall hereafter enjoy,—and that the sorrows which he suffers in this world of trial are meant to purify and refine his soul, and rivet his affections upon heaven. On the mountain-side and in the dark wood, in the luxuriant field and amongst the wild pasture-land, he lifts his soul in fond gratitude to his heavenly Father,—in his smiling home with cheerfulness around,—in the hour when sickness pales the cheek of those whom he loves,—even when death strikes down the objects around whom his dearest affections were twined, he remembers the lessons which he learned from his father's lips, at the humble school, and in the time-worn house of God far away among the hills, from the man whom he has, since his youth, heard with reverence discourse of God, of judgment and eternity, in the same spot where his father and his grandsires drank the same heavenly wisdom,—and confidence fills his breast that all is well regulated by that God who is Love. Wonder not then that happiness is here,—there is temporal knowledge sufficient for duty, and a conscience void of offence towards God and towards man. But there might be as much happiness in the other case, and there would be if there were as much moral worth. There often is religion combined with knowledge, and then there too is happiness. Nor do I see any other cause for the unhappiness of the man in question than the absence of moral principle.

This comparison helps us, I think, to form a correct

notion of what ought to guide us with regard to one great point, respecting the happiness of individuals, and consequently of communities. The rules of morality are common to all, and are binding upon all. In all cases the man who infringes them is so far miserable, and the man who observes them so far happy. In all cases the community where the infraction of them is most common, is the most wretched,—the community where the observance of them is most common, is the most prosperous. These rules are useful in all times and in all places. There is not a conceivable situation in life where they are not fulfilled or violated. By the wayside and in the house, in business and in pleasure, in the senate-house and in the hovel, —with friends and strangers, we cannot stir a step without violating or observing these great laws. They follow us to retirement, and they bind us in the busy hum of multitudes; when we enter the house of mourning, and when we join in the merry feast of the rejoicing, they are with us. To transgress them is to incur certain unhappiness,—to forget them altogether is impossible: they are graven on our very hearts. Nor are they only common to all individuals and to all classes, but they are common to every period of life. The child, the youth, the full-grown, and the hoary-headed, are all subject to the same laws.

They have for their end the glory of God, the good of society, the happiness of states, families, and individuals. They can be taught by no religion but that of Christ, for it alone professes to bestow a new heart, new obedience, and in the end everlasting life.

CHAPTER VIII.

Meaning of the Term, Glory of God, as used in Reference to Education
—Love and Obedience—Negative in many Cases easily discovered
—Truth of Affirmative difficult and unnecessary to be known—
Moral Reasons for Happiness of a Country which worships God—
Mere Obedience to human Laws insufficient for the Happiness of a
Country—Superiority of a seemingly religious People to the other
Requisites of the general Happiness—Four Grades of Society—
Lawless—Bound by Law alone—By voluntary Morality in Ap-
pearance—In Reality—Blending of these Grades—Duty of the State
to aim at the highest as far as possible—Especially in Education—
The Means to be employed for this—The Bible—Neglect of it—
Study of it requisite—History of the Jews—Philosophy of History
—Morals—Jewish Law—Prophecies—Psalms—Historical Books of
the New Testament—Epistles—Method of Salvation—In renewing
the Heart—In bestowing immortal Life.

As I have stated that the glory of God should be taught as the proper end and aim of all our actions, it behoves me to examine more particularly into the meaning of this term, and how far the obligation extends.

By the glory of God, in this application, I mean the honour voluntarily paid him by his rational creatures in worshipping him and obeying his laws, including love and submission. There are some cases in which it may be doubtful, both to his fellow-men and to himself, how far a man has respect to the glory of God, but there are very many in which there can be no doubt, as to the negative at least. If we see that a man omits altogether the outward acts which God requires as indications of inward homage,—that he neglects his word, that he despises his Sabbaths, that he cares nothing for his ordinances, we can have no doubt that this man voluntarily lives without regard to the honour of God. And if we see another, who affects to live in the practice of God's worship, systematically profane his commandments, act in defiance of the

second great branch of the law, and, instead of loving his neighbour as himself, take every opportunity, fair or unfair, of adding to his own wealth, influence, or enjoyment, at the expense of his fellow-men, we can have as little doubt that he practically dishonours God by disowning allegiance to him as his moral governor. We can pronounce with perfect safety on both these cases that there is here a voluntary dishonouring of God, a desire not to add to his glory, and either resistance to the divine law or a contemptuous disregard of its requirements.

As to the affirmative, it is more difficult to pronounce. Nor is it necessary. There may be many men who, from any other motive than a desire to advance the glory of God, live in the outward use of the means appointed by him for the maintaining of his worship, who appear to have a reverent regard for the Word of Truth, for the duties of divine worship, and all the forms of religion. They may be strictly honest in their dealings and kind in their demeanour toward their fellow-men. It is not our duty, for it is not our province, to say more with regard to all such, than, that whatever may be the motive, they have the show at least of giving honour to God. Society is benefited by them to this extent, and no human judgment can pronounce accurately with regard to them. It is possible that their motives may be the desire of a fair reputation, the desire of aggrandizement, the indulgence of a natural temperament, any thing but a desire to give glory to God. He may never be in their thoughts, and all the while that they are seeming to honour him, they may only, in reality, be seeking to honour themselves. But the human eye can never penetrate this. We can only judge of motives by actions; and it were alike dangerous and absurd to attempt to establish any other canon. Hence all human decisions as to a man's character are necessarily imperfect,—the seat of the human affections which most operate on the will is beyond our reach, we can neither act nor sit in judgment upon it with certainty,—and, estimating our

neighbours as ourselves, we can only deplore the deceitfulness of the human heart, and pray for the bestowal of sincerity.

In estimating the effects upon society of the sincere and of the simulate worshipper of God, there are obvious elements which we cannot compute. How far the blessing of God will attend the one, and how far the other, we do not know; for we are often mistaken as to what is actually the value of certain outward circumstances as a blessing, and we have no means of ascertaining the divine procedure. Leaving this, then, out of view, as beyond our knowledge in its extent, though we know assuredly that it will affect the state of matters in reality, we cannot compare, if even two such things existed, a country all sincerity, and a country all hypocrisy. But we can have no difficulty in seeing moral reasons for lauding the condition of a land where outward homage is paid to God,—putting out of account the inward feelings for reasons above mentioned,—compared with that of a land where God is generally unknown and unhonoured. The regular and solemn worship of God occurring at stated intervals and in one common sanctuary,—the homage paid outwardly by all ranks and conditions,—the expressions of love and the lessons of obedience common to all,—form a cement that binds together the different grades of society, at a time when the contests of the world are shut out. There is the recognition of one common parent and of one common master. There is the knee bent to the same supreme God. There are the same confessions of the same weakness, the same follies, the same sins. There is the request of one common forgiveness and of one common acceptance. There is the prospect of one day of judgment and of one Judge. There is the view of one happiness and of one misery. One God is the Lord of all, one Saviour the Redeemer of all, one Spirit the Teacher of all. The more all ranks are thus brought together, the more will there be of attention to the mutual relationships of life, for several reasons, independent altogether of the

influence which the instructions may have upon the conscience, though the results must fall far short of what they would be if these lessons actually reached the heart.

There needs be said little of the effect upon society of the observance of the great moral laws affecting our intercourse with our fellow-men, because, without regard to the motive for this observance, the object of all human laws is to secure it to a certain degree. Only to a certain degree, for, as we have already seen, there are many moral obligations which, from their indefiniteness in some particular, the law cannot enforce. And herein consists the efficacy of the moral obligations of religion beyond that of the mere restraint of law. You might have a community where all the laws of the land might be kept, and all legal obligations punctually discharged. And yet that land might be the scene of unhappiness, discontent, and foulest passions. Nothing might be done to satisfy the demands of gratitude, benevolence, and love; nothing to prove that there were any obligations, except those resulting from the iron miserable philosophy—that only that is right which is the creature of statute. It is not mere obedience to the law which any wise legislator would wish to see practised throughout a community; that is merely the limit which must not be transgressed without the interference of penal restraint. The great duty is to use means for the infusion of such a spirit as shall yield ready obedience to the laws, but shall do much more,—shall cheerfully recognise and act upon loftier principles, which the law can never reach, but which spring from common relationships, and knit the community together. There are in all countries men who, without any regard to the feelings thus alluded to, keep within the letter of the law. They defraud no one,—they never violate a statute,—but neither do they acknowledge any thing else but a statute. They demand the full right to do what they will with their own, and they deny the existence of the claims of beneficence, of gratitude, of charity, and of love. Such

men are a fair specimen of what a society would be, thus constituted in the very first elements of legal order—they constitute a society superior to that of the openly disregarding of law, and one again vastly inferior to the other, where not only is statute law recognised as binding, but where there is attention paid to the claims of a higher right.

Let us see how it is, that both in the binding together of all ranks, and in the observance of statute law, and in the practice of virtues which the statute law cannot enforce, a community seemingly alive to the duties of religion—irrespective of the question of the reality of that seeming—is superior to a community where there is no such outward show. The first have voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher law. They have not only shown obedience to those obligations which can be defined, but to those which are undefinable. The extent of the real obedience given will vary in proportion to the reality of their subjection to the undefinable obligations; but it will, in all cases, be greater obedience to these than if there was no show of recognition. The very profession of one common religion implies the recognition of one common humanity; and this brings with it all the consequences of a more extended obedience to the requirements of mere moral obligations. My haughty neighbour, who obeys no law but the law of the land, may treat me with scorn as his inferior so constituted by the law; but if he voluntarily acknowledge himself my equal in all the essentials of sinship, he must, to a certain extent, that depending on other considerations, depart from his haughtiness. My rich neighbour, intrenched behind the laws of his country, may steel himself against my need of assistance. But, voluntarily subjecting himself to the law of beneficence and charity involved in our common religion, he must needs, in consistency, prove himself sincere by some deed, however small, of active charity. But it must not be a religion,—it must be such a religion as acknowledges those common obligations both to God and man,—not such as

has one set of doctrines for the rich and one for the poor, for the wise and the unwise,—not such as puts beyond the pale of humanity all who have not the same creed, making a distinction between the Jew and the Samaritan,—it must be a religion which convinces all of sin, which regards all mankind as our neighbours,—it must be **THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION**, which reveals to all one common condition before God, which binds all together by the close and endearing tie of neighbourhood.

Waving all consideration of the exceptions which may here and there occur, and which may blend the particular acts of the different states of society, and looking at that feature which, standing prominently forward, characterizes them, we have four distinct grades in which communities advance to perfection. The one is where there is no general respect to law, but only to the obligations of force, where the weakest are obliged to yield to the strongest, and where possession and enjoyment are held by that feeble bond which results from mere sufferance. The very sufferance is an indication of moral feeling, but in its lowest state. This society is that of the savage, where life and all its consequences are precarious and dependent on animal feeling, without the guidance of reason or moral privilege, and where a mere feeling of moral obligation keeps the community together. One step higher, we have the community agreeing either tacitly or expressly to certain laws. In such states there is no effort made to recognise or enforce, in general action, any thing except the provisions which are made by express enactment. This is a higher, but still a low condition of things. It is to be found in all states where religion is not taught so as that it shall act upon the principles. In such communities there may be manifestations of moral feeling, but there are none of abiding moral principle, except such as are engendered by the law. To this extent the moral principles of the mind are exercised in the general mass, and no further. Hence, with greater stability than in the former case, there is no expansion of

national views, no liberality of individual character, but national and individual selfishness. We reach a third grade, where there is a profession of religion as acting upon the moral feelings, and where, consequently, there is the bond of obligation, so far extended as religious voluntary obligation, in its lowest degree, exceeds laws. Add to this, the reality of the religious feeling, and you have the highest possible state of human society, the members bound together by a chain stronger far than any ever forged by human hand,—even that which is formed of divine materials. It comprehends all the obligations of the other three, and superadds the working of love, leading to cheerful obedience to God and benevolence towards man.

In many communities we see these various degrees variously blended. We see semi-barbarous countries, where law has not obtained firm and settled consistency, and yet operates in a certain degree, where there is a greater protection than in mere vague fits of moral feeling, and yet where the law does not operate with constant vigour, but is liable to give way to paroxysms of injustice or violence. In arbitrary countries, such as Turkey, we find a greater degree of protection than in New Zealand, but there is the risk of the tyrant's resentment or his covetousness. In the back settlements of America there is a blending of the two, in the respect had to the rights of property and in the operation of Lynch-law. The second and third are blended where we have the community, in part, sternly pressing forward in the acquirement of wealth, and, in part, influenced by religious feelings which expand their morality. May we not cite as an example almost the whole of the United States? Have we not here a race of men, in whom we are startled by extraordinary keenness on the one hand, driving a bargain up to the very verge of the law, and on the other exhibiting splendid instances of Christian philanthropy? The highest state of human society which we can any where show is one made up of the third and fourth, where we have the profession of

religion universal, but without the power, and the power manifested strongly in many, and giving the remainder of the community its tone. We might refer as an instance of this state of things to Scotland in those palmy days of our church, when peer and peasant united in one profession, and many showed, by the sacrifices which they made, the sincerity of their convictions.

We ought to desire earnestly that the highest conceivable state of society should be ours, but this human legislature,—human efforts,—cannot attain. Even the next in rank cannot be made universal, but it can be made so general, that it shall give the “age and body of the time its form and pressure.” No one would advocate that the profession of religion should be demanded by legislative enactment. But this we can demand; seeing that the legislature is bound to secure the highest state of society possible, and that the highest state of society is that wherein the members are led by moral feeling and principle implanted, enforced, and sanctioned by religious considerations, to the willing and active discharge of every duty, the legislature is bound to approach this state of things as nearly as it possibly can. It cannot implant religion in the heart, for that is beyond the power of man. It ought not to enforce the observance of active religion, at least by penal statutes, except in so far as the non-observance is opposed to civil order, for Christ’s “kingdom is not of this world.” But it can encourage religion as a surer safeguard, even if it be only the religion of profession, than mere statutory enactments. It can furnish all with the means of religious instruction. It may be a question whether it is more expedient for it to interfere actively or not, but the state can actively or neutrally see that society at large has the means of knowing sacred truths. It cannot implant those religious principles which are the honour and the protection of a country, but it can use the means which God has been pleased to appoint for their implantment; it can teach, in one word, all under its jurisdiction, the

great truth, whether they act on it or not, that they are bound to do all things with a single eye to the glory of God.

These means are all outward, it is admitted, and may be totally inefficacious in many cases. We may never reach such a state of society as that none of the third class shall mingle with the others. But in education, we must make the attempt. Viewing by himself each individual to be educated, we are all agreed that the most blessed consummation of his education would be, that he should perform his duty to his God and his fellow-men with perfect obedience. And we are all agreed that this is the result of a morality brought about by religion. We are agreed that if this cannot be attained, we are bound at least to use the means, that is, to make him acquainted with that morality; and we have no doubt that, whether it be implanted in his heart or not, there is a reasonableness and a social safety in its requirements, which shall, in a greater probability than the contrary, lead him to adopt them to a certain extent in his general dealings. At all events, we are bound to use the means, and we are encouraged to use them by their success in other instances. Here we come to inquire practically into the means.

I repeat that I do not intend yet to enter on the controverted ground. But I must again call upon those who profess the religion of Christ, to agree with me as to the desirableness and necessity of the use of these means. They who deny the Scriptures to be the Word of God may consistently reject the use of the means which are to be now mentioned. What system of moral teaching they would adopt, or by what sanctions they would enforce it, I do not know. But Christians have but one common source from which to draw their teaching, and that I call upon Christians to adopt. There is a necessity to make the call strong and urgent. There are many who dare not deny the propriety of using it as means of education, who never use it in their own families. There are others

in whose families the Scriptures are read but never taught, never examined from, never made a medium of instruction at all. I call upon them either to deny that the Scriptures are the word of God, or to give them a place in the education of the young. If they make the admission which their conduct seems to refuse, they admit that the word of God contains the purest precepts of morality, the highest sanctions for enforcing them, and the only method of implanting them in the heart, which is effectual to procure love, obedience, and everlasting happiness,—that it embodies the only means and the only end of all morality and of all happy existence. I ask all those who have children to educate, or are educating the children of others, and who profess the Christian faith, if they are acting upon this profession. It includes all that I have said, and much more. It were far more honest, and it were safer, to abandon the Scriptures altogether, and take to some other moral system, than, holding by the Scriptures, to teach no morality at all. Yet such remarks as these are necessary for very many who, perhaps, have not thought much of the matter. As occasions have occurred, they have perhaps inveighed against the odiousness of lying, or the disgrace of being liable to be called a thief,—but have they systematically shown the corruption of the heart, the need for purity and strength, the divine law enjoining truth and honesty, and the necessity of manifesting love to God by exhibiting these qualities towards man? Have they shown from Scripture the extent of the divine requirements, that it is not sufficient to do some things, but that it is our duty to do all things according to the law of God ;—that outward obedience is not enough, but that all the affections of our mind must combine to render him homage and worship,—that we must not only avoid flagrant sins, but subdue every rebellious desire,—that our whole nature must be conformed to the law of God—that God looks to the heart,—that there is offered to them a change of heart, a renewed

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will, growing strength in every good thought, word, and work, and a happy immortality? Have they, in short, endeavoured, so much as has been in their power, with prayer for the blessing of God, to reveal to them the whole counsel of God on their behalf? If they have not, they have been teaching a morality defective, if they have taught morality at all.

Now I do not so much fear that any man—any Christian, I mean—will meet these statements with an open denial, as I am afraid that, admitting them to be true, many will still neglect to act upon them. If there were any denial of the propriety of educating with the aid of the Scriptures, there might be a hope that, the propriety of the measure being proved, the use would be resorted to. The neglect might have arisen from a misconception, or from some fallacious reasoning, or from ignorance, and that misconception or fallacy or ignorance being removed, it might be expected that the proper measures would be adopted. As it is, there is an admission on all sides, but there is not a general acting upon that admission. There are various degrees of neglect—a total neglect—almost total—and a use which is nothing but neglect. There is a never-reading at all—a reading now and then as in affliction or on a death—a reading on the Sabbath with perhaps a sermon to pass the time—and there is a regular reading with no examination, and a reading with a sort of examination now and then; and there is a reading and examination with no application to the occurring affairs of life, and so on in the same ascending but, at the highest, melancholy series.

Every Christian will admit that the word of God, containing the will of God for our salvation, claims the first place in every system of education, when the object is to train the young to the habit of voluntarily honouring God in all things, to the observance of his law, and to the hopes of eternal happiness. The study of it will be admitted to follow as a necessary branch of education. I say the study of it. The mere reading, without atten-

tion to the import and force of its contents, will not satisfy the claim which it has upon our attention. Now this study demands three things—close attention to the morality developed, to the plan revealed for securing moral observance, and to the scheme of salvation.

I. For the first, among other things, we must impart to the young a knowledge of the history of the Jews as contained in the Old and New Testaments. I shall have occasion in a subsequent part of this work to examine shortly into the methods which ought to be pursued at different stages of progress, but I am here speaking of the result of full education. A knowledge of this history is important, not only as connected with the plan of redemption, but as opening up to us sources of information otherwise to us wholly closed. I do not mean merely the history of the world at a period when profane literature is altogether silent, although in this point the study is of immense value. Let those who, accustomed from their earliest years to the information contained in the Bible, are on that very account so imbued with its contents that they do not know their value from the want of contrast, reflect on the acquisition which is made by the simple declaration, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," thus authoritatively putting an end to the endless questions as to the co-eternity of matter with the eternal God himself. Let them reflect on the gain acquired by philosophy from the statements made as to the introduction of moral evil, "the cause of all our wo," and the proceedings of the first inhabitants of this world. Let them calculate, if they can, the importance of certainty in the moral history of our race, in putting a stop to endless speculation and babbling philosophy. The mightiest masters of antiquity, engaged in endless unsatisfactory inquiries, and perplexed themselves about questions which can be answered at once by the young child of our day, before he has had time to acquire more than the very elements of learning. But

the history of the Jews gives us a key to all history. It is as if the mechanician were to open up the interior of some elaborate work, and show us the springs, and explain the structure, and develop its use, leaving us to apply our knowledge thus acquired in judging of other products of his skill. We might be wrong in our estimate of the particular parts, but we could not be wrong in fixing upon the particular design or the great principles which applied to all. In the Jewish history the interior of the mechanism of a world's history has been laid open to us. We see how God in their case overruled all things to advance the great cause of his own kingdom, how he made even the wrath of his enemies to praise him, and how the march of events advanced surely towards the accomplishment of his mighty purpose. In history, all who have attended to its philosophy know that there is often nothing more fallacious than the causes which are assigned to certain events,—the motives which are said to have actuated the parties and the secret springs of action attributed to them. Now we have in the Bible the only account which can be depended upon as unerringly true of events with all their philosophy. It is admitted that the Jews were a people set apart for a particular purpose, and directly governed by God. But we have no reason to believe that in that government he moved them by principles different from those which now actuate men. We have the question solved of how far a people would obey God if he should reveal himself directly to them. We have the history of the Israelites and their motives, when they had abjured the God of their fathers. And we have the contemporaneous history of other countries, so far as they were connected with the Jews, all bearing testimony to the same fact that God causeth all things to work together for the promotion of the great kingdom of righteousness and peace. The true philosopher who wishes to draw lessons from history on which he may rely will seek for instruction in the Bible.

The moral lessons that are easily deducible from the scripture history render it most valuable. The evils of family strife, and of parental partiality,—the blessings attendant upon an affable disposition ready to benefit and to forgive,—the miseries that follow immorality,—the troubles that attend ambition, and the pangs of jealousy,—all these and much more are shown by facts whose truth is indubitable, and whose every detail is fraught with instruction.

Nor must we neglect the knowledge of the Jewish law, at least in its great features. No one will deny the propriety of making the young acquainted with the moral law, but the history of that people cannot be followed with due understanding, without an acquaintance with the great points of the ceremonial law, such as those connected with their feasts, their worship, and their courts. Much of the perception of the force of the New Testament depends on this knowledge, where we have of course numberless allusions to the passover, the sacrifices in the temple, the sanhedrim, and many other points otherwise unintelligible, or at all events uninteresting. It cannot surely but be a matter of interest to know the types and shadows, of which we are now enjoying the antitype and the substance. All such matters rivet the interest, and through the understanding reach the heart.

It is hardly necessary to say that a knowledge of the geography of the countries alluded to at any length or chronicled in sacred history, is in a high degree useful. Every thing that adds interest to such a subject demands our attention. I do not mean merely a knowledge of the position of the places, but of this in reference to the history. Each man, while tracing on his map the march of our armies in Spain or India, acts upon the principle, that without an acquaintance with the localities, his knowledge of history is imperfect and unsatisfactory.

In educating on Bible principles, we must have respect to the prophecies for the lofty moral lessons which they

constantly breathe, the confirmation which they give to the truth of the sacred writings, and the key which fulfilled prophecy furnishes us with, to solve prophecies yet unfulfilled or unrecognised as such. I speak not here, for it were out of place, of the mere literary claims which the prophecies possess for assiduous study. In truth, I have not taken that element at all into calculation, although I might have urged the severe simplicity of the scripture narrative, the lofty and overpowering dignity of its prophetic annunciations, the melting pathos of its complaints, and the authoritative sublimity of its legislative enactments. All these, irrespective of the sacred character of Scripture, might entitle it to a place in a complete system of education; but I am treating of it as entitled to hold the first place. Irrespective of literary claims, then, altogether we should give prophecy a place in education for its moral bearing. Where shall we find more pathetic invitations to virtue, more appalling denunciations of vice, more lofty appeals to a sense of duty and of gratitude? "Turn ye, turn ye, why will ye die, O house of Israel? I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me. The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib, but Israel doth not know, my people doth not consider." We should give it a place for its evidence. It is of vast importance that the young should be provided with materials for defence against the sophisms of infidelity. Not that I would advocate a systematic exposure, in early years, of the usual and stale arguments against the Christian religion, before the mind is able to understand, perhaps, either the objection or the answer. But I would furnish our youth with weapons previously to the combat. When the conflict does come, it is well if they are able at once to draw upon their resources, and to meet the first shock unharmed. To different minds different kinds of proof are more or less convincing. That afforded by prophecy is easily furnished. To show, for instance, that the

prophecies concerning our Lord were uttered long before his appearance, and that they were, in a most surprising manner fulfilled in him, is not a difficult task. And so with others. The third use of prophecy is one of high value, in order to give stability in Christian belief. The possession of this knowledge may not unlock to the young the treasures of prophecy unfulfilled, but it will render them competent to judge to some extent of the supposed discovery of fulfilment made by others, guarding them against the wild fancies which periodically appear, originating in well-meaning ignorance or daring presumption.

The experience of Scotland universally bears testimony to the delight and utility of the study of the Psalms. The devotional feelings,—the models of prayer,—the sincerity and heartiness of the conviction and the confession,—the rapturous thanksgiving,—the varied statements of a varied experience, render them invaluable. These melodies adhere to the mind long after other things are forgotten, and many a time has the youth, educated in our land, in a far distant clime been reminded of his home and of his duty, by the verse which has, unbidden, risen to his lips from the fountain where it had long been hidden, ever since the days that he was taught to repeat it at his mother's knee or in the village school.

What need I say of the historical books of the New Testament? Is there—Christian or infidel—the man who will say that they are unworthy of study? No; but there may be those who show that they do not deem the study of them essential in education. Let me remind such that we have here the morality of God's word fully developed. One great object of Christ's life was to fulfil,—to satisfy,—to complete,—to sanction the great moral laws written on the hearts of men and on the tablets of stone. Never was object more adequately fulfilled, for the designer and the performer of it was divine. In the preceptive part of the New Testament history there is a

purity, an absence from all moral taint, which renders it, as a source of instruction, truly invaluable. In the life of the great Author of our religion himself, we see fully exemplified all the principles which he taught. If it be of great importance to show to the young models of excellence which may stimulate and guide them, what higher model can there be than that of one whose whole life was perfection? If it be useful to show in what respect we can know God and benefit our fellow-men, what nobler example can we have than that of him who glorified his Father in all things, and went about continually doing good? Christian and infidel all bear testimony to the excellence of Christ's life as unimpeachable, as sinless, as perfect even in the eyes of God. In the lives of his followers, we have furnished instructive lessons of men in the lowest ranks of life, illiterate, ignorant, prejudiced, and obstinate, exhibiting at first all these characteristics which they honestly depicted themselves,—afterwards by the teaching of God's Spirit becoming ornaments to society, enlightened, gentle, and burning with love to God and man. If the young Christian views with admiration, and yet despair, the model of perfection exhibited in him who was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners, he can turn to Paul, and read the record of his life in its opposition to God's word, in the triumph of truth, and in his successful career of resistance to sin.

By the epistles is taught the operation of Christian morality in all the relationships of life. The young learn there the duties incumbent on them as superiors, inferiors, and equals. Commissioned by God to instruct an ignorant world, the apostles have left to us lessons of divine importance. Husbands, wives, parents, children, rulers, subjects, masters, servants, all are instructed in the great principles which ought to regulate them in their several spheres. No rank is left untouched,—no responsibilities unenforced,—no duty slurred over. All is written with the clearness of the noon-day sun, that he who runs may read.

II. But we have seen that in educating man we must have regard not only to the development of moral duty, but to his present inability and unwillingness to discharge it. From the scriptures we learn the method by which God is pleased to remove that inability, and change that unwillingness to love. It is by belief on his son Jesus Christ. We must educate with a view to this object, otherwise we are beating the wind. The great obstacle to moral acting is the want of will. We must not only supply the understanding with reasons, but, through the understanding, the heart and the affections must operate on the will. Faith in Christ works this change. But before there be faith, there must be a certain degree of knowledge. The knowledge will not work the change, but without the knowledge the change cannot be effected. Thus, if it be true that there can be no sure virtue without a change on the general bias of the will, and no such change without knowledge, the degree of knowledge necessary for the change of bias is necessary to effect a rectitude to which we can trust. To educate with the belief, therefore, of the efficacy of human means, is a most dangerous error, because, leading us to trust to human means, it neglects the source of all human renovation,—even the Spirit who made the heart of man, and who alone can change it. It substitutes the precepts of the gospel as all-sufficient, whereas the precepts are in themselves, though invaluable as a rule of life, inoperative to cause obedience. We have seen that happiness is more dependent upon moral obedience than on mere knowledge, and we know from all experience that the knowledge of duty does not command moral obedience. If it were so, then it would be sufficient to educate solely by instilling a thorough knowledge of the rules of morality, and to attend to the outward practice, so far as to see that the rules were understood. But that this is not the case, all history, national and individual, shows. Nothing is more indisputable in the philosophy of man, than that the under-

standing and the will are divorced,—that the moral faculty of the mind is unable to control the passions, and that unless we add to its power, giving a new direction to the will, we cannot calculate on what a single hour may bring forth. Now we stand erect in all the pride of conscious moral worth,—anon, temptation assails, and we fall debased and degraded in our own eyes and those of others. Heap moral rule upon rule,—you do well, if it is in the belief that you may thus add to the influence of the reason upon the affections, and of both upon the will,—you are altogether mistaken, if your object be simply to convince the reason, for, in truth, it has been convinced long ago. Educate, then, with the Bible, not only as containing the purest and loftiest morality with the most binding and awful sanctions, but as alone containing the knowledge which is essential to the change of will securing moral acting. Remember that the precepts therein contained have an authority from their author and from their sanctions, which all mere human moral rules want. Proceeding from the eternal mind, they are fitted to arrest the mortal will in its mad career. Stored up in the memory, they furnish an antidote against the poison of temptation. Remembered thus in connexion with the lawgiver, the law has the force of a divine command, inoperative, alas! too often, but, for obvious reasons, not to be gainsaid, and explained away, and evaded like human enactments.

III. Moreover, the Bible is to be used in education, as containing from beginning to end the development of the scheme by which God confers on man eternal happiness. I have touched slightly on parts, because the more the Scriptures are viewed in detail, the more convinced shall we be of the utility of using them in education. But let us look at them as a whole, and what have we? We have the record of God, wherein he has set forth his Son, not only as a divine teacher, not only as an example, but as the propitiation for us,—not only as procuring us the gift of the Spirit, whereby our wills are renewed, but “an

inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away." We have this record exhibiting God as love, as in all affliction chastising us for good, pouring the balm of consolation into our wounded spirits, and in the hour of sorrow declaring that he hath not forgotten us, but, that having given his own Son for us, he will with him freely give us all things. Supposing we could give no information but such as is connected with a boon like this, should we not have done infinite benefit to the young under our charge? Is it not self-evident, that the annunciation of this bright truth,—Jesus Christ suffering, risen, glorified, our advocate, our mediator, our judge, our portion, our elder brother,—would of itself be an education before which the glories of all the knowledge of the things of this world must pale their ineffectual fires? Away then with all schemes for using the Scriptures merely to impart moral lessons. If my readers estimate aright the value of God's word, they must see with me, that the loftiest aim of the worldly educationist is grovelling and contemptible, compared with that of the man who employs the Bible to teach a pure morality, the use of the means whereby the Spirit of God changes the heart from sin to holiness, and whereby the creature that crawls on the earth, the victim of suffering, disease, and death, becomes a king and a priest in the house of the Lord for ever.

CHAPTER IX.

Importance of the Controversy as to Religious or Non-religious Instruction—Two Classes of Instructionists—Advocates for Religious Instruction—Advocates for Instruction without Religion—Attempt to unite all the Friends of Religion itself and of Religious Instruction—Removal of Causes of Misconception—Boarding Schools—Real Question not as to Instruction, but a National System—Difficulties arising from different Uses of the Word Instruction—Difference between Instruction and Religion—This Difference leads to Errors from Misconception—Errors from not attending to the whole Truth—Leading to a Neglect of Religion—To an exclusive Cultivation of Religion—Paramount Claims of Morals—Benefits of Religion as to the Feelings—One Object of Religion, present Happiness—Instruction aids the Church in this—Different Kinds of Schools—Hence confused and false Views of Instruction—As, Christian Morality involved in all Discipline—"But the Pupils need not be taught it in School, for they are taught it elsewhere—Besides, there are Youths of different Persuasions attending Schools"—Folly of confounding National Schools with those generally giving rise to Anti-religious Arguments.

I TRUST that I have proved, to the satisfaction of my readers, that religion forms an essential part of a proper system of *Education*. Not that the proof was necessary to induce men to admit this, but that the grounds of a proposition universally assented to requires to be frequently revolved, that we may execute, with a vigour springing from clearness of apprehension, what, with vague notions, we pursue feebly and at random. Keeping ever in view the great objects at which we aim, we are incited to perseverance, knowing that we seek a consummation of paramount importance to our fellow-men.

I now leave the pleasant and quiet region of admitted truth to descend into the arena of controversy.

Even had there been no such embroiling question as that of religious or non-religious instruction, I doubt, for reasons before alluded to, whether we should have had in operation at present a national system. But one thing is

certain, that *now* it is on the adjustment of this question that the settlement of the whole matter depends. And we ought therefore to enter upon it free from bias and party views, as we wish to have correct notions on a subject which is so fraught with interest to all, and incorrect notions on which lead to consequences of fearful import.

Among the conflicting views which have been taken of this question, I may be allowed to rank them all as belonging to one or other of two classes,—the one including those who declare that they have for their object religious instruction, and the other, those who argue for the exclusion of religion from instruction. There are in both of these classes men of varying opinions, but such are the great departments in which they may be safely ranked. Of the former, various men have various schemes, both as to extent of religious instruction, and of the methods to be pursued. But religion is their common principle—the great basis on which they recognise all sound instruction as founded. The others also differ among themselves in still more important particulars; some excluding religion altogether as a matter of provision, and others arguing for substitutes, these substitutes being of different kinds, according to the views of the proposers.

Of the latter class there are some, doubtless, who, though attached to the cause of the Scriptures, are yet influenced, by what I conceive to be groundless fears, and by many misapprehensions, to advocate non-religious instruction. They have not taken a view of the whole subject, or they have taken a false view. They do great injury to what I conceive to be the cause of truth; because the advocates of the cause which they espouse put them in the very front of the battle, pointing to them and saying,—You cannot doubt the reverence which these men have for the Scriptures, and yet see how they oppose you in their use. If we had to do only with the avowed enemies of the truth, we should not have much difficulty in accomplishing a victory. But we have to do

with many who are really attached to her, and with many more who bear her colours but favour not her cause in their hearts. It would be well if, by removing misapprehension and groundless alarms, we could detach the sincere lovers of the Bible from their false position, and bring them to exert on the other side the talents which they have hitherto misapplied.

In the former class, again, there are many shades of opinion, and, while they have one great object in view, they are apt to quarrel with each other in details, so that time and charity are lost, and the cause is endangered. Details are of course of great importance, but it is needless to contend about them till we get the great principles settled from which these details shall proceed. If we get the recognition of the great object at which we are aiming, we can go on to the particular adjustment with charity in our hearts and kindness on our tongues. Hard words and uncharitable arguments will only tend to disserve us, and postpone the great triumph of truth. Let us, therefore, hold that all are sincere friends to the cause of sound instruction who advocate the necessity of religion being its basis; and let us, thus agreeing with them in essentials, proceed to attempt an agreement as to the details, in the spirit that can alone lead to it,—the sinking of minor differences in the absorption of one great common end.

With this double view, fully aware of the charge of presumption to which I am liable in taking up a theme so often handled by men of mighty minds, I shall endeavour to remove a few hindrances out of the way. Whatever be my success, let my motive be my excuse,—my desire to unite as many as may read these pages in the glorious work of instructing aright the sons and daughters of poverty throughout our land.

I have throughout carefully guarded against any error arising from confounding instruction, a part of education, with education itself. This I did to avoid the possibility

of misleading. It may be true that education, having respect to the formation of the whole man, includes in it necessarily religion as a part, and yet that instruction, a part of education, may not so include it. With this distinction we get at the real state of the question in part. But there is another chance of confusion, telling the other way, which we must carefully avoid. By blending the questions of education and instruction we might easily confuse, and lead to a conclusion which, from that confusion, no man would dare to deny, however inclined, till he had resolved the elements, and seen what belonged to the one and what to the other. But in the same way, by blending together different kinds of instruction, errors have arisen on the question of a national system. The differences we must note, to be able to see our way clearly to the truth. It may be true that in some schools religious instruction is unnecessary comparatively, while in others it is indispensable to effect the great objects aimed at. This may arise from the objects had in view by those who conduct the various branches of instruction, or from the circumstances in which those who are responsible for the whole education of the young are placed. These differences demand our attention.

There is one class of schools which we may dismiss altogether from this survey. Very generally throughout England, and not unfrequently in Scotland, parents delegate the whole education of their children to others. Whatever it is incumbent on the parent to do is incumbent on the teacher so situated. If at no period of a youth's education we ought to dismiss religion from forming a part of it in a family, it ought to form an integral part in every such case as that supposed. A parent may not attach any very great importance himself to the religious part of his children's education, and may thus be utterly careless as to whether there be any provision made for it in the boarding-schools to which he sends them. If they had remained at home, they perhaps would never have

been taught regularly to read the sacred volume, nor have been examined on its truths, nor exhorted to fulfil its requirements, nor entreated to accept of its offers. And when sent to school, whether the teacher make this a part of his duty or not, such parents do not much care. If he do, it is very well, provided the youth is not becoming, as it is sometimes contemptuously termed, religious. If he do not, it is quite as well, more especially if there be success in imparting mere human attainments. Nay, the very men who have been most pathetic and energetic on the wrong done to the poor by the exclusion of religious instruction, will very often be found to send their own children to be educated without a single inquiry as to the provision made for their spiritual interest; or if they are told that their children are accustomed to go to church regularly, and that there is no neglect of training them in the general principles of their peculiar creed, all is right. But no one will advocate this openly, though so many act on and practise it. All will agree,—I mean all who make any religious profession with the smallest semblance of consistency,—that since the young are thus just transferred from parental education to school education, religion holding a necessary place in the former, it holds a necessary place in the latter, and hence that there can be no question as to the necessity of religious instruction in cases like this.

There is a distinction commonly but improperly made between religion and morality, as if they differed, whereas the one necessarily includes the other. Religious instruction implies moral, with the additional notion of divine obligation and divine aid. In truth, there can be no moral instruction, properly so called, without religion, for there are duties which we owe to God, discoverable by reason, and all obligations are enforced by the same principle, while the Christian religion alone reveals the aids without which a stable virtuousness cannot exist. But as religion is commonly viewed as referring principally to our duty to God,—to divine sanctions, and divine aid,—and morality as a

system of duties which ought to be observed towards our fellow-men, we may allow the distinction, to keep clear of greater difficulties,—always remembering that religion, in its widest sense, includes morality.

A right education we have seen to differ from instruction in this, that the former includes all that prepares a youth for entering with efficiency on the discharge of the duties of life,—while instruction belongs only to that portion of education which goes on in school. Instruction is in itself an ambiguous term, meaning either the imparting and inculcating generally of attainments, truths, precepts, and practices, or of only a particular part of them. Thus we say, “Without instruction the mind seeks in vain for knowledge,”—where instruction evidently means the imparting of an acquaintance generally with the facts that come under the cognizance of knowledge, and the methods of learning them. And we say, he received instructions in drawing, when we mean that he received the imparted rules enabling him to draw correctly. I have endeavoured to avoid all ambiguity that might impede us, by using the term generally, extending it to all lessons given in school, whatever these lessons may be, whether restricted to mere intellectual attainments and acquirements, or extending to the culture of the morals. Now, putting aside the case already mentioned, the question is not, whether religion should form the basis of this or that *partial instruction*, but of a *national system of instruction*.

As the object of education is to prepare wholly for life, and of instruction to prepare in part, and as instruction itself is divisible, let us endeavour to see clearly and distinctly what the term instruction in its widest sense demands, that we may see the demands involved in national instruction.

All our duties have a reference, we have seen, not only to ourselves, but to God, and through him to our fellow-creatures,—not to this life only, but to eternity. In common with all other duties, the duties connected with instruction have this double reference to God and ourselves,

to eternity, and to the life that now is. But this general reference, it may be urged, is not sufficient to teach us the great aim of instruction,—that is, of the lessons and training pursued in school. Take away the element above mentioned of our duty to God, so far as being common to all duties, it does not, it may be said, constitute any peculiar part of instruction, and we shall find that the object for which children are sent to and are trained in school, is to fit them for the due discharge of their duties as regards this life. But this view may lead to error. It may be imagined that, because the training and lessons of a school have for their object this life, they have no concern at all with religion, the right lessons given as to divine things, and whose great object is the life to come. Not so. The objects of religion and of instruction even thus viewed,—and so, for the sake of an irrefragable argument, let us continue to view them—though different, are yet not separate. In the former we have principally and directly in view the glory of God and eternal happiness, in the latter, knowledge and habits affecting the world. If we were to make the supposition—monstrous as it is—that we were destitute of all religious knowledge whatever of God and of eternity, there would still remain the necessity of instruction to prepare for active life. And if there were no means, or no need of instruction, we should still be bound to acknowledge God as our Benefactor, our Ruler, our Redeemer, and thus to engage in the duties of religion. Religion has a wider sphere than instruction. It presides over this territory as well as others; and the labours of instruction and its fruits, as well as all other labours and fruits, are bound to be yielded up to its supremacy. But it is easily conceivable how instruction may till its portion of the field of human life, hoping for a harvest to be consecrated to the service of religion, and yet not a harvest directly belonging to religion. It brings forth the materials which its producers, having ever in view the great object of all human exertion, elaborate and ultimately give as

an offering to God, though immediately delighting to use them in the furtherance of human enjoyment. Instruction aims immediately at making useful men; religion at forming citizens of heaven. Without religion man will not be useful; therefore religion is necessary to instruction directly or indirectly: directly, if there be a want of religion in the history of the being, irrespective of instruction, and that more or less according to the want of the religion elsewhere derived; indirectly, as the great object of instruction is to prepare for the duties of life, and as there is no duty of life which has not an indirect reference to religion. We frequent church that we may directly acknowledge God as our God, that we may glorify him, that we may make known to him our wants, that we may learn of his Son, that he may shed his influence on our hearts, giving us peace and joy in believing. We frequent school that we may have imparted to us the elements of knowledge, that our minds may be trained to use our faculties so as to promote our worldly interests and our enjoyments, and that we may acquire those moral habits and aptitudes which are necessary for our happiness. If it is impossible to acquire the last without religion, then this is necessary, either directly or indirectly, just in proportion to the supposed impossibility. Limiting and directing all our pursuits is the duty we owe to God; more especially limiting and directing instruction is that duty, for instruction involves acquaintance with our duty. Allowing that instruction is not exclusively—nay, even not directly, concerned with religion, without the latter, the former being maimed in that which ought to limit and direct the whole, is imperfect, nay, dangerous.

I wish to make this the more clear, both for reasons which will be seen hereafter, and especially now, because mistakes here lead to errors that do not end in theory, but have been embodied in practice. I wish to prove, that while the direct object of religion is the glory of God and the eternal happiness of man, even supposing that the

direct object of instruction were the preparation of man for the use and enjoyment of his faculties in this life, instruction involves religion, and I moreover maintain, that such an instruction all ought to receive. There is nothing more common than for well-meaning men to seize part of a truth to the exclusion of the rest, and act upon that part. This has been done in the present subject. Many, supposing the direct object of instruction to be as I have stated, have banished religion altogether from their systems, urging that it has no proper place there. They have directed their aims at a full development of the faculties which more immediately bear upon intellectual enjoyments and professional pursuits, but have neglected the moral faculties by using an imperfect system for their development. They have, with a common one-sidedness, concentrated their whole attention on one part, to the neglect of the other. Forming one fixed system, without regard to differences of situation on the part of those to whom it applied, they have reasoned only on partial views of society, and their system is hence defective in a most important particular. It is so desirable an object to instruct man in all that shall render his outward condition prosperous, that they have overlooked the conditions which, while lying deeper than mere outward circumstances, most materially affect them. The moral faculties have in a threefold manner claims upon our attention. They affect man's happiness in relation to his God, to his fellow-men and to himself. Some have thought it sufficient to give him rules and habits as applicable to the two last, overlooking the importance of the first, both in itself and in its relation to the other two. They have argued, that because the object of instruction is preparation for this world, the two last only are concerned. Granting that this were the object of instruction, it does not follow that the two last are sufficient. They may be sufficient in certain cases, and yet not in all. The efficiency of moral training, as rendering its results permanent, depends wholly

on religion. Moral observance without religion is not a prop on which individuals or communities can rest. If there be not somewhere supplemented the religious enforcements, the effect of mere moral precepts and habits is such as ever to deceive and disappoint.

There is another error, but on the other side. The promoters of this system have seen clearly, that worth is more conducive to happiness than wealth or knowledge. And as they, putting almost out of view the use and enjoyment of the faculties in this life, have had a greater regard in instruction to the glory of God and to eternal happiness, they have directed all their instructional machinery to religious instruction. They too have erred. The party before alluded to have adopted an object too limited—an imperfect development of the faculties. These, one also too limited, from neglecting the portion more immediately before them. Our moral faculties override and rule over all the rest. They give them stability, and utility, and enjoyment. They are given us in this world to direct us in the use of our opportunities and advantages, as respects our own happiness and that of others. Hence, without their due government, the domain of knowledge may be all anarchy and misery. But this need not be. There may be the knowledge and the moral rule. Hence it is unnecessary in this manner to confine the working of instruction to fencing all the territory within, and to leave a great portion of that territory a waste. Better far to have the fence and keep away the foe, than to till the ground for enemies to obtain nourishment from the fruit. But it is better still to have both the bulwark of virtue enforced by religion, and the enclosed region blossoming with knowledge and rich with enjoyment. God surely never intended that the faculties of men should be unimproved, or that we should be debarred from delighting in the sources of enjoyment which their cultivation bestows. Surely, having endowed rich and poor with the same capacities, rich and poor may lawfully employ them, and in

enjoying the pleasures of this life in accordance with his will, all the while give him the glory and the praise.

This error is by no means so dangerous as the other, because it cultivates that part of our nature on which we have seen that our happiness most depends. And, in truth, it appears that the cultivation of the faculties by means of religious instruction, even when exclusively pursued, gives an elevation to the mind, to which no other system can possibly pretend. Acquaintance with the nature of man's heart,—with God's forbearance and love,—with the sublime mysteries of revelation,—with the awful doom for good or evil that awaits all men, impresses the mind with a sense of human littleness and of the vanity of human things, with longings after greater destinies, that at once refine and strengthen. It introduces to a literature of passing sublimity, and accustoms to a phraseology pregnant with meaning and with power.

We have seen that supposing instruction to have for its more immediate object the development of all the faculties for use and enjoyment in life, there is one portion of these of such paramount importance, that whatever system of instruction we adopt, we must have a constant reference to them, and be ever guided by them, as on them the due use of all the other faculties depends, both in the enforcement and in enjoyment. They are efficacious to rouse the slumbering youth, in teaching him what he owes to himself, and that he must exert all his powers, as in God's sight, to please him, and benefit his fellow-men. They are efficacious in teaching him to direct his mind ever to good—whether that good be his own enjoyment or the prosperity of others. They give a charm to all the rest; if neglected, the natural advantages and pleasures of literature and science become sources of discomfort and of ultimate wretchedness. They must be cultivated to the uttermost, come of the others what will. If their cultivation renders it impossible to train the other powers, we cannot help it. For the uses of this life they are not only

important, but absolutely necessary. The others are important, but not essential. In their cultivation, precepts and habits, though useful and necessary, are not enough now, and never have been enough. We want a change of general purpose, a dethroning of self, an enthroning of God, as the recognised, felt, and honoured moral ruler. We want religion with its enforcements, and its functions, and its appliances. Hence, in this other view, instruction having for its great object the present life, requires the aid of religion.

I have spoken thus far of the development of those faculties which pertain to active moral duty. But there are others that more immediately regard God as an object worthy of our veneration and our love. In the enjoyments of this present life, there can be no doubt of the importance of well directed affections; and, therefore, in every course of instruction, we must have regard to this part of our nature. The young mind is prone to feelings of affection and dislike, easily excited and easily removed. It is prone to admiration, but feeling pleasure in the exercise, and being so consciously inferior in itself, its admiration is not so easily shaken as its love and its dislike. It is born into a world of wonders, and you cannot unteach it to wonder and admire. Fix, by constant association, its love and its admiration on the same object, and you give permanence to both. The love that is associated with admiration does not quickly change to dislike, for there is the overcoming of the double pleasure,—the pleasure of simple affection and the pleasure of excited wonder, while the admiration which is connected with love becomes confiding and obedient. Fix, then, the love, and soften and particularize the admiration of the young. In the development of their affections you will find not only the natural relationships of life, the paternal and the preceptorial,—but, above all, those connected with God, the Almighty God, the Redeemer, as furnishing you with most powerful weapons to subdue unholy passions, and fix the affections on right

objects. Religion, then, again, is necessary for the development of those faculties so important in the formation of character, prepared for the use and enjoyment of this life.

Every church service has a threefold object in view,—directly to glorify God, directly to guide man in the pursuit of eternal happiness, and indirectly to promote his temporal happiness, by teaching and enforcing moral duty. If this last be the great object of instruction, here the school comes in to aid the church. The teacher of sacred truths, having before him an audience composed of men of all ranks and of all ages, must, notwithstanding, use one common language. There may be diversities in extreme cases, as Bishop Butler's sermons to the learned society of Lincoln's Inn, or discourses to children. But in general the truth is as I have stated. All, then, as to the instructions of the pulpit, should have a degree of knowledge as nearly the same as possible. The preacher cannot address himself wholly as to the illiterate, because he would be rendering his instructions burdensome to the informed. He cannot speak to the audience as fully trained, because he would be neglecting the inaptitude of those unaccustomed to severe thinking. He has thus many difficulties to contend with ; and whatever may be our religious belief, one common object ought to be, to lessen these difficulties. If the truths of the gospel are of paramount importance, it is surely highly desirable that those who are to hear them expounded should come to the place of religious instruction prepared to attend and to understand. The best means of attaining this object is a knowledge of the elementary truths of religion imparted in schools. There the teacher can ascertain the degree of ignorance possessed by each, he can remove errors, he can supply deficiencies, he can enforce study, he can accustom to habits of attention, he can render familiar to the understanding, he can store the memory. All this he can do, and yet keep within the supposed limit. He may have the strongest desire to promote the eternal happiness of those en-

trusted to his care for daily instruction, and so far as duty calls him, he may act upon the wish. But supposing that the great objects of instruction were immediately connected with this world, and that he may not directly seek more, unless specially so intrusted, in this he does not go beyond the limit which the most rigid enforcer of mere secular instruction could set, consistently with sound principles,—himself being the expounder of these principles. He maintains for teachers the right of instructing with reference to this world. He grants that an indirect object of religious instruction by the authorized expounders of religion is the same as theirs, and with the use of the same faculties, and that the preacher may be aided by instructions in what may be called the secular parts of religion. Then within this limit they may safely move, even according to him, while in truth they may go,—nay, ought to go,—much beyond it. They can explain the terms used throughout the whole of the Christian church. As every other part of knowledge, religion has a language of its own, which it is necessary for the hearer to understand, in order to hear with ready intelligence. Here they can be of material use. They can bring up to the church the youth informed in the literature and the phraseology of the Bible, ready to listen intelligently, to remember, and to understand. All this has a bearing, indirect but important, on the happiness of this life.

Having thus seen the nature of instruction generally, and the general connexion which religion has with its great objects as admitted by all, we are better prepared to remove the confusion which arises from mingling up different kinds of instruction.

Schools, all having instruction for their object, are of very different kinds. In some, only one department of knowledge is taught, and that, it may be, not requiring much exercise of the intellectual faculties. In large cities in Scotland, where—as in large cities elsewhere—the subdivision in this as well as in other professions is carried

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to a great extent, this is a very common case. A parent thinks that one individual excels in one department, and another in another,—he may approve of one as an excellent teacher of English, send his children to a second to learn writing, to a third to learn geometry, and so on. Then there are schools where a combination of teachers has rendered it possible for a boy to acquire instruction under one common system, but with liberty to choose any branch and forego the rest, or seek instruction in any of the others elsewhere. Again, there are schools where there is one branch imperative,—all the rest being optional, and liberty being given to attend the school, provided that branch be taken, and to obtain instruction in other departments from other teachers. Then there are schools where all the branches must be attended, unless for special reasons, and on permission being granted to that effect. All these are intended for those classes of society which can afford to educate their children at a rate of expense effectually excluding the great mass of the population. We find them in schools where the whole range of instruction is gone over by one teacher,—or in a few cases by more,—and at which generally attendance on any branch is quite a matter of choice. In the smaller towns and in the rural parishes of Scotland, there is no such liberty of choice for the upper classes,—all generally receiving instruction in one school, and on one common system, in the former by one teacher or more, in the latter almost universally by one teacher. In the large towns there is but little superintendence of any kind. The principal schools are under the management of the various burghs, which lay down certain regulations, leaving—and that with perfect safety generally—to the teachers to work out the rules, or they are under the management of directors, who, cautious in their choice of teachers, find little interference necessary. Then there are combinations of teachers, each only self-responsible for and alone interested in his own department, except so far as any gross defect

would cause the rest to detach him from them; or there are charity schools, and under the control of the patrons; or the teachers are under no control at all, the desire of eminence and success, or of a bare livelihood, stimulating in various degrees and in the different ranks. The burgh schools of Scotland are under the control of the various town councils, who in general leave matters very much to their teachers, and the great majority of the schools in the rural parishes, being parochial schools, are under the superintendence of the established clergy.

I have made this brief statement of the nature of our schools, because I believe that from their familiarity with them—especially with schools in town—many have been misled as to the nature of a proper system of national instruction. Accustomed in their own case to consider the various branches of education entirely a matter of option,—to choose one teacher here and another there,—those who have written, and spoken, and moved on the subject, have viewed it from ground which gave them false views. In general, certainly there is one great branch of education pursued in Scotland, to which all the rest are deemed subservient—English, or the classics, or mathematics. But teachers and parents have no common rallying point,—I mean in general, and in those ranks whose members are likely to take an active part in this question. Perfect liberty as to the branch, the number of branches, the teachers, is ever at the command of the parents, and they can choose from among a large number. To whom then, in particular, are they to look for religious instruction? To the classical teacher? He has his own department. To the English teacher? He has not time. To the mathematical? It is not his province. Strange as it may sound, it is nevertheless true, that the upper and middle ranks of our large towns are the worst instructed in religion. It is quite common in the schools for the poorer orders to use the Bible regularly. It is quite as uncommon in those for the upper. There are exceptions,

and in some of our large institutions—especially those formed by combinations of teachers—religious instructions are given,—but the Bible is regularly read in hardly one. Yet I doubt not that we will find among the supporters of those schools, almost all who advocate the use of the Bible in the instruction of the poor. Is this as it should be? Is the Bible not good for the one as well as for the other?

I need hardly say whether this is as it should be or not. Yet there are two reasons why Scotland, which has always made a boast of its Bible teaching, yet neglects it in the instruction of its upper ranks. I do not deem them sufficient, but the reasons are these.

No school ought to be tolerated—and I do not speak of the great institutions above referred to as guilty of such a gross defect—which does not act in its discipline upon the great principles of Christian morality. We can conceive cases of instruction in a particular branch where the discipline is thus enforced, but where it would be a difficult matter to teach the direct sanctions of the gospel. A teacher of drawing, having for his object to instruct in this department, would be leaving his province if he were directly to teach and examine on the great principles of Christian doctrines. So far as he is required to enforce discipline, he ought himself to be guided by the moral results, and if possible so to lead others. Influenced constantly by a love of God, he could not fail to make use of every opportunity to raise the mind of others to that love. Regarding the moral wellbeing of his pupils as essential to the enjoyment of art, he could not fail to impress upon them the duties of moral obedience, and of dedicating their faculties and enjoyments to the glory of God. But this is not systematic religious instruction. It is what would be done by any casual spectator who is interested in the happiness of the young, and it is only employed to enforce a particular duty. No argument either for or against religion, as a necessary part of a complete system

of instruction, can be drawn from a case like this, though the attempt has been made to invalidate the arguments for religious instruction from such examples. Now, applying this to a wider field, it appears that no system of instruction can exist without the practical application of the rules of Christian morality. These rules, as derived from the Bible, may be taught elsewhere. They may be learned at home. It is unnecessary for the teacher to occupy the time of the pupil with them, for the parents are well educated and pious men, who devote much time to this very object.

I do not think it necessary to do more here, than to state this defence such as it is. It clearly admits the necessity of religious instruction somewhere, throwing the responsibility on the parents.

The other reason is, that these schools are intended for youths of all persuasions ; and that religious knowledge being already provided for elsewhere, to give instructions in religious matters would frustrate their general object, by keeping back those who dissented from the religious views taught. This, of course, requires an answer hereafter. But as I cannot imagine that the worthy teachers of such seminaries would neglect religious instruction altogether on this ground, I infer that it is resolved into the former answer. They could not believe it to be their duty to train without a special reference to religion, if they thought that the young under their care had no religious knowledge elsewhere derived, but on the ground that although desirable it is not needed at their hands ; because elsewhere provided, they shun it as an element of division. Thus, in reality, the two answers are one in principle,—the non-necessity of religious instruction in *such* schools, because the pupils receive it at home.

We have thus, from the two elements of separate branches, and of the religious instruction supposed to be communicated at home, *data* from which to account for the views held by many among us on this subject.

The former has led them to calculate so little on this as an element of school business at all, and the latter has so obliterated any lingering traces of desire, that they have leapt to the conclusion that the same system is desirable in all cases. In the community in which they have lived, religious instruction has not been made a matter of any practical importance,—in their own education probably it was all acquired at home, or in the church ; and hence they draw certain conclusions, and build up a system accordingly, decorated with Christian liberality, freedom of conscience, the removal of sectarian views, and other educational figments.

Let us remember that instruction is only a part of education, and that education without religion is a curse. In a national system, we must endeavour not only to bestow the portion of right education that can be given in school, but to supply the defects and remove the gross errors of the education at home. It may be true—although I do not think that it is—that the well-informed classes should keep out of the teacher's hands the religious portion of the training of the young ; and yet it may not be true that this can be safely done with the uninstructed classes. We must, in a question of this importance, carefully separate all the elements, that we may not commit an error which would involve the nation in misery and ruin.

CHAPTER X.

One Object of Religious Instruction—Some speculative Questions hinted at—Man as a Moral Being—What Affections subject to Moral Rule—And how far Affections in Infancy gradually checked by Regard to Self—To Man—To God—Double Set of Feelings—Those acting through Means—Those acting directly on the Will alone—Transference of the former—Unchangeableness of the latter—Former liable to Disappointment—Not so the latter—Conscience—Need of Conscience—Especially in Instruction—For it must be enlightened—By Reason—By Religion—Superiority of Religion—How Religious Instruction acts—Strengthening of Conscience—Habit, a supplementary Principle of great Importance—Love to God—Use of this in Instruction—It must be the God of Revelation—It is a fluctuating Feeling—How rendered permanent—Quotation from Bishop Butler—Love to God both passive and active—God's Word the highest and only sure Record of his Will.

THERE are many who have vague general notions of the meaning and benefit of religious instruction connected with that called moral, who have yet no very distinct notions of the precise nature of its efficiency. For their sakes, and to concentrate my own opinions, I proceed to consider this branch more particularly.

The object of religious instruction, in this view, is to train to the love and practice of virtue. If it be the best means for accomplishing this end, it will not be denied that it is desirable in the highest degree. And that it is so will appear from the following considerations, in which I shall give a brief summary of certain parts connected with the regulation of morals.

What is Virtue? This is a question which has a double import, and, consequently, admits of a double answer. It may mean, what is Virtue in itself? And to this question I would reply, Virtue is that which has recommended to the divine will a certain state of mind in preference to others,—not simply because it is the will of God, but because being so, we can to a certainty conclude, that from his in-

finite holiness, justice, and mercy, he has willed nothing but what is holy, and just, and good. But the question may mean, What is virtue in the agent? And I would answer, Conformity with the will of God. The first question is one, I conceive, totally beyond human power to answer further, with certainty, than I have done; all speculations as to what that quality is, ending either in total uncertainty, or in coming to the conclusion that virtue consists in some quality, which it undoubtedly possesses, but which is demonstrably a consequent of, and not in itself, inherent virtuousness.

The question in its first import is utterly beyond our province, for, whatever the quality may be which has recommended a certain state of mind to the divine will, no man will deny that we cannot have a better test of what possesses the quality, that is, of what is virtuous, and becoming man as a moral agent, than the will of God. If man were a perfect being, the second would also be a subject of mere speculation, as to whether, after all, conformity with God's will be not as much a test, in the one case, as God's will itself is a test in the other. But, constituted as man is, it is not a subject of speculation merely. Man is naturally vicious,—that is, his mind is not in conformity with the will of God. Our object in religious instruction being to bring the mind into such conformity, we must necessarily examine the mind in its moral structure, as it is, that we may the better know the process of adjustment.

But we cannot do this without a reference to the will of God. We, the examiners, are as far from conformity as the examined. We cannot therefore tell, from any reference to our own nature, whether our conclusions are sound or not. We have the law of God in our hearts, but we cannot employ it with certainty in examining the mind, because evil has rendered its pure light dim and unsteady. We must have recourse to God's will, where he has most clearly revealed it, in his word.

There consequently arises a third question, What are the operations of the mind, connected immediately with virtue in man as he is, fallen and impure? Now, part of this question refers to mere speculations. These respect the faculties or feelings, by which we know and are led to follow virtue,—whether they are original or compounded,—whether they are distinct from other operations of the mind, or the same differently applied, and others of the same nature. While we are benefited by all such inquiries, conducted judiciously, and in the light of God's word, they do not fall within the scope of this treatise. I shall confine myself to such a statement as shall effect my purpose of showing the bearing which religious instruction has upon morality.

We consider man a moral being, that is, deserving of praise or blame, according as we find, or from his words, actions, and other outward demonstrations, believe that we find, his will influenced by certain affections in relation to the objects towards which he feels desire or aversion. If these outward demonstrations gave us no index to what was passing within, or if there were a dis severment between the mind as willing and the outward act, we should be incapable of drawing any inference as to his moral condition. All those states of mind wherein it is moved to like or dislike, to wish or to shun, we may call by the general name of affections. But, some of our likes and dislikes are totally beyond the power of will, and are therefore not the subjects of moral cognizance. And some of our actions do not proceed from will at all, or are controlled neither by desire nor aversion, but proceed from instinctive feelings, and are therefore also excluded from the moral standard. Again, certain feelings which are to a certain extent subject to the will, but which do not lead to action, because, originating in the mind they terminate there, are not the proper subjects of moral approbation or disapprobation. Thus, hunger or thirst, considered as affections of the mind or appetites, arise without any bidding

of the will, and as mere appetites, are worthy of and receive neither praise nor blame. The winking of the eyelids, and many other ongoings of the body, are instinctive or beyond the reach of the will, and are exempted from moral jurisdiction. And those feelings which come under the province of what is commonly called *taste*, connected with literature and art,—are, from being confined to the possessor, in themselves not subjects of moral praise or dispraise. It will be seen from this classification that the affections connected with moral duty are those which prompt the mind to actions affecting either God or man, and that those removed from this operation do not come under our present inquiry. It is true that hunger may act upon the mind, causing a desire for food belonging to another, and here the moral guidance is required. But this introduces another element. Hunger is the feeling of uneasiness, arising from the desire and want of food, irrespective of that food belonging to any one, and is blameless. It may prompt the mind, in the case of many, for its gratification to desire the food belonging to another, and this desire comes under the moral law. The feelings connected with taste undoubtedly, though themselves beyond the province of morals, lead to desires and habits which, affecting the will, in relation to certain habits connected with other men, have certain moral tendencies. And so with regard to other affections. From all which we conclude that morals are cognizant of affections, so far as they influence the will, or are dependent on the will. I use the last clause designedly, to show that while certain affections, naturally and irrespectively of will, arise when the mind contemplates the object existing there, the mind has the power, in many cases, to withdraw from the contemplation of the object, or to present it in a certain aspect, or to accompany it with other considerations calculated instantaneously to remove the feeling as soon as formed. The remembrance of a wrong done me may, with a moral certainty, call up the feeling of resentment, and so far as

independent of the will, may be perfectly harmless, neither deserving of praise nor dispraise. But if I willingly inflame my mind with the remembrance,—or wilfully remove from the remembrance of the wrong that of the provocation,—or do not call to mind the duty of forgiveness exciting a counteracting feeling to influence the will, I am subject to moral laws. The affections then deserve our serious inquiry as respecting the question of morals. They act immediately upon the will, and are thus in reality, as they were intended to be, the great springs of all action. There is no affection, except the appetites and instincts, utterly removed beyond the control of will, which may not bring us into moral contact with others,—and upon their strength, control, and tendency, depends our moral wellbeing.

The affections prompt to immediate action in early infancy, all restraints of any kind being then unknown. Before any manifestation of regard to utility,—of a moral sense,—of the recognition of the claims which others have to obedience, the child exercises all its feelings of like or dislike. But soon these checks come into exercise. The child, without any knowledge whatever of the object served by the swallowing of a certain quantity of food, feels a pleasure in the satisfying of the appetite of hunger. He never stops to inquire whether or not his system will be supported and strengthened by the sustenance of which he partakes with so much relish, but the love of food, and the pleasure derived from the exercise of devouring it, are all-sufficient inducements with him to engage in the pleasing task. In the same way, the child first beginning to sport with his equals, knows not and cares not that the exercise in which he is delighting is that which the physiologist would recommend as the best fitted for promoting his strength, his health, and his future usefulness. It would be in vain to dilate to him on the difference between venous and arterial blood, on the importance of strengthening his muscular powers, and on the connexion

which soundness of body has with soundness of mind. "With jocund glee he gambols on the green," and, as the healthy glow of joyous exercise mantles on his cheek, he cannot refrain from the exulting shout, indicating that he is so far enjoying the happiness which results from the free and innocent use of his bodily powers. But in time he begins to learn that there is a limit to the enjoyment of his faculties, and then the doctrine of usefulness dawns upon him, rising from a sense of its opposite. He learns from dire experience that, pleasant as the exercise of eating may be, there is a possibility that he may indulge overmuch in the gratifying duty. The darkened room, and the nauseous black draught, and the languid frame, teach him that he must *restrain* as well as *indulge*. And so with the over-exercise of his bodily powers. He acquires a growing knowledge which terminates in an almost instinctive acquaintance with the fact, that he cannot go beyond certain limits with impunity. And thus the young mind is taught practically, that the pure enjoyments of the body are those which are confined within the limits of a due regard to his own health and comfort,—in other words, that he owes certain duties to himself, the infraction of which entails unhappiness, because, however much they may be enjoyed in the mean time, the recollection is accompanied with the association of pain and trouble. The enjoyments were only acts of the mind, and end in a state of positive unhappiness.

Again, without pausing to inquire how the child acquires the notion of property, nothing is more certain than that very early in life the notion manifests itself. The boy, when very young, knows that his brother has no business with his little cart, and repels with puny arm any attempt at a seizure. This is mine, not yours, is the ready answer to any demand for the toy or plaything which he has appropriated to his own use. Nor does the little girl show less clear manifestations of a desire to assert her own rights. Should the rosy boy quit for a moment his

wooden horse, and lay hand on the miniature figure of womankind, without which closely pressed to her bosom she will not retire to rest, the burst of genuine grief which immediately ensues warns the whole household that the laws of justice are in the act of being violated. And thus the young show that there is an early consciousness of duty to themselves, of the claims of which they are perfectly conscious. From this, to recognition of the claims of obligation due to others, there is an easy and an obvious step. This, too, we can in manifestation readily trace. Who has not seen the ingenuous boy, in very infancy, with the loud sob, and the bursting tears, and the faltering step, acknowledging that he has wronged, by some act of passion or disobedience, those whom he knew he was bound to honour and obey? Who has not recognised in the act of submission, and the lisped prayer for forgiveness, and the proffered kiss of reconciliation, the labouring throes of the soul, in the consciousness that the sacred laws by which man is bound to his fellow-men have been violated,—the mind thus virtually recognising that the exercise of our powers, whether of body or mind, are restrained, not only by what is due to our own interests and feelings, but by what is due to the interest and feelings of others.

Ascend we still. The human mind, mysteriously constituted as it is, displays itself to us by its results. No sooner is it capable of conceiving,—not in words nor by system, for I do not allege that all this process is embodied in language and systematically stated by the child, or even methodized by the parent,—than a higher feeling is capable of being appealed to. The author of all human existence,—the source of all human good,—the former of our bodies and the parent of our spirits,—in whom we live, and move, and have our being, is, in the aspect of a Father, a known and an endearing relationship, easily recognisable by the almost infant mind. And the duties resulting from all the previous regards become enforced and hallowed by the new sense of duty infused into the nascent con-

science. No one has witnessed the awe which steals over the smiling face of the lisping child when the name of God is pronounced by lips he loved, who has not been able to perceive that a new sense of duty is struggling its way into the recesses of the human heart, and that the voice of Deity is, in the child, enforcing the claims of a paramount and sovereign obedience.*

There is thus generated or found in the mind a double set of feelings,—those which have for their object gratification by the use of means, and those which, regarding the mind itself and its voluntary actings alone, admit of no interference between them and their end. If, in indulgence of resentment, I seek to punish one who has done me wrong, I devise means for that purpose, or use the means which are at my disposal. The feeling of resentment may be justifiable, and so may the desire of punishing, and so may the means. But the means may be such as I ought not to have employed. Still the feeling seeking its gratification may have recourse to them. But I am likewise conscious, at least in my calmer moments, of a feeling of approbation or disapprobation of those means. If the feeling of disapprobation occur before the deed of punishment be inflicted, and I yield to it, the feeling seeks no farther gratification,—it needs no means, because it aims directly at influencing my will, which it has done. If its counsels be neglected, the feeling of disapprobation which follows arises from the remembrances of the neglect of that which has a right to control my will.

Again, I may desire pleasure, and hence seek to gratify that desire by the pursuit of wealth. In process of time my mind, habituated to the gratification of a certain feeling in pursuing riches, may cease to seek them as a means only, and pursue them as an end. If I had been able to

* It cannot be expected that I should enter into any discussion on the various systems of morals. I have adopted,—in respect to the operation of the conscience on the will,—the lucid theory of Sir James Mackintosh, without following him through some questionable points as to the formation of and what constitutes conscience.

secure the gratification of my desire without the aid of the means, I could never have been led to this transference, from a love of pleasure to a love of gold. Hence, the other set of feelings—those of approval or disapproval—having no means necessary, but passing at once from the feeling to the will, are never transferred, but, having always the same object, are unchangeable.

Our first set of feelings from their dependence on the use of means may be disappointed. The patriot may not be able to save his country,—nor the benevolent man to serve his friend,—nor the miser to accumulate wealth,—nor the lover to obtain his mistress, and the desire ungratified may lead to wretchedness. But the other set of feelings is independent of external means. They depend wholly on the mind itself, and their influence acting thus, enshrined from the contact of outward things, may preserve from the general destruction of happiness the noblest part of our nature. These feelings are generally known by the name of our moral sentiments, and the mind acting under their influence is said to be regulated by conscience.

It will easily be seen that there is no part of our nature on which our happiness so much depends, as on the regulation and control of our feelings by the actings of conscience. There are, as might be expected, observable in men great differences in feeling as manifested outwardly. Some possess strongly those in which others are deficient, and those last again are much influenced by feelings which the former easily subdue. In some men certain principles of action require to be strengthened and enforced, even such as seem of themselves likely to be injurious. Thus the feeling of resentment requires in some cases to be fostered,—that feeling which, bestowed for defence against wrong, is sometimes so weak as to render its possessor in this imperfect degree a mark for ridicule or positive oppression. It may, on the other hand, be so powerful as to lead its unhappy lord, or rather victim, into constant

scenes of strife and angry passion. The love of power may be so weak as to expose a man to conduct the proper business of life with indecision in his instructions to others, or it may be so strong as to render him a tyrant and oppressor. In the same being, the feeling of to-day may not be that of to-morrow. We shall find him who is now all beneficence and gentleness, on the instant transformed, under the influence of some ruling desire, into a blustering malevolent tyrant. The lover of pleasure of this year, we may find the next denying himself the necessities of life that he may gratify his love of gold. These feelings, thus changeable, are, notwithstanding, the principles of action which impel us onward. If we were left only to them, we could never calculate on human nature,—we could have no stable observance of moral rule. But we are not abandoned to their sway. There is conscience, the supreme ruler of them all, who guides and controls and directs them,—strengthening the weak, reducing the strong, and approving or disapproving of the means devised by reason for their gratification, or checking their gratification altogether. As she never looks beyond the will, and the actions springing from the will, she is not liable to the changes which operate on the feelings,—she may be silenced, but, where her voice is again heard, it gives the same response as before.

In instruction we have to do with so many varying dispositions, the elements of which are utterly inscrutable, that it is a most difficult task even to approximate to a rude appreciation of the various principles of action possessed by each. To ascertain these exactly, with the view of strengthening the weak and of reducing the strong, is impossible. Add to all this the changeableness of the mind with regard to its principles of action, that many of these are not developed till boyhood passes away, and it will easily be seen that, while a great part of instruction has to do with moral wellbeing, and moral wellbeing depends on the due training of the principles of action, the task

seems, at first sight, a hopeless one, in its details. Hence many never attempt it at all, contenting themselves with the mere repressions of outward manifestations of wrong, heeding not the source from which they have flowed. Yet it is not a hopeless task, and it is to be accomplished by teaching the young to regulate their conduct, not by giving way to every feeling, but by fixed principles of moral obedience,—by always giving the conscience power to control. When we hear of a man of principle, we all know that there is indicated by this, one who is not swayed by his feelings or principles of action irrespectively of the dictates of conscience, but that it is his settled habit to act as she bids. To the formation of such characters our moral instruction should be directed, and the system which accomplishes this great object is the best system of moral instruction. We must seek, therefore, now the system which gives us greatest efficacy in leading the will in all cases to obey the conscience.

However we may define conscience, whether we may consider it implanted in the human breast, or deriving its sanctions from a regard to self-love, self-interest, or associations borrowed from and ultimately becoming unconnected with other desires and aversions, we must all agree that it requires enlightenment. This enlightenment is effected by reason and religion. Without the aid of religion at all, reason, to a certain extent, enlightens the conscience. It does not itself act directly upon the will, as conscience does. You may convince the drunkard that, in the indulgence of his favourite pursuit, he is ruining his health and his fortune, and alienating from himself the affection of his friends. His reason may approve, and may present all these things as proper objects of desire, with temperance as the means of securing them. But, if the favourite indulgence produce a desire stronger, he yields in spite of reason, which has only operated in producing a liking in this case too faint. But, though reason does not act immediately on the will, it supplies materials

to enlighten the conscience. It tells the mind that the yielding to a certain desire is injurious to the condition of the yielder, and thus conscience, seeing clearly the evil effects of indulgence, has a clearer view of the evil which it wishes to avoid, and its consequent duty. Reason dictates sobriety as the means. And as the means, if pursued, produce pleasure, the mind comes in time to seek sobriety for its own sake, not as a means but as an end. Hence the conscience becomes purified from secondary considerations. It learns to seek the virtues for themselves, not as bestowing pleasure or profit, but to be pursued irrespectively of the pleasure or profit actually derived. The mind assuredly derives both from the practice of virtue, but this is not in the view of the purified and enlightened conscience, when issuing its mandates. Much more does religion teach this. Reason is too often erroneous in its calculations, and too refined for common use. Religion supplies to all, with universal authority, what reason tells to the few, and that timidly. It pronounces that the paramount happiness of the individual is promoted by the practice of virtue alone, that every deviation from it is sure to tend to misery, and that the true objects to be desired are those flowing from a moral life. Conscience, drawing its rules from natural feeling, is so far entitled to obedience, but, having its sanctions enforced by the will of God, its claims are felt to be paramount. Reason suggests, for the attainment of innocent ends, means which may not be innocent. On these, as well as the ends, conscience has to pronounce. Reason, contemplating principally the means with a view to the ends, may neglect the consideration of the former, and hold up to the mind no desires or aversions connected therewith. But religion, extending to every action of our life, *regarding them all as means*, enlightens both the reason and the conscience, enabling the former to see clearly relationships before unobserved, and that improper means are hurtful, and the latter to feel a dislike to

every thing that is in any way contrary to the revealed will of God. By religious instruction we do not diminish the power of reason ; we supply it with new materials, and we enlighten it on the nature of certain connexions on which its decisions were before loose and wavering. We enlighten the conscience. In the pursuits of life, a man may engage in business and have for his end the enjoyments of time, to secure which he, in the mean time, endeavours to amass wealth. Whether this becomes at last an end or not, for the furtherance of his immediate object, he may have recourse to these petty frauds which exist in trade ; his conscience may be so far enlightened as to shrink from gross violations. Reason enlightened would inform him that his happiness, considered as a whole, was thus injured. But it may be too weak to act immediately upon the conscience ; she, purblind, is led astray by inward maxims respecting the duty which a man owes to himself. You may convince him that he is not pursuing the surest means to his end, but with this conscience has nothing to do directly. He continues his course till religion sheds its light on his heart ; he then sees that he is living for a certain end, and that the course he is pursuing is contrary to it ; his conscience, recognising claims unseen before, acts upon his will. The duties are the same as they were before, but he has not seen them clearly. He perceives that the rules of justice binding upon his conscience, are violated by the slightest infraction of fair dealing, and his mind is busied about the requirements thus considered. Reason might have led to the same conclusion, but weakly, for in the mass of conflicting interests, it might have overlooked some link in the chain. Nor is reason to be trusted with regard to the generality of men left to themselves. It may do for philosophers—who all agree that virtue is the surest path to happiness—to arrive at these conclusions by a long train of deductions. The people are incapable of discovering these, or of following them when discovered.

We want a universal rule of conduct that shall enlighten the conscience, not of the few, but of the whole. Religion supplies this defect of reason. It opens up to us one common relationship with one common rule and one common end. Whatever be our pursuits in life, religion tells us that the object of existence is in all men the same. Reason, acquiescing and enlightened, acquiesces also in the means. It discovers relationships between different objects unseen before ; these it transfers to the conscience, and thus from a purer feeling is the will influenced to right. The religious instruction for which we are contending supplies us with this means of enlightenment in a variety of ways. We are furnished, in the examples contained in holy writ, with the doings of men whose motives are unveiled to us, and on which, therefore, we can pass sentence without the risk of mistake. It often happens that we mistake motives altogether, and the reason presents to the conscience cases to be decided on in which there is uncertainty and doubt. But the sacred record presents us not only with an account of actions, but of motives, and these motives weighed in the balance of the sanctuary ; it informs us of the imperfections that mar a holy life ; it tests all by the loftiest and purest standard ; it gives one example of perfection in motive and consequent action, and not only gives us rules, but their exemplification. It leaves us in no doubt as to its requirements, nor does it express itself obscurely ; and thus the reason applying the connexions it has learned, leads to the decisions of conscience, which become pure and unerring.

We should desire not only to enlighten the conscience, but to give it authority and power. It is, as we have seen, the principle which ought to regulate all our actions, considered in a moral aspect. It aims only at this control. It has for its direct object the will, and the actions flowing from the will, and not some, but all of them. It does not always govern, though it should always govern.

Having for its object control, the system of our nature is thrown into confusion when the other feelings overpower it. Hence one great object in all instruction ought to be to add to its authority, even as a speculative principle of action. We do this when we show that its dictates are alone conformable with self-interest. However philosophers may differ in other respects, we have seen that they are all agreed as to the fact, that obedience to the dictates of an enlightened conscience is alone consistent with true self-interest. Whether, in obeying conscience, we have a reference to this fact, is another question ; but, by it, we add authority to the rules imposed by conscience. And so with reference to the love and esteem and approbation of our fellow-men. But these considerations may not be, nay, are not able to give its dictates the authority of which it is capable. Religion furnishes us with these in a much greater degree. It gives the subsidiary force of a regard to eternal happiness and of the esteem of the good of all ages ; but it furnishes with a sanction which no mind refuses to acknowledge. It gives the divine authorization to the rules by which our conduct ought to be guided. It cuts off all pleas and all extenuations. The will of God shuts out all excuse ; and the man who might raise a thousand sophistical pleas to take from the authority of a sentence of the moral sentiments within him, cannot refuse the authority of the Divine Word. Our object being to give dignity and weight to the decisions of conscience, it were strange if we should neglect to superadd to its natural force the sanctions of the Eternal Will.

The conscience thus enlightened and thus enforced may still be deprived of its rightful sovereignty. Now, we have here a supplementary principle to which all moral instruction must be directed. Both in our appetites and our mental affections nothing is more common than the change of a means into an end. This has been before alluded to, but I recur to it as a principle of primary im-

portance in the present part of our question. A man who has toothach may be recommended to employ tobacco in the shape of smoking, for the purpose of deadening the pain. He becomes so habituated to this, and at last derives so much pleasure from it, that he relishes smoking for its own immediate effects. He becomes therefore a smoker. All are conscious of the principle. It is no uncommon thing for the intemperate man to have acquired the love of drinking, not from any desire on his part, but contrary to his desire, from the force of habit. So with regard to the moral part of our nature. We have seen that the miser may have become so,—and has often become so, from the force of habit, which has transferred the love of pleasure or of power to the love of gold. If such be the effect of habit in other departments, let us employ it in the department of moral instruction. We ought to accustom the youth to obey the dictates of an enlightened conscience, whatever may be the propelling cause of that obedience. He will find a pleasure in it that will lead him to continue the obedience when the cause is withdrawn, and to transfer the pleasure to that derived from obeying conscience directly. We may use for this purpose the considerations of interest, or the dread of our displeasure, or any other motive which, acting upon principles coinciding in their obedience with obedience to the biddings of conscience, produces the pleasure therefrom derived. This will lead to the desire of their gratification felt from the identity, and the habit will transfer the pleasure from virtuous observance as a means to virtue as an end. Religious instruction thus viewed is very dear to the philanthropic teacher. He knows the innate depravity of the human heart,—the blindness of the conscience,—and the impossibility of leading by natural means to pursue the dictates of holiness. But knowing the force of habit in the transferring from a means to an end, he accustoms those under his charge to do all things with a reference to religious requirements. The pleasure felt from this he

aims at transferring into a love of holiness and a hatred of impurity, not from their effects but in themselves, and thus he hopes to see them seek in divine grace that holiness without which no man shall see the Lord.

Reason, as we have said, of itself does not act upon the will. It presents to the mind objects of desire or aversion which may or may not be shunned, according to the feeling which acts immediately upon the will. To cultivate the reason morally, is a duty, not because it acts upon the will, but because it furnishes feelings which so operate. Thoughts engender feelings, and thus the mind is influenced. The thoughts are of importance, and so are the feelings. Conscience pronounces as to whether the will should obey this or that feeling. Now, there is one feeling to which conscience always gives its unequivocal assent. It is LOVE TO GOD. It is in vain, often, to attempt to overcome a feeling of desire by reason pointing to self-love, when the conclusions are faint and distant, whereas it may be at once overcome by a strong feeling flowing from another source. Conscience is enlightened when it perceives clearly the connexion between will and love to God, and strong, when, with the aid of this feeling it opposes others. The reason points out the connexion between God and man, and from this connexion spring the knowledge and feeling of what we owe to God,—which may all be comprised in one word, Love. When all our thoughts and words and actions proceed from this feeling, conscience smilingly approves. To implant this as the principle of action is its great duty and end, the means which it employs being the formation of moral habits and the love of purity. When we love virtue for its own sake, and love God, we become like him. But it is not *a* God whom we love, not *the* God discoverable by reason. It is the God of revelation, who is to be the object of our supreme affection, and we, in the exercise of this feeling, are to comply with his great injunction, “If ye love me, keep my commandments.” We thus obtain possession of a

feeling which is far more efficacious than mere reason,—which operates more directly, and is not like other feelings confined to certain ends, but, co-extensive as the conscience, extends to all, and, superior to the conscience, is the end at which conscience aims. Were conscience sure that this love were an everlasting principle, she would at once yield her sceptre, but she continues in her seat till the other feelings are all subdued and give obedience to love.

How can we excite this feeling but by religious instruction? We cannot implant it by reason, nor by vague praises of the God of nature. The proofs of design in nature are great and manifold, abundant enough to warrant us in praising God while we live. But these fade into insignificancy when compared with the manifested love of the Christian's God. To teach what we owe to God, and thus to produce love, is not to show merely, that as a Father he provides for all our wants,—that to him we are indebted for the food we eat, the air we breathe, and the raiment wherewith we are clothed. We must have recourse to the astounding love of redemption,—sins forgiven, righteousness bestowed, and eternal happiness secured. Thus are we enabled to use moral suasion to induce the young to love God, and loving him to seek to know him as he is,—the Redeemer of a world sinful and lost.

This feeling, like all others, is liable to the fluctuations of change. It becomes a matter of great importance to convert it into a steady principle of action, constantly recurring. This is to be effected by habit. Not only must the feeling exist in the mind, but it must be strengthened by habit so as to become a spontaneous principle of immediate action. In cases where we have time to deliberate, conscience decides which is the right course to pursue, and thus comes into operation before action. It may call to its aid considerations of prudence, of interest, of the feeling of love to God, and thus it may give force to its requirements by the complex feeling which they engender, and which

supports its decision, overcoming the feeling that prompts to an action opposed to it. But in many cases—in most—we act without deliberation, on the impulse of feeling. The feeling which has most power over us in this way will lead us to act. That feeling has most power which is most of all our ordinary principle of action. So much is this the case that, if we are well acquainted with the habits of a man, we can almost to a certainty tell how he will act in given circumstances, and hence we can judge of the propriety of our placing him in them or not. All the while, the feeling considered in reference to our perception of it is getting weaker, while the actions as flowing from it are more certainly to be calculated upon from the force of habit. This is admirably shown by Bishop Butler: "Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement passively to pity, and actively to relieve it. But let a man set himself to attend, to inquire out and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted, when yet at the same time benevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen, and whilst he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So, also, at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men, *i. e.* to forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it. And this seems, again, further to show that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonitions, experience, example, though they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one towards forming active habits, yet can have that efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a course of action, and that it is not being affected so and so, but acting which forms those habits. Only, it

must always be remembered, that real endeavours to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible in the nature of things that effects should be wrought in us at once equivalent to habits, *i. e.* what is wrought by use and exercise. Their progress may be so gradual as to be imperceptible in its steps, it may be hard to explain the faculty by which we are capable of habits throughout its several parts, and to trace it up to its original so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind, and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But the thing, in general, that our nature is formed to yield in some such manner as this to use and exercise, is matter of certain experience.

“ Thus by accustoming ourselves to any course of action we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it grow weaker, the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen, the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions, and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on in a course of action to which we have been accustomed. And practical principles appear to grow stronger absolutely in themselves by exercise, as well as relatively with regard to contrary principles, which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course. And thus a new character in several respects may be formed, and many habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire.”

The distinction made by this great author between active and passive feelings may lead to mistake, if we do not remember that love to God is both active and passive. As far as regards the mere feeling of complacency with which we view God, it is a passive feeling ; as far as it is expressed by words and outward manifestations of worship it is active. And thus it may be that, while the will, almost instinctively from principles which habit has en-

gendered, acts so as to please God, there may be no such stirrings up of the soul as at first were necessary, but a calm uniform life, accompanied with that active perception of an unbroken reference to God's glory, which is fed and kept alive by the daily tribute of homage and worship, opening up new sources of admiration, praise, and active love. Yet have men mistaken the great object of religion with regard to our worldly duties. It has been argued that it thus subdues the feelings, and makes man, for instance, relieve the wants of his fellow-creatures, not from the impulse of pity, but at the bidding of an irresistible power. This is a great error. Religion does not subvert the feelings, it directs them. The impulse of compassion in all, it regards properly speaking as a subject neither of moral praise nor of dispraise,—it is involuntary. But the man who disregards this impulse from sordid motives, religion condemns. What it requires is, not that we should disobey our feelings, but that we should obey them when sanctioned by conscience, enlightened by reason, and by the enlightener of reason, the word of God. As a feeling that the conscience can always employ, it furnishes us with the love of God, which, practised and acting with habitual rule, will give us a steady principle, approved of by our reason, our conscience, and our Supreme Judge.

But this love of God must be, as we have seen, love of the God of the Bible. From a mistaken love to God, men may perpetrate actions, and have in all ages of the world done so, at which enlightened conscience shudders. As a feeling it has always been found of efficacy, and by its aid governments have managed empires. As a principle of action it never has been operative, except through the religion of Christ. The more we instruct in this, we have the greater certainty of this feeling being guided by sound views of what is directed by God as a manifestation of love to him, and of converting it into an ever-active principle, the never-failing auxiliary of conscience, and the sure guarantee of all moral observance.

In schools one great part of the teacher's duty is to train to the purest morality,—to instruct in all that may enforce it by a regard to interest and happiness, by habits engendering the love of holiness, and by the love of God. Nothing furnishes us with all this but religious instruction,—instruction in the whole truths of the Bible. We may have the lessons of virtue taught and enforced in our schools without a reference to the source from which they are drawn. We may have moral maxims showing, not only that honesty is the best policy, but that virtue is true happiness. We may attempt to train to moral habits which lead to the love of virtue for its own sake. And all this is well, but of itself it is insufficient. We are taught by facts—the history of the world tells us that is insufficient even with respect to mature mind. And all the history of the human mind coincides with that part of it in the word of God, that to renew the will, which refuses obedience, in all men, to the dictates of conscience, we require divine instruction. Those who reject the word of God itself, may not see and will not acknowledge the force of this. I do not hope to convince them. But they who acknowledge the Bible to be God's word, must admit its truth. Strange if, in endeavouring to teach virtue, we should be debarred from inculcating it by a reference to that which is admitted to be the highest and the only sure standard.

CHAPTER XI.

Examination into Reasons for the Non-universality of Religious Instruction—Admitted Advantage of mere Moral Discipline—Of Church Instruction—Of Domestic—More wanted—In Schools Youth should be taught not only Moral Rules, but their Source—They should be taught to connect Religion with School Business—And thus with all the Business of Life—Necessary in all, but essential in a System of National Instruction—In the Poor not only no good, but a bad Education, counteracting Instruction—The uninstructed Poor in ordinary Times—In Seasons of Scarcity—Of Disease—Cause of Evil, FORGETFULNESS OF GOD—Folly of attempting to inculcate Moral Practice without the Bible—Quotation from Bunyan—Secular Instruction alone not advocated by any Man—Secularly uninstructed but religiously taught to be preferred to religiously uninstructed but secularly taught—Why—Secularly and religiously uninstructed Classes require Secular Instruction and Moral to prepare them for Christianization—Present Question between perfect and imperfect Moral Training—Cause of Doubt—Even though admitted Advantages immense—Religious Differences.

I HAVE in a previous chapter made reference to cases where it has been argued that, from religious instruction being supplied elsewhere, it is unnecessary in certain schools. The force of this, however, I cannot see. Neither, on the one hand, do I deny that moral discipline may be enforced in such schools, nor on the other do I undervalue the effect of ministerial or domestic religious instruction, given to the young throughout our land. Practical lessons are good, but inefficient without a course of religious. Without such a course, the teacher uses the benefits derived from religion as conceived in his own mind, but does not know the practical acquaintance with Christian motives possessed by his pupils. He takes it for granted, that they are all trained in scriptural truths—and so they may all be, less or more—but he does not know the extent of that training. Now he ought to know

how far the rules on which he acts are understood and felt; and should try to give practical consistency and shape to the views entertained by the young, of the religion of Christ. He should identify himself with their dearest interests, and prove to them that whilst his object is to guide and improve and direct all that is noble in their intellectual endowments—that while he is fitting them for the happiness resulting from the knowledge that they can go forth into the world with the power of performing their duties there, he also wishes to add to their moral powers by the sanction of religion—to give them a taste for pursuits connected with the revelation of God himself—to furnish them with precepts that shall sooth the hour of sorrow, elevate and regulate the season of their joy, guide them in perplexity, strengthen them in temptation, and lift their hopes to heaven itself. While he is ransacking literature to polish their tastes, refine their imaginations, and give them powers of expression—while he is going abroad into the world of science to open up to them that volume of nature in which the beneficent Creator has shown himself to man—while he trains them in studies which will afford them sources of delightful and innocent recreation—he ought with reverential hand to open that other volume in which the God of all has more clearly manifested himself, and there point out to them the sources of an information, the possession of which charms away evil, smooths the wrinkled brow of care, sanctifies disease and trouble, and places all the virtues that can adorn humanity in the very centre of the human heart, to cast a brilliancy on all learning and all accomplishments. In all this he does not interfere with the stated instructions of the pulpit, nor with those which render sacred the domestic hearth. All the instruction that can be given in this great theme is not too much. Highly must every one who wishes well to his race prize the regular return of instructions given in the House of God. Not to speak of the sacredness of the sanctions by which these instruc-

tions are enforced upon our minds, there is even in a merely moral point of view all that is impressive connected with them. The multitudes of serious worshippers assembled within walls which have witnessed the devotions of thousands before them, who now sleep around the sleep of death—the united song of praise, and the sympathetic breathings of one common prayer to one common Father—the words of eloquence and truth impressed on the mind, and coming from the lips of the man who is known to all in their domestic circle, as connected with all their joys and all their sorrows, render the ministrations of the sanctuary invaluable, altogether independent of the blessing of God promised to those who forsake not the assembling of themselves together. And what is it that gives a charm to a Christian household? What but the quiet air of unobtrusive piety in the proceedings of that family where the love of God is enforced by the lessons of the Gospel? Is it not the feeling that each parent there is a priest to God, dedicating to his service those young ones whom he has received from him? I envy not the feelings of the man who can contemplate, unmoved, the Christian parent, surrounded by his family—each listening with ear attent to the lessons of Heavenly wisdom, taken from God's own book, and taught with the earnestness that results from a conviction of a parent's responsibility. Happy is it when the labours of the minister and of the parent go hand in hand, each striving to secure for the young a well-regulated life here, and happiness hereafter. A household where religion is thus enshrined advances incalculably the happiness and prosperity of a country; and parents have advantages to which no one else can pretend. They have unfeigned love—a deep interest in the prosperity of those whom they are instructing—a knowledge of their tempers and dispositions—power effectually to foster what is good and repress what is evil. They can turn to account all the little incidents of life—and events seemingly unimportant in themselves may serve to convey the most

salutary lessons. The love, besides, which the children bear to their parents gives the latter much power and influence. The child, while he listens to the admonition of the parent, may seem comparatively regardless of what is most valuable and important, but the lesson is not all lost even then. He knows—although he may not express it in words, nor perceive it as a distinct conception of the mind—that there is for him in the hearts of those who are endeavouring to benefit him, a love which no waters can quench ; and, in after-years, when he reverts to the quiet room where a mother's gentle voice told him of murdered Abel, or of the repentant son who returned again to his father's house—and where a father, with all a father's tenderness, warned him of evil days to come—the gushing feeling that melts his bosom proves that these lessons have not all been in vain, and resolutions rise afresh, even as they did in his early days, to be worthy of those who expended on him all the stores of parental love. Such scenes of quiet domestic bliss present themselves everywhere throughout our land. The solitary cottage at the hill-foot—with no habitation within miles—and all moss or stunted fir patches here and there around—sends forth the nightly song of praise as the sun sets in the far west—or the waning fire warns that it is time for retirement—and the tiny girl and the sturdy lad then read, in homely accents, the benignant words of Him who said of his message, that “to the poor is the gospel preached.” And when the blessed day of rest returns, the noiseless tenor of that day, preparatory for heaven, is only broken in upon by devotion more deep and fervent. And then the peasant tells of heaven and happiness, and hears the happy young ones repeat the hymn that they have conned with anxious care, and with all the household sitting with grave yet happy faces, examines them on the doctrines of their faith, reproves, commends, and admonishes with zealous care. In busy cities, too, after the public duties of the day are closed, the man of business turns with delight to do by far the most important

portion of his duty to those to whom he is bound to point the road heavenward. Some, seated round the ample table stored with all the helps which piety and talent have given to our day, are studying, and questioning, and being questioned. Even the little one, with glistening ringlets and wondering eyes, as she sits at her mother's knee, listens with rapt attention to the story of the youthful Samuel, and of Him who, Lord of all, obeyed in all things his earthly parents. Here we may expect the lessons of religion to be best taught. Religion is by too many regarded as something distinct from all things else—a science by itself—whose rules bind only in certain cases, and in others are perfectly indifferent. How strange a mistake! Religion is the ordering of the heart aright in all things; its sanctions are connected with all our thoughts, our words, our actions. The lessons of religion, then, can best be inculcated by those who have a constant control over the taught, and a ceaseless interest in their prosperity. It thus gives a fresh charm to all that is connected with parental love.

Admitting all this, and delighting to admit it, I cannot perceive why in any case religious instruction should be abandoned in those schools where the youth receive the principal part of their training for active life. In the dealings of men, we do not examine the motives, but judge of them by the actions. In school, the teacher has to do not only with the actions, but with the motives. His concern is not only to secure the outward obedience of his pupils, and the abstaining from wrong towards their fellows, but such principles of conduct as shall lead them in after-life to observe the great rules of morality. This cannot be done effectually without religion, which alone imparts the principles required. The actions should flow from a motive higher than fear. So far as the dread of punishment or a desire to please may lead to proper habits, we must approve; but we want a constant reference to higher principles, even to those which flow from love to God. We

wish that every action should be watched so as to check the love of evil, and implant the love of good, by a principle of conscience enlightened and strengthened by God's word. We have the obedience and the harmlessness and the benevolence now, but we do not know whether it will be hereafter, unless we know the source from which it springs. An examination into the source includes religion. The teacher who knows not how far his pupil is acquainted with the word of God, with its laws, with its suppliances, with its promises, and its sanctions, knows nothing of his pupil's moral state in the highest sense. He knows only that he is obedient to him, that he has no flagrant vices, no violent passions openly displayed. The youth is about to go forth to a world of temptation and trial, and to meet it he has furnished him with no other weapons than a shield of frailest texture.

But, moreover, not only does this kind of teaching injure by not arming the youth against the trials of life; it gives him false views of religion. He is told by his religious instructors,—in the case supposed he has these,—that all things should be done to the glory of God, that every duty should be performed with a reference to his will,—that in all things he should seek to please him. His principal employment, for years, is connected with his school,—and during all that time he never hears the name of God; he is taught to perform all his duties without any reference whatever to him, and so far as habit forms principles, he acquires that of practical disregard to God's will.

It is surely a strange thing for him to find the parent whom he loves instructing him in a constant regard to the Ruler of all, and the teacher whom he venerates never once alluding to him, except so vaguely as to lead him to think it a mere matter of course. He is taught at home, that all virtue has a reference to God, and he is taught in school, that virtue is a mere matter of human attainment and human concern. It is no wonder, in such cases, that the youth looks upon religion as a secondary matter,

not connected with the real business of the world at all, but to be attended to separately and at leisure, a mere matter of speculation and knowledge, to be learned and practised or not as convenient. Hence our middling ranks abound with men who, excluding religion from all concern with the affairs of life, recognise it as something which is true, but not as a fixed and permanent rule of life.

That which is so necessary to the success of general education, is surely no less so in instruction, one of whose undoubted objects is, to develop all the faculties, among others those connected with morals, and to prepare for the proper discharge of the duties of life. There can be no mistake greater than that of confounding the instruction which has this admitted object, with that which has some other specific end in view. The object of the teacher in this general species of instruction, is not only to give rules and to enforce practice, but to enforce practice with reference to rules, to derive these rules from their highest source—the word of God—and to recommend them by appeals to the highest principles of our nature—the love of God—to show how this may be effected in practice, not merely as a matter of outward manifestation, but as springing directly from the principles themselves. If it be of importance, even to man's worldly happiness, that he should be guided by the principles of religion, it is of importance that his attention should be called to them in early years. If the aid of the motives and strength imparted by our blessed religion be necessary to keep men from forgetting the moral lessons engraven on their hearts by God, it is essential to supply that aid in early life. If it be easier to acquire virtuous principles and inclinations in youth, and more difficult to eradicate vicious inclinations when confirmed by habit, it is of the utmost importance that we should use the power thus afforded us, of destroying the seeds of vice, before they spring to rankness, and of fostering the growth of virtue in the soul. Why should teachers be allowed to refer to examples of profane history for

this purpose, and be shut out from the holy ground trodden by scripture heroes? Why may they not check the growing passions of envy and of hate, by referring to the bright examples of forbearance and charity and love with which the gospel abounds? Why may they not enforce the lessons so derived by the maxims of those who acted as they wrote? Why may they not inculcate obedience to lawful authority, and industry in the discharge of duty, by the admonitions to be found in the sacred page? Why not excite to the devoting of all the powers and attainments to the glory of God, by the strong motives afforded by religion? Thus would be brought into active and everyday practice principles of virtue, which would adorn and sustain in after-life. And, in truth, this is gaining a point of essential importance, though it may not be one on which parents dwell, because it is not seen, nor heard, nor obtruded. It does not show itself as an accomplishment—nor can it be exhibited as an attainment—nor does it prepare for making gain,—but its importance is not the less real on that account. We are not called upon, in the present day, to make extraordinary sacrifices to attest our belief in the truth. The old man is not now tied to the green fagot to be tortured and insulted, during the space of time that detains him from heaven—the maiden is not fastened to the stake, where the prayers upon her fervent lips are to be checked by the silent flow of the ceaseless tide—and no strong excitements urge us on to manifest warm enthusiasm in the caves of the rocks or the parched wilderness. But we are called upon, each day of our lives, to show that Christianity has thrown its beautiful essence into our character—we are required to check the rising gust of passion, and to repress the harsh word quivering upon our lips, to do humble unostentatious deeds of quiet benevolence—to bear with the failings of those around us, however disagreeable to ourselves—to refuse to throw incense upon the shrine of vanity—to be modestly firm in our opposition to sin in all its enticing forms—

to conquer desires opposed to conscience—and to do all things to the glory of God. This is not an achievement easy of accomplishment, and we should therefore begin in early years.

If it be desirable that, in all cases, the young should be furnished with these advantages, the argument acquires a tenfold force when applied to the case of national instruction. All good men view with feelings of charity the vices of the uninstructed, but no man denies their prevalence. Hence, to the advantages above detailed, we have to add a consideration which naturally suggests itself with irresistible force. Instruction is but a part of education; and in the case of the youth alluded to in our last remarks, what is wanting in school is supplied at home. But, in the ranks of the poor, let us remember that there is not only no such education, but a bad one in its stead. In many families of even the middling ranks there is no religious instruction to supply the defects of school; but there is, at all events, the example of a moral life, and there are in most cases the regular instructions connected with the house of God. In those unhappy families, where brawls and discord take the place of harmony and love, where open restraints are compensated for by secret indulgences, there is still a conventional check, which operates, alas! how feebly, in teaching the necessity of some appearance of morality. Now, it has been seen that it matters little in one respect how moral habits may be formed, provided they are formed; and hence there is hope even in such cases as this. But in the ranks of those whom a system of National Instruction would immediately benefit, we have no such ground of hope. Instead of an education forming them for heaven, they are receiving habits that fit them for misery and woe. Thus we have not only to supplement, but to undo and recreate. The passive obstacles which stand in the moral path of a pupil who receives no religious instruction in school, but is so trained

at home, great as I think them to be, are as nothing compared to the active obstacles, which not only impede but oppose, which not only obstruct but counteract. In such homes there is not only no religion, but no outward morality; there is not only no training for heaven, but none for earth; there is not only no real love to God, but no knowledge of him at all. From day to day the father hies him to his workshop or manufactory, not only with no prayer, but with curses on his lips. The mother manifests her love by screening from deserved punishment, and, anon, tempestuous in passion, brings upon herself the vengeful imprecations which she herself has taught. There are bursts of wild enjoyment, when father, and mother, and friends, and children swallow the burning liquid, drowning the reason and firing the passions. The very parental affection—pure and holy as it naturally is—but drives on to vice. It is expressed, not in lessons of religion, or of prayer, or of gentle benevolence, but of loud laughing applause at the mimicked oath, the vengeful blow, and the glass drained with feverish greed. The Sabbath is known only as a day when father may spend all his forenoon in bed, after the previous night's debauch, and all may, in the evening, renew the dose of wild intemperance. Then rises high the storm of angry passions. The mutual blow—the loud and fearful shriek of malediction—the wish uttered with frightful emphasis, consigning to eternal doom—the whirlwind of a fierce and restless domestic war,—excite and confirm within the young breast feelings and habits of wretchedness to himself, and war against the common weal. The promise broken—the falsehood uttered to conceal from the tyrant the truth which would inflame him—the constant fraud—the low cunning displayed in every bargain and every transaction, not only sow the seeds of vice, but implant it full grown, in that most hopeless of all manifestations, the ever-ready lie. A season of trouble comes, and surely brings with it moral feelings. It may be the season of

want. Then is the time for the tyrant of the household to expend his wrath and fury on all around him. Then, too, in open rebellion against God and man, he rails against the Supreme, and calls down curses on the heads of rulers, employers, all. Then are taught the lessons of open resistance to the law, if possible, of fraud and of stealth, if that be beyond the power or the daring of the poor. The latter expedient is never questioned as having even the appearance of immorality. He who succeeds in supplying himself with any article of consumpt, at the expense of violating his country's laws, is so far from being branded as immoral, that each man approves the deed, and would do the same if he were as well informed, or had the same opportunity as his happier neighbour. The young mind, naturally prone to the indulgence of every passion, without the restraint of reason or the guidance of conscience, drinks in all these lessons with greedy mind. The example set him agrees perfectly with all his inclinations—the habits which he is forming receive and would need no check from conscience, which does not, except feebly, point otherwise, and he hurries on with fearful rapidity along a path that conducts to everlasting ruin. Or disease enters the household of ignorance, and probably of vice. Does the awakened conscience rouse the soul to alarms and to inquiry? Alas, no! there is the stifling of fear, and the medicine administered—it may be with a grudge at the expenditure—but certainly without a reference to the God in whose hands are the issues of life and death. The rising griefs are drowned in the maddening cup, and the dying one is invited to partake. With some vague glimmerings of light, only making the moral darkness visible, there may be a clergyman procured to pray, as if there were some charm in this—to them no more than an incantation, having the power to arrest the hand of death, or to procure some unknown effect hereafter. Even this is seldom had recourse to, and the inmates may expire, one after

another, without one prayer, one wish consigning them to the mercy of their Judge. There may be deep grief, wild and uncontrollable in its first frantic burst, but the deadly potion drowns all, grief, senses, every thing. God may be then recognised, but it is only as a tyrant; there is no knowledge of moral government, nor of the gospel that converts death into a benefactor. Hatred to God and man, as oppressors and destroyers, drives to atheism, and blasphemy, and deepest vice, reckless of all considerations but the gaol and the executioner.

It is not necessary to have recourse, as an attestation of the truth of this picture, to the haunts of open vice, where congregate the unhappy beings who indulge in crimes subjecting them to punishment by the hands of the law. It is not necessary to thread the way through foul and loathsome streets in large towns, and gain admittance into the dens of thieves or the haunts of midnight robbers. Nor is it always the case that you will find the instructed better. So strong is the general tendency to irregularity and vice, that instruction is not a sure preventive in every individual case; it is only so in the mass; it has only a tendency to prevent. So weak is mere instruction without habits, that it can hardly be said to have any more than a tendency, not to produce order, morality, and religion themselves, but to produce a tendency to love, and thus perhaps to practise them. Search, however, the homes of the uninstructed poor, who would not quite descend to steal, nor to do any thing to bring them within the grasp of the law, and you will find the picture given of the immorality practised there more than realized,—intemperance, impurity, lying, greed, fraud, violence, envy, hate. We must add to all this, as no small evils, the moral effects which arise from the consequences of improvidence, the sensual habits engendered, and the want of order and regularity, the idleness that leads to mischief, and the physical effects resulting from uncleanness, and the whole train of causes

thus only alluded to, not dwelt on to form an exaggerated picture.

Above all, and the cause of all this, is an utter forgetfulness of God. The masses are as much embedded in heathenism as if the bell for the service of the sanctuary never tolled the invitation to prayer and worship throughout our land, or as if the Saviour's voice had never been heard in our streets. To them is utterly unknown, and by them unfelt, the humanizing influence of prayer and praise. "The Sabbath comes no Sabbath-day to them." Feelings of religion, of a going out of the soul towards an unseen power, are as natural as are any of the other feelings of the mind. Melting and humbling the hardest and proudest soul, they, in their indulgence, produce at least a sentiment of religion, which has its effect. But, like other feelings, it may pine away and wither from want of fostering care; or, if employed at all, it may be in the ignorance of foul superstition, leading to credulity, and making its votaries a ready prey to the designing and misguiding. We have thus persons of both classes,—those who never think of God at all, who have been so unused to the exercise of religious feeling, that it can hardly be said to exist; and others, whose religious feeling is expended upon certain forms, complied with as necessary to gratify the feeling, but neither sought with any desire or view to influence the practice, nor at all influencing it.

Such are the parents whose children it is wished by some to instruct in mere secular knowledge, without any provision for counteracting it with what alone is moral—religious instruction. We are to teach them to read, and write, and cipher—we are to train to habits of thinking—they are to understand all the secular truths which they read—they are to be instructed in the elements of many a science—and they are to gain what is called useful knowledge—but not one word of religion is to be uttered within the doors of the schoolroom, by him to whom they

are taught to look as their guide and friend ! It may be said that they are to be taught the purest morality, even that drawn from the sacred writings, but without one reference to the source—they are to be trained in the habits of virtue, and to know the rules without the sanctions. “Proud reason all and vain philosophy,”—never so was a stable system of practical morality imparted by nor to any man. Feeling, passion, the temptations of the world, all are opposed. This practice is moral, but the indulgence is more alluring ; this promises certain distant happiness, but that immediate pleasure—this exposes to disapprobation and contempt of the world, but not of my companions, my world—this no one will approve of, even your companions will shun you, but they will not know—God sees you, and will punish. Ah ! here comes in religion. And religion must not enter our schools. What we want is not moral teaching merely, but the teaching of the Bible ; and if any one can point to a moral community without it, then is the Bible false, and religious instruction unnecessary. “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.”

This reasoning applies in all cases, even where you have the family supplement. But there is none such here. You require to foster habits, not only strong enough to withstand the ordinary feelings of our nature, schooled by domestic use into humanity, but to conquer them when urged to outrage by all domestic usage. You have to sow the seeds, not only in soil unprepared, but covered with stones and rank with weeds. You have to root out this poisonous produce, and ever as you do so, you have to watch, lest, wafted on the household breeze, there come flying fresh seeds to the too friendly soil. Bunyan's image of water and oil well illustrates the Christian's view of the necessity of Divine teaching, to which religious instruction is but subservient : “Then I saw in my dream, that the Interpreter took Christian by the hand, and led him into a place where was a fire

burning against a wall, and one standing by it, always casting much water upon it, to quench it; yet did the fire burn higher and hotter. Then said Christian, What means this? The Interpreter answered, This fire is the work of grace that is wrought in the heart; he that casts water upon it to extinguish and to put it out is the devil: but in that thou seest the fire notwithstanding burn higher and hotter, thou shalt also see the reason of that. So he led him about to the other side of the wall, where he saw a man with a vessel of oil in his hand, of the which he did also continually cast (but secretly) into the fire. Then said Christian, What means this? The Interpreter answered, This is Christ, who, continually with the oil of his grace, maintains the work already begun in the heart, by the means of which, notwithstanding what the devil can do, the souls of his people prove gracious still. 2 Cor. xii. 9. And in that thou sawest that the man stood behind the wall to maintain the fire, this is to teach thee, that it is hard for the tempted to see how this work of grace is maintained in the soul."

It has often been debated whether secular instruction without religious be dangerous to the wellbeing of a country. There is no doubt much in the mere idea of an instructed people which tempts to form high notions of their probable morality. The introduction to the pleasures of intellect and taste, the growing acquaintance with the use of the powers of reason, and the general intellectual cultivation of the whole nature, are subjects on which the philanthropist dwells with delight. On the other hand, the experience of many communities, and of individuals in all communities, so proclaim the fact that the cultivation of the intellect does not advance morality, that we must come to the conclusion that the elements of the human mind are dissevered from their rightful connexion. Unless intellect and morality go hand in hand, we have neither an upright nor a happy people. But the supporters of mere secular instruction are, I presume, nowhere to

be found in this country, at least to advocate their views openly. Some advocate an instruction which shall be at once secular in its knowledge and in its morality. Thus fortified and fenced, while I think there can be no greater delusion than to represent a people all intellect as a moral people, I should be inclined to think an education where secular instruction is given, and moral habits formed, useful to a certain extent—though not to the extent of, nor to be compared with, an education based on, carried through, and completed with the sanction, rules, and appliances of religion. If the question were between no instruction at all, to a population brutalized by the want of all knowledge divine and human, and instruction training the intellect, and imperfectly training to moral observance, I should certainly, and without hesitation, decide in favour of the latter. If it were between no secular instruction to those who, utterly ignorant intellectually, were trained in religiously moral habits and truths—and secular instruction combined with the same imperfect moral training, I should without hesitation decide in favour of the secular ignorance, on the ground that this imperfect system has a tendency to teach what is dangerous, that there may be virtue independent of religion. Some, alas! the minority of our uninstructed, are in the former condition. Trained in the religion of Christ, scrupulously honest, mild and docile, yet independent and all without lore or science, they are happy and contented. Suppose them utterly devoid of all this, and introduced to intellectual knowledge, that knowledge being severed from religion, and their minds attaining a smattering acquire a power to injure, and desolation follows. It must be remembered that we cannot hope to give so much knowledge as shall teach humility, the necessary accompaniment of all acquirements auxiliary to morality. We can at the best but introduce to Truth—not give a full acquaintance with her; and, if we do not guard against intellectual pride, we run an imminent risk of introducing into our cottages

and our humble homes, scepticism, infidelity, crime, no longer openly attacking, but ingeniously undermining the very foundations of all society.

On the other hand, we found our great hopes of civilizing the population of our land on christianizing it. With a view to this, it were surely expedient that a population without instruction of any kind, and sunk in vice, should be raised by means of moral instruction, even though imperfect, combined with secular, because this partly moral and secular education may lead to the awakening of the faculties, which shall at last grasp Christianity. It is I think from mistaking the question, that philanthropists, doubtlessly sincere on both sides, have wondered at each other's blindness, and never have been able to meet on common ground.

This is not our question now, although it deserves great and separate consideration on a different branch of the subject; but our question is,—Shall we adopt a system of instruction perfect in its moral training, and imparting secular knowledge, or one imperfect in the most important branch, the first?

So self-evident is the answer, that there could be no difference of opinion at all on the subject, were it not for one most unhappy element. It is palpably most desirable to have our young taught morality, and that the morality of religion. Thus instructed, and acquiring likewise as much secular knowledge as should expand and develop all the faculties, and such habits as should induce them to long for additional information and expansion and development, our land might not at first rise high; but it should inevitably and surely rise in all the elements of national prosperity and happiness. We should have the children introducing their own quiet and peaceable habits into some of the homes at present the scenes of discord and strife. We should have the vacant hours of some devoted to the pursuits of intellect, and saved from sensual gratification. We should have the maxims of the word of

life refreshing regions all barren before and unblest. We should have the first great movement made towards universal civilisation, Christianity and prosperity. We should have parents reclaimed, and children confirmed, and intemperance relinquished, and joy spread abroad. We should have the physical condition improved, the moral desires renovated, and the Word of God the rule of life. We should see the first onward progress of that mighty movement in whose termination the will of God should be the will of the nation. We should see the blessing of God descending on us, our population becoming contented, the demagogue laying down his useless declamation, and betaking himself to the pursuits of honest industry. Poverty and vice we should have still—and crime and misery—but the poor should have the consolations of the gospel, and the sympathies of a moral population should relieve the distressed, and vice and crime should be more and more loathsomely repulsive. Hope should smile upon us, and tell us of a time when the name of Britain should be known as first, not in arms merely, as heretofore, but in the arts of peace; not distinguished merely as first among the nations in affecting the political destinies of the world, but as foremost in affecting by her example their education and their virtue. Christianity, slowly but surely permeating our masses, all rude and wild before, the sport of each political burst, and of each superstitious phrenzy, should add to the stability of our institutions, and to the firmness of our political bulwarks. All this we might not live to see realized, but we should look forward in the certain hope that our children should reap what we had sown, with humble confidence in the blessing of the great Lord of the harvest.

These prospects, so inspiring, are darkened by the introduction of one element, the unhappy element of religious differences. That there is nothing in the teaching of religion which of itself could even for a moment cause any doubt, will be apparent to any mind which considers what

would be desirable in instruction, supposing all were agreed on what right religion is. No one would hesitate in seeing at once that all the benefits which I have feebly attempted to develop, and many more, would flow from it. He would see that there would be nothing more likely to tend to promote the moral worth and the happiness of a people. Let him substitute—and I presume him to be a sincere follower of religion—his own religion as that taught in every passage wherein I have dwelt upon it, and he will attest what I have said, and even accuse me of not putting the case strongly enough.

I am entitled then to assume that I have proved to the satisfaction of my readers that religious instruction connected with secular is not only most desirable, but so much so that very strong grounds would be necessary to warrant our refusing it. The great ground alleged is, that Religious Instruction given in such schools as are proposed by its friends in Great Britain would be SECTARIAN.

Let us now examine the various systems of education which the state recognises—the one in Scotland religious—the other in Ireland non-religious, as well as some others both at home and abroad—and especially those proposed by different speculators, that we may be the better able to judge of the whole question, and come to a decision with that intelligence which is required in a matter of so much moment to the interests of our country.

CHAPTER XII.

Various Systems of Education—Parochial System of Scotland—Its Establishment—First Book of Discipline—Compulsion—Anstruther Wester—Acts of the Scottish Parliament—General Summary of the Objects of these Schools, and Provisions affecting them—General Assembly's Reports—Religious Instruction therein given—Open to Improvement—Evidence of Dr Chalmers—Dr Macleod of Glasgow—Facts, constituting the System—Improvements easily effected—But Something must be done for the Teachers—Inadequacy of the present Endowment—General Assembly's Schools—England—No regular Parochial Schools—Diversity of Supply—National School and British and Foreign School Societies—Ineffectual—National Schools—British and Foreign Schools—Religion the Basis of Education in both—Difference between them and Scottish Schools—Irish National Schools, principally from Reports of Commissioners—Summary of the System—Evidence of Rev. James Carlisle—Objections to the System—Sabbath Schools—Prussia—Religious Instruction there vigilantly looked after—Holland—France—Religious Instruction provided for in France.

WE come now to the consideration of the various schemes, both religious and non-religious, which have been proposed as deserving the support of the country. And as so much has been written, and so much said, while there has been too often little of charity and too much of party spirit, it will be necessary to discuss them, some briefly and others more at length, that, by stripping the question of all unnecessary adjuncts on the one hand, and, on the other, doing to all full justice, we may know them as they are, not as they have been depicted by unfair hands.

That system which, in Scotland, most obviously presents itself, is the system pursued in our parochial schools. These, it is well known, originated in the desire of the

early reformers, that in every parish the young of all ranks should have the means of instruction in divine things. Although for a long period after the Reformation there was no legal provision made for the establishment of schools, yet the clergy in different parts of the country, acting under the authority of the Reformed Church, exerted themselves strenuously for this purpose. The objects, the motives, and the extensiveness of the plan,—an extensiveness creditable to any age or country, but truly extraordinary in the circumstances of the case,—may be understood from the statement regarding it contained in the First Book of Discipline, promulgated in the year 1560, and which, whether sanctioned by the state or not, at all events shows the notions entertained by the early Scottish reformers on the subject of instruction.

“ Seeing that God hath determined that his kirk here in earth shall be taught, not by angels, but by men, and seeing that men are borne ignorant of God and of all godlinesse, and seeing also he ceases to illuminate men miraculously, suddenly changing them as he did the Apostles and others in the primitive kirke: Of necessity, it is that your honours be most careful for the vertuous education and godly upbringing of the youth of this realm, if either ye now thirst unfainedly the advancement of Christ’s glorie, or yet desire the continuance of his benefits to the generation following; for as the youth must succeed to us, so we ought to be carefull that they have knowledge and erudition to profit and comfort that which ought to be most deare to us, to wit, the kirk and spouse of our Lord Jesus.

“ Of necessitie, therefore, we judge it, that every several kirk have one schoolmaister appointed, such a one at least as is able to teach grammar and the Latine tongue, if the toun be of any reputation: If it be upland, where the people convene to the doctrine but once a week, then must either the reader or the minister there appointed take care of the children and youth of the

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parish, to instruct them in the first rudiments, especially in the Catechisme, as we have it now translated in the Booke of the Common Order, called the Order of Geneva. And further, we think it expedient in every notable toun, and specially in the toun of the superintendent, there be erected a colledge, in which the arts, at least logick and rhetorick, together with the tongues, be read by sufficient masters, for whom honest stipends must be appointed: As also [that] provision [be made] for those that be poore, and not able by themselves nor by their friends to be sustained at letters, and in speciall those that come from landward.

“ The fruit and commoditie hereof shall suddenly appeare. For, first, the youth-head and tender children shall be nourished and brought up in vertue, in presence of their friends, by whose good attendance many inconveniences may be avoyded in which the youth commonly fall, either by overmuch libertie, which they have in strange and unknowne places, while they cannot rule themselves; or else for lack of good attendance, and [of] such necessities as their tender age requires. Secondly, the excercise of children in every kirke shall be great instruction to the aged [and unlearned]. Last, the great schooles, called the universities, shall be replenished with these that shall be apt to learning; for this must be carefully provided, that no father, of what estate or condition that ever he be, use his children at his own fantasie, especially in their youth-head; but all must be compelled to bring up their children in learning and vertue.”

We find adopted even the system of compulsion, for which some now contend. Thus, in an extract from the record of the kirk-session of Anstruther Wester, quoted by Dr M'Crie in his *Life of Melville* (vol. ii. p. 503), we have the following curious passage:—“ Oct. 26, 1595. Anent the complent given in by Henrie Cūningham, doctor in the schooll, the Session thinks meit, that all the yowth in the toun be caused com to the schooll to be

tached, and that sic as are puir shall be furnished vpone the cōmon expenses; and gif ony puir refuiss to com to scholl, help of sic thing as thay neid and requir shall be refused to them. And as for sic as are able to sustein their barnes at the schooll, and do their dewitie to the teacher for them, thay shall be commandit to put them to the school, that they may be brought vp in the feir of God and vertue, qlk if thay refuse to do, thay shall be callit before the Session, and admonished of ther dewetie, and if after admonition they mend not, then farther order shall be taken wth them at the discretion of the session. And the magistrates and counsale shall be desyred to tak fra them the quarter payments for ther child, and ane dewetie efter ther discretion for the dayes meit as it shall cō abovt vnto them, whidder they put ther bairnes to the schooll or not."

It was not, however, till 1616 that the Privy Council, by an act dated 10th December (Dunlop's Parochial Law, p. 462), provided, " That in every parish of this kingdom where convenient means may be had for entertaining a school, a school shall be established, and a fit person appointed to teach the same, upon the expense of the parochinaris, according to the quality and quantity of the parish." This act of council was ratified by an act of parliament in 1633, which explains this "*expense of the parochinaris*" to mean an assessment upon the land according to the worth, " for maintenance and establishing of the said schools." The regulations became more definite by an act passed in 1646, wherein the estates of parliament (Dunlop, p. 463), " considering how prejudicial the want of schools in many congregations hath been, and how beneficial the providing thereof will be to the kirk and kingdom, do therefore statute and ordain, that there be a school founded and a schoolmaster appointed in every parish (not already provided) by advice of the presbyteries; and to this purpose, that the heritors in every congregation meet among themselves, and provide

a commodious house for a school, and modifie a stipend to the schoolmaster." This act was rescinded at the Restoration. By an act passed during the Episcopal period, in 1662, it was enacted that none should be permitted "to teach any public school, or to be pedagogues to the children of the persons of quality, without the license of the ordinary of the diocese," Scotland being put on the same footing as England with regard to education. After the restoration of Presbyterianism in 1690, this act was of course repealed, and an act passed, having for its preamble, "Our Sovereign Lord and Lady, the King and Queen's Majesties, and the three Estates of Parliament, considering how necessary it is for the advancement of religion and learning, and for the good of the Church, and peace of the kingdom, that the Universities, Colleges, and Schools be provided and served with pious, able, and qualified professors, principals, regents, masters, and others bearing office therein, well affected to their Majesties and the established government in church and state,"—it enacts, in the first place, "That from this time forth no professors, principals, regents, masters, or others bearing office in any university, college, or school within this kingdom, be either admitted or allowed to continue in the exercise of their said functions, but such as do acknowledge and profess and shall subscribe to the Confession of Faith, ratified and approved by this present parliament, and also swear and subscribe the oath of allegiance to their Majesties, and withal shall be found to be of a pious, loyal, and peaceable conversation, and good and sufficient literature and abilities for their respective employments, and submitting to the government of the Church now settled by law." The superintendence of the schools, which had by this act been given to a commissioner appointed by the crown, for reasons connected with the state of the country at the time, was restored to the Church by an act passed 1693. In 1696 the rescinded statute of 1646 was adopted as the law,

compelling the heritors to establish a school in each parish, or, if they did not comply with the terms of the act, authorizing the Presbytery to apply to the Commissioners of Supply, who were empowered to settle a school and assign a salary, as effectually as if it had been done by the heritors themselves. The Church of Scotland acted vigorously in enforcing the law, and to her efforts we undoubtedly owe the present parish schools of Scotland. Finally, in 1803, an act—of which, in some particulars, the parish schoolmasters complain, and it seems to me justly—was passed, regulating the salaries of the teachers, the method of election, and the power of appeal.

Of these schools, it may be noticed, that it is the intention of the legislature that there shall be at least one in each parish. The burden is laid upon the heritors or proprietors of land, who are bound to provide a school-house, a dwelling-house for the teacher ("such house containing not more than two apartments, including the kitchen!"), and a garden, and to pay a salary, varying from £25:13:3 $\frac{3}{4}$ to £34:4:4 $\frac{1}{2}$ as the minimum and maximum. The superintendence is vested in the hands of the clergy, as education seems always to have been, with the exception of the period above referred to, between 1690 and 1693. The election is vested in the minister of the parish and the heritors of land to the extent of at least one hundred pounds Scots of valued rents appearing on the local tax-books of the county. The person elected must take the oath of allegiance, and subscribe and sign the assurance and abjuration before a justice of peace, and he is then examined by the presbytery as to morality and religion, and such branches of literature as the heritors and minister shall deem most necessary for the parish. The determination of the presbytery is final, and, if favourable, the teacher is required to sign the Confession of Faith and Formula of the Church of Scotland, previously to his obtaining an extract from the

minute which completes his right. The duty of the schoolmaster is to teach the branches, and at the fees, fixed upon by the minister and heritors, and during the hours and times established by each presbytery,—he being also obliged to teach such poor children of the parish as shall be recommended by the heritors and ministers at any parochial meeting. The clauses in the act of 1803 which regulate the superintendence of the clergy and of presbyteries are as follows:—“ And be it enacted, That the superintendence of schools shall continue with the ministers of the established church as heretofore, according to the several acts of parliament respecting the same, except in so far as altered by this present act.

“ And be it enacted, That, as often as presbyteries, in the course of their visitations, shall find any thing wrong with respect to the hours of teaching, or the length of the vacation annually given, or when any complaint shall be made to them upon those subjects by parties concerned, they shall have the power of regulating the same in the manner they may judge most consistent with the particular circumstances and general good of the parish; and the schoolmaster is hereby required to conform to and obey all regulations so made by the presbytery, under pain of censure, or suspension from or deprivation of his office, as to the presbytery shall seem proper.

“ And be it enacted, That when any complaint from the heritors, minister, or elders, against the schoolmaster, charging him with neglect of duty, either from engaging in other occupations, or from any other cause, or with immoral conduct, or cruel and improper treatment of the scholars under his charge, shall be presented to the presbytery, they shall forthwith take cognizance of the same, serve him with a libel, if the articles alleged appear to them to be of a nature which requires it; and having taken the necessary proof, they shall acquit, or pass sentence of censure, suspension, or deprivation, as shall

appear to them proper upon the result of such investigation, which judgment shall be final, without appeal to, or review by, any court, civil or ecclesiastical."

It will thus be seen, that, while what is determined by a majority of heritors and the minister comprehends all that the schoolmaster is required to teach, the superintendence remains altogether in the hands of the established church, the sentence of the presbytery being in all cases final. Accordingly, by various acts of Assembly, ministers are directed to visit and examine the schools within their respective parishes, and presbyteries to appoint presbyterial visitations within their bounds at least once a-year. By an act of Assembly 1794 (Dunlop, p. 490), " Schoolmasters are enjoined to cause the Holy Bible to be read as a regular exercise in their schools, and to teach the Shorter Catechism, and cause the children to commit it to memory; and ministers and presbyteries are enjoined to take care that the schoolmasters do their duty in these respects."

The presbyteries, moreover, lay annually reports of the state of the schools within their bounds, not only parochial, but all others that permit their examination—this being refused by very few, and the legality of their refusal being doubtful—before the synod, which transmits them to the General Assembly. By this last body an education committee is appointed, which examines these reports, and they have begun to publish them in a collected form. " The committee trust they do not over-estimate the tendencies of the publication of a document such as this, though they confess their estimate is high; for they scruple not to assign to it a place of much moment, among the means of a less direct description, employed by the church for the advantage of education; and they trust that in the hands of Providence it will be guided to the consequences expected."—" In the mean time, it is matter of satisfaction that a commencement has been given to an annual publication, calculated to increase

the general interest in the important matter of education, and that the superintendence of all schools throughout the country by the church—a duty of great compass, and engrossing much time and attention from the members of the church, is likely to have hereafter—what a function of that importance cannot in the present circumstances any longer want—a public record, setting forth how faithfully the work has been performed, and applying a stimulus to improvements which are shown to be required.”—(*Report of the General Assembly's Education Committee, 1839, p. 18.*)

From these reports it is evident that every effort is made to improve the quality and quantity of instruction, both as to method and manner; and from the influence of the clergy, they cannot fail to be successful.

It will thus be seen that, waving all considerations of other points, the parochial schools of Scotland are intended to supply with the means of instruction all, even the poorest—the fees being fixed by those who have an undoubted interest in the wellbeing of the locality, and the poor being taught either on the recommendation of the heritors and minister, or by arrangements made with the teacher. The power of curtailing or extending the branches taught is vested in the same hands, and there is provision made for the regular use of the Bible and the Shorter Catechism of the Church of Scotland, the superintendence being in the hands of a body of men constantly on the spot, and deeply concerned in the welfare of the whole community. On the one hand, the poor are not deprived of the privilege of paying for the education of the young; and on the other, the endowment bestowed on the teacher—though too often ludicrously inadequate, renders the fees so moderate, as to place their payment within the reach of most.

Connected with the parish schools of Scotland, there arises a host of interesting questions; but I must confine myself to my immediate object, which is to consider them

in reference to religious instruction. And here it will be seen that, while it is in the power of the heritors and minister to modify the secular branches as they shall see desirable, the Church of Scotland exercises a vigilant control over the religious department, ordering the reading of the Scriptures as a daily exercise, and the committing to memory of the Shorter Catechism. The enforcing of this is left to the minister of the parish, and thus there is every security for the regulation being rendered effective. It will depend altogether on the judgment of the teacher, aided by that of the minister, and the suggestions of the General Assembly, as to the method. Whether the whole Bible shall be read, whether with or without explanation, at what age the teaching of the Shorter Catechism shall be introduced, and other points, are left entirely to the teacher and the clergyman. Thus, whether it be an advantage or not, the instruction given in secular matters may be varied according to the circumstances of the locality, or to the view taken of these by the minister and the heritors, who are mainly guided by the opinion of the minister. The *method* only of instruction in religious matters is left to discretion, and in this, doubtless, there is much of difference. While some parish teachers confine themselves merely to the reading of the Bible and to the bare hearing of the questions contained in the Shorter Catechism, others act upon the principle of causing the young to understand, as far as this is possible, the various subjects that come before them. And so as to discipline. There seems to be no limitation set to the teacher in this respect, except as far as, in the words of the act, respects "cruel and improper treatment of the scholars under his charge."

As far as regards methods of teaching and discipline, then, these schools are open to improvements of all kinds. And there is one point which deserves especial attention. *Attendance in these schools on the religious instruction given is optional.* While there is nothing in the shape

of enactment, so far as I know, on the subject, the usage is undoubted.

This and other points connected with our parish schools may be best shown from a portion of Dr Chalmers' evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, upon the subject of a poor law for Ireland in 1830, printed in the 16th volume of the new edition of his works, page 413. Being asked, "Do they" (the reading of the Bible and also a daily examination of the children on the Catechism) "not form the major part of it?" (the system of parochial education).—"I will scarcely say they form the major part, because the Catechism does not occupy more perhaps to each individual than a very few minutes; and with regard to the reading, it is, in my opinion, a bad plan to make the Bible so very elementary a book, that scholars have to spell and misspell, and hammer their way to the words of it; the Bible, therefore, should be chiefly read by the higher classes. The general course of our country schools consists of the alphabet, two spelling-books, the easier and more difficult; the New Testament read at a distinct class, and earlier than the Bible-class, which has lessons from the whole Scripture; besides these, there is a lesson-book, called the Collection, consisting of miscellaneous pieces from various authors; I have also seen abridged histories used as schoolbooks.

"Have you any extracts from the New Testament, such as the parables and the miracles?—We have often extracts of that sort in our spelling-books.

"Do you then consider a competent knowledge of the scriptures on the part of the population of a country necessary to its moral wellbeing? Decidedly so." Again, at page 419, in answer to this question, "You say you would not make the scripture-class compulsory any more than the writing-class, or the arithmetic-class, at the same time you stated you would lay down for your school that system which you thought essential, in which system a scriptural class formed a part; how would you practically arrange

the machinery of your system, so as to allow the attendance on the scripture-class to be optional?" he says,—“ I know there are a great many classes in a Scottish school, and that, in like manner, as there are many that attend the reading-classes, and do not attend the writing and arithmetic classes, so I can conceive it a very possible thing that scholars may attend certain reading-classes and not attend others of them.” And, in confirmation of this, we have the evidence of Dr M'Leod of Glasgow, before the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into Irish Education, whose report was printed in 1837. The substance of his evidence on this point is, that Roman Catholics are very numerous in some districts of the Highlands. In one parish, in the county of Inverness, there were 3500 Catholics, and very few Protestants. In all these parishes, there are the usual parochial schools, although, in consequence of their insufficiency, there are likewise many Assembly schools. But both parochial and Assembly schools are conducted on that principle, that a portion of scripture is read every day in the school, by what is called the Bible-class. This is the upper class, but there are junior classes which read the New Testament, it being considered more easy for them, not that the old is deemed unfit to be put into their hands. In many of the schools in which the scriptures are regularly read, there are Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholic children are not obliged to read the Bible if the parents object—if no objection is made, they join in the class with the others, and no notice is taken of their doing so. He never knew nor ever heard of an instance of Roman Catholic parents objecting to their children, not only being present at, but even reading in the Bible-class. Nor do their clergy object. The bishop of the district even offered every facility for carrying their plans into operation, and gave letters of introduction to the priest in Barra, who rendered every assistance. His successor was deposed by the bishop, because he ordered the children to leave the school if the scriptures were read, as he (the bishop)

wished them to go and secure the blessings of education, to enable them to go to the low country, procure situations, and get on in the world. His successor is equally liberal. Gaelic Bibles and Testaments are deposited in the houses of influential Roman Catholic gentlemen, and distributed to people in districts where the bishop and the priest have the greatest influence. These Gaelic Bibles are translated from the authorized English version. The scriptures are not merely read, but explained without objection, and the whole Bible is read.

I have been tempted by the interesting nature of this evidence, to give the substance of more of it than I needed for my immediate purpose, which was to show that attendance on any of the classes in the parochial schools is optional.

From all this we may deduce the following facts, as constituting the system of parochial schools in Scotland: *1st*, Each rural parish has at least one school-house, with provision by the proprietors of the land for an endowment to the teacher, who has, besides, a right to certain fees fixed by those proprietors and the parish minister. *2dly*, It is the province of these last besides to fix the branches to be taught, and to choose the teacher. *3dly*, In all cases the Bible and the Shorter Catechism form a part of the regular instruction. *4thly*, Attendance on any branch of instruction is optional. *5thly*, The teacher must be a member of the Established Church. *6thly*, The minister of the parish has no direct control over the teacher, farther than has been mentioned above, it being the province of the *Presbytery* to superintend the performance of the duties required, to censure, suspend, or depose the teacher, their sentence being final.

I have been thus minute in stating the nature of our parish schools, because much ignorance of their nature prevails. Some attribute to them all the excellencies that can possibly be predicated of any system, while others are still more absurd in their vituperation. It is surely not the

part of Scotchmen to inveigh needlessly against an institution to which we owe so much. These schools shared in all the defects of every other system of education—but they possessed and possess the excellence of indefinite improvement. The machinery exists, and if it requires amendment, the amendment is easy. The parish teachers of the present day are not the same men as those of forty years back. Every one who knows them is aware that they have fully participated in the advances that have been made, both in general knowledge, and in that pertaining to the details of their own profession. Whatever remains to be done can be easily effected, if attention be paid to their *status*, by giving them the elevation which is their due. We cannot expect men to labour in this arduous calling, who have talents and energy enough to advance themselves in other pursuits, unless a reasonable provision be made for them, sufficient to place them in their proper position in society. Unhappily, while all are agreed as to this, nothing is done, and they are left as before, to vegetate on their scanty endowments, and to be the butt of censure from all quarters, as inefficient and behind the age.

Surely the bare statement of the following dry statistical certainty is sufficient to call up a blush on the cheek of every man who knows how much we owe to our parish schools. What think you, my wondering reader, are the average emoluments of the parochial teachers of Scotland? Just 18s. 2¼d. per week! Impossible! you exclaim. Nay, consult a parliamentary paper, before referred to, on the state of education in Scotland, and you will find that there are 1170 parochial teachers, who, as their total income, from salaries, fees, and *all other emoluments*, have distributed among them £55,339, 17s. 1½d., leaving to each £47, 5s. 11¾d. per annum, or about 18s. 2¼d. a-week. To be sure they have a house—the heritors in very many cases not confining themselves to that degrading clause of the two apartments—and garden. Well, add £4, 14s. 0¼d. for them, and they have £1 per week!

When shall we rouse to a sense of the folly and shame of this economy? A change has been talked of for years. Is there no patriot member who will make the walls of the House of Commons ring to the cry of justice? The educators of Scotland and its constables receiving much the same pay! Education can point to no greater marvel than the progress made lately in such circumstances, by these very men, in all that adds to the efficiency of a teacher—moral worth, intelligence, and professional skill.

To the parochial schools of Scotland may be added the General Assembly's schools, referred to in Dr M'Leod's evidence. An account of them will be best given in the words of the Report of the Education Committee for 1839:—(p. 7.) "The schools maintained on the General Assembly's Scheme represent no more than a part of the service which, by the aid of Divine Providence, the Committee are in the course of rendering to education. It is, however, the principal part—none of the other means employed either offering themselves so much to observation, or reaching their intended objects so directly. The school establishment, as it stands at present, is as follows:—

Total number of schools on the Scheme	117
Number of schools established in the Highlands and Islands	97
Number established in the Lowlands	20

"The total number of pupils instructed at these schools, High and Low land, is upwards of 9000. Of them it may be safely said, that more than one half, but for the Assembly's schools, would have received no instruction at all in any thing usually taught at schools; and the remainder had been instructed in a very different fashion from what is commonly practised by the teachers in connexion with this scheme."

An act of parliament was passed in 1838 for the endowment of a salary to the teachers of these schools, by which the teachers are rendered liable to all the obligations and superintendence of parish schoolmasters. Such schools may therefore be considered, when they have

availed themselves of the benefits of the act, as belonging to the parochial system of Scotland.

In England there is no fixed parochial supply of education. Hence there is a great variety in the instructional circumstances. Some counties seem to be very badly provided, while in others, such as Rutlandshire, there is at least one school in every parish. Much has been done by societies to supply the deficiency. Of these, the principal are the National School and the British and Foreign School Societies, which, having been in operation for many years, supported by the leading men in the church and the leading dissenters, and yet being inadequate to their object, even by the confession of all, notwithstanding the immense good which they accomplish, and the aid which they have repeatedly obtained from government, prove, that if instruction be a blessing, it is not to be obtained by any thing short of a national provision. The National School Society is supported exclusively by members of the Church of England, and has for its criterion the teaching of the doctrines of that church, the Catechism being a text-book which all who receive instructions under its auspices must learn, except in its infant schools. The British and Foreign, again, is supported principally by dissenters, but is not exclusively so—many churchmen subscribing, and some being directors. Mr Dun, their secretary, being asked by the Committee of the House of Commons in 1837, "What is the criterion of union with your society?" answered, "The criterion is, that they conduct the school on the method of the Borough-road school, and that the children are instructed in the Scriptures, the peculiar catechisms of the different denominations not being admitted." We learn further from his evidence that the Bible is the only reading-book, and, while the society denies being a dissenting organ of instruction, those classes of dissenters included in the terms Congregationalists (Independents) and Methodists, are satisfied with the principles of the British and Foreign Schools. Mr Dun is of

opinion that Catholics and Jews will never generally consent to be instructed with others. The teachers in these schools are expected to examine simply on the plain, obvious, and grammatical meaning of the words, but not to inculcate any doctrine. With this most have been satisfied, one Unitarian clergyman objecting to one passage being read. There seems to be no effectual inspectorship, nor means of ascertaining either the instruction, or how the teacher conducts his school. Though the Bible be the only text-book, there is incidental instruction given in other things which do not come under our present inquiry.

It does not seem that all who attend the British and Foreign Schools are dissenters, nor that all attending the National Schools are churchmen. On that last point, Mrs Austin, in her spirited little work on national education, says:—(p. 12) “By a reference to the evidence of the Bishop of London, and of other witnesses before the Committee of the House of Commons, it appears distinctly, that the instances of objection made by dissenting parents to the children joining in the religious instruction given at the National Schools are extremely rare—that they are satisfied that they *have* religious instruction, and trust to their own or the pastor’s influence to correct those points of belief in which they differ. At the same time, it is difficult to say how much of this is owing to the discretion of the teachers.” “The practical working of our national system,” says the Bishop of London, “*in judicious hands*, is such, that no offence *need* be given to dissenters.”

It will be seen from this, that the basis of instruction in both these great societies—including the members of the Church of England, and by far the majority of the dissenters—is religion,—that these schools differ from the parochial schools of Scotland in not being localized and universally distributed, in not being provided for by legal enactments, in having no regular method of appointment or superintendence, in having no text-book but the Bible—the British and Foreign Schools in not teaching

a catechism, nor requiring the teacher to belong to any particular sect—and the National Schools in making the being taught a catechism an indispensable requisite for acquiring other instruction.

These, with the foundation-schools of England and Scotland, are the principal schools of the youth of Great Britain; and in nearly all of them religious instruction is offered.

The national schools of Ireland, supported by the government, differ from all these, in not *necessarily* offering religious instruction, and, when it is offered, permitting it to be Protestant or Roman Catholic, at the will of the parents. Whether this be right or wrong, such is the fact, and, from consulting the Reports of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland, we learn,

1st, That schools are supported which give no religious instruction at all. *2dly*, That it is *recommended* that teachers use Scripture extracts, prepared for the purpose by a Board consisting of men of all denominations with a list of words to be explained, and questions to be asked in each lesson. *3dly*, That, in addition to the secular instruction given, and which *may* include the reading of these extracts, with explanations that must not touch on disputed points, there is set apart one day of each week (independently of Sunday), when the pastors or other persons approved of by the parents—whatever may be their belief—are encouraged to give them religious instruction in their peculiar tenets—which encouragement is explained to be, merely affording to such pastors facility of access to the pupils at the time specified, and not employing or remunerating them. *4thly*, That facilities of the same kind are to be afforded on any other day of the week for the same purpose, any arrangement of this kind being made known publicly in the schools, that those children, and those only, may be present at the religious instruction whose parents and guardians approve of their being so. *5thly*, That the reading of the whole Scriptures is regarded

as a religious exercise—and so is prayer, and these, therefore, are confined to the hours set apart for religious instruction. *6thly*, That all books read in the schools during the hours of general instruction are to receive the sanction of the Board, and that, if any other book than the Bible, or the standard books of any church to which any of the children belong, are to be employed in communicating religious instruction, the religious teacher is expected to communicate his intention to any individual member of the Board, and consult with him respecting its suitableness. *7thly*, That the salaries granted by the Board are granted to the teachers individually, and a change consequently requires their sanction. *8thly*, That the Board takes no cognizance of the religious belief of the teachers.

Such are the principal points of the system bearing upon religious instruction. As to its working, we are not furnished with any means of knowing whether there is any advantage taken of the encouragement given for separate religious instruction. Indeed the Board themselves do not seem to know. Thus, when the Reverend James Carlisle was examined before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Irish Education in 1834, being asked, “Is there not a day set apart in the National Schools when the children receive religious instruction from their respective ministers?” he answered, “There is. We secure a day for that purpose, but we cannot be certain that the minister will attend.” And a little farther on, “Have you found in practice that setting apart one day in the week has a tendency to produce a marked division among the children of parents of different persuasions?—That is a practice we have found considerable objection to in some quarters. The setting apart of one day in the week does not appear to be regarded as a matter of much consequence by either party, and most, I think, would rather not be bound to it. We are not, however, yet prepared to recommend its discontinuance, for the indifference respecting the setting apart a day for religious

instruction arises, partly at least, from this circumstance, that, though applications are made for schools by persons of different persuasions, there is a sort of understanding, we often find, that the schools are to belong to one of the denominations ; *that it is to be the priest's school, or the school of the clergyman of the Established Church of England, and school of the Protestant dissenting minister, and that they are not to interfere with each other.* And each minister thus having his school in his own management, he is satisfied with going and giving religious instruction on the usual days of teaching out of or in any school hours, and does not care for having a day set apart for religious instruction. But were schools generally to be conducted *bona fide* by committees consisting of all parties, it is probable that the one day in the week secured for religious instruction might become more important than it now in general is."

It would seem to be the fate of Irish questions to expose all who meddle with them to certain strife. With this fear before my eyes, I humbly offer the following remarks on the scheme, which are dictated by no party feelings, but a sincere, perhaps a mistaken, love of truth.

1. The state which supports these schools furnishes secular, but does not furnish religious instruction. It certainly recommends that religious instruction of a particular kind—I allude to that conveyed in the extracts—shall be furnished, but does not itself furnish this. It is not denied by the Board that the extracts are not read in all their schools,—they conjecture (p. 50 of the Reports) that they are used in more than four-fifths of the whole number. I need not discuss this objection now, as I shall hereafter consider the duty of the state ; but I may hint that this seems a vital objection to the system.
2. The religious instruction which it recommends is limited to the morals and history, exclusive of the doctrines, of Christianity, and that taught not from the whole Word of God, but from portions of it, the distinction being made in such a way as

to leave false impressions of the value of the whole counsel of God on our behalf. The first part of this objection I shall recur to hereafter, the latter—the question of Extracts—is of comparative unimportance, depending not so much upon extracts in themselves, as the impressions made by them in relation to the Word of God—and as this inquiry would lead us into a lengthened train of reasoning, I do not insist on it, nor shall I resume it. 3. The state employs teachers, of whose religious belief no cognizance is taken. 4. The state encourages—that is, affords facility to—teachers of all religious denominations, to inculcate their religious tenets without reference to their truth or falsehood.

I can appreciate the feelings which led to the adoption of this system—but I must be pardoned for thinking and pronouncing that any thing more objectionable in the way of instruction could hardly well be contrived. It is an attempt to carry through a half-measure, neither wholly to teach, nor wholly to leave untaught, religion. It gives no guarantee for the teaching of truth, and it gives encouragement to the teaching of error.

I here leave this necessarily brief and imperfect sketch of the provision made in this country for the religious instruction of the young. But there are two points to which I shall advert before closing this chapter.

I have taken no notice of Sabbath Schools, because if they are conducted as they ought to be, and universally are conducted in Scotland, they are not connected with secular instruction, and our inquiry only respects that connexion.

One other remark I may make. Appeals are often made to Prussia, France, and other continental countries, as if the system pursued there possessed some degree of liberality at which it were desirable that we should aspire. Scotland, on this point of religious instruction, is in her parish schools in advance even of Prussia on the score of religious instruction. Unfortunately, in advance—for

while in Prussia private schools must furnish an account of the religious instruction given, any thing may be taught in Scotland, practically at least ;—for it is doubted whether the presbyteries have not a universal power to inspect ;—provided it be not openly offensive to public morality. To be sure, there is no distinction of sect, and herein Prussia agrees with Ireland—but religious instruction is a necessary part of the instruction furnished, and herein Prussia differs from Ireland. It connects secular and religious instruction as inseparable, modifying the right of the parent to accept or refuse the religious instruction so tendered.

(Cousin's Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia, p. 55). " Every complete elementary school necessarily comprehends the following objects:—Religious instruction as a means of forming the moral character of children according to the positive truths of Christianity. Care must be taken to introduce and combine those branches of knowledge with the reading and writing lessons as much as possible, independently of the instruction which shall be given on those subjects specially..... *The instructions in religion, reading, writing, arithmetic, and singing, are strictly indispensable in every school.*

" No school shall be considered as a complete elementary school unless it fulfil the whole scheme of instruction first marked out." Again (p. 58), " For religious instruction, which in protestant schools is founded mainly on the Holy Scriptures, the Bible and the Catechism generally adopted shall be read. The New Testament shall be given to the children who can read. Those who approach the time of communicating shall have the whole Bible in Luther's translation. This book shall also be used for the religious instruction in all the classes of the gymnasia, to which shall be added the New Testament in Greek.

" The bishops in concert with the provincial consistories shall choose the religious books for the use of Catholic schools. In case these two authorities do not agree in

their choice, the matter must be referred to the minister of public instruction, who shall decide."

If we look to Holland, we find much to commend, while, if the principles advocated in this work be well founded, there is also much to condemn. In all the schools, Biblical history is most accurately taught, as matter of fact and sacred authority. The moral rules inculcated are founded on the precepts contained in the Old and New Testaments, embracing all that mankind generally agree in considering binding on them as accountable beings, while the teachers are debarred from giving instructions in any peculiar religious tenets, including the questions which divide Protestants from Catholics, or the different sects of Protestants from each other, as Calvinists from Lutherans, Arminians, or Baptists. The young receive a knowledge of these from their separate pastors, or from catechists, or both. But it is to be carefully noted, that thus the labour of the pastor or catechist is rendered comparatively light, and, above all, not only is Holland so well supplied with churches and clergy that all the inhabitants are within reach of religious instruction, but, literally speaking, all are connected with one or other religious sect. And this was the state of things previous to the present system of public instruction, the peculiar habits of the Dutch having always been those of frugality, sobriety, and patient plodding industry.

With regard even to France—far inferior to Germany and Holland in religious feeling—which avowedly followed the model of Prussia, we have this statement of the principle recommended by an educational committee in 1833, to the Chamber of Deputies (Mrs Austin, p. 30), " Shall we decide that religious instruction shall be exclusively reserved for the ministers of every persuasion, or shall we permit (as is proposed in the bill before us) the masters of primary schools to take a share in these instructions?

" By intrusting the primary teachers with religious instruction we in no way interfere with the dogmatical in-

struction of the clergy, nor with the exercises of religion. Religious instruction, which will be completed by the exercises peculiar to each church or communion, rests, in the first instance, on those general notions which can excite no scruple, and without which, whether in or out of the temple, no reasonable language can be held with children. The direction of practical religious exercises will remain exclusively with the ministers of each sect, who thus retain the right of completing or of rectifying the instruction ; but the moral and the historical parts of religious instruction form one of the essential branches of all civil education.

“ The wishes of parents shall, according to Art. 2., be always consulted and obeyed in all that concerns the share their children take in religious instruction. This guarantee will answer the double end of securing all consciences from alarm, and of preventing any one from attempting to lead children in a direction disapproved by the parents.”

Now we may be inclined to think that a teacher should do more than what is here projected ; but the principle, at all events, is recognised, even in France, of connecting religious with secular instruction, while in Prussia not only are the morals and the history of the Scriptures taught, but the doctrines thence derived or said to be derived. It is true that the last are imparted to the different sects by the state according to their creed,—a proceeding which may be wrong ;—but they are imparted notwithstanding. Prussia is sometimes quoted as an instance of the separation of religious from secular instruction. It may be pointed to as setting an example of liberality, but it cannot be cited as guilty of depriving the teacher of the privilege of enforcing the lessons of virtue and the right use of knowledge, by the sanctions conveyed in the Word of God.

CHAPTER XIII.

Views of those who advocate Non-religious Instruction—Tendency of these Views—One common Bond, the admitted Importance of Religion—Why Government Measures not here considered—ATHENÆUM—Representative of England—Extracts from—Seemingly inconsistent Views of Christianity—Appeal to public Schools—Connexion between Doctrine and Morality not appreciated—Argument that two Pursuits cannot be well followed together—Argument that Man is not wholly a spiritual Being—MR WYSE—Representative of Ireland—Extract—Same Separation of Doctrine from Morality—Religion the Law of Duty—Various Meanings of *Religion*—Religion applicable to Man only—Mr Wyse's Views as to the Formation of Moral and Religious Feelings—Extract—How is the Will to be directed?—Principles—Feelings—Art and Science of Moral Instruction—Feeling of Religion—Extract—Fundamental Error—Extract—Seeming Vagueness of Description of the Bible—Moral Part most valued—Possible Answer to this—General Answer in the Case of Treatises on Morals—Should Religious and Secular Instruction be combined?—Mr Wyse says no—Why—Extract—Confusion of the Scheme—Strange Language leading us to the Notion of the Author's incorrect Appreciation of the Effect of Doctrine—Aggressive Argument—Classification of Labour—Answer—Summary of Objections to Mr Wyse's Speculations.

I COME now to state and comment on the views of the leading non-religionists who have proposed and advocated by their writings a separation between secular and religious instruction; but, before doing so, I may be allowed to offer a few preliminary remarks.

In using the term *non-religious*, I do not mean to imply any more than that these men would banish religion from our schools in connexion with the secular instructions given there. I neither insinuate—nor wish to insinuate—that they undervalue religious instruction; but I do maintain, that the general effect of their systems would be, not only to separate these two branches, but to destroy one altogether—and, moreover, though it were not so destroyed, that it would be rendered comparatively value-

less by the very separation. I may be mistaken in those latter views ; but, inasmuch as they propose that religion shall not be taught in our schools, nor by our teachers, I am warranted in saying that they wish—some of them with avowed, and, I doubt not, real reluctance—to banish the Bible, to exclude religion from our schools. They may be right, and they may glory in the discovery of a right principle, but assuredly such is the effect of this principle as stated by themselves.

They provide secular instruction, and they do not provide religious. The Bible is not to be taught in their schools, but *perhaps* to be learned, *according to pleasure*, elsewhere. In proposing this system, they boast of being liberal, just, and free from sectarianism. It may be all this, but it shuts the door against religion. They may include it in their to-be-recommended system of *education*, but they carefully and anxiously banish it from their to-be-enforced and legalized system of *instruction*. They are therefore non-religionists. They are so by their own avowal,—their object being to exclude religion from the province of the secular teacher : they are so by inference—the effect of their system being to exclude religion from having any share in education.

The non-religionists include men of different religions, different degrees of influence, and different motives. With these motives we have nothing to do ; we have only to do with their reasonings. If these are correct, it matters not from what motive they have been propounded, and we ought to adopt them. They and we have one bond in common : we all admit the superlative importance of religion to advance and secure the happiness and morality of individuals and communities. We differ as to the *manner*, not the *matter*. The latter they admit to be pre-eminently important. And it is of great moment to keep this steadily in view ; for we have thus reason to hope that, the matter being agreed upon by all, if their measure be proved unsound and inefficient, they will

follow ours. Now, their great objection to any measure of ours is, that it is sectarian.

In order that there may be no risk of my readers or myself being misled, I shall put them in possession of the views of the opposite party, as much as possible *in their own words*. I shall select as the representative of England, the Athenæum, a literary and scientific paper conducted with great talent, and occasionally producing articles of startling merit, especially on the subject of the philosophy of the mind ;—as the representative of Ireland, Mr Wyse, one of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and an ardent educationist ;—and for Scotland, Mr Simpson, who is well known for his enthusiastic labours in the support of his views. I shall take the liberty of making brief remarks, in passing, upon such points as are peculiarly urged by each writer, as these incidentally occur, reserving for separate consideration the arguments in which they all agree.

I may remark, besides, that I do not intend to consider the various plans proposed by the government, because, as my object is, as much as possible, to unite all the friends of sound instruction, I should hazard this by mixing myself up with what would inevitably be considered—whether it were so or not—the concerns and the heats of party and political faction.

We have a statement of the views and reasonings of the Athenæum in an article contained in Number 606, being a review of two works on education. After sundry remarks, which need not occupy our attention, the writer goes on to say :—“ But it is urged, that intellectual education is worse than useless, if unaccompanied by moral instruction ; and that morality must be based on the sanctions of religion. That knowledge is power, and that an educated man, wanting in common morality, will prove a more accomplished scoundrel than an unlettered rogue, may be conceded ; but this only proves that the power should be as widely distributed as possible, and is

no fit subject for monopoly: whereas our present system, so far as the humbler classes are concerned, is to educate exclusively all promising young rogues—our housebreakers, pickpockets, and thieves, in general, are, in their way, highly educated, and there are public instructors enough who, like poor Oliver Twist's friend, Fagin, labour zealously in their vocation. But we have discussed this question before (No. 486.).

“We allow also that the very small portion of morality which depends on doctrine (for the larger proportion results from example, and is confirmed by habit) might, if necessary, be as conveniently taught in schools as elsewhere;—nay, we even believe that the great fundamentals of religion could, with a little common honesty, be so inculcated there, as to shock no man's prejudices; but sectarians, in their knowledge or their ignorance of their rivals, will not trust each other. Besides, they who are hostile to the proposed model schools, are desirous to embrace in the course of tuition the peculiar doctrines of their own particular sect of religionists, including a multiplicity of dogmas, on which a general agreement is notoriously impossible. The debate then, though professedly concerning a question of education, really turns on religious tolerance, and the religious rights of the British subject.”

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“In matters of faith there are but two possible principles for adoption—the imposition of a creed by absolute authority, or an acknowledgment of the unbounded right of every man (as confessedly alone answerable for the consequences of his own decision) to judge for himself. The former is Popery, the latter Protestantism; and between them there is no *mezzo termine*, no grounds for Jesuitical distinctions. One man has, on the Protestant principle, as good a right to private judgment as another, and has an equal right to have that judgment respected in all its legitimate consequences. To impugn this right

by restrictions, civil or religious, in any particular, is, to that extent, despotism, or Popery. In point of fact, Protestantism is as much directed against an assumption, on the part of the state, of a control over the creed of the people, as against the Pope for imposing one particular creed. The Scotch Protestants successfully rebelled against this usurpation, while the struggle against it in England has been the cause of two revolutions.

“ But in the present state of the public mind, it may be most useful to touch on the practical consequences of this system of exclusion. Its chief advocates profess an ardent desire to see the people educated : but he who really desires an end, should desire the means essential to its accomplishment. It is absurd to profess to seek an object, and at the same time insist on a *sine qua non* condition, which renders that object unattainable. In education there must be two parties, the teacher and the pupil. It is to no purpose that the former is willing to instruct, if the latter will not come into his tuition,—under such circumstances education is impossible. To place the clergy of any one sect at the head of national education, is to decree that there shall be no education at all. Each and every sect has a perfect right to think its own the only true faith ; but, in the present position of the world, they cannot act on the thought ; for the Catholics will not believe the Protestants, nor Protestants the Catholics ; and the East Kent Baptists have told the Established Church that their truth is a ‘ pernicious heresy,’ to be abhorred. If such be the overreaching character of religious zeal, then education must be placed upon some ground which shall be neutral to all.”

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“ It is because the poor cannot discharge this paramount duty that the state interferes. If then the state confines education within the pale of the establishment, it practically denies the religious rights of the dissenting pauper, while it as assuredly defeats its own proposed end in

undertaking the business. Would any one dare to refuse bread to all but conforming paupers? or is the bread of intellectual life less an indefeasible right, than that material daily bread for which we are divinely taught to pray?

“ But the expediency of an universal secular education, tied down to no sectarian influences, is not denied by churchmen alone. There is abroad in other quarters a dread of indifference in religious matters. But if general religious instruction cannot be separated from sectarian, without incurring the risk of lapsing into indifference, then some sect must assume the control; and as no man can sincerely desire to give up his child to a hostile sect, what else can he intend in opposing a liberal system than the exclusive tolerance of his own.

“ Truth (it is undeniable) must be one, and the teaching of error is abstractedly an evil to be lamented; but the danger must be submitted to as unavoidable, so long as mankind cannot agree on what truth is. With regard to religion more especially this is eminently the case. But what is meant by this danger of indifference? Not surely that an honest and fair teaching of the great truths of the moral government of the world, and of man's salvation through Christ, will tend to make men indifferent to these awful yet consolatory doctrines.”

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“ Among the many sophisms which surround this question, perhaps the most palpable is, that we are under a necessity of choosing between rival sects, in order to insure religious education. No education confessedly is complete, that includes not with intellectual instruction the lessons of a sound and enlightened morality; but it does not follow from this truth that the two must be inculcated together at the same time and in the same place. As well might it be contended that the student should ‘ spout out Homer's Greek ’ while under the hands of his dancing master. On this point practice has already decided; and we appeal to every man educated in our

public schools to say what lessons of morality they received there, beyond those addressed from the pulpit of the college chapel. This is no fault of the masters. Two pursuits cannot concurrently be as well conducted as separately; and it is but rational to anticipate that if our schoolmasters are to turn school divines, either religion and morals will risk being slobbered over in the zeal for intellectual improvement, or temporal learning may be banished to make room for theology.

“Man, it must be borne in mind, is not all spiritual: he possesses a body, and the wants of that body must be considered. Reading, writing, secular knowledge, and the practice of the mechanical arts, are not parts of religion, nor in any way dependent on it; and a clerical hierarchy was founded for the very purpose of keeping religious instruction distinct from the already established secular.”

* * * * *

“But while opinion is forming on this point, is secular education to remain as it is? Is nothing to be done till Whigs and Tories, Churchmen and Dissenters, can compose their differences, and remember that they are men? We know that many who have hitherto warmly advocated a public endowment of national schools, are beginning to waver, and to fancy that such institutions are suited only to despotic states, where the absolute will of one master can enforce universal obedience, and subjugate sectarian jealousies. We, however, bate no jot of heart or hope: our faith is unshaken in the ultimate establishment of truth and of justice, in defiance of all opposition. We look on the progress of the last thirty years, and we cannot doubt of its influences on the generations which are to come.”

On the common arguments herein contained I shall not enter into any lengthened comment. It is clearly admitted that no education is complete that includes not, with intellectual instruction, the lessons of a sound and

enlightened morality—meaning religious instruction ; but it is said that it does not follow from this truth that the two must be inculcated together, “ at the same time and in the same place.” And the reason why it should not follow, is the fear of sectarianism. The writer, however, seems to have somewhat inconsistent notions of Christianity. He writes of “ the very small portion of morality which depends on doctrine.” If, by morality, he means the observance of moral rules, all morality depends on doctrine. Of this, in another place, he seems to be conscious, for he characterizes as awful yet consolatory *doctrines*, “ the great truths of the moral government, and of man’s salvation through Christ.” Now, though it may be true, in a loose sense, that there is a *quasi* morality producible by the effects of conscience unenlightened by a knowledge of the moral government of the world and of man’s salvation through Christ, that cannot be the morality to which the reviewer refers, for it is not such a morality as any one could depend upon—no, not for one hour. He must therefore be held to include in morality the knowledge of these doctrines. We may gather something more of his views by comparing two consecutive sentences. In one he states his belief that “ *the great fundamentals of religion* could, with a little honesty, be so inculcated” in schools, “ as to shock no man’s prejudices.” In the next, he speaks of “ *a multiplicity of dogmas in which a general agreement is notoriously impossible*,” of course not belonging to the great fundamentals of religion. Now, when it is remembered that this applies to all sects, we must come to the conclusion that the multiplicity of dogmas includes all the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, for I defy the reviewer to point out any one great fundamental of the *Christian religion* which would shock no man’s prejudices, from the fall of man to the atonement of Christ.

The appeal to public schools has been already met—and I hope answered. The reasons for that practice have been

shown, and will be shown still further to be inapplicable to a national system, even were these reasons sufficient, which they do not seem to be.

It is a possible thing that our opponents may mistake us, and that we may mistake them. Thus, because we argue for the close connexion between doctrine and morality, they may accuse us of underrating the force of example and habit. We do not undervalue them, but endeavour to give them their due place. Now, I may be mistaken in my conclusion,—but from all that I have read on the subject, I am forced to infer that the non-religionists do not appreciate the nature or the importance of doctrine as connected with morality. Surely there is no more marked method of depreciating the former, than to say that “the larger proportion of morality results from example, and is confirmed by habit.” Yet we shall find, I think, during our examination, that this is common to all who advocate the non-religious system. It is perfectly consistent with this, that they should hold the views which they do. He who maintains the possibility of morality independently of the doctrines, may be allowed to separate the one from the other. And then arises the question, which must be answered by the Word of God and by experience, Is this a possible thing? To experience and the Word of God I appeal for an answer.

There is one subsidiary argument worthy of a short notice.

The subsidiary argument is, that “two pursuits cannot concurrently be as well conducted as separately;” religious instruction therefore should be conducted separately. Two pursuits—for it is of school the reviewer is writing—must mean branches of study. Two branches of study cannot concurrently be as well conducted as separately. *Concurrently* does not mean during the same period of life—for he advocates the concurrence, only in a different place, and by a different teacher. The whole force of it then is “two branches of study cannot in the same place,

and by the same teacher—though at different times of the day—be as well conducted as in a different place and by a different teacher.” We have the argument now in a tangible shape, and it derives its whole force from a supposed *incompatibility* lurking under *two branches of study or pursuits*. Two incompatible, or found to be incompatible pursuits, may be so characterized—as, in a common opinion, classics and mathematics. But a knowledge of religion ought to be possessed by all, and if a teacher is so addicted to or so immersed in any other pursuit, that he cannot teach religious doctrine, the sooner that he is prevented from corrupting our youth the better. It is a fallacy to introduce the word “*school divines*.” A teacher is expected to do no more than an intelligent parent—yet no one would apply to them the term *domestic divines*.

It is urged besides, that “man is not all spiritual; he possesses a body, and the wants of the body must be considered. Reading, writing, secular knowledge, and the practice of the mechanical arts, are not parts of religion, nor in any way dependent on it, and a clerical hierarchy was founded for the very purpose of keeping religious instruction distinct from the already established secular.” As to the last assertion, it does not rest on any foundation, even if it were of any force, which it is not.

The first part is of more consequence, and flows from the reasoner’s notions of religion. By separating religion, that is, a set of doctrines from morality, he sees no connexion between reading, writing, and the rest, with religion. If the sentence were “reading and writing are not parts of morality, and are not dependent on it—therefore morality need not be taught in connexion with reading and writing,” the proposition would involve so gross a *non-sequitur* that no man would make it. And I doubt not that the reviewer does not, in reality, separate religion from morality, but having their constant and indissoluble connexion in his eye, he ventures on an argument

which, if sound, would not only warrant the severment of religious, but also of moral from secular instruction. That body belongs to man, with all its appetites and desires, is one of the strongest reasons—not why we should not have—but why we should have, religious instruction to regulate and control these bodily affections. If religion excluded reading, writing, and other branches enumerated, it would then be a question, to the teaching of which of them should we turn, and there seems to be but little doubt of what the answer should be. But religion is to be taught, not to exclude other teaching, but to preside over, to regulate all other teaching and its results. It seems to be a fear utterly groundless and visionary, that attention to religious instruction should ever exclude attention to mere human attainments. The fear is all the other way. Man is too anxious about success in this world, and too careless about the morality by which he ought to attain and to regulate it. We may, with perfect safety, relieve the reviewer from this apprehension. The time will never come when religion will be studied to the exclusion of secular matters, while the time now is—as in the large schools appealed to by him in a previous passage—that the latter are studied to the exclusion of religion.

MR WYSE has written on the subject of education a work of high merit. It abounds with sound views blended with lofty feelings, and tinctured deeply with the philosophy and technicalities of Germany, supplying a host of valuable suggestions to the former of an educational code, but it seems to have been put hurriedly together. I do not know that the fact of his being a Roman Catholic necessarily led to his advocating non-religious instruction. For, while it is quite clear that, with his belief, he could not recommend the formation of Protestant schools, he might have conceived it to be the duty of the state to establish schools bestowing religious instruction, throwing the responsibility on the state if it chose to sanction

erroneous views,—or he might have advocated schools for the different sects. We ought therefore to give him credit for having come to the conclusion which he has formed, from motives altogether irrespective of the religion he professes not being the religion of the state.

He writes strongly and well on the influence of religion on education. (Wyse's Education Reform, p. 225):—
 “Moral and Religious Education.—They who would build the great work of human perfection, without calling to their aid the chief instrument by which it is to be accomplished, attempt not merely an impossibility, and secure only a failure, but render dubious, and frequently injurious, those very acquisitions for which they have already laboured with so much care. The education of the moral man is the education of the most essential portion of our nature.* We shall find in the other educations which have preceded it, auxiliaries, so long only as they are kept in subordination. The moment they rebel, they are its worst foes.

“Moral and Religious Education are essential to each other. Religion is not a mere sanction of morality, it is the highest order of morality itself. They are not to be separated—neither are they to be confounded. Religion, true to its noble name, is pre-eminently ‘OBLIGATION.’ It is the law of DUTY. It is conscience, taught by God in his Revelations, and in the human soul. It embraces, ‘in nuce,’ all the obligations. It extends to the most intricate as well as the most simple. But this *general* law requires its *particular* developments. New relations arise—new duties are imposed: their specific character—their several shades—are to be determined. The social

* “ — In fabricâ si falsa est regula prima,
 Omnia mendose fieri, atque obstipa necessum est,
 Prava, cubantia, prona, supina, atque obsona tecta
 Jam ruere, ut quaedam videantur velle, ruantque
 Proditâ judiciis fallacibus omnia primis.

Lucret. l. ii.

man, in reference to society at large,—to the several masses of society,—has numberless functions to fulfil. Then come the various subdivisions of these great classifications, each with its line of corresponding duties. The distinguishing and defining these duties is moral science—their practice, morality.

“ But neither are Religion and Morality to be limited to the mere determination or performance of duties. They go much deeper both in individual and natural education. Their great end is to form the *character* to such a temper that the practice of each and all of these duties shall naturally follow. Under this aspect they are especially education.”

I value this passage as a strong attestation to the universal admission, that there ought to be no secular instruction, unless accompanied, somewhere, with moral. But if I mistake not, we have the same narrowing here of the word *religion*—we have it valuable for its morality as a system,—but not one word of its fitting man for the due observance of such morality. It cannot be that this aspect of religion is omitted here, as a part not involved in the inquiry, for it is a most important part in this very inquiry. From the statements made, we learn that our author's notions of morality are, that it is the practice of the duty incumbent on man to perform, and that religion is the law of this duty.

I would not be understood as objecting to the author's definition of religion, as a separate definition, unconnected with what follows. In the succeeding passages, we may find such an opening up of the term as shall show what he means by the *Law of Duty*. Religion is principally used in two senses. In one, it indicates what the individual using it deems religion truly and exclusively so called: in another, it is employed to denote those doctrines and rules which distinguish one class of men from another—and is partly, often wholly, synonymous with *creed*, indicating, it may be, what is held to be false,

as well as what is deemed to be true. Of course, the writer here employs it in the former sense. Now, it is of importance to observe, that in speaking of religion, we always use it as applicable, exclusively, to man. Angels, doubtless, have their law of duty, but we never speak of the religion of angels. Spoken, then, of man, it must have a reference to man's condition. A law is the will of the lawgiver, announced as authoritative and binding—duty is the obligation consequently following to obey it. Hence if we say religion is the law of duty—in the sense, “Religion is God's law authoritatively announced, and forming an obligation to obey it,” we must see that there is a special reference to the lawgiver. But we often use it in reference to the subject. There, it means obedience to that law, as when we say, “that a man has religion in his heart.” The word is thus, both objectively and subjectively ambiguous—for it may not only mean what is authoritatively commanded *in itself*, but what is commanded *in order to attain certain privileges*. Now, religion, considered objectively, is the law of duty, both absolutely and provisionally—it contains a revelation of duty, and of the consequences conditionally attendant on the full performance of that duty. It is the will of God, not only revealing what we are to do, but how we are to do it. It is the will of God for our salvation. Nor can our author say, that he is treating of true religion, irrespectively of man's condition; for he states, that “*religion is conscience taught by God, in his revelation and in the human soul.*” This is a most satisfactory definition of subjective religion; and it proves that the religion of which our author treats is revealed religion—the religion of the Bible. Now, it will be interesting, as well as instructive, to see, if, while coming to the conclusion, that in the circumstances of this country, such a religion should not be aimed at in connexion with secular instruction, he keeps steadfastly in view—not only the law of duty, strictly and absolutely so called, but the provisional law

of duty—the necessity of divine strength to assist man in obeying the moral law, and the enjoined method of obtaining as well as applying it.

After this passage, there follow speculations as to the origin of conscience, and of religion and morality. Having stated, that for a time the mother is to the infant God and nature—that his love to her is easily and naturally convertible, and actually converted into religion—that, with piety, conscience also begins, from feeling what it is to displease his mother—that, as she seems to him his God, so for a long time she is also his conscience—that the love and respect paid by a child to his parents he gradually attaches to their injunctions, the sense of duty thus taking root—that, when he finds them and all around bound by the same injunctions as himself, then the religious and moral impulse is fully formed, his education in both having fully begun,—he says,

“So far we have been dealing solely with sentiment; but though sufficient to create, it is not sufficient to preserve morality. The child *feels* morality, but he is not yet a *moral being*. *Reason* is yet silent—he wants the great essential—*reflection*; he lives solely in the present. ‘It was yesterday,’ is a sufficient excuse for his little faults. ‘It will be to-morrow,’ a sufficient answer to all our menaces. He does not fully feel his identity—he has no general rule—his sense of duty is attached only to *particular* acts—he has little fixed either in vice or virtue. From this state, however, he necessarily emerges in due time; and then it is that the consolidation of virtue, the formation of character, becomes practicable, and demands attention.

“With the development of reflection, it must be remembered that the sensual organisation develops also. The world without assumes new potency—the novelty of existence, now more strongly perceived, kindles in him new desires—the feelings of infancy are weakened—his mother ceases to be his all—a boundless career of self.

indulgence and corruption spreads before him—the germs of moral and religious feeling are on the point of being suffocated by the poisonous weeds which every where rise up about his heart. Nature is now no longer sufficient; the wisdom of experience must step in. Its task must be to profess, amidst such perils, those first feelings of divine origin,—that mother-love which was his first religion, and first morality, in all its purity and strength. On success in this depends life. It is the vice or virtue, the happiness or misery, of the future man.

“But how preserve them? We must find the means to regulate and render them permanent, to direct them wisely, and to render them habitual. But this cannot be effected, without first assuring ourselves of the constancy and direction of that on which they depend; they depend upon the Will.

“The Will, then, is the great central power: to render it constant, and judiciously to direct it, thus becomes the great purpose of moral and religious education. This is a matter very important, very difficult, and very much neglected.”

I need say nothing more of his succeeding remarks on the will, which are many of them very admirable and worthy of the sincere attention of every one connected with education, than that, after dwelling on the weakness and capriciousness of the will, and the necessity of strengthening and directing it, to strengthen it being the first, and to direct it the second great duty of moral and religious education—the question being, how is the will to be directed? he answers, By Habits coming from Feeling and Principle. “Principle is that external and internal law of morality and religion which God has established for us; and our feelings are those impulses upon which this law should act, and by which they should be regulated, in order to be formed into moral and religious habits.”

Now, the speculative questions opened up here must

not tempt me to digress, although the temptation is strong. We have not yet reached, however, that for which we are seeking. Our author has come to the conclusion that principle—the external and internal law of morality and religion—acting on and regulating our feelings, forming them into moral and religious habits, is the science and discipline of moral and religious instruction. What we want to find, then, must be included in this. It cannot be included in feelings, for these are the very things to be acted on and regulated ; it must be in principle. Now, according to our author, principle is God's law, external and internal—that is, I presume, revelation and conscience. But God's law cannot be principle, for the object of this law is to secure obedience to itself, and the object of the principle is to secure, not obedience to itself, but obedience to the law. Principle, then, is not God's law, but the settled habit of the mind leading it to obey God's law. When principle is there—in the mind—the habit is there, the very object of principle, according to our author, being to lead the feelings to habits of obedience. Wherever principle possesses the mind, the feelings are already accustomed to obey—their disobedience arising just from the want of principle ; when principle is wanting, our inquiry is, Whence are we to obtain it? how are we to get this regulating and controlling force, by our author called principle—which is nothing more nor less than a renewed will?

“The first,” says he (principle), “forms the science, and comprehends moral and religious instruction, properly so called.” “The second” (feelings), “form the art or discipline by which this instruction is reduced to practice, by which it is often anticipated, and without which it would be utterly unavailing.”

There is some confusion here. The science of moral and religious instruction is the knowledge of how we can impart a power so far to regulate the feelings according to the will of God at all times—called by our author

principle. The law is not the science ; the science investigates the connexion between the law and the governed. So, the art or discipline is not feeling only, but feeling acted on by principle. The science or art of instruction, like all other sciences and arts, runs into each other. By the former we acquire reasons and rules for the latter, and by the latter we apply these reasons and rules to practice. Thus, in the science of moral instruction, we inquire how we shall best regulate the feelings for good, and we find that the only effectual way is by imparting a habit of referring all thoughts and actions to the Supreme will ; which habit, *with its reference and its power*, is called principle. In the art, again, we apply the rule, accustom to the reference, and endeavour to superinduce the principle. There is a danger in reckoning the science of moral instruction all principle, or the art of it all feeling. But, besides, there is another error. Principle itself acts through feeling, and we can hope for no sound science of morals, unless we take into account that every moral act is accompanied with feeling. There is not only a law, but a feeling of love to that law ; and thus principle is not a law, nor is it distinct from feeling, but is a habit of obedience to a law, and is always necessarily accompanied with feeling.

There is the same looseness, of expression at least, which detracts so much from the value of this part of the book, in the next paragraph, where he speaks of “ the selection and encouragement of the good (feelings), and the rejection and extinction of the bad,” as of great consequence. Now, no feeling, in itself, is bad, considered generically. Considered in reference to its object only, is any specific manifestation of feeling bad. The desire of money is not bad—the desire of my neighbour’s money is covetousness. Our author must have passed from feelings considered generically, which are the impulses, and require only to be regulated, to specific manifestations, which require to be extinguished.

I cannot enter into an examination of the propriety of subdividing the general feelings of conscience into the branches dwelt on by our author. He ranges the feelings—as the phrenologists do—into three kinds: the sensual, the moral but selfish, and the moral of the highest kind. “Our physical and sensual propensities require no culture; they grow up without our care—often in despite of it—they require strong counterpoises, great compensations.” Hence, to check some, and I presume eradicate others, we are led through the feelings of Order, of Justice, of Benevolence, and Generosity, of the Noble, the Pure, the Beautiful, and last of all, the feeling of Religion. Here follow some remarks, so strikingly beautiful, that I cannot forbear quoting them (p. 240):—“The individual Will of man is subject to his individual fluctuations and errors. The most perfect means of securing it from either is, the placing it in true harmony with the universal and eternal will of God. This is the rule of duty—these the means by which he is to aim at that final perfection, which we have already seen is the true end of all education—of all existence. This it is, by means of which he can declare himself undauntedly, with a full sense of all its obligations, of all its difficulties, for truth and virtue.* This it is, which truly vivifies the heart—which dignifies the intellect—which elevates the simple desire of moral good, the simple aspiration towards its attainment, to a profound and inflexible resolution, to the full height of true morality. This it is which establishes a real unity between all our duties, which renders nothing indifferent, nothing distant: and, from the first step in the path, conducts unceasingly to the point, where life itself seems a natural inspiration of the conjoined influences of intellect, morality, and religion.”

* “Effort et sacrifice,” says Cousin with so much justice, “voilà les conditions pour savoir quelque chose et pour être honnête; déguiser à l'enfance ces conditions, c'est la tromper sur la vie humaine.”—Rapport, p. 68.

Still our question is not answered. Most desirable as is this consummation, it is but a part of religion, and it almost appears as if Mr Wyse belonged to the school of perfectibles. The following passage strengthens this conjecture (p. 241) :—"To elevate them to this highest degree, these feelings must not only be cultivated and expanded, but so frequently and fully that they gradually may become habits—a second nature—the man himself. He who has evil dispositions always to conquer in order to become virtuous, can never be sure of his virtue. It is impossible, in practice, to fight every-day battles with our evil inclinations, without losing many. We must look for some better guarantee than this. We must make it as difficult to depart from good as from evil. There is no reason why one habit should not be as easily and as strongly planted as another. We can choose and we can plant—seed, soil, season, instruments—all are in our hands."

There is no reason why one habit should not be as easily and as strongly planted as another! Here is the fundamental error, I opine, from which all the rest spring. This being given as a truth, then all the deductions of the work on moral and religious education may be true. Let this, the basis of the system, be undermined, and the whole falls. We must undermine and remove it before we proceed to educate. We must act—if we wish to act aright—on a maxim not different, but totally opposed. There is, alas! too much reason why all good habits should less easily and less efficaciously be planted than bad ones. Do I, on that account, deny the use of education? Nay, I magnify the use. To deny that good habits can be formed, would be to cut up education by the roots. To assert that they can be as easily formed as bad ones, is to contradict Scripture, Philosophy, and Experience. Nor can it be said that this is a casual expression. The whole train of reasoning bears the impress of this passage. Hence he speaks in one place of the "*true feeling* of

true religion”—not formed by acquaintance with the will of God, not the product even of religious instruction, but, as “*the first which meets us on our arrival on this earth, the last which quits us on our departure.*” What the last clause may mean, I do not exactly know, for the true feeling of true religion truly implanted, never quits us—if by *us* is meant our souls; if by *us* is meant our bodies, it is manifestly not correct, both as to the meeting and the departure. But we can have now no doubt as to the author’s philosophy, and we may admit his consistency in separating religious from secular instruction—meaning by religious, Bible instruction. On these *data*, it is clearly superfluous. We have only, in school, to cultivate, by any natural means, the *true feeling of true religion*, which already exists in the heart, and what need is there for the Bible? We may have, in this case, need for its *morality*, that we may place the mind “in true harmony with the Will of God.” But *doctrine* is clearly unnecessary, and therefore, to be consistent, our author must connect the religious and moral instruction of youth, not in the doctrine but in the moral parts of Scripture. We shall see if he does.

We are still at a loss for the means of placing the Will in true harmony with the Will of God. An important truth in morality, which no sage of ancient, no moralist of modern times would deny, has been strikingly expressed. Well, let us wait till we read the many excellent, and the few visionary, remarks on Habit and Discipline. Having read them, we at last come to Inculcation of Principles (p. 258):—“Habits then, but habits produced, and cultivated to their full vigour, by the processes just recommended, are the forces which we must create, if we desire to impress a salutary direction on the Will. But one only of these processes, the cultivation of the feelings, has yet been considered. The cultivation of the feelings must be accompanied by the instilment of sound princi-

ples. Sound principles are the result of Religious and Moral Instruction.

“ In teaching religion and morality, we naturally look for the best code of each. Where is it to be found ? There are many excellent. No nation has been without gleamings of the light, in the noon of its darkness, without occasional vouchsafings, from Providence, of the truth. Yet the merit even of the purest is relative. They were wonderful for the time, singular in the nation ; their glory is to have anticipated, or to have approached, the best. But where is that best to be found ? Where, but in the Holy Scriptures ? Where, but in that speaking and vivifying code, teaching by deed and sealing its doctrines by death, are we to find that law of truth, of justice, of love, which has been the thirst and hunger of the human heart, in every vicissitude of its history. From the mother to the dignitary this ought to be the Book of Books ; it should be laid by the cradle and the deathbed ; it should be the companion and the counsellor, and the consoler, the Urim and Thummim, the light and perfection of all earthly existence.”

We need go no farther. We have here sufficient evidence of the value put upon the Bible by this educationist—even the highest—in the moral part. We question the expression—“ their glory is to have anticipated”—even with regard to parts of morality ; but it is inadmissible altogether, when spoken of morality as a whole, and still more with reference to a code of religion. And we have found no recognition of that which we desiderate—even a recognition of the specialties of this code—if code it can be called. Does there not lurk under the word *code* some fallacy of diction—as if the Bible revealed no more than the positive rule of duty ? We are told, to be sure, that it is “ vivifying, teaching by deed, sealing its doctrines by death,” and there we are to find “ that law of truth, of justice, and of love, which has been the thirst

and hunger of the human heart in every vicissitude of its history." Alas! Is it—using the term as our author does in the strict sense—for the *law*, that the human heart has thirsted? Man has not thirsted for the law, for he had enough of that not to make him thirsty for more. By God's grace he sometimes thirsted, not for the law, but for conformity to the law of righteousness, and then indeed he longed to know more of the law, and to act his part better. I am most anxious not to do injustice, but I cannot discover any glimpse of recognition of any of the peculiarities of Christianity. We should value the Bible for all that Mr Wyse has so well said of it; but, then, he considers it only as the best code of morality and religion—which religion is the law of duty. What a lurid light would the Bible throw on the world if it were no more than this—showing man more clearly what he should have done, and casting over the earth the horrors of coming doom—showing him the charms of liberty, and casting the light of Heaven's wrath on the chains of sin.

I do not deny that there is, in these passages, much that is beautiful, nay that there is an allusion to the doctrines; but then, all ends in the Bible being the discovery of a law of truth, of justice, of love. If under the word *Law* lurketh the meaning sought—if by law he means not only an *obligation*, but a *principle imparted* enabling man to discharge that obligation—is it proper thus to conceal one of the two great and distinguishing features of the Word of Life? It is impossible—with the utmost stretch of charity—to excuse him, who is liable to this imputation, that in writing of any production, its very characteristics distinguishing it from all similar productions, are concealed by him under an ambiguous expression, and rather insinuated than expressed. But doubt almost becomes certainty. Taking together all the expressions, religion, the law of duty—the true feeling of true religion—one habit as easily and as strongly implanted as another—the Holy Scriptures, the best *code*

of morality and religion sometimes anticipated,—we can have no doubt that the part most contemplated as useful in instruction—to put a gentle interpretation on the matter—is the moral part. Hence, we shall see that the consistency of our author is maintained throughout.

But it may be said that a work on education was not a proper place to discuss religious dogmas, but simply to urge that the Bible was the best text-book for teaching morality and religion, without explaining how. This might have been, if Mr Wyse had spoken in general terms of the formation of moral habits—but he has treated of this at length, and in detail, *in connexion with religion*—he has never insinuated a doubt as to the success of the training—he has never spoken one word of the necessity or essentiality of any one Christian doctrine. This may have been done that offence might not—in a work on national education—be given to the religious feelings or prejudices of his readers. The defence may be—if defence be supposed to be needed :—“ The following is the sum and substance of the moral and religious part of this work. The moral and religious part of man’s nature is of the highest importance. How shall we improve it? Cultivate the feelings, making them all subservient to the feeling of religion, so that their right operation shall become a habit of the will. Regulate them by sound principles. If you wish to inculcate sound principles, use the Bible. But I do not bid you adopt my interpretation of that sacred volume. Only use it in any way that you yourselves choose. The Bible is the great code teaching by deed and sealing its doctrines by death, containing the thirsted-after law of truth, of justice, and of love. What these doctrines are I say not—only use the Bible.” If this be the defence, it is more specious than sound. In treating of the formation of moral and religious habits and principles, the man who was impressed with the belief, that these are aversive to his nature, and require not merely human teaching, but divine, must

have alluded to so all-important a fact. He was not required to force his readers to believe this—but he was required to show that he knew it. To tell us to use the Bible is not enough—for we may understand this in a sense different from that in which he wishes us—we must be told to use it aright—and with a reference to its contents. If the Bible be the best code for teaching morality and religion, it is singular that, in treating of both, not one allusion is made to the statements in the Bible as to the disposition of man with regard to them.

I am aware of what is commonly urged on this head, when the same objection is made to treatises on morals. It is asserted that there is a science of morality apart from religion, and which deserves separate investigation. That is a question totally different from the one now under discussion, and which is simply this. In urging man to make use of the Bible as a code of morals, and as an instrument for training to moral habits, are we entitled, while entering fully into the question of the best mode of training, to take up no single position from the Bible, but to philosophize as if no such work existed? He who does so, must surely hold the distinctive characteristics of divine truth, either as too doubtful or as too inoperative to require him to mention them. We are bound to use the Bible *as it is*, not vaguely to direct us in morality as our notions may lead us.

Do I unfairly infer that this work leads to the use of the Bible in morals, as a mere code—not as a revelation of the power of God, through Jesus Christ, sanctifying the heart?

I need not follow Mr Wyse through his development of the method in which the Bible should be taught, nor through the question of selections or the whole Bible—in which he declares for the former—but come to his deliverance on the inquiry, “Should Religious and Secular Instruction be combined?” (p. 262). “If religious and moral teaching could be strictly confined to the generalities of Christianity, no difficulty could be apprehended,

even where various sects of Christians were assembled together, from the general perusal of the Scriptures. But when this is impracticable, there is no alternative but to separate the different persuasions, or to leave the reading of the Scriptures to separate or out-of-school hours, under the direction of the respective communions." With an amiable feeling, he dislikes the separation of sects, as leading to permanent animosities—which he must have felt the more, as an Irish Roman Catholic. He prefers, therefore, the last alternative, and whether the children be taught together the generalities of Scripture—or are separated according to their persuasions—or religious instruction is separated from secular, he advocates the propriety of each believer believing what he likes and as much as he likes: "Belief," says he, "is not so common that we should quarrel much about the quality or quantity, nor is it less fitting that he should know what he believes, and why he believes it."

Protesting against all attempts at proselytism, he thus concludes (p. 269): "Let every child, then, have the Christianity which he demands, and can digest, and let him have it frankly, as well as abundantly. This is his right; he is a man and a Christian. But this cannot be given by our common schoolmaster. He is incompetent, intellectually and religiously. We all know too well the sort of man-of-all-work he generally is, to expect from him any thing beyond the straightforward task-hearing of the catechism; we all know his church creed. All goes on very liberally, as long as he keeps to 'true no meaning,' to generalities—but the moment he descends to particulars—to dogmas, the teacher disappears, and the partisan starts up. Do I blame the man? Not at all. I cannot conceive him otherwise. I cannot imagine that perfect stoic between contending faiths, neutralized to inflexible impartiality by their well-balanced opposition—that semi-Catholic, semi-Protestant—that 'concordia discors' of establishment and dissent, which, like the

Demos of the ancient painter, unites in the same person all diversities, and is equally indifferent to all, which the existence of so perfect a monster would imply. If such exist in human nature, he is a very abstract personage ; for I doubt much whether he is to be found in English, Scotch, or Irish. The man cannot suspend his creed ; he cannot put off his mind. Each faith has undoubtedly a right to apprehend the experiment ; each church has good motive to look to other pastors ' for the feeding of its lambs.' These pastors are to be found—each church provides them ; they are the constituted guardians of their respective beliefs. Education qualifies them for the duty, and Christianity, whatever be its form, inculcates the performance. To none, then, can the religious education of youth in this advanced stage, with more propriety be intrusted, than to those who are ' *ex virtute officii*' the religious instructors of youth. It is an important department of their ministry, from which they should not be excluded, and from which they cannot, without direct dereliction of duty, retire.* Nor can I well conceive what legitimate objection can be made to this division of religious and intellectual education—this apportioning of special hours and places to Scriptural instruction. What is studiously sought after in other studies, why should it be avoided in this ? The very essence of *all* well-ordered education is strict and minute classification of labour. I might go farther and say, that to this division and re-

* " The clergy have their duty to perform, but they have also their rights. The most important branch of education belongs to them ; they ought reciprocally to be associated in its general direction and support. Even in France, where they have been hostile or indifferent, they have been anxiously invited, under the new code, to take their part. The apprehensions which may have been once entertained are not now allowed to interfere. ' *Aujourd'hui le clergé est vaincu,*' says Cousin, ' *le temps de le menager en le contenant est arrivé.*' How this may be best effected, with reciprocal regard to the interests both of the clergy and the state, is judiciously pointed out in his *Rapport*, p. 255."

gularity, intellectual labour is in all cases chiefly indebted for its acquisitions. Reading Scripture at particular hours is only an additional security that the reading will be conducted with *attention* and *punctuality*. Allowing other studies to mingle with it, must necessarily neutralize and confuse. So far from limiting the extent of Gospel education, or in any degree curtailing its salutary effects, such arrangements eminently tend not only to remove all obstacles arising from difference of persuasion, but add materially to the weight and efficacy which every well-wisher to true Gospel instruction must assuredly have in view."

It will be seen from all this, that he urges the common objection of sectarianism. In speaking of "our common schoolmaster," Mr Wyse is surely a little inconsistent. *He* is not to have this work to do, apparently, because he has some peculiar incompetency intellectual and religious. But, in a few sentences, his incompetency is shared by all—he cannot do what nobody can do—except "*concordia discors*," a very abstract personage. Then do not, oh! do not blame the common schoolmaster.

But, leaving the schoolmaster, with his intellectual and religious incompetency, there is confusion about the whole scheme. First, it would be desirous if we could have all taught the generalities of the Scriptures, but if that be impossible, all should be taught, at all events, secularly together, and yet all should be taught their special religious tenets by their masters. Well, one would imagine that the matter were at an end as to the schools, from the supposed impracticability. But no; somehow or other, the schoolmaster who was at first dismissed as impracticable in teaching the generalities, is brought in to be dismissed as incompetent to teach the peculiar tenets of Christianity. Can it be that by *generalities* and *tenets* the same thing is meant? It would appear not—for "every believer is to believe what he likes and as much as he likes," and "every child is to have the Christianity

which he demands and can digest—and he is to have it frankly and abundantly—for he”—every child—is a “man and a Christian.” A strange reason for giving a child Christianity !

Could any man, attaching importance to the doctrines of Christianity, write thus? Take the sentence in its most intelligible and favourable sense, and it is, “Let every child then have the instruction in Christianity which *his parents* demand, and the child can understand and apply, and let him have it frankly as well as abundantly. This is his right, for he is a human being, and his parents are Christians.” Having stated the meaning as I understand it, in the sense most favourable to the import and force of the passage, look at it and see the religious instruction to be given, and the reasons why. “The Christianity which he demands,”—not in the sense of “needs,”—for away goes the whole reasoning then, but demands, asks for as his right. What Christianity will the great bulk of the people demand? Then look at the reason. “He is a man,”—a human being, a very good reason, but oddly introduced,—“and a *Christian!*” Mohammedanism, for he is a Mohammedan. Deism, for he is a Deist. If we were to teach none but the children of even professing Christians, Christianity, then we are to teach none but those who need it least. We are shut up within a narrow space, the humanizing influences of the Gospel are not to stray beyond the pale, and no man has a right to be christianized but the Christian. How much of a piece is this singular appreciation of Christian teaching in connexion with doctrine, with the extraordinary desire before expressed, that each believer should believe what he likes, and as much as he likes, and that we should not quarrel as to the quantity and quality ! I ask, Could any man who thinks that morality is at all dependent on belief thus express himself? A private individual may say, that, having no control over others, each believer *must*, for him, believe what he likes and as much

as he likes, though even that is subject to many modifications. But neither Mr Wyse, nor any other man seeking to influence others, can say that a man should believe what he likes. He should believe *only what is true*, and not as much as he likes, but *as much as is true*. It will not do to guard this by saying, "he should know what he believes, and why he believes it." For the "what he believes" adds nothing; it is the belief; the "why" removes *likes*, and substitutes *reason*, which has to do with truth. A man is responsible not only for his belief, but for the reason; not part of the reason, not only why he believes this, but why he disbelieves other things. And, however this may be, there can be no doubt of our duty, that we should not leave each man to believe what he likes, otherwise where were Christianity itself? As to *quantity* and *quality*, belief has either a connexion with morals, or it has not. If it has, then we *should* quarrel. The coming to the conclusion that we *should not* is seemingly a proof that Mr Wyse holds that there is no necessary connexion. What is the use then of using doctrines in religious instruction? None, of course; and hence Mr Wyse consistently sees no great harm in separating religious from secular instruction.

Our author, in speaking of the specialties of the Christian religion, while recommending an excellent mode of teaching them through the historic parts, writes, "To this nothing can be better suited than the *historic* teaching of the Bible, aided by the constant exercise of the *feeling* of religion. These histories embrace *all the chief articles of faith*, all the great moral and religious duties. They satisfy the imagination, as well as the understanding of childhood. They excite, and they gratify, and they imprint. I doubt much whether the *precepts* of the Scripture should ever be presented otherwise." "*Precepts!*" I may misunderstand the passage, but it seems to me that even the specialties of religion are precepts,—

things commanded only, nothing believed. If so, it were consistent with all the rest.

Mr Wyse "cannot well conceive a legitimate objection to the division of religious and intellectual education." I shall just hint an objection now, which seems to me legitimate, but on which I shall not at present dwell; it is part of a former argument, and belongs to a future one. By separating religious from intellectual education, you withdraw the training of the mind from what alone can train it effectually in the right use of the intellect, and of every thing else—from religion. But this becomes an aggressive argument as he warms with the subject. From not seeing that it was a valid ground of objection, he sees it to be a ground of praise. "The very essence of all *well ordered* education is strict and minute classification of labour." To support this argument, we have another definition of religious education, it is "reading Scripture." No one, on reflection, can suppose that a separate time could be an argument either for or against religious education—if religious education is reading Scripture. In a school, an hour or any portion of time may be regularly set apart for the reading of Scripture, and no man would seek to avoid regularity in this. But, then, this is surely not religious education. The system to which this argument points is one which, certainly, it would not do to apportion to special hours. It is, that at all hours and during each minute the teacher shall practically give religious instruction, encouraging, and exhorting, and dissuading, and deterring, and strengthening, by the Law of God.

Upon the whole subject, I urge against Mr Wyse the charge of leaving out of his estimate of religious instruction that on which a great part of its efficacy, and the greatest part of its essentiality, depends. This is shown not only by his omitting to notice it, but by his advocating views opposed to it. The former would, in my opinion, be sufficient, in the circumstances, to prove the

charge, for this reason, in addition to others already given. He advocates the separation of religious and secular instruction, in the circumstances of this country, and in all countries where the specialties of religion are to be taught. Now, the great arguments which the opponents of such a system employ, is that the doctrines are essential to the morality. He was bound, therefore, to disprove this—in other words, to notice these specialties. In not noticing them, he shows that he is of opinion that there may be sound and stable moral observance in its highest sense, for he treats of that, irrespectively of sound or unsound doctrine. And this conclusion as to his views becomes irresistible when, in addition to his manner of treating of belief as a thing about which as to quantity or quality we need not much quarrel, he speaks of the true feeling of true religion as naturally existing in the mind, and of the equal ease with which good and bad habits may be inculcated.

CHAPTER XIV.

MR SIMPSON—Representative of Scotland, and of ultra Non-religionists—Necessity of considering his Views at great Length—"Task, and Toil, and Tears" Argument—Answer—"Bible ill-used"—Answer—Third Argument, "Use of the Bible pushed too far"—Answer—Fourth Argument—Creed and Catechism taught too soon—Answer—Fifth Argument—"Nature cannot be known through the Bible"—This Argument with its Reasoning considered—Sixth Argument—"Truths of Scripture and of Nature require to be separately studied"—Answer—What our Author means by Nature—By Scripture—Argument considered—Objection to Mr Simpson's Scheme from its Sectarianism—Argument again considered—One-sidedness of the Argument—Extraordinary Mistake as to Dr Duff—Natural Theology, and the Study of Nature how to be pursued, and why.

MR SIMPSON's work on National Education next comes under our review. He belongs to the ultra school of non-religionists. We have seen that the other two are not disinclined to the mingling of religious with secular instruction, even with the fear of Sectarianism before their eyes, provided *that* instruction were confined to the generalities, that is, I presume, the moral and historical parts of Scripture. But Mr Simpson, in his views, goes much further.

I have been much perplexed as to how I should state and comment upon Mr Simpson's opinions. To avoid doing this altogether were impossible. Not only has common fame spoken highly of him, but as the representative of a class,—of the ultra non-religionists, we must hear him, otherwise any account of the arguments used on that side would be incomplete. On the other hand, to do these opinions full justice—that is, to show what they are, how they are defended, and, if it can be done, to demonstrate

their fallaciousness and danger, will occupy a larger share than might otherwise seem necessary. But this is counterbalanced by two considerations. His peculiar views have drawn upon him much severe remark, and he has once and again complained, I doubt not sometimes justly—of what all writers on such a theme must make up their minds to encounter—misrepresentation. This I wish above all things to avoid. And secondly, Mr Simpson has, as we learn from his own account in an appendix to his work on the Philosophy of Education, been engaged for some years—since 1835—in diffusing his notions among all classes of men. In that year, he delivered twenty-one lectures to the working-classes of Edinburgh—the attendance averaging 600. Thereafter, he does not tell us when, he lectured thirteen nights in Liverpool, and as many in Manchester, having in the former place 500, and in the latter, 700 hearers, of both sexes of the middle class. In addition, he addressed one lecture to 3000 of the working classes of Liverpool, and another to 1000 in Manchester. What he has done since in this way, I do not know. But he tells us so far: “Mr Simpson has received invitations to visit several other places in England and Ireland, all of which he hopes to be able to accept. This sign of the times is truly cheering.” In addition to the activity of his labours this way, he had been examined by a parliamentary education committee for Ireland during seven days, where he had an opportunity of fully developing his schemes, and he significantly hints, not without success. Thus he says in the work above quoted (p. 139)—“At the time of publishing the present edition of this work, the Report of the Education Committee for Ireland has not been made in Parliament. It was by the last-mentioned committee that I was examined, and *I have the best grounds for anticipating that the separate teaching of secular and religious knowledge will be recommended by the legislature, as essential to a national system of popular education.*”

It is but right, therefore, to give as full a development as possible of the views of this apostle of the non-religionists, their advocate with the working and the middle classes, and the influential adviser of the legislature, in its Irish Educational Committee.

For these reasons, and because Mr Simpson embodies what appear to me all the concentrated *possible* errors of his party, I shall dwell on his statement of them,—taking him as their representative, and—reserving the consideration of the arguments common to him with the rest of his party—I shall comment on his peculiar views, as unfolded in his work “On the Philosophy of Education,” and as shown in his evidence before the committee of the House of Commons, especially that portion contained in a pamphlet published by him in 1837, entitled “Anti-National Education,” this portion containing, he himself says, “the whole of his evidence on the subject of Religious Education.”

In a passage on Religious Education in his work (p. 138), we find the following arguments, which I condense.

I. “Every association with religious instruction should be pleasing,”—but given in school, it is connected “with task, and toil, and tears;” whereas, according to the proposed plan, all, “even the youngest child from the infant school” resorting to church, “will find his pastor, and, as from a kind parent, have the message of salvation as something higher and holier than the lessons of every-day school.” Therefore, he should not receive religious instruction in school, but from his pastor.

Now, either task, and toil, and tears are associated, necessarily, with all religious instruction, or they are not. If they are, then we have no relief from changing to the clergyman. If they are not, we have no need, *on this ground*, to resort to the clergyman. I find that Mr Simpson, in writing of *Infant Education*, says (p. 98)—“The conductor’s own relation to his infant charge should be affection, cheerfulness, mirth, and that activity of temperament which

delights and keeps alive the infant faculties." In another passage (p. 208) he says, " We need not consume time on the other well-known stimulus in ordinary schools, punishment." Even prizes and places are quite superfluous (p. 108) " under a system of training which gives delight by exercising so many of the faculties." Nay, we have a statement with regard to religious instruction in schools, made by the author himself, which annihilates the whole argument (p. 106): " I have been assured by Mr Widderspin, and the statement has been confirmed by the two successive masters of the Edinburgh Model Infant School, Mr Wright deceased, and Mr Milne, *that whenever the children are allowed a choice of the kind of story to be told them, the vote is almost invariably for a Scripture story.*" It is true that all this is said of infant schools, but then, infant scholars are included in the "task, and toil, and tear" argument—and I am sure that the learned author will be the very first to admit, that the same principles which apply to the infant schools, should be applied to all.

In his evidence before the House of Commons occurs the following question and answer. " 3038. The human mind, always acting under the impulse of some strong motive or passion, what other stimulant," than emulation, the desire of reward, and the fear of punishment, " would you substitute?—It is a truth observed, in the philosophy of the mind, which I have submitted to the committee, that the different faculties which the Creator has bestowed, *have all pleasure in their own exercise*; a pleasure which is not known to those educationists who have confined their views to the exercise of one, or a very few of them. Now, a sound system of education will exercise, and I have seen it exercise, all the faculties, and there is pleasure, intense pleasure, in the exercise."

So much for the argument as applicable to schools, where, according to his own evidence, there are not necessarily the causes and signs of wo deprecated by this pro-

tector of religion from doleful associations. But he cannot possibly mean that the pastor is to dispense with task and toil altogether. "Revealed religion," says he (p. 140), "as knowledge, sacred and important as it is, is but a branch of knowledge, like mathematics, astronomy, or chemistry. In its doctrinal department it is, like them, addressed to a more matured intellect than that which is exercised in the foundation of all instruction." If, then, the pastor is to deal with these more matured intellects, he must demand both task and toil,—unless, indeed, they can be taught without them. But, if they can be taught without them, why should not the teacher, *as far as this reason goes*, so teach; it cannot be because the pastor is better skilled in dealing with the young, for that is another reason altogether, which would apply alike to secular and religious instruction. It cannot be because the pastor is better acquainted with the subject, for that, too, is another reason, and is used separately by our author. If the instructions of the teacher must be accompanied with such results, so must those of the pastor. But in neither case need they be accompanied with the tears,—though I will not answer for the task and the toil. Our author may use the word task in the sense, not of a lesson to be learned, but of a *disagreeable* lesson to be learned. That matters not, for unless the pastor have some incommunicable art, he must, if he do the work as effectually, demand the same task and toil as the teacher. "Task, and toil, and tears!"

But the sacred lessons are to be taught apart from school, for this express object among others, that they may be considered as "inculcating something higher and holier than the lessons of every-day school" (p. 138)—the lessons of every-day school, including natural theology, and the morality of nature. That which is instilled into the young mind as higher and holier, will necessarily throw into the shade—obscure—that which is lower and less holy. Revealed religion then will, according to this system, obscure

natural theology and the morality of nature. Well, that is one statement of our author. But then, a little while after, he says, while treating of the two latter (p. 142), "It is a superstitious veneration, not a rational respect, *which exalts one revelation of God above another, to the effect of obscuring or vilifying*, much more dispensing with either." Either, then, our author is guilty of superstitious veneration, or he holds that that which is higher and holier, associated with privilege and pleasure, will not obscure what is not only lower and less holy, but connected with task, and toil, and tears.

Moreover, this distinction shows, that either there is a fallacious inference drawn from some schools conducted on a bad principle, and applied to all conducted on what even the author himself conceives to be the best principle—or, he is of opinion that, in all schools, however well conducted, or on whatever principle, instruction is a something disconnected with privilege and pleasure, and associated with task, and toil, and tears.

I would use the admitted fact of this instruction being higher and holier as an argument, not why it *should not*, but why it *should*, be introduced into schools.

II. Another argument used by our author is (p. 140), that, whereas the Bible is, according to the present system, tossed about, "vulgarised" as a common reading book, "perverted into task-work and even punishment, and its very name associated with tedium, satiety, and disgust," it should be placed "in hands where, from the earliest to the latest impressions of life, all its associations will be exalted, and all its lessons impressive and delightful." Now, no man would wish the Bible to be so shockingly and, as described by our author, so miserably misapplied. But the same remark applies as before. What the pastor can do, so can the teacher. What the teacher cannot do, neither can the pastor. The argument may be a very good one for not using the Bible in religious instruction till a certain stage in the progress of the children's studies, but is

no argument against religious instruction itself. In the Edinburgh Model Infant School, our author eulogizes the religious instruction given ; but the children there do not use the Bible. Should we use the Bible at all ? when should we begin to use it ? may be questions proper for the religious instructionists to ponder, understanding by the use of the Bible that the children use it as a common schoolbook. And it is a question which the most ardent advocates for religious instruction have carefully considered. It has therefore in reality nothing to do with the preliminary and fundamental question of " Should there be religious instruction at all ? " As to perverting the Bible into task-work, the pastor must do that as well as the teacher ; but on that I have spoken already.

No man—so far as I know—has ever charged Mr Simpson, though he complains of this, with *wilfully* excluding the Bible from education,—but I must repeat a charge, often made before, that he does, *in effect*, so exclude it.

But, while I maintain that a reverend use should always be made of the Bible, I must notice that facts contradict the whole train of reasoning used by our author. If it be true that the Bible, used as a common schoolbook, is necessarily productive in all, or even in most, of tedium, satiety, and disgust, we have an opportunity of verifying this fact on a great scale. Universal Lowland rural Scotland has been for centuries trained in the reading of the Bible as a common schoolbook. Has she manifested this disgust ? I am not speaking of the general effect of the training so received—but of this specific manifestation. I need not be told that if the Bible were better taught, it would be even more revered. That may or may not be. It has been used in the manner described by our author, and it *is* revered. In the hour of sickness it cheers the lonely cottage—in the day of gladness it checks obstreperous mirth as the evening closes on the joyous throng—its authority is appealed to by each

parent as the revealer of right—it is in the mouths, if not in the hearts of all. The Scotch peasant would laugh you to scorn if you told him that he was disgusted with his Bible because he was accustomed to use it at school as a common schoolbook.

The cheerfu' supper done, wi' serious face,
They round the ingle form a circle wide ;
The sire turns o'er, wi' patriarchal grace,
The big ha' Bible, ance his father's pride ;
His bonnet rev'rently is laid aside,
His lyart haffits wearing thin an' bare ;
Those strains that once did sweet in Sion glide,
He wales a portion with judicious care ;
And " Let us worship God," he says, with solemn air.

Verily, Burns, thou and thy compeers must have looked on the Bible with tedium, satiety, and disgust !

III. A third objection is the tendency to push the use of religious instruction too far, to base " all secular knowledge on Scripture," that is, to act as if " all secular knowledge must be based on Scripture, and must originate there." Where the extraordinary wights are who hold this doctrine, the author gives no means of learning. There are many who hold that, during the short time that the children of the poor can at present attend school, it is better to make the Bible the only reading-book, from which, however, are furnished topics for instruction, elsewhere derived, on secular matters. There are, besides, infant schools, where the children are taught nothing formally at all,—where the Bible is so used, not from any supposed necessity, but choice. Mr Simpson, however, ought to know that, even in these infant schools, secular knowledge is only so far communicated in connexion with the Bible as is necessary to render the passages explained intelligible and interesting ; and he ought to know that, in our parish schools, which most naturally presented themselves to a Scotchman, all secular knowledge is not taught as originating from the Bible. In his

evidence before the House of Commons, he referred to his acquaintance with the system pursued in the Sessional School of Edinburgh. Now, no fact is better known than the following, which is thus stated in the published account of that system: "One thing only we would remark on this subject, that the examinations on the Bible are strictly confined to such as may enable the pupils to understand the passages read, or augment their religious knowledge. Questions regarding orthography, grammar, and the general meaning of the language, are invariably reserved *for those other books which always accompany the reading of the Bible.*"

This absurdity, then, if it be an absurdity, is one not attaching to religious instruction, but to a particular method of it, hardly known in the country of the objector. It would have been a valid argument, after proving the proposition to be erroneous and absurd, if it could be shown that religious instruction in schools necessarily led to this erroneous and absurd practice. But Mr Simpson knows that, so far from its necessarily leading *to* it, in this country it leads *from* it. Now, though Mr Simpson uses the argument at first only defensively, it becomes, as he goes along, an aggressive argument. His object is to defend himself against an "utterly erroneous and absurd" proposition. And he slips into an attack upon teaching doctrines to intellects less matured than what is exercised in the foundation of all education. This, then, is his

Fourth objection,—a tendency to teach doctrines,—by which, from the note to p. 140, I presume he means mere abstract doctrines, before the pupil's mind is advanced enough to understand them. This is much more strongly stated in another part of his book (p. 190): "The zealots of every sect most conscientiously entertain the opinion, that the only chance for the youth of the country obtaining what it calls a religious education, is to place the sole direction of education, secular and religious, in its peculiar hands. Most sects, so empowered, would then proceed

to instil into the young, nay, the infant mind, *theology*, almost exclusively. This is the only idea the sects, if zealous, attach to education on a religious basis. It must *begin* with the creed, catechism of the sect, and never for a moment lose sight of either. The consequence is, that both become objects of tedium and disgust, and neither religious nor secular knowledge is attained." This, then, is an argument in its proper shape. The practice is bad; and sects will pursue—inevitably, if zealous, which we must wish them to be—a bad method. This would happen whether the sects were empowered by the state or not to conduct the religious instruction; for "it is the only idea attached by them to education on a religious foundation." Now, it is of no consequence to the argument whether I agree with Mr Simpson in his objection against premature *theology* or not. It is clear, that it is no objection at all against religious instruction, unless it is the inevitable consequence of such instruction to lead to the error, admitting it to be an error. The error does not consist in teaching the creed and catechism, but in teaching them too soon,—before the pupil's intellect is advanced enough to understand them,—requiring, as they do, a more matured intellect than that which is exercised in the foundation of all education; it consists in beginning with the creed and catechism. But this error is the same, whether committed by the teacher or the pastor. If it inevitably follows, that religious instruction, in the hands of sects, must fall into this error,—which is so dangerous that he designates it (note to page 140) "not only labour lost, but mischief done, in so far as religion remains for ever in the mind a matter of memory and feeling, not of the understanding as desiderated by the Apostle,"—how is the mischief less mischief because it is perpetrated by the sacred hands of the minister, and not by those of the school-master? We must, to follow the matter up, deny religious instruction altogether, if this is its inevitable tendency, in whosoever hands it may be. But, if it be not inevitable,

and the pastor will not be guilty of this absurdity, how comes he to be freed from this tendency? Is he alone not the zealot of his sect? Are we to believe, that while the teacher will, with eager haste, prematurely plunge the infant zealot about to be, into the very hottest fight of theological polemics, the pastor will, with greater indifference, keep him from the strife till his youthful frame be knit, and he be strong enough to engage in the *melée*? And how come there to be zealots at all? They have all themselves been trained in this way, and should, with satiety and disgust, have thrown Bible, creed, and catechism into the sea, as the things associated with task, and toil, and tears. But, somehow or other, they are zealots, —only the pastors are not zealots; *they* would not, at the bidding of the sects, *begin* with the creed and catechism.

I need not dwell on the conclusion to which we come. We must, to be consistent, restrict religious instruction to sects not zealous, for we must admit that whether the instruction be given by teacher or pastor, the question of creed and catechism is precisely the same. It may be wrong in schools to teach this creed or catechism, because there are present those who will not believe the creed, nor learn the catechism,—but that is the sectarian argument. It may be wrong to teach creeds and catechisms at all before a certain age, but it is equally wrong, in that case, in the pastor and in the teacher,—and it is therefore no argument at all against religious instruction, but against a certain kind of it.

It is strange that Mr Simpson should not have known that the Church of Scotland, a sect, moreover a zealous sect, and endowed, has no such notion of religious instruction that it must begin with its own creed and catechism. The Edinburgh Sessional School has for years been conducted under the immediate superintendence of the clergymen of Edinburgh. We cannot suppose that a system is there introduced not approved of by them. In the year 1828 an interesting and most instructive Account

of the Edinburgh Sessional School was published, dedicated to the Reverend Clergy and the Kirk-sessions of Edinburgh. Every thing in the work, respecting religious instruction in its essentials, must be held to be the opinion of the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland, for they have adopted that school as their normal school, as the model on which they wish all their schools to be conducted. Now, mark the passage which follows from the book (p. 59). "Of all the methods of instructing the young in religious knowledge (and perhaps we may add in every other species of knowledge), catechising appears to us to be at once by far the most interesting, and the most profitable. By this, however, we trust we shall be understood as recommending something more than merely reading, from a book denominated a catechism, a certain number of prescribed questions, and hearing the child repeat by rote the words which are set down for him in the same book as answers to these questions. We here employ the term in its more comprehensive signification, 'to instruct, by asking questions, and correcting the answers.' At the same time we are far from asserting that a form of sound words, drawn up on the principle to which we have referred, when rightly employed, and holding only its proper place in religious education, is by any means without its use."

On these principles, then, is grounded the method of teaching the catechism in the Edinburgh Sessional School,—and such, therefore, is the method which the General Assembly recognises, and practically enjoins on the teachers trained under their own eye. Nay, I find the following strong sentence quoted by Mr Simpson himself, in "Antinational Education," from a pamphlet written by the Reverend George Lewis of Dundee,—then editor of the Scottish Guardian,—and published under the superintendence of the Glasgow Educational Association, of which Mr Colquhoun, the member for the Kilmarnock burghs, was then and is president. The writer is men-

tioning the books used in the parochial schools of Scotland. (P. 48): "To this is added a spelling book,—an elementary grammar,—the Shorter Catechism, an admirable compound of theology, and most useful, if taught to the scholar when his mind is somewhat opened, and he can be made to understand it; but which it is utterly impossible to defend as an INITIATORY catechism in religion,—and last of all the Bible or New Testament; used, we fear, in too many cases, not so much for reverently teaching and training youth in Christian principles and Christian duties, as for teaching the art of reading and spelling." With the purpose for which Mr Simpson made this quotation we have nothing to do. But he may now dismiss his fears of the zealots. In connexion with that society, schools have been established where religious instruction is given, and on these principles,—they, too, having become normal schools, and recognised as such by the General Assembly.

There can be but one answer to this; and it is, that the objection is made not merely to creeds and catechisms properly so called, but to the teaching of "revealed religion as knowledge,"—of religion in its "doctrinal department,"—"its mere abstract doctrines," till the intellect is properly matured. It may be a question, certainly, at what age, or rather at what period of development, the minds of children can understand doctrines. But this is a question as to time, and is equally applicable,—as I have shown before,—to the pastor as to the teacher. Is there not, at the same time, some error couched under the expression "revealed religion, as knowledge, is but a branch of knowledge, like mathematics?" The idea meant to be conveyed is, I presume, that as revealed religion is a branch of knowledge, it requires, like all other branches, a certain maturity of intellect to be successfully taught. In this sense, religion is assuredly a branch of knowledge. But then when it is said that it is not only like them in this, but in another respect, we must take care lest we

get into a false notion. Some of its more abstract doctrines must be addressed to a more matured intellect than that which is exercised in the foundation of all education. But then we must understand what is meant by the foundation of all education. We find our author stating that "Infant education is to commence in the cradle," and, if so, no one will deny that we can no more, *in the foundation* of all education, teach doctrines mostly abstract, than we can astronomy or chemistry. But we can surely teach a part at least of even the doctrinal department of revealed religion much earlier than we can astronomy or chemistry. And the question thus becomes a question of time, of grave importance as to the details of religious instruction in schools, but not as to the principle. We must, besides, take care not to confound what is different in the likeness. We must remember that a knowledge of doctrine is essential to man's happiness, which a knowledge of astronomy and chemistry is not. And we must remember that doctrine is intended to act directly upon the affections, which, without it, are radically depraved, while a knowledge of chemistry and astronomy acts only indirectly, when at all, upon the affections, and is comparatively of little value in redeeming the sinner from the error of his ways. Above all, in reference to this very argument, doctrine is suited to the recognised wants of man, and is felt as well as known. It is therefore different from these, in that they require a more matured, and not only so, but a *disciplined* intellect. Blessed be God! the other is adapted to the learned and the unlearned, to the wise and the unwise.

V. I certainly agree with our author that it is unnecessary and injurious to send the young for a knowledge of nature—that is of the world around us—to the Bible. But I cannot agree with all his reasonings on the subject. If he had contented himself with merely stating that the Scriptures were never meant as an exposition of nature,—that is of the laws of the material world,—and therefore

should not be resorted to for that purpose, which is undoubtedly a lawful one, he would have said all that it appears to me can be said on the subject. But then his reasoning goes a great deal farther. He misstates facts, I humbly submit, and he misapplies reasons. As to facts, he asserts (p. 141) that revealed religion "concerns facts and events posterior to the institutions of nature, and even the existence of man." Even though this were true, what bearing it has on the subject I cannot see, except a bearing contrary to his purpose. His design is to prove that we should not attempt to draw our knowledge of nature from the Bible,—and he uses this as an argument. If for *posterior* we were to read *prior*, the force of the argument might be, that, as revelation respected facts and events prior to nature's existence, its theory must be useless in an attempt to elucidate nature. But its posteriority is just one reason why we should search if there were any indications of natural knowledge revealed. We find no such revelation, but not on account of this posteriority,—for another reason altogether,—it was not so meant. But as to the fact, revealed religion, both in its historical and in its doctrinal department, concerns facts and events of date *prior* as well as *posterior* to the institutions of nature. Not to multiply proofs, there is both a doctrine and a historical event in the sublime words, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Revealed religion, he says (p. 141), "presumed the previous existence of nature, and of man as a part of nature, and was conformed to both." Well, if it was conformed to both, why, since we thence get a knowledge at least of man, should we not get a knowledge of nature,—the outer world of which man forms a part? I must confess that I do not see very clearly the author's meaning, but such seems the effect of it, so far as I understand it. "It is evident, that if Scripture was not intended to reveal nature which was already revealed, it must be not only erroneous, but injurious to make use of Scripture to control natural knowledge." Indeed! What

can be the meaning of the expression *control natural knowledge*? Our author cannot possibly mean that religion is to be prevented from ruling over—from setting bounds to—the search of the knowledge of nature, because he must admit that this search might interfere with other duties enjoined by conscience and enforced by religion. *Control* must mean to prevent. Even in this sense there is a fallacy in the reasoning. The author means to prove, that as God has revealed nature and thereby permitted us to know it, and has not revealed it in the holy Scriptures, it is injurious to make use of Scripture to prevent us from knowing that which it was clearly intended we should know. But the fallacy of his argument is in using the word revealed in two different senses in two consecutive clauses. In the first, it means to *disclose fully* the constitution and laws that regulate the material world and its inhabitants in reference to the material world; in the second, it simply means, manifested, shown, *presented to the view*. Now this argument is utterly untenable. It is just this: “It is evident, that if Scripture was not intended to disclose fully the constitution and laws of the world and its inhabitants, which material world was already presented to the view, it is erroneous and injurious to use Scripture to prevent a search into these laws.” Now this proves no error and no injury,—for the very object of the non-intention might be to *prevent further search*. We must prove along with the non-intention of Scripture, not that nature was *already revealed*, for it was not, in the sense of our author,—but that, the desire of the knowledge of God’s works, so far as we can know them, is a legitimate desire, not forbidden by Scripture, but expressly sanctioned by it, so far as it does not interfere with other duties. Hence, we use Scripture alike to *stimulate* and to *control* natural knowledge. The meaning may be, however inaccurate the reasoning, that we should not judge of the truths brought out by a search into nature, such as the truths of geology, by the authority of Scripture.

If it is so, I shall examine its force in a subsequent passage.

VI. "The truths of each" (a knowledge of Scripture and of Nature) "rest upon their own evidence,—and in order to their own full development, and even to their value, as throwing light upon each other, they must be separately prosecuted." The meaning and the tendency of this must be carefully studied to get at a full understanding of our author's system. And, first, as to what is understood as being contained in the truths of each. Let us begin with *Nature*. One essential of education is (p. 63) "to convey as extensive a knowledge as possible of the nature of external beings and things, and the relation of them to the human constitution." (P. 190): "While in the order proposed, secular instruction precedes the lessons of Revelation, it cannot be said by the most scrupulous that it *excludes* them. By secular education the pupil is introduced to the God of Nature. He desiderates a Creator as the author of the wonders unfolded to him in creation, and, as it were, *discovers* him in his works. Thus prepared, he proceeds to find that the God of Nature is the God of Revelation. Is it wise to reverse this order? Is it not impious to exclude one half of it?" (Evidence, 3136): "In a former part of your evidence, you were understood to state that you would prohibit the secular elementary teacher from giving instruction in revealed religion as such?—It is most important to speak guardedly and distinctly here. I have said in my former evidence that natural theology inheres in every lesson, and is inseparable from secular education; but I have not the same opinion with regard to revealed religion or Christianity; I do not hold that that does inhere in secular education."..... (3036): "Is it not part of your philosophy, upon which your system is founded, that you are to take man with the qualities he possesses, and to work upon these qualities?—No doubt of it."—As to a knowledge of Scripture, he means *of all Scripture,—he forbids any use of it, or of any part*

of it. (3143): "Would you then distinctly prohibit the teacher from any reference, in the course of his lessons, to Christian doctrines or Christian history, as such?—It would be better to do so." (3149): "Would you use the Bible at all in secular education?—Certainly not." (3150): "Not even the stories and parables of the Bible?—Not in secular instruction. But I beg the committee to keep particularly in view that I speak entirely of that branch of education called secular; for I have said that I would make provision for Bible instruction in elementary education. There must be two teachers, the secular and the religious."

We might imagine, that although the teacher was not directly to lead to a knowledge of divine things in connexion with the study of Nature, he might himself be so impressed by it as to lead the pupils to feel that the information which he conveyed was after all but a prelude to a higher pursuit. But that is not desired nor contemplated. (2795): "Would the practical effect of the system you recommend be to allow the appointment of a Dissenter or Catholic, or even an infidel, without any examination as to their religious opinions on the part of the Board?—The teachers of the elementary school, it is proposed, shall be secular teachers and no more. As shall be afterwards stated, they should not be required to teach revealed religion, but more, they should not be permitted; and it should be cause of removal that they interfere to inculcate, however indirectly, either religious or anti-religious views. The department of revealed religion must be committed to more competent hands. Hence, the religious opinions of the secular teacher cannot in either way affect his pupils."

Let me pause to collect myself, and prevent me from breaking forth into an expression of indignation unworthy of the high cause which I advocate.

Having ascertained what is meant by the truths of each, it will not be necessary to dwell long upon the various

arguments for the pursuing of each separately. It is because they (p. 141) "rest upon their own evidence, and in order to their own full development, and—" But here let us pause. The truths of nature rest upon one kind of evidence, and so far, it is admitted, require separate proof. Their "full development" adds nothing to this, for it means nothing more than the truths of each fully brought out and explained as parts of truth. The development of the truths—is just more truths; for if it means theories, then we cannot call them truths resting "on their own evidence,"—it cannot mean the connexions between separate truths, for these are as much truths as those which they connect, and rest on their own evidence. We have nothing more, then, in this as a reason than "these truths in their general and their more full development, rest, &c." And it is granted, that the discovery of truth, both religious and natural, rests on its own separate evidence—and that it would be absurd to mingle them up. But the truths being discovered and fully developed, what follows? "And even to their value, as throwing light upon each other." If this refer to their evidence, of course their value, as throwing light upon each other, depends mainly on the evidence of the one being different from that of the other, and then we have the whole three reasons contained in one,—"that as the value of the truths of each, as throwing light upon each other, rests upon the fact that they have different sources of evidence, both generally and in their full development, they should be separately pursued." Undoubtedly they should, as far as the evidence is concerned, and the discovery of the separate truths and the development. Nay, as our author says, they *must*. You might analyze all the elements, and make the most astounding discoveries in chemistry,—you might discover new planets and their laws,—you might promulgate a method for solving equations of the fifth order, and you most certainly not only might not, but would not, catch the slightest glimpse in all these of one of the doctrines of our faith. And you

might ascend the loftiest speculations in theology, and, with sure because heaven-supported step, pass from height to height, singing praises as you ascended, and not one discovery could you possibly make in your progress, because of that progress, of the humblest element of the knowledge of the material laws. But what has that to do with the question? It is involved and stated in the reasoning, that they may throw light on each other, and the question is,—not do they rest on different evidence, but do they form parts of the same system,—to what extent do they throw light on each other,—how are we to use this light,—is it to be reciprocal,—and what is the best method?

To a certain extent, then, it is admitted that the truths must be separately prosecuted, to enable them to throw light upon each other. But I defy man to prove that they can ever do this, unless they be prosecuted together.

Accordingly our author, notwithstanding all that he has said, does not recommend their separate prosecution. There are obviously two methods of enabling us to use nature and revelation so as to throw light upon each other. The one is,—while the young are acquiring a knowledge of nature, they may be taught that every fresh discovery they are introduced to, every fresh truth developed, is an additional incentive to the love which they ought to bear to God as the Christian's God, and the consequent duty of obedience. The other is,—while the young are acquiring a knowledge of revelation, they may be taught that these doctrines lead them to obey One who in all his works displays surpassing wisdom and benevolence. Of these two, the former is rejected for various reasons.

I shall notice here one incidental point that occurs, connected with sectarianism. Mr Simpson's great object is to produce such a system of education as shall not only be good, but as shall admit all sects. Now, on this system, if one sect has no right to exclude another, the non-exclusion must apply to all, and neither must religionists nor unbelievers exclude others. If, then, there is introduced

into the schools, in the teaching of the natural knowledge, not what *is* anti-scriptural, but what is *supposed to be* anti-scriptural by any sect, the system is violated in a most important part. It will not do for the advocates of the system to say that the natural-instruction view is true, and that only an erroneous interpretation of Scripture is put upon it. "I am a Pharisee," said Paul, and the Pharisees took his part. "I am a Sectarian," cries the aggrieved party, and Mr Simpson must take his part. It is replied, perhaps, that this is guarded against, because, according to Mr Simpson's plan, for any thing communicated, religious or anti-religious, the master is to be dismissed. But, if the teacher be a deist, he will deem nothing anti-religious which is merely anti-Christian,—anti-peculiar to Christianity, or—if he, being an honest man, deem that this comes within the scope of the word religious, or whether he be a deist or no,—he may forget that anti-religious must mean, according to Mr Simpson's system, not in reality what is anti-religious, but what may appear to any sect to be so. This is but fair,—for this is the great ground on which religious instruction is banished;—and I cannot imagine Mr Simpson excluding it to make way for peace, yet proposing to keep in a natural knowledge, which destroys the very object that banishes the Bible from the schools.

In all this, I do not assume that the sect is right. But if it were so to happen, that in order to introduce and inculcate natural knowledge,—the Bible being away,—there were taught facts in such a way as to lead to conclusions really opposed to the Word of God, who does not see that our national schools would become a national curse?

I need not go far for illustrations. Geology might furnish me with many. But, waving it, I presume that Mr Simpson will not refuse to admit Mr Combe as a witness. Mr Simpson stated in his evidence before the House of Commons, that his plans for educating the nation were based on a certain system of philosophy. And, he says,

speaking of Combe's *Constitution of Man*, "*I consider that work as by far the best exposition of the system.*"

Now, without taking into consideration the truth or falsehood of phrenology, it is clear that Mr Simpson holds by that *sect* of phrenology—for it too has its sects—which has Mr Combe as its head. He not only acknowledges Mr Combe as his instructor, but Mr Combe claims him as his pupil. (*Constitution of Man*, 4th Edition, p. 78, note.) "Mr Simpson also has treated the subject with great ability in the same Journal, vol. ix. p. 481, and in the Appendix to his work on the 'Necessity of Popular Education'—a work in which he has expounded and applied many principles of the present treatise with much acuteness and felicity of illustration."

But, irrespectively of Mr Simpson's advocating Combe's *Constitution of Man* or not, I have only to point out a danger of Sectarianism, as resulting from his system, and the system must be abandoned. Having left the light of the Bible, we must not rest in natural theology, but retire into some deeper depth. He expressly provides in his scheme of Education for a knowledge of the human body as a part of nature. (Part of answer to 2954): "A knowledge of man as a physical, moral, and intellectual being, should next be imparted; the structure and functions of his body, the conditions of his health," and so on.

Supposing, then, that the teacher when inculcating a knowledge of the body were to come to this passage, or along with Mr Combe—this conclusion (Combe, p. 52): "Let us first view the dissolution of the body abstractedly from personal considerations, as a mere natural arrangement. Death, then, appears to be the result of the constitution of all organized beings; for the very definition of the genus is, that the individuals grow, attain maturity, decay, and die. * * * * I am aware that, theologically, death is regarded as the punishment of sin, and that the attempt to reconcile our minds to it by reason is rejected as at once futile and dangerous. But I beg

leave to observe, that philosophers have established, by irrefragable evidence, that before man was created, death prevailed among the lower animals, not only by natural decay and the operation of physical forces, but by the express institution of carnivorous creatures destined to prey on living beings; that man himself is carnivorous, and obviously framed by the Creator for a scene of death; that his organic constitution in its inherent qualities implies death as its final termination; and that if these facts be admitted to be undeniable on the one hand, and we are prohibited, on the other, from attempting to discover, from the records of creation itself, the wise adaptation of the human feelings and intellect to this state of things, neither the cause of revelation nor that of reason can be thereby benefited. The foregoing facts cannot be disputed or concealed; and the only effect of excluding the investigation on which I propose to enter, would be to close the path of reason, and to leave the constitution of the external world, and of the human mind, apparently in a state of contradiction to each other. Let us rather trust to the inherent consistency of all truths, and rely on all sound conclusions of reason being in accordance with every correct interpretation of Scripture."

In quoting this passage, I may be erring in supposing that Mr Simpson would approve of this work as a text-book in the National Schools, even although it is "the best exposition of the system." But I have referred to it for a much higher purpose than merely to show what Mr Combe thinks about death theologically and truly considered. Banish the Bible from school, and introduce the study of nature in the hands of any man—you know not what in point of belief,—is it not patent to the veriest devotee of natural knowledge that the teacher,—he may, like Mr Simpson, be a follower of Combe,—has it in his power, without stating one anti-religious fact, so to arrange truths—which cannot be anti-religious, as that put in ignorance, and so received, they may seem so. Admit for a moment

that the theological doctrine is true, and that the teacher believes it to be so, notwithstanding this seeming contradiction from nature, and what is the result? You have the teacher laying down fact after fact, all leading to a conclusion that the true theological doctrine is false; but he dare not say one word about the theological doctrine, for he would be dismissed if he said a word religious or anti-religious. And this is the case with many more than these facts concerning death.

Some sects, the dominant sects, as Mr Simpson calls them, for instance, hold that the Scriptures clearly reveal that the external world fell into disorder, along with man, by the introduction of sin. Mr Combe maintains that geology, history, and the true philosophy of the mind prove that man and the world are in a state of progressive improvement,—and have been improving, with occasional vacillations on the part of men, since their creation. Now, supposing all this to be false, the facts have made such an impression on Mr Combe's mind, that he believes this inference to be true, and he must be of opinion that they will lead every body else to the same belief. Every sect, then, according to Mr Simpson's system, must have a right to complain of this indirect proselytism. And, still more, still assuming that the received interpretation of the Scriptures is true, and that the facts, from their incompleteness, lead to false conclusions,—who would not at once spurn a system which introduces half-formed sciences, without one word of warning as to their tendency to mislead? Many of the isolated truths of science, yet in their infancy, are supposed by some to contradict revelation,—by others to contradict false interpretations of Scripture,—and by others, only in seeming to contradict God's word. Yet what limit is there to be put to the injurious effects of all this? It is absurd to talk of this being counteracted by the pastor. You have no right to teach any thing that requires such counteraction. You must counteract it upon the spot.—You must unite religious with secular instruc-

tion, otherwise you must banish the study of nature from your schools.

Nor will it do to say that the doctrine opposed to theology is not inculcated. If the facts "can neither be disputed nor concealed,"—and yet are opposed to the Scriptures, or to a given interpretation of Scripture, they may, according to Mr Simpson's plan, be taught elsewhere,—by the pastor, who holds such a doctrine as is reconcileable with the inferences to be drawn. But if these facts in their mere statement lead to a conclusion opposed to the opinion of any sect, it surely does not matter whether the opposition to the schools be grounded on a statement of doctrines or of facts, provided it is opposed to religious views. The objection must be held to be fatal.

. This, then, is one way in which Mr Simpson must be compelled to adopt a practice "not only erroneous, but injurious, to make use of Scripture to control natural knowledge."

. But another objection is made against combining religious with natural instruction, that thus we reverse the proper order (p. 190). According to one proposed plan, a pupil is to *discover*, as it were, God in his works, and thus be prepared to find that the God of Nature is the God of Revelation. According to the present method, this is reversed. He is first taught the God of Revelation, and then the God of Nature. Or one-half of it—that belonging to natural theology—is impiously omitted. If these reasons are good, then they should be applied to religious instruction in schools, but need not banish it. But be they good or be they bad, the order mentioned here as "the order proposed," is not the plan actually detailed at all. In the "order proposed" the child should be taught nature first; I presume, not in the cradle, but in the infant school,—and some time or other—that is not mentioned, only it is to be after he has desiderated and discovered God in his works—he is to proceed to find that the God of Nature is the God of Revelation (p. 190). But, according to the plan else-

where detailed (p. 140), the child, while at the infant school, is to be handed over to the pastor, who may teach, or may not teach, for no attempt is made to dictate to him, in any way he chooses; but surely, in whatever way the pastor teaches, the teacher may likewise. If the pastor does not reverse the order, why should the teacher? If he do reverse the order, why should the teacher be prevented from, or blamed for, doing that which the pastor is permitted to do? If the order is not reversed, but the two pursuits are carried on together, what becomes of the "order proposed," where the one was to precede the other? Which of the two conflicting plans does our author really wish us to adopt? And, above all, where—where is the man, boy, or child, that ever was or ever could be taught to find the God of Revelation before he found the God of Nature?

"They must be separately prosecuted,"—nature and revealed religion. These, "in order to their own full development, and even to their throwing light upon each other, must be separately prosecuted"! Well, then, this seems to follow. Let nature be taught in schools, and the study there prosecuted; but let there not be one word of revealed religion. Let revealed religion be taught in church, and the study there prosecuted; but let there not be one word of nature. But Mr Simpson would perhaps object to this last,—“that cannot be, for revealed religion presumes the existence of nature.”

Yes, but it does not presume the prosecution of the study of nature. So far as we can, let us act fairly. Yét (2901)—“Then it is to science, *and to science only*, in so far as it is connected with natural religion, that you would propose to limit the lectures” (lectures suggested to be given at occasional hours) “*of the clergyman?*—*Of course* he teaches revealed religion at its proper time, *and brings an enlightened natural theology in aid of it*. This is too little done by some zealous but mistaken religious teachers. All scientific phenomena suggest, *to a properly*

constituted mind, natural theology. It is impossible to give a lesson in science, as it ought to be given, without unfolding some truth in the manifestations of God, and an enlightened teacher will delight to point out this connexion. Natural theology is another word for science and truth ; they are convertible terms, and they are inseparable." Now, this is the strangest thing of all. The clergyman is to give lectures on science ; but he is not to say one word about revealed religion, for he teaches that at its proper time ! But when he does teach revealed religion, he is to bring an enlightened natural theology in aid of it, which recourse to natural theology is too little practised by some mistaken religious teachers. What extraordinary source of evil there is in revealed religion, I do not know ; but I should think, that if a clergyman were to teach an enlightened natural theology, he must teach revealed religion, as I never heard of any other enlightened natural theology. So that this is just as much as saying, the preacher brings revealed religion in aid of revealed religion. But if he is to teach science, connected with natural religion, it will be in connexion with enlightened natural religion, which is revealed religion. As to "properly constituted minds," read it in connexion with these sentences from "the best exposition of the system." (Combe, p. 49)—"It appears to me that the native American Indians, and native New Hollanders, *cannot with their present brains* adopt Christianity or civilisation. (P. 58) : Criminals and profligates of every description, therefore, *from the very constitution of their nature*, are excluded from great enjoyments attendant on virtue ; and this is the *first* natural punishment to which they are inevitably liable." "But natural theology is another word for science and truth ; they are convertible terms, and they are inseparable !"

Our author, then, is of opinion that the preacher should make it his business to teach the laws of nature when he is expounding revealed religion, but not to teach revealed

religion when he is expounding the laws of nature: For what reason does not seem very clear in this case, for we have not here the bugbear of sectarianism.

Let me, on the contrary, leaving for a while the atmosphere of this work, endeavour to show how all lessons explaining the laws of nature should be given with reference to, not natural,—as our author strongly recommends, in an excellent passage that I regret there is no room to quote (p. 123),—but enlightened natural—revealed religion.

Before, however, I proceed to this, it would be unpardonable to omit instancing, as one of the most astonishing mistakes on record, the following, into which Mr Simpson has fallen. In his evidence he had been asked (3151), “Can you give any facts of your own knowledge, or any authorities, which could lead you to divide secular and religious education?” and had replied, “In Scotland, during the period of my own elementary education, the separation was in all schools but the parochial, and those for the lower orders in towns, complete. Neither in any English reading school nor grammar school for the middle classes was the Bible a school book. The education at school was secular, and at home religious.” This has been already animadverted on in the 11th Chapter, and needs no further notice. Next, after one speculative question affecting morality, he is asked (3153), “Have you any other authority than those you have quoted (!) approving the separation of secular from religious instruction?—I have one most striking authority, one which has made quite a sensation in Scotland. It is the speech of Mr Duff, delivered in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in the month of May last.” Then follows an account of Dr Duff and his speech, and the sensation it made, and of a prayer by Dr Gordon, on which he makes a commentary that I do not imagine the reverend doctor ever anticipated. “A sublime prayer was poured forth by Dr Gordon, one of the most eloquent and popular

preachers in Scotland. He prayed fervently that God would send forth his light and his truth. What that light and that truth are in Mr Duff's splendid commentary—and it was that commentary which called all who heard it to prayer—is not doubtful; that they are the twofold revelation of God, his works and his word, *and that these are distinct and require separate study.*" Then there is another account of Dr Duff's speech,—how he narrated the failure of missions to India, on account of the utter impotency of doctrinal preaching to the ignorant,—how he drew a picture of a missionary preaching, and the failure thereof from various causes. And he ends his answer thus: "Mr Duff proposes to enlighten the Hindu, and *to begin* to enlighten him with *secular* knowledge; *separately* and *previously* to attack his superstitions and fables on their own philosophical impossibility and absurdity; *to open to him the book of nature*, and *then to follow it up with the book of revelation.*"

When I read this in Mr Simpson's evidence, I was much startled. On the one hand, I was certain that Dr Duff had, in that most eloquent address of his, proved the very reverse of all that Mr Simpson said that he did prove; on the other hand, my certainty was shaken by the consideration that Mr Simpson was examined in 1835, immediately after the speech was delivered, and when the impression on his mind must have been very recent. The mode in which he speaks, especially of the prayer, suggests that he had been present. In the second edition of his *Philosophy of Education*, published in 1836, he says in a note (p. 27), "The above argument was published before Mr Duff the Indian missionary from the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland came home and confirmed it, amidst the most enthusiastic concurrence of his audience, in one of the most splendid speeches ever listened to by that venerable body." The very pamphlet from which I read the passage was published in 1837, and it is to be distinctly

noted that he does not confine himself to the statement of an *inference* drawn from Dr Duff's narrative and reasonings, but of what Dr Duff actually *proposes*. I turned to Dr Duff's speech in wonderment, and almost contrary to my expectations, I find that, as I had believed, Dr Duff's address proves the very opposite of that *affirmed and detailed to the Committee* by Mr Simpson, *with its inferences and conclusions*. I shall just quote one short passage, which is conclusive, and I trust that Dr Duff will never again be referred to as proving what, I am sure, in his inmost heart, he abhors,—the separation of secular and religious instruction. After exposing the monstrous evils that follow from *separating secular from religious instruction*, as is done in the Hindu College of Calcutta, supported by the government, which in consequence had sent out, for the previous ten years, class after class, of “infidels or sceptics of the most perfect kind, believing in nothing, believing not even in the existence of a Deity, and glorying in their unbelief,” he narrates what course he pursued with some of them, and his partial success in a course of religious instruction. When speaking of the General Assembly's Institution, the following words occur (The Church of Scotland's India Mission, p. 16): “And as the result of our determination to communicate *Christian knowledge from the beginning, along with the elements of general literature and science*, we now find that, after a period of upwards of four years, *almost all* the youths in the more advanced classes have become *as perfect unbelievers in their own systems* as the young men in the Hindu College before referred to; and, at the same time, *as perfect believers in Christianity*, so far as the *understanding* or the *head* is concerned. And already, in some cases, is there the commencement of a working of the higher order; already, in some cases, are there symptoms that indicate that the *heart* also is beginning to be vitally affected. Farther still: it is delightful to

think, that lately one of the most talented young men in the institution, and a Brahmin of the best caste, has offered himself as a candidate for baptism; and, what is more cheering still, *spontaneously proffered his services for the work of a CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY.*

“Such, fathers and brethren, such is the *nature*, and such the *tendency*, of the system pursued in the General Assembly’s Institution,—an institution that contains about *five hundred* Hindu youths, all of them of respectable caste, and many of the very highest; and numbers more belonging to some of the wealthiest and most influential families in Calcutta.”

Need I add more?

“He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” (Hebrews xi. 6.) In this assertion of the inspired apostle, we have the confirmation of what our reason tells us, that revealed is founded on natural religion. It is a conceivable thing, and may have happened, that a man, formerly an unbeliever in the existence of a God, may have been so struck with the dignity and purity of the sacred writings, and their adaptedness to human nature and human wants, as to have passed to the belief which saveth. But I apprehend that the first step even here would be, to believe “that God is,” although the beauty of the revelation, and not of nature, led to that belief. And in the felt adaptedness of the revealed religion to man’s nature, the nature being the element known; this, too, may properly be termed natural theology. But such cases must be so very rare, that I have only alluded to them to avoid any cavil at the general statements which follow. Revealed religion does not create, but finds in the heart of man principles to which it appeals, even the belief that God is. The person to whom the appeal is made does not of necessity erect a theory of natural theology; his feelings are pointed to an unknown Benefactor and Ruler, whom

he designates by the name of God. The belief need not have been attained by science, nor by diligent research ; in most cases it is not so attained. Not only is there a natural theology in the child reared among Christians, and in a Christian family, where the notion of God might be derived from family intercourse—though even there the notion could never take root if there were not a disposition to receive it, in other words, religious feelings ;—but the savage who roams the desert, and, with appetite indomitable, seeks only to slay and gorge, trembles at the name of the Great Spirit, whom he ignorantly worships. This of itself constitutes an obligation to inquire after God, to desire to know more of his works, and to seek him wherever he may be found. Whenever the mind so inquiring finds what is presented to it as a direct revelation from God, the superinduced obligation arises, to examine its claims ; and, if the examination prove that it is indeed a revelation, to embrace it. It does not matter whether there is a formal inquiry into evidences, though there is an obligation so to inquire before rejection ; the revelation may be adopted as true on any ground of evidence—of miracle, of prophecy, of history, of its internal truth and felt adaptedness to nature, or all or any of them, in whatever combination. But thus, then, arises another obligation. Before, God was known but through his works, dimly and imperfectly known as the God of nature ; now, he is known as the God of revelation. The former obligations are all merged in this. God is the same in both, but inasmuch as he is more clearly revealed in the latter, the believer no longer feels nor thinks of God as the God of nature, but as the God of revelation, which term includes the other. The former is exclusive, and necessarily shuts out the latter, which embraces both. It is true that each new discovery made of God's goodness, or his wisdom, or his power, adds in the believer's heart fresh sources of admiration. But all his admiration is directed, not to God as the God of nature, but as the God

of revelation. Nay, more, each new discovery made deepens his responsibility. He was, before, bound to love and obey him to the uttermost,—to devote every talent to God's service; but here is a new talent added, for which he is bound and willing to account. This feeling gets stronger and stronger every fresh mark he has of the love shown him, and the wisdom exercised towards him, and the power exerted in his behalf, which each new discovery unfolds. For he has a felt relationship to the Being who has so contrived and executed. He who travels through the domains of a powerful king, bent on promoting the good of his subjects, and wisely executing his intentions, may admire and praise. But it is they only who are under the paternal sway of the monarch that feel the bonds of a willing obedience made lighter, and yet constraining them the more to admire and to honour their gracious prince.

Even they, however, who have not subjected themselves to the sway of heaven's King,—the God of Revelation,—are not exempted from responsibility. They are bound to examine into his claims upon their regard. If they do not, they treat him with contempt. And the more that they know of his works, the more guilty is that contempt. It is true that they do not recognise in the God of Nature, the God of Revelation. But he is God, whether they recognise him or not. They are not strangers traversing the country, but rebels disowning the lawful authority of the rightful monarch. Each proof that he gives them of his perfections, but adds to their condemnation in rejecting him. It is no answer to the charge against them, that they do acknowledge his authority as the God of Nature,—it is not as the God of Nature that he has willed his authority to be recognised. Revelation has superseded nature as the interpreter of God's will, and by revelation we must be guided, or bear the guilt of rebels.

There can be no doubt as to the case of those whose

understandings acquiesce in the truths of revelation, and whose hearts do not yield obedience. They are, admittedly, guilty. They acknowledge that they should obey God, and yet they disobey him. They admit that this is his will, to do according to his revealed word, and they do it not. Every fresh view of his infinite attributes, as displayed in nature, sends them the more forcibly to revelation. They, too, feel a sense of relationship,—even that of disobedient children. And, just as we should gaze with grief and surprise on the child, who, rebellious, continued so, and whose heart did not melt, though day by day his father's love was proved in his ongoings towards all and towards him, do we gaze with grief and surprise on the practical votaries of deism, who, admitting the truths of revelation, are yet not moved by each fresh discovery, to seek forgiveness from the God of love.

It is in truth this fact, that nature is just another word for what God has made, that renders it a duty on us to examine it so far as lies in our power, as that which our God has made. If we can suppose that the moral government of the universe were dissevered from the natural, we might support a severment of pursuits. But they are both in the same Almighty hand, and the natural government is subordinate and subservient to the moral. If we must exclude one, there is no doubt as to which we ought to exclude. No man, who believes in revelation at all, will venture to affirm, that—come of the study of nature what will—we ought to exclude that of revelation. “The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof.” We are bound to give obedience to God, and we cannot find the rules of that obedience in the study of nature, nor in natural theology. What might have been the case, in different circumstances, it is needless to inquire, in establishing deductions for practice. We must take man as he is, and we know only of God in relation to man as he now is, through revelation.

Is there, then, any use in natural theology and the

study of nature? Much use. Natural theology, so far as we have to consider it here, irrespective of morality, is the great principle to which revelation appeals. By studying nature, we acquire a knowledge of our relationships to other beings,—but we acquire no knowledge of our real relationship to God. We are, then, led by the study of nature to the study of revelation. But we are not so led, unless this be made a habit. There can be no error more dangerous than to separate the study and use of revelation from any pursuit whatever. We are in constant danger of idolatry,—practical idolatry,—bowing down to other gods than the God **JEHOVAH**. To train us to the absurd belief that nature is any thing but the production of the God of Revelation, is to train us in unbelief. It is thus that revelation must control natural knowledge. If I, on sufficient evidence, conclude that a revelation comes from God, I must admit its power to control natural knowledge, *for it claims that power*. If I believe that it came from God, I believe that it is true. I may doubt as to whether I understand its full import in this detached passage or that, and so far I do not believe definitely,—but I doubt whether my interpretation be that meant by the Revealer. But, having on proper evidence made up my mind as to the truth, that truth undoubtedly controls natural knowledge. If it does not, in my mind, it cannot be said that I hold it to be revealed,—it can only be said that I hold it to be embodied with that which is revealed. It may be a reason why I should doubt the whole. And this is one great hazard of imparting a knowledge of nature indiscriminately to the young, *that they will inevitably doubt the whole*. We have truths which are undisputed, and not one of them has ever been found to contradict Scripture regarded as a revelation of the creation of the earth, and of man, and of God's moral government. But we have also truths made up of parts, seemingly connected together, but, for aught we at present know for certain, not so connected, which have appeared

to contradict Scripture. To present these to the minds of the young, without accompanying them with the warning which is necessary,—I do not mean a mere warning that it *may* be found that the two are reconcilable,—but that no natural truth can possibly contradict what is revealed, on the points already referred to—and without keeping ever the connexion between the God of Revelation and his works in view, is sure to lead to the most disastrous consequences. It is true, that the evidence of both is perfectly distinct,—but, where I have evidence for a solitary truth in nature, or even a series of truths, I must, with all humility, acknowledge the imperfection that attaches to my faculties, and the possibility of error. When I have evidence for the truth of revelation, I cannot receive it as true only in so far as it is not opposed to truth,—for that it is only true in part, is an argument why I should not receive it at all. When I admit that its evidence convinces me, I admit that I receive it, as what it claims to be,—a revelation of truth, made by God himself. I cannot, then, for a moment doubt its truth ; and if I find that any thing in the world around me seems to contradict its evident meaning, seeing that I have an express revelation on the one hand which I know—and the conclusion becomes irresistible when I have felt it—to be true, and on the other a supposed discovery made to me by my own faculties, or those of others, I can have no doubt of that to which I should give credence.

To impart, then, natural knowledge without revealed, is to train, so far as in us lies, a race of infidels and sceptics. If men liked to retain God in their knowledge, there might be no need for connecting nature and revelation, though surely there could be no reason for severing them. But man does not like to retain God in his knowledge. And I shall just touch on a few reasons why it is dangerous to sever those things which never should be disconnected. In all scientific pursuits, all successful researches into nature, there is a complex action,—a complacency

to the first cause, and a complacency towards oneself. This generates a pleasure, elevating if properly directed, degrading, because selfish, if confined to what is called the God of nature. There is no trustworthy relationship felt towards him, except that of being so far a co-operator with him. And hence is engendered pride, without any thing to subdue or modify it. In revealed religion, man finds God as a ruler, and an offended ruler. In the feeling of relationship towards him, there is no room for pride or self-complacency. Need we wonder that the mind—accustomed to consider the God of nature as, somehow or other, different from the God of revelation, and to feel in the service of the former a self-exaltation that belongs not to the worship, the heartfelt worship of the latter—makes the God of nature its God, and rejects the claims of a revealed ruler? But, besides, there is in revelation a constant reference to God as the great mover of all, constantly presiding over, governing, directing, and acting upon all his works. In nature, the search of man is to find out something that shall account for effects. He succeeds, and there is a *partial displacement of God's immediate operation*. If he be not constantly reminded by the Word of God, that nothing can be done without his permission, the mind dwells upon the causes which it sees, and forgets the God whom it does not see.

The natural bias of the human mind being to free it from all restraints but such as are relished by itself, it will exercise that bias as much in researches into nature as in every thing else. Nature furnishes the materials on which the mind works, and its faculties are the instrument. But there is, in reality, no difference in the pursuits of nature, from any others that are innocent, to cause it to seek God. Unless the name of God be deeply imprinted on the instrument, and continually renewed, it will wear away, and be effaced by use. Nature is not God, but only one of his works, and in searching into nature, the mind is apt to

rest there, and not to pursue the search farther. Even if it does, it will not be the more inclined to seek him in his word, being apt to deem the discovery made by itself more certain, and finding it more agreeable, than the other. The pursuits of the world in general are apt to efface the impressions of faith,—and this applies equally to nature with other pursuits. In the gaining of natural knowledge, the mind may discern manifestations of God. But it may and too often does not. God, as manifested in his word, must be in the heart before the inquirer can refer his discoveries to that God. Nor is it necessary for natural theology that there should be an extensive acquaintance with nature. The belief is as strong in the mind of the unlettered peasant, who sees the daily rising and setting of the sun,—the regular march of the stars,—the change of the seasons, and the provision made for the wants of all God's creatures, as in that of the profoundest philosopher. The expounder of the Word of God may appeal to the one belief with as much certainty as to the other. Nature, we know, will pass away. What new combinations may arise, what laws to regulate them, and delight the soul, we do not know. But the knowledge of God in his word will never pass away. It will increase and become more and more vivid in an intense admiration and love.

But there is manifest use in training the young to a knowledge of nature, subordinately to a knowledge of God. It exercises the faculties of observation and of reason,—it discloses properties of matter that it is useful to know from their applicability to the affairs of life,—it furnishes sources of innocent gratification,—it gives them the means of being useful to others,—and it ministers new materials to the flame of love rising in the heart to the eternal throne. Without revealed religion, in its desired ends, it is harmless, sometimes praiseworthy,—in the use of the mind intellectually considered it is highly useful,—in its moral effects highly dangerous. With the aid of revealed religion, it accomplishes the two first as well as without

it; and, in the last, it converts the dangerous into the counteracting, and the saving, and the ennobling. In saying what I have said of natural knowledge, as partially beneficial without revelation, I have spoken more strongly in its favour than perhaps it deserves. For, while a few minds have in all ages, and in all civilized countries, attended to the laws of nature, their extensive discovery, its diffusion and perpetuity, depend upon the freedom of the masses from superstition and moral ignorance. The co-operation of many well-trained minds,—not the labours and researches of a few, are necessary for the opening up of the volume of nature. Revelation alone has effected this,—remove revelation, and the world will assuredly retrograde. The *moral* rules over the *natural*,—revelation over nature, but they are closely and uniformly linked. As you cannot bring the former to act upon the latter, unless the latter exist, so you cannot bring the latter to act at all unless the moral exist. And there is no morality among men that deserves the name, but the morality resulting from revelation.

Let us, then, delight to disclose to the young, so far as we can, the wonderful works of our God, and to do so as in his sight, impressing on them the obligations they are under to reverence and obey Him who has revealed himself in majesty, and wisdom, and love,—not in nature alone,—but in a mightier revelation, even that which unveils him as their Father, estranged by their offences, but ready to receive them to reconciliation, and bestow upon them heaven's highest blessings. Let us add each link of design opened up to us by nature's light, to that golden chain which, effulgent in the glory of God's revealed love, binds us to the throne of the Eternal Jehovah.

CHAPTER XV.

Consideration of Mr Simpson's Views on Points incidentally connected with the Question—Instructions of the Pulpit—Character of the Scottish Peasantry—Examination of this—Influence of the Clergy on the Parochial System—Mr Simpson's Account of it—Is the Edinburgh Model Infant School on the Model of Wilderspin's Model Schools?—Infant Schools described by Mr Simpson in his Evidence—Examination of this—Effects of Mr Simpson's Views if fully carried out—Liberality of the Liberal School.

BEFORE proceeding to discuss our author's seventh objection to the union of secular and religious instruction, it will not be uninteresting to ascertain his views on certain points connected with this great subject.

He is of opinion that the method pursued by our clergymen of almost all sects in instructing the people is altogether wrong. We have seen how he thinks they should act with regard to natural pursuits,—that they should found more than they do upon natural theology, and that, in order to do so with success, they should give lectures on science,—but without any reference to revealed religion. He is of opinion,—and beyond all controversy he is right, when the sentiment is properly qualified,—that the instructions of the pulpit require the instructions of the school. And, moreover, he is of opinion that the prevalent style of preaching, in this country at least, is defective, and comparatively useless.

Thus, he says (p. 26), "In the country parishes" (he has already spoken of the towns, "where a very small proportion of the manual labour class attend public worship"), "In the country parishes, especially in Scotland, a considerable portion of this class *habitually* appear in church." This is, he says, from fear of the minister, who possesses over each individual "a prescriptive pastoral influence," and because each is a slave to "the fear of the

folk. But"—of course—"the church-going of a person so influenced is his whole religion ; it has a set-day, and is then suspended till that day-week. Of natural religion, as inferred from the glorious manifestations of God in physical and moral creation, he has not an idea ; some religious teachers even forbid him this ground ; and his Christianity is a set of abstract notions, without the semblance of practical direction." He is governed by "unqualified selfishness;" but there are exceptions. "But that I have rightly described the character of the religion of a large portion of his parishioners, will not only not be denied by any parish minister, but is bewailed by him every day of his life." Yet, religious instruction is better provided for than any other of our wants ; still, wherever the error may lie, it is far from him to impute blame to the excellent clergymen, who "have no power over an erroneous system and one not of their own creating. But the application of their part of the process is premature. It is as if the metallurgist were to attempt to melt the gold before it is worked out of the vein. Education is the only excavating process ; preaching, in its utmost conceivable perfection, is a defective engine for the purpose ; purely doctrinal preaching is utterly impotent."

We shall see presently what his opinion is of the education given in our parochial schools. In the rural districts of Scotland, to which the passage above quoted refers, there undoubtedly is education "the only excavating process ;" not certainly of the kind which Mr Simpson would recommend,—not such in some places as it should and will doubtless be,—but still education. That there is too little of the influence of religion in the rural districts of Scotland, as well as every where else, it is melancholy to be obliged to allow. We have to lament the little influence which it has over ourselves, and are constrained to admit that it weighs too little with all. And I can easily conceive the parish minister bewailing this every

day of his life, and praying that he may be the honoured instrument in the hand of God to effect a change. But there are two ways in which to view a man's moral condition,—as in the eyes of God, and as in the eyes of man. If Mr Simpson means this passage to apply to the moral character of the rural districts of Scotland in the eyes of God, I admit it all, and would extend it to the whole race, qualifying a few of the “unqualifieds.” But if he means, as there is no doubt he does, thus to stigmatize with “exceptions” the great bulk of our rural population as in the eyes of men, I deny it altogether. The fact is the other way. “With exceptions,” the mass of rural Scotland is a moral people. It is true that the minister has over each individual a pastoral influence. What it is founded on is not prescription, but that from which the alleged prescription would arise—the influence of religion, and a reverence for his minister. “The fear of the folk” is a singular reason. If all are so led, “with exceptions,” and a loss of character is dreaded, “with which irregular performance of ostensible religious duties is followed,” can we conceive any thing more indicative of a general feeling of respect to Christianity? The thing appears preposterous, that all should be led by the fear of all. A few might be led by this fear, or even all might for a while, not knowing the sentiments of their neighbours, be so led; but that they should continue for centuries to disguise their sentiments from each other, and still fear each other, in a matter where all held common sentiments, is morally impossible. If this were true, the minister would find, some fine Sabbath morning, an empty church, fear having left the folk. “The fear of the folk,” and the loss of character necessarily involved in forsaking God's worship, prove universal respect to ostensible religious duties. It is, at the same time, surely not very consistent with fairness first to assume this as the motive,—and, founding on this assumption, to rear a fabric of details. The man who has no other motive in his religious duties but the influence of the minister and the fear of the folk, is doubtless all that Mr Simpson has said,—

with qualifications,—and even many more who go under other influences. But let us not despair. This “fear of the folk” is a good sign, and will lead him to hear the Word of God, the appointed means for freeing from the fear of man that leadeth into a snare, and of bestowing that glorious freedom, blood bought, with which Christ has made his people free.” “Of natural religion, as inferred from the glorious manifestations of God in physical and moral creation, he has not an idea; some religious teachers even forbid him this ground”! There breathes not the man,—with a small allowance for exceptions, in case of error,—who has not such an idea, both from physical and moral creation. He may not have the precise ideas which Mr Simpson wishes him to have. But let us hear what James Hogg says to this,—a competent witness surely of the feelings and knowledge of the shepherd class of the peasantry. “The daily feeling naturally impressed on the shepherd’s mind, that all his comforts are so entirely in the hand of Him that rules the elements, contributes not a little to that firm spirit of devotion for which the Scottish shepherd is so distinguished. I know of no scene so impressive as that of a family sequestered in a lone glen during the time of a winter storm; and where is the glen in the kingdom that wants such a habitation? There they are left to the protection of Heaven, and they know and feel it. Throughout all the wild vicissitudes of nature they have no hope of assistance from man, but are conversant with the Almighty alone. Before retiring to rest, the shepherd uniformly goes out to examine the state of the weather, and makes his report to the little dependant group within; nothing is to be seen but the conflict of the elements, nor heard but the roaring of the storm; then they all kneel around him, while he recommends them to the protection of Heaven; and though their little hymn of praise can scarcely be heard even by themselves, as it mixes with the voice of the tempest, they never fail to rise from their devotions with their spirits cheered and

their confidence renewed, and go to sleep with an exaltation of mind of which kings and conquerors bear no share. Often have I been a sharer in such scenes ; and never, even in my youngest years, without having my heart deeply impressed by the circumstances. There is a sublimity in the very idea. There we lived, as it were, inmates of the cloud and the storm ; but we stood in a relationship to the Ruler of them, that neither time nor eternity could ever cancel. Wo to him that would weaken the bonds with which true Christianity connects us with Heaven and with each other." (ii. 127.)

You do not believe James Hogg. Well, walk behind that hedge on a summer evening, when the sun has just set, and the quiet influences of the departure of day are enhanced by the solemn feelings and hushed repose of a Sabbath's stillness,—as you turn the rounded corner of the hawthorn fence, there is a cottage, at whose door you last night saw the little ones sporting, till they were called in to be washed all over, as a preparation for the approaching day. Hush ! A rude strong voice begins to sing. Can you catch the words ? The window is open, for the night is sultry ; difficult as it is to hear distinctly what is sung, yet from your knowledge of the psalms, and the distinct utterance of the as yet single voice, you may make it out. Hark ! they all join. The words are these :—

When I look up into the heavens,
Which thine own fingers framed,
Unto the moon and to the stars,
Which were by thee ordained ;

Then say I, What is man that he
Remembered is by thee ;
Or what the son of man, that thou
So kind to him should'st be ?

The psalm is finished. The same voice begins to read. We may approach more closely. Ah ! a well-known

passage, full of light and love, greets my ear. "Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature? And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: And yet I say unto you, that even Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" Hush! let us with reverence bare our heads in heaven's sight, and join in the offered prayer. Though they would not refuse us this companionship, yet our known presence might embarrass the rural worshippers. We have seldom joined in a prayer of more fervency to Him who made the starry frame, and clothed with more than Solomon's glory the lily of the field. A blessing rest on thy humble cottages, even a double blessing from on high, beloved land of our Christian sires!

We have seen how the parish ministers bewail, and must ever bewail, as in the sight of God, the character of the religion of all their parishioners. But as Mr Simpson has appealed to them, let us take up the Statistical Account. Surely he knew that he was asserting new things of rural Scotland. But we have seen in the account that he has given of Dr Duff's address, how apt he is to mistake the opinions of others, most clearly expressed. We need not wonder that he has altogether mistaken the opinions of the clergy here.

I have already given specimens of this Account; and making allowances for the kindly feeling which a clergyman ought to have towards his people, I will venture to say, that any thing more contrary to the general run of the statements made by the parish ministers, than Mr Simpson's description of the people of Scotland, cannot be

conceived. Take Mr Simpson's account, which was published in 1836, and contrast it with the description of the people of Traquair, which was selected by Mr Hill, in his work published also in 1836, as the worst he could find. Mark the evident candour with which it is written, and the total want of concealment. I have already quoted the whole passage, but compare the following:—

Simpson.—"Unqualified selfishness resumes its reign in the heart, if ever it was suspended, and an influence, the antipodes of Christianity, continues to impel his thoughts, words, and actions."

Statistical Account.—"The expensive articles of tea, coffee, and sugar, they can neither easily want nor easily procure. They become, therefore, liable to feelings of discontent, which have, it may be feared, injured the cause of true and vital godliness, and of brotherly kindness and charity in the hearts of many; for while justice demands the admission, that our people are generally intelligent, generous, and respectable in their station, it is doubtful if we can aver that they are equally religious."

It is odd that in this *worst* parish the very opposite is to be found of what Mr Simpson complains of. He reprobates a slavish attention to religious observance, and unqualified selfishness,—the minister speaks doubtingly of too little of the former,—at least so I infer, while he lauds their generosity.

It would at the same time be unfair to leave the character of the rural people of our land under even this impression. Read this of Stobo in Peeblesshire.

"*Character of the People.*—My residence among them has been for upwards of sixty years. I have known in the parish many respectable, benevolent, and kind-hearted parishioners. They are gone, and I have mourned their loss. Yet they have left behind them successors to whose integrity of life and manners I am happy to have the opportunity to bear testimony. There is, in one word, perhaps no parish where the moral character and conduct of

the people are in all respects more uniformly unexceptionable."

With this I leave the character of the peasantry of Scotland.

Mr Simpson deprecates the idea of blaming "the excellent men who are labouring to excavate the people." After attentive and careful consideration of what Mr Simpson has written, I cannot blame him for mistaking the meaning of other people, for he seems to me to be constantly mistaking his own. Of this we have already had some specimens, and we shall have a few more before a glance is given to his general system. He has no thoughts, it seems, of imputing blame to them. Yet he blames them throughout. The excuse for them is, that "they have no power over an erroneous system, and one not of their own creating." He alludes to education as the only excavating process,—and this is on an erroneous system, one not of their own creating. But he surely knows that the established clergy of Scotland did create, and have practically complete power over, this erroneous system. Perhaps, after all, he does not know. He was asked before the Committee, in reference to delinquent schoolmasters, (2767)—"What is the course of proceeding in similar cases in Scotland?" The Committee might well have expected a correct answer to this question from one who professed to be acquainted with systems of education, who was giving his opinion as to how such matters should be treated, and who, moreover, belonged to the profession of the law. But if he had been unable to answer from knowledge, why not say so? "I cannot answer that question," would surely have been the fitting course. How does he answer it? My readers are already aware, that by the act 1803, the delinquent is tried before the *presbytery alone*, whose sentence is final. Mark Mr Simpson's answer: "The course of proceeding in similar cases in Scotland? The course of proceeding there is by arraignment, first before the kirk-session, with an appeal to the Presby-

tery, and the ordinary continuation of appeal to the Synod and General Assembly. The case goes through the whole church courts, if the loser at each stage chooses." (2769) : "Are you aware of any inconveniences arising from the multiplicity of appeal to which the schoolmaster is entitled, if not satisfied with the first adjudication?—Great delay is the chief inconvenience."* I happen to know that at this moment the parochial schoolmasters of Scotland are exerting themselves to get restored this "chief inconvenience," from which they were kindly relieved in 1803.

We now see how far we can trust Mr Simpson in respect to his knowledge of the educational system of his own country, in a point of great importance, and on which, without hesitation, he delivers his opinion. Great delay is the chief inconvenience !

Let me instruct such of my readers as believe with Mr Simpson that the clergy of Scotland neither created nor have power over the system of education. In another place (p. 190), Mr Simpson says, "In England, and in Scotland too, every school is under clerical superintendence, and four out of five teachers are in some degree or other in clerical orders. There was another reason for this besides a concern for the interests of religion, when the custom began. The clergy were the only educated persons, hence their name, and the only persons capable of educating others. Laymen were educated by the monks, who kept daily school in the convents. There is a habit of thinking hence arising, centuries old, that it is quite natural that the clergy should educate the young." There are two reasons here given for the rise of the connexion between secular and religious instruction,—regard to the interests of religion, and the necessity of the case. My readers must have already drawn for themselves a third. The church, at least in Scotland, created the system of education, and on their ability to do so we may decide from the following words of Dr M'Crie, one of the most

* I find this extraordinary blunder quoted and animadverted on in the Presbyterian Review for August 1837.

competent judges in this or any other country, who, when treating of another plan of theirs, says (Melville, vol. ii. p. 361), "It would be affronting the learned reader to enter into a statement of the superiority of this plan of education to that which it was intended to supersede. It was the most liberal and enlightened plan of study which had yet been established, as far as I know, in any European university." In every period of her history, the church has exercised a control, alike in enforcing the laws for the establishment of schools, and in improving them. "Notwithstanding all the diligence employed by the church, such was the tardiness in this cause of other parties, that so far down as the beginning of the present century, not a few parishes remained unprovided; and even where school-houses were erected, there was often, and to a late period, the greatest difficulty in securing the salaries. About the year 1720, for example, several attempts were made by the Presbytery of Aberdeen to obtain the legal salaries for the parochial schoolmasters; but so late as 1780, five or six of the schools within its bounds were still unsupplied; and on almost every occasion it appears that the heritors refused to assess themselves conformably to law, and that the school salaries were from time to time obtained by the appeal of the Presbytery to the Commissioners of Supply."* "About the year 1794, there was no parochial school in the parish of St Mungo, nor any salary appointed for the support of a teacher. 'Proper measures,' says the minister, 'are now taking to remedy this shameful defect.' A parochial school was even later than this reported to be 'unaccountably wanting in the parish of Glasserton.'"† "It is a mistake," says Dr M'Crie, "to suppose that the parochial schools of Scotland owed their origin to these enactments. The parliamentary statute has, indeed, been eventually of great benefit. But it would have remained a dead

* From a truly valuable Report on "The System of National Education in Scotland," made to the Synod of Aberdeen by the Reverend A. L. Gordon of Greyfriars Parish, Aberdeen, p. 17. † Ibid. p. 51.

letter but for the exertions of the Church courts ; and owing to the vague nature of its provisions, it continued long to be evaded by those who were insensible to the benefits of education, or who grudged the smallest expense for the sake of promoting it." (M'Crie's Melville, vol. ii. p. 409.) We have constant proofs of the anxiety with which the Church has watched over every part of the machinery. Thus we find an act of Assembly 1706, " recommending to such as have power of settling schoolmasters in parishes, to prefer thereto men who have passed their courses at colleges and universities, and taken their degree, before others who have not, *cæteris paribus*." " At this moment," says a clergyman* who doubtless would be surprised at the announcement of his having no power in the matter, " there are many parochial schools where the branches taught are such as the most enthusiastic friend of *liberal* education could desire." And to show the mode in which this may be carried into effect, here is a recommendation made to the Presbytery of Aberdeen :—" As to the parochial and other week-day schools, the Committee recommend that the attention of the schoolmaster be directed with a view to its adoption, to any real and practical improvement effected in the education of the young, and that he be required to pay special regard to their religious instruction. By which term, the Committee understand not merely the repetition of certain answers to certain queries, the connexion and import of which they may not understand ; but an actual comprehension, so far as their years and circumstances will admit, of the events, doctrines, and duties of the Bible."—(Gordon, p. 57.) When we add to this active superintendence of the presbyteries, the power of examining the annual reports furnished to the General Assembly by each presbytery, as to the state of education, in quantity and quality, within their bounds, we are amazed to find a Scottish Educationist speaking of

* Reverend A. L. Gordon.

education, as that over which the clergy have no power, and which is not of their creating.

But he, moreover, blames the clergymen in their management of that part of the system over which they have admittedly and necessarily control. We have already seen that he blames "some zealous but mistaken religious teachers" for not bringing an enlightened natural theology in aid of revealed religion; and we have seen that in treating of the large portion of the rural population of Scotland, he asserts that they have not an idea of natural religion as inferred from God's physical and moral creation. Surely this is to blame these excellent men. If it is their duty, and they do not discharge it, why not blame them? "The base of our belief, on the other hand, is immeasurably strengthened, as well as widened, by discovering the *double* foundation on which rests our duty to God and our neighbour; and I would strongly recommend to our religious guides to ponder well this truth, and by availing themselves of it in their discourses, to try whether they may not recover their popularity, and with it that usefulness, of which their exclusion of the glorious volume of God's works, and adherence to merely doctrinal abstractions, have so unfortunately deprived them," (p. 143). And in a note he says, "In my lectures to the working classes of Edinburgh above referred to, I had the satisfaction, as I am informed, of making a strong impression upon my hearers, by expounding this view. I observed first the moral command written by the finger of God on the heart of man, and written there long before he vouchsafed the revelation of his word. I pointed then to the text of Holy Writ where the very same precept was repeated; and so powerful was this appeal, that some of my hearers, as I have since heard, who previously had rejected the Scriptures, which had been forced upon their almost undivided attention, had returned to the perusal of them with an interest they had never felt before." Were we to complain of this last, well entitled would Mr Simpson

be to exclaim, in the language of Cromwell to the governor of Edinburgh castle,—“Are you troubled that Christ is preached?” Assuredly not. We sincerely hope that the effect of all Mr Simpson’s lectures may be to send the working classes to their Bibles. But there can be now no doubt that even in their own system he does blame the “excellent men.”

I should doubt very much the success of Mr Simpson’s remedy, and he must have propounded it in an utter ignorance,—which is quite conceivable, considering former specimens,—or an utter forgetfulness of facts. It may be very stupid in the people, but the fact is so, that they who preach the doctrinal abstractions, as Mr Simpson calls them, are uniformly the most popular. It is notorious, that what is called a moral preacher, be his other merits what they may, is sure to empty a church. If popularity, under the specious guise of usefulness, is to be hunted after, Mr Simpson has set his excellent friends upon a wrong scent.

Mr Simpson surely writes too strongly, when he writes of education as the only excavating process. Every man who wishes well to his country must wish both the improvement and the extension of education. But if the Scriptures and history are true, we read there that the excavation of the people from the mass of heathenism in which they were embedded, was not the result of education, but of preaching. Why under-rate the one, in order to raise the other? Education is not the only excavating process. It may loosen the mass,—but it is the Word of God in the hands of his ministers which God himself has appointed as the instrument for finally excavating it. Yet our author terms education the only excavating process,—stigmatizes preaching as contradistinguished from it, in its most conceivable perfection, a defective engine for that purpose. Now, if Mr Simpson included preaching in education, we might understand his supporting both. But as our great object is to christianize the people,

and education alone does this,—and education does not include preaching, for it is contrasted with preaching, there is no conclusion to which we can come, than just to shut our churches, and turn them into schools on the liberal system. It is absurd to keep up an engine which is defective in its utmost conceivable perfection, when we have the only excavating process in our own hands. Perhaps, moreover, when Mr Simpson learns that the General Assembly have in their own power the erroneous system, and one of their own creating, he may get the system changed, and an act passed by that venerable body to forbid the reading of the Bible in schools, enjoining teachers not to venture any opinion, religious or anti-religious,—and sending the children for their religious instruction to their own pastor,—as the teacher might be “a Dissenter, or Roman Catholic, or even an Infidel.”

What “purely doctrinal preaching,”—“mere abstract doctrines,”—“merely doctrinal abstractions,” Mr Simpson may refer to, I do not know. There are certainly points connected with the Trinity and with predestination, which are merely abstract. In a note (p. 27), Mr Simpson speaks of sects that “rank doctrine so far above Christian morality, as nearly to shut out the latter from the pulpit,” and it is evident, from a passage above quoted, that he ranks among them “our spiritual guides.” Now, in this country, the two doctrines above mentioned, in their speculative points, do not much—if at all—occupy the attention of any of our preachers in the pulpit. The warning, then, cannot be meant as applying to these doctrines; and, if it were at them Mr Simpson pointed his strong condemnation of utter impotency, most men would agree with him. We need not wonder that Mr Simpson has the characteristic, which I have already said is common to all the non-religionists, that, while they do not reject doctrine, they rely more on precept. Thus he is asked, (3178) “Would you wish that religious education should repose not so much upon precept as upon doctrine?—Upon both.

(3179.) *Which has the most influence upon conduct?—The precept certainly; yet we miss the precepts of Christianity in the various creeds.*” He has given us, in detached passages, a notion of preaching *in its utmost conceivable perfection*—it is the preaching of revealed religion, with the aid of an enlightened natural theology, and such moral teaching as sent his pupils of the working classes to their Bibles. He contrasts this last with the preaching by “our guides” of merely doctrinal abstractions, and we know how our religious guides preach. And this is utterly impotent. He has tried another process, and it sent those on whom it operated to their Bibles. Dr Chalmers tried both. Let me transplant into these pages one of the most striking attestations ever borne to the efficacy of gospel teaching.

Dr Chalmers, when leaving the parish of Kilmeny for Glasgow, addressed them on the duty of giving an immediate diligence to the business of his Christian life. In this interesting document there is shown that masterly power of bringing out salient points, and of urging them home with overpowering eloquence, which that great writer displays in all his works. (xii. 108.)—“And here I cannot but record the effect of an actual, though undesigned experiment, which I prosecuted for upwards of twelve years among you. For the greater part of that time, I could expatiate on the meanness of dishonesty, on the villany of falsehood, on the despicable arts of calumny,—in a word, upon all those deformities of character which awaken the natural indignation of the human heart against the pests and the disturbers of human society. Now, could I, upon the strength of these warm expostulations, have got the thief to give up his stealing, and the evil speaker his censoriousness, and the liar his deviations from truth, I should have felt all the repose of one who had gotten his ultimate object. It never occurred to me that all this might have been done, and yet every soul of every hearer have remained in full alienation from God; and

that even could I have established in the bosom of one who stole, such a principle of abhorrence at the meanness of dishonesty, that he was prevailed upon to steal no more, he might still have retained a heart as completely unturned to God, and as totally unpossessed by a principle of love to him, as before. In a word, though I might have made him a more upright and honourable man, I might have left him as destitute of the essence of religious principle as ever. But the interesting fact is, that during the whole of that period in which I made no attempt against the natural enmity of the mind to God, while I was inattentive to the way in which this enmity is dissolved, even by the free offer on the one hand, and the believing acceptance on the other, of the gospel salvation ; while Christ, through whose blood the sinner, who by nature stands afar off, is brought near to the heavenly lawgiver whom he has offended, was scarcely ever spoken of, or spoken of in such a way as stripped him of all the importance of his character and his offices, even at this time I certainly did press the reformations of honour, and truth, and integrity, among my people ; but I never once heard of any such reformations having been effected amongst them. If there was any thing at all brought about in this way, it was more than ever I got any account of. I am not sensible that all the vehemence with which I urged the virtues and the proprieties of social life, had the weight of a feather on the moral habits of my parishioners. And it was not till I got impressed by the utter alienation of the heart, in all its desires and affections, from God ; it was not till reconciliation to him became the distinct and the prominent object of my ministerial exertions ; it was not till I took the scriptural way of laying the method of reconciliation before them ; it was not till the free offer of forgiveness, through the blood of Christ, was urged upon their acceptance, and the Holy Spirit given through the channel of Christ's mediatorship to all who ask him, was set before them as the unceasing object of their de-

pendence and their prayers ; it was not, in one word, till the contemplations of my people were turned to these great and essential elements in the business of a soul providing for its interest with God, and the concerns of its eternity, that I ever heard of any of those subordinate reformatations which I aforetime made the earnest and the zealous, but I am afraid at the same time, the ultimate, object of my earlier ministrations. Ye servants, whose scrupulous fidelity has now attracted the notice, and drawn forth in my hearing a delightful testimony from your masters, what mischief you would have done, had your zeal for doctrines and sacraments been accompanied by the sloth and the remissness, and what, in the prevailing tone of moral relaxation, is counted the allowable purloining of your earlier days ! But a sense of your heavenly Master's eye has brought another influence to bear upon you ; and while you are thus striving to adorn the doctrine of God your Saviour in all things, you may, poor as you are, reclaim the great ones of the land to the acknowledgment of the faith. You have at least taught me, that to preach Christ is the only effective way of preaching morality in all its branches ; and out of your humble cottages have I gathered a lesson, which I pray God I may be enabled to carry with all its simplicity into a wider theatre, and to bring with all the power of its subduing efficacy upon the vices of a more crowded population."

There can be no such thing as doctrinal preaching, which is *purely* so. Every doctrine, save those above excepted, and to which Mr Simpson could not possibly refer, because such preaching is utterly unknown to "our spiritual guides,"—the fall, the atonement, justification, adoption, sanctification,—all, all announce or involve a lost morality, and the whole doctrines, so far from being mere abstract doctrines, are connected with the great question, How shall man recover the image of his Maker, which he has lost ? "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved !" Purely doctrinal preaching is utterly impotent !

We need now hardly wonder at any thing which Mr Simpson may choose to say as to the parochial system of Scotland. And yet I do wonder. I have endeavoured, in another part of this work, to trace the working of the parochial system on Scotland, and to show its nature. I may be misled, to a certain extent, by feelings of partiality, though I have endeavoured to free myself from them. I am willing to allow that there are imperfections in these schools, and willing, nay anxious, to aid in their removal. My notions of what instruction ought to be are different from Mr Simpson's, though our object is, I trust, the same,—to elevate the character of our countrymen and benefit our species. But, making every allowance for imperfection, and for difference of notions, I cannot help expressing my wonder at the following account of our Scottish schools, in which there is not only no notice of the Bible—no allusion to the scriptural instruction therewith, even in the mere reading connected—but none to the creed and catechism, with which the zealous sects begin, continue, and end, “as their only idea of education on a religious basis.”

P. 28: “But we come to the question, what is the *nature* of the education of the humbler classes which is extending in England, and has been so long established in Scotland? Is it of a kind to impart useful practical knowledge for resource in life,—does it communicate to the pupil any light upon the important subject of his own nature and place in creation,—or the conditions of his physical welfare, and his intellectual and moral happiness; does it, above all, make an attempt to regulate his passions, and train and exercise his moral feelings, to prevent his prejudices, suspicions, envyings, self-conceit, enmity, impracticability, destructiveness, cruelty, and sensuality? Alas! no. It teaches him to READ, WRITE, and CIPHER, and leaves him to pick up all the rest as he may!” Why, if it teaches him these three things, certainly it is of a kind to impart practical useful knowledge in after-life—not

enough certainly, but still a great deal to be thankful for. But a description of the education given in our parish schools, desiderating an attempt to throw light on human nature, man's place in creation, and the conditions of his moral happiness, and not one word of the Bible! Every peasant boy will tell him, from the word of God, that "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the seat of the scornful; but his delight is in the law of the LORD; and in his law doth he meditate day and night. And he shall be like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth his fruit in his season: his leaf also shall not wither; and whatsoever he doeth shall prosper." From his Shorter Catechism, proved by the word of God, he will tell him, that "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him for ever."

"If a national system of education is to stop at reading, and writing, and ciphering, it would save much trouble and after-disappointment not to attempt it at all."—(P. 30.) The value of Mr Simpson's views on this subject may be inferred from this sentence, with which I shall close all reference to his strictures on Scottish Parochial Education, glad to escape from the strong sensations naturally arising from the contrast between the reality and the representation. Let us consider that Mr Simpson has characterized the Parochial Schools of Scotland as teaching nothing more than to read, write, and cipher; that therefore he here indicates these schools and others on their model. And let us reflect on what we owe to them as a nation and as individuals; and let us call forth the spirits of those who, gaining their first lessons in lore under their blessed influence, have won themselves imperishable renown in literature, and science, and art,—and of the thousands upon thousands of our countrymen who have been there trained in the way that they should go, and now rejoice with triumphal palms in their hands before the throne of God; and let us summon Scotland from all her smiling

dells and upland moors,—and let us read aloud, “IF A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION IS TO BE ON THE MODEL OF THE SCOTTISH PAROCHIAL SYSTEM, IT WOULD SAVE MUCH TROUBLE AND AFTER-DISAPPOINTMENT NOT TO ATTEMPT IT AT ALL.”

What are we to make of the following singular instance of the author’s mistaking his own meaning? In treating of infant education, as pursued in the Model Infant School of Edinburgh, he says, (p. 105) “Careful provision is made in the infant system to give early religious *impressions*, in a manner that shall connect religious ideas with every thing in life, and render them a means of happiness, and not, as is too much done—and it is a remnant of popery—a source of tasks and punishments for the present, and terror for the future.” Then follows an account of the religious instruction given, which seems to be excellently imparted by means of lessons from the Bible. In the first edition of Mr Simpson’s work, published in 1834, he has this passage, (p. 259): “What is the practical inference from facts like these? Is it not that the example of Prussia should be followed; and, in order that the schools provided by the nation shall be beneficial to the nation, that all direction of the schools of secular instruction shall be denied to sects as such, dominant and dissenting; and that *all schools shall be constituted on the principle adopted by the Model Infant Schools of Edinburgh and Glasgow*, and by many others, both infant and advanced, all over the country?” The facts alluded to are, that the Catholic children were withdrawn from this very Model Infant School of Glasgow on account of the religious instruction therein given. How it is possible for a man, who wishes all distinctions of sect to be abolished in education, to draw as an inference from the operation of a certain kind of religious instruction, that the very kind should be continued which he quotes as a proof of the evil against which he is arguing, is not very clear. After, however, that edition was published, Mr Simpson detailed

his views in the House of Commons, the management of the infant schools of Glasgow passed into "the hands of the Established Church exclusively," and some change was necessary in the next edition. In it, accordingly, we find the following note appended to the account of the religious instruction given in the Edinburgh Infant Model School:— (P. 107), "With a view to a national system of education, I shall afterwards endeavour to show that the department of revealed religion, in infant as well as advanced education, should not be in the hands of the schoolmaster at all, but in those of the pastor; by whom, however, it ought to be taught in the simple and attractive manner which I have above described." Accordingly, he endeavours to prove this position in the manner in which we have seen him proceed in the last chapter. Well, how does he alter the passage with regard to the "practical inference"? You shall see. It would clearly not do now to quote the Edinburgh nor the Glasgow Infant Model Schools, for the latter are in the hands of the Established Church, and have become "schools of infant theology;" and a description of the religious instruction given in the former occupies most usefully a portion of the book, so that the reader could turn to it and wonder. "What is the practical inference from such facts as these? Is it not that.....all schools should be constituted on the principles adopted by the *Model Infant Schools of Wilderspin*?" (p. 196). This is the substitution. Of course, then, in the Model Schools of Wilderspin, "the department of revealed religion is not in the hands of the schoolmaster at all." Yet I quoted before a passage where it is said, (p. 106) "I have been assured by Mr Wilderspin..... that whenever the children"—in this very school, which is different from Mr Wilderspin's!—"are allowed the choice of the kind of story to be told them, the vote is almost invariably for a Scripture story." Nay, this itself seems to be one of Mr Wilderspin's Model Schools. For in the first report of the Edinburgh Infant School Society, printed in the Appendix to Mr Simpson's own work, we

have (p. 214)—“ Mr WILDERSPIN, though distant, continues to guide the Edinburgh Model Infant School ; and will continue to do so, till its Directors are well convinced indeed that something better than this system can be substituted.” The very first rule for the management of the school is so explicit that I need not go farther. (P. 224) : “ The object of the Edinburgh Infant School Society is, to establish and support in this city a Model School *for the inculcation of Christian truth on the infant mind, according to the mode of instruction laid down in the fourth edition of Mr Wilderspin's work on infant education* ; to establish such other schools of the same kind as their funds may permit ; and to promote the formation of similar schools, both in Edinburgh and elsewhere, by affording every facility and encouragement in their power in favour of the extension of infant education.”

Now, let us read his sentence, stripped of the Wilderspin fallacy. “ What is the practical inference from such facts as these? Is it not that the example of Prussia”—where religious instruction is enforced along with secular—“should be followed,” by giving no such religious instruction ; “ and, in order that the schools to be provided *by* the nation should be beneficial *to* the nation, that all direction of the schools of secular instruction shall be denied to sects as such, dominant and dissenting ; and, that ALL schools shall be constituted on the principle adopted by the Model Infant schools of Wilderspin”—for the inculcation of Christian truth on the infant mind—although the Catholics of Glasgow withdrew their children from one of the schools so modelled by Wilderspin himself, and that before it had become an “ infant school of theology?” Perhaps, were it not for that evidence before the House of Commons, Mr Simpson might be induced to join, notwithstanding of the “ wretched differences ” of religion.

Yes ; Mr Simpson, after all, cannot, benevolent as he is, shake off the feelings of “ a son of the church ” ; (3141), in spite of theories, he clings to the Scriptures, and, in the

schools of which he is a director, attempts not to realize what he has recommended to the legislature.

We have seen, that in his opinion (p. 196) "The infant schools of Glasgow may be called schools of theology, where the doctrines of *one* sect are authoritatively instilled, to the utter exclusion of freedom of thought in after-life. This is popery in its worst form, which all sects ought to denounce." And, in his evidence, he speaks in still stronger terms. He there speaks (2971) of some in Edinburgh, "where is given a very paramount and preponderating importance to Bible instruction, at a period of life when it is entirely lost." He also speaks (3145), in general, of "schools with well-meaning, but imperfectly educated directors, where the Bible is the schoolbook, the only schoolbook." He then gives a description of the method pursued in these schools, and ends thus:—"There is so great a zeal and anxiety on the part of the religious to inculcate religion, that they think they never can overdo it, and therefore the infant brain is overworked by an excess of religious instruction, and runs the risk of being injured by that which ought to be made, if properly inculcated, a source of pleasure, being made a source of unsuitable intellectual labour." To what schools Mr Simpson alludes, which have a tendency to produce this fearful effect, as he does not mention, it would be unfair to conjecture. But, as he has elsewhere selected two Edinburgh Infant Schools, and the whole of those in Glasgow, if he has any fears that they should so operate, his mind may be at ease. Many improvements have been made upon the mode of imparting religious instruction to the young, and especially in Glasgow. But none of these schools act upon any other general principle than that pursued in the Edinburgh Infant Model School. Mr Simpson objects (3145) to the selection of a large Bible, and the placing of it on a stand in the middle of the school, as "impressing, or at least leaving the impression to take effect on the minds of the young, that the

Bible is the only book in the world, and addressing to it something almost of an idolatrous respect." This is an extraordinary fear on the part of Mr Simpson. The Bible *is* so placed in the infant schools above referred to; but I hardly think that any child is of opinion that there is no other book in the world, although it is to be hoped that all the children think that there is no other book in the world so entitled to their respect. It certainly is not the intention of the conductors of such schools as Mr Simpson elsewhere specifies, and where the Bible is so placed as he describes. (Stow, of Glasgow, p. 162) "Imagine with what relish and interest the infant scholar, of six years of age, in a school for juvenile training, would embark in *acquiring the knowledge of reading* (to him then almost intuitive), *that he might read for himself about those natural productions*, and important moral and religious duties, to which his attention has been so frequently turned, and to the practice of which, probably for fully three years, he has been so happily trained." There can be no schoolbook, for in the infant schools the children are not taught to read. (Stow's Moral Training, p. 161): "Granny. Ay, you learn the bairns to read, I see, as I go along. Master. No, madam, *we do not profess to teach the children to read*, nor does it form any *necessary* part of our system." As to the over-inculcation of religion (Stow, p. 107): "It is true we amuse the little ones, for what child will learn much, or attend to any instruction, without amusement; frequent exercise and activity, you know, add to the children's health; and I believe you will grant, that the promotion of cheerfulness and health is perfectly consistent with the Scripture precept, 'Train up a child in the way he should go.'"

In speaking of such schools as have "well-meaning but imperfectly educated directors," Mr Simpson says, "In those schools every lesson, however secular, arises out of and comes back to the Bible; for example, if the lesson should . . . peradventure turn to the goat, the descrip-

tion of the day of judgment, with the goats upon the left, and the sheep upon the right, is first found out and read. This leads to the hurtful error (for I hold that by the arrangements of the Creator no error is harmless), that the Bible is given to teach all knowledge, scientific included, and that nothing can be true that is not found there." I shall subjoin a specimen of an examination upon the goat, as actually pursued in these schools, that we may see the truth of the charge, agreeing perfectly with Mr Simpson, that the maxim stigmatized by him, "that the Bible is given to teach *all* knowledge," is an error, and that no error is harmless.

It must at the same time surely be allowed, that as the children are not formally taught to read, the Bible is just as good a book as any other—strange that we should have to make this defence!—from which to draw materials for illustrating the instructions given, not to the exclusion of any other book, for no book at all is read by the pupils. "The question always is, what does the Bible say upon this point?" In Mr Simpson's unknown schools this may be done—of course is done, otherwise he would not have said it. But not in the schools referred to by him elsewhere. Now for one specimen, where two infant boys examine each other alternately. (Stow, p. 197): "*Donald*. Of what size is the goat, *John*? *John*. About the size of a sheep. What sort of horns has it? *Donald*. Long upright horns. Are the horns of any use, *John*? *John*. Yes, to make handles for knives, spoons, and other things, and combs for combing our hair. Is the goat a quiet beast? *Donald*. Only sometimes. Has the goat hair or wool on its back? *John*. Hair, long shaggy hair. Where do the goats live? *Donald*. There's plenty of them in the Highlands, and in Wales, and in Ireland too. Did you ever see a goat, *Johnny*? *John*. No ;" and so on. Then follows a Bible lesson connected with the goat.

It would be affronting the reader to show how very different all this is from inculcating the error that the Bible is given to teach all knowledge, scientific included,

unless they are taught that the goats in the Highlands, and in Wales, and in Ireland too, and the leather for gloves, and the name for animals with four feet, and the goat's form and look, all taught in this lesson, are subjects on which the Bible is said to give them instruction. It is now quite evident that the question in such schools is not *always* "What does the Bible say upon this point?" So much for the infant schools. It is of course unnecessary to go into detail as to the books used in the Juvenile Normal Schools of Glasgow, for I am not discussing secular instruction at all. It may, however, surprise Mr Simpson to learn, that in the juvenile model schools, in addition to the Bible training, are lessons on objects; geography; English grammar; root, construction, and meaning of words; and practical music, the books used being (Stow, p. 246) "those of Mr Campbell of Dundee; Alphabet Analyzed; Economic Instructor I. II. III.; Junior and Senior Collection." Nor do I know of any parish school in all broad Scotland where the Bible is the schoolbook, and the only schoolbook.

It has been already stated, that it may be a question when doctrinal instruction should begin to be imparted to a child. At whatever time that is proper, it is all one in respect of the element of time, whether the duty be assigned to the teacher, the parent, or the pastor. In schools where attendance is quite optional, and hence it is not to be supposed that parents would intrust their children to receive religious instruction, unless they approved of it, no one can object to the teacher's giving religious instruction to the young in the very same doctrines which the parent and pastor would inculcate. Whatever instruction might be trusted to them, may be trusted to him; and whatever is refused to them, may be refused to him. Now, the teachers of infant schools in Glasgow, "in the hands of the Established Church exclusively," which are precisely in this predicament, are accused on this account of (p. 196) "Popery in its worst form, which all sects ought

to denounce," because they authoritatively instil "the doctrines of one sect to the utter exclusion of freedom of thought in after-life." But teachers cannot be thus guilty alone. Whenever the father begins authoritatively to instil the doctrines of his own sect—those doctrines which, he believes, are able to make his son wise unto salvation—he is guilty of Popery of the worst kind. It cannot be said that this does not apply to the father, but only to the teacher, for the reason is given, and is equally applicable to both. It is, that it operates "to the utter exclusion of freedom of thought in after-life." Nor can it be said that it is only referable to the teachers of infant schools; for the same cause ought to operate until the formed reason is able to decide upon articles of faith. Follow this up to its consequences—and you will give doctrinal religious instruction neither to infants nor to boys—and they are to grow, untaught the blessed doctrine of the atonement, until they are fit to enjoy the freedom of after-life. Follow it up, and you not only have no religious education at school, but no religious education at all in youth; for there is, according to Mr Simpson, as we shall see immediately, a natural morality without religion, quite as good as that of religion, and the doctrines of one sect ought not to be authoritatively instilled, since that leads to the utter exclusion of freedom of thought in after-life—and is Popery in its worst form, which all sects ought to denounce. Ye fathers of Scotland, whose anxious care has been to teach your children, as soon as you thought them capable of understanding you, the doctrines of your sect,—that they were sinners by nature; that their Saviour died that they might live,—grateful to the new system that it is expressly said of you, in connexion with the minister's teaching the Bible, that you are not excluded—"not excluding their parents at home," (p. 140)—know that ye have been perpetrating Popery in its worst form, and, warned in time, renounce creed and catechism, lest you should fetter your children's right of freedom of thought in after-life—should they ever reach it.

Yet, somehow, this cannot be the author's meaning always. For, in a passage before quoted, when speaking of the youngest child from the infant school resorting to the pastor, he says, that from him as from a kind parent he will "hear the message of salvation, the tidings of peace on earth and good will to men." That the pastor can manage to do this without teaching the doctrine of his sect, *unless he is expressly prohibited*, neither Mr Simpson nor I believe. Thus Mr Simpson, speaking of the teacher, in his evidence, says (3166.), "There would always be a risk of the teacher, if he were a sincere sectarian, giving his own particular religious views, and directing the character of the instructions into a sectarian channel." This must be true also of the minister, who is, of course, a sincere sectarian, and who, moreover, has probably lost his popularity by adhering to "mere doctrinal abstractions." It is true, that Mr Simpson (p. 107) recommends him to teach religion in the simple and attractive manner described in his account of the Edinburgh Normal Infant School. But I doubt that, from the experience which we have had of the schools in the hands of the Established Church exclusively, they will not take his advice, but be guided by what has been done in those Popish schools of Glasgow.

It is curious to notice how Mr Simpson alternately belabours with blows, and loads with caresses, the clergy. Sometimes they are excellent men whom he is far from blaming,—sometimes they practise Popery in its worst form,—sometimes they cause creed and catechism to be so taught that both become objects of satiety and disgust,—sometimes they are to be listened to as kind parents,—sometimes they have no power over an erroneous system of education,—and sometimes in England and Scotland, too, every school is under clerical superintendence, and four out of five teachers are in some degree or other in clerical orders,—sometimes they impiously exclude the God of nature,—sometimes they are trustworthy and trusted pastors.

"Who would not laugh if such a man there be,
Who but would weep if Atticus were he?"

But, says Mr Simpson, when treating of the Glasgow schools and their religious instruction before alluded to, "We hold this to be a complete perversion of the very purpose of infant schools." (p. 196.) We have seen that he holds by Wilderspin. Well, in Wilderspin's "Early Discipline Illustrated" (second edition, p. 132), I find these words by Mr Wilderspin: "The character of the system is *well described* in the following extracts from one of the Glasgow reports;" then follows the report of which the following is an extract (p. 136): "*The condition of the heart by nature, and the means of recovery by grace, and the providential government exercised by the Almighty, are all explained; devotional feelings are cherished by religious exercises—by singing hymns and psalms, by prayer, and reading or hearing portions of the Word of God. And, above all, the committee conceive that it is essential to success, that there should be before the children an embodying, as it were, of the spirit of the Gospel in the kindly and devout deportment of a teacher, living and acting under the influence of evangelical truth.*" It is true that since that time the schools have come more under the superintendence of the established clergy, but there can be no doubt that they at present do not teach more doctrine than is set down here,—and this, which is called by Mr Wilderspin a good description of his system, is stigmatized by Mr Simpson, who stands upon Wilderspin's system, as a complete perversion of the very purpose of infant schools. "Evangelical truth!" No; a dissenter, a catholic, or an infidel.

These liberal educationists possess the very quintessence of liberality. We have seen that they do not exclude even a child's parents from having the Holy Scriptures in their hands, with which to educate them. And here we have another specimen—which must contrast strongly with the conduct of others of the dominant sect. Thus, Mr Simpson says (p. 196), "Were he," the author, "to enter a child of his own at the infant or advanced school,

under the proposed national plan, he would do so without demanding or expecting any deference to his own dogmas, more than was shown, or he should wish to be shown, to those of any other sectarian who placed his child there."

It would be very unfeeling in Mr Simpson or any man to ask a deference to be paid to his dogmas by the schoolmaster on the proposed plan,—for does Mr Simpson not remember, that if the schoolmaster were to comply with such a request, he would be instantly dismissed?

The architect builds, according to the most approved liberal principles, a schoolhouse, on the model of nature, from which, designedly, he takes all precautions to exclude the rays of the glorious sun, and, smiling at his own handiwork, he leads his child to the door, nor murmurs at the prospect of his boy spending the day in the dimness and uncertainty of the dubious light within. Unparalleled liberality!

CHAPTER XVI.

Mr Simpson's seventh Objection to the Question of Secular and Religious Instruction—No Knowledge of Revealed Morality required of the Teacher—"It is unnecessary to teach Revealed Morality in Schools"—"It is injurious"—Inconsistencies of Mr Simpson's Statements—Various Uses of the word Morality in the same Passage—Examination of Arguments—He contradicts Mr Combe and himself—Advances Sectarian Views—Effect of his System, on his own showing, not to teach Scripture Morality at all—Absurdity of some Deductions from his Reasoning—Uses and Limits of Natural Morality—Errors and Tendency of the proposed System—Religion and Morality both founded in Love to God—Hence only one Foundation of Obligation—How Revelation acts upon Morality—Example of the Sabbath—Impossible to separate them, if Revelation be taught.

LET us now consider our author's seventh objection to teaching revealed along with secular knowledge, extraneous of sectarianism.

The nature of his preceding objections we have already examined, showing, that while it is to be admitted that, as the Bible was not meant to reveal a knowledge of nature, and we are therefore not to seek such knowledge there, his arguments are inadmissible, and lead to dangerous conclusions. But the Bible was intended to reveal a knowledge of man's moral condition, of his duties, his obligations to duty, and the sanctions by which their performance is enforced. We might therefore expect that there would not be the same objection to the teaching of morals from the Bible in schools. But in our expectation we should be disappointed. For, Mr Simpson actually endeavours to prove that the Scriptures are not necessary to teach morality, either in the way of instructing the teacher or the scholar.

This may seem very extraordinary, but it is true. As to the first proposition respecting the teacher, it is easily proved. It will be recollected that Mr Simpson, in an-

swer to a question, whether a dissenter, catholic, or even an infidel could be appointed as a teacher under his system, replied, that as the department of revealed religion must be committed to more competent hands, "the religious opinions of the secular teacher cannot in either way affect his pupils." It is true, that he had previously answered that "certificates of their moral character and conduct should be required." But this does not alter the fact, that one openly disavowing belief in the Bible as a revelation from God, and therefore disowning its morality as authoritative, perhaps ignorant of it, might have the charge of the morals of youth.

Some strong reason must have driven our author to this untenable position. His system required that there should be no religious instruction. But if without religious instruction there could be no morality taught, religious instruction was evidently indispensable, for the teaching of morality was indispensable: Hence, the necessity of separating religion from morality. But if this was done, there seemed no reason to demand from the teacher of morality a profession of religion, or any knowledge of it. Hence, David Hume or Thomas Paine, with proper certificates, would be perfectly qualified to teach the young so as to prepare the soil for the sowing of the seed of God's word.

I need not dwell on this, but proceed to consider his arguments for depriving the proposed national system of the morality of the Bible. These are twofold. 1. It is unnecessary to teach scripture morality in schools. 2. It is injurious.

1. It is unnecessary to teach scripture morality in schools, for the morality of revealed religion is not "the sole foundation of morality" (p. 141), and the morality of scripture is identical with the morality of nature, which is "the morality previously existing in the right course of the nature of things" (p. 142). 2. It is injurious, for otherwise "you are confounding the two sources of mo-

ality" (3152.), "it is unphilosophical to blend them, and confound in the young mind the difference of their source and evidence" (3144.), "because it is revealed, it is better separated from secular instruction" (3136.), "and the division of labour would cause natural morality to be better done" (3165).

Before proceeding to examine the arguments by which this extraordinary position is defended, it will be fair to put my readers at rest from their fears as to Mr Simpson's views, and to show them, that either he does not know what he says, or otherwise that he does not say what he means.

2795. He says, "Hence, the religious opinions of the secular teacher cannot in either way affect his pupils."

2893. "Do you think a teacher, who had thought proper to enter the church, should be allowed to continue his functions as teacher in the school?" As the religious opinions of the teacher could not in any way affect his pupils, you would imagine the course to be the same now as in 2795, regarding the dissenter, catholic, or infidel. Yet he answers, "For reasons which I shall state when the committee shall examine me upon religious education, I should say very decidedly, not; that he should not continue his functions as a teacher, if he entered the church, or became in any way a clergyman." Turn to the examination, then, upon religious education, and you have (3165.): "If the secular teacher be also qualified to be a religious teacher, either from being a minister, or by his previous course of study, would you prevent such teacher, who has the secular education of his pupils specifically under his particular charge, from also giving religious instruction?" Well, you expect that because he is a minister, he is "very decidedly not" to be allowed to continue his functions as a teacher. You are again mistaken. "Yes, I should think the division of labour would cause both to be better done." You see that the minister is not to be dismissed.

3144. "I hold it to be unphilosophical to blend them"—secular and religious truth—"and confound in the young mind the difference of their source and evidence," and,

3152. "I hold, that in explaining to the pupils the foundations of morality, it is not only possible, but it is absolutely necessary, otherwise you are confounding the *two* sources of morality." You are in pain, for you think that there is only one source of morality. So does Mr Simpson (3144.): "First, secular and religious truth, though from the same God, are distinct in their sources and evidence."

(P. 142). "The morality of nature, I have already shown, is the right use of the moral faculties and intellect, and under the supremacy of these, the right use of all the faculties,—a use which is pointed out by the very nature of these faculties, and enforced by the evils which follow the abuse of them; an abuse, nevertheless, which man is most prone to commit." You are grieved that Mr Simpson should advocate this natural morality as sufficient. Nay, you know not what lurks under this. He quotes from Mr Combe, as explanatory of his moral system, (p. 85): "In maintaining the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect, I do not consider them sufficient to direct conduct by their own instinctive suggestions. To fit them to discharge this important duty, *they must be illuminated by a knowledge of science and of moral and religious duty.*"

It is painful labour to wade through the inconsistencies of such reasoning, which I can only account for on the love of system, that partly, and yet not wholly, overcomes the force of conviction of the truth. Fortunately for the removal of all danger from the system, it is not only inconsistent with itself in the theory, but in the application. If the teacher can impart a perfect system of ethics, without the aid of religion even in his own mind, there is no need of a pastor at all. And, if there

is need of a pastor to impart a perfect system of ethics, then the teacher needs that which the pastor needs,—the aid of revealed religion. The argument, that it will be better done if religion be separated from secular matters, has been already briefly answered, when animadverting on Mr Wyse's system. One other argument only requires notice.

God, he says, and says truly, is the source of secular and religious truth, by which he means of the morality of the conscience and the morality of the Bible. There are therefore two revelations of God's will, perfectly agreeing with each other. These two revelations should be studied separately, that they may cast light upon each other.

My reader must not imagine that Mr Simpson expresses his argument in such plain language as this. Morality with him sometimes means in the same passage a system of morals—sometimes a correct system in the abstract—sometimes the observance of rules—and sometimes the system that can be drawn up by man's own unaided powers.

The two first he uses in the same sentence (p. 141). "As little is the morality of revealed religion the sole foundation of morality." The first means the system of rules contained in the Bible; the second is a correct system. Now, undoubtedly, the system contained in the Bible is not the *sole* foundation of a correct system in the abstract, for morality in this sense would have existed had man never fallen, and the revelation never been required. But the question is, Is the system revealed in the Bible the sole foundation of a perfect system in *present circumstances*?

It is certain that the morality of the Scripture is not the foundation of morality at all in this sense; but it is equally clear that neither is the morality of nature, as our author calls it: God's will is the immediate foundation in both. What the ultimate foundation is we are not inquiring; but both are identical in this,—that so far as they are true, they are so because they are revelations of God's will.

The third use of the word morality—neither a system of rules, nor a perfect system of rules, but the observance of these rules—occurs in the very next sentence. “The morality of nature is the right use of the moral faculties and the intellect, and, under the supremacy of these, the right use of all the faculties” (p. 142). Here it clearly means the observance of the system which nature teaches—for a system cannot be a use, though observance is. Now, without staying here much longer than merely to point this out, we may remark, that the morality of nature is, and can be nothing more than the system of rules which God has implanted in the heart; and must when perfect coincide with the morality of revelation. But, as we shall see afterwards, it is not perfect, and does not so coincide.

The fourth sense—neither a system of rules, nor a perfect system of rules, nor the observance of a system—but the system that can be drawn up by man’s unaided powers, occurs four sentences below. “It is too apt to be forgotten by religious persons, that morality as well as religion is of God.” Here morality is the morality of nature, and religion is the morality of Scripture. If religious persons forget this, they forget the words of Paul: “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.” There are, doubtless, religious persons who think that the blaze of the morality of the Bible utterly extinguishes the light of nature, but they never deny that both were originally from God. There may be an error in carrying this principle too far, but it is not the error pointed out by our author. They admit that both came from God, but deny that, in present circumstances, we can tell whether we have the light of nature, as from God, in its perfect state or not. Nature,

it must be remembered, is nothing in itself; it is that which God hath made, though it may be perverted by man. And there is an error either in considering it as distinct from God's work, or as uncorrupted by man.

Now, there being two revelations of duty, the one in the soul, and the other in the Bible,—are they both equally to be trusted? Our author evidently thinks that they both may. I am not called to discuss the general question of the best method of teaching moral philosophy. The Bible is silent on a number of questions which interest the moral philosopher; and, in solving them, he can only have recourse to the reasonings of an enlightened intellect. But so soon as the questions begin to affect man as he is, and rules for practice, it is utterly contrary to all true philosophy to neglect, or not to use as our guide, the Bible, whose express object is to throw light on these subjects. The questions being, How came man to be as he is? In what state are his moral powers? What is the practical rule of morals? How is his moral condition to be repaired? it seems the extreme of folly to shut out the sole source of light, which shines with certain lustre, and to grope among the crannies of the human heart, with the rush-light of mere human deductions. Who can doubt the rapture with which the moralists of heathen times would have hailed that better light, resplendent with heavenly wisdom, that has witnessed the almost agony with which they travel from position to position, doubtful of their way, and ever ready to cry for help in their dubious progress?

But in the question before us we have to do solely with practice. So far as I know, Mr Simpson stands alone in the rank of Christian moralists, in advocating, that it would be better that our youth in schools should be trained in morals without the aid of the Bible, positively as respects the young themselves, and possibly as regards their teachers.

That there is not mere speculation in his views is evident

from the following passages (3036.) : " Is it not part of the philosophy upon which your system is founded, that you are to take man with the qualities he possesses, and to work upon those qualities?—No doubt of it." Our youths then are to be trained to morality with a reference to the qualities which they possess. He is a strong advocate not for moral teaching merely, but for moral training. " There is no greater change, nay revolution, in education than will arise out of the nascent want, the incipient demand, which is felt by the more enlightened part of society for moral training, education's paramount object." The instrument of this moral training in schools is not to be the Bible. There is some other instrument of moral training, then, equal to it. Of course there is one identical with it—natural morality. The boys are to be taught in schools natural morality, identical with the morality of the Bible. You may think that it is to be derived from the Bible. Remember the infidel !

It will not do to go to his work for the natural morality. There is there given a detailed account of it. But it will not do to go there, for, as we have seen, it is all spoiled by the admission of religion—which we may give Mr Simpson credit for agreeing to be revealed religion. I have already quoted from another part of his work—but then it will not do, for it does not contain the system, but the result of the teaching of the system—it is the right use of the faculties ! Let us take, then, the account given to the Committee ; and be it remembered that the young are to be taught this system, as well as to be trained on it. " The moral sentiments go out of self, and have relation to and seek the happiness of others. The chief with which the educationist has to do, are benevolence and justice, which act towards men ; and veneration, which, while it gives respect for human worth, is the source of piety towards God, and the foundation of religious feeling, inferring in its very existence the existence of Deity. These three important faculties can scarcely be

too much exercised. Yet even they, if not regulated by the intellect, may be abused—as benevolence in indiscriminate almsgiving, justice in severity, and veneration in sycophancy and superstition.” (2955.)

This is the moral system which our youth are to be taught, and in which they are to be trained in schools, as a substitute for the morality of the Bible !

I surely need not examine it minutely. It is not a system on which a man could train at all. Observe that the moral sentiments may be abused, and require to be controlled. What is to control? The intellect. But the intellect is not intuitively informed. What is to control it? Take the case of a tendency to superstition—an improper and undue exercise of veneration. How is the intellect to be enlightened? Not by nature,—for intellect is in this sense nature. Not by its own light surely, nor its own exertions,—for in that case, as it is struggling onwards, what is not superstition to-day, will be superstition to-morrow ; and different men will doubt and differ as to what superstition is. Besides, when the intellect has made the discovery, it will be called religion. But then if the intellect is to be guided by religion—as we give Mr Simpson credit for his belief—we have revealed religion controlling the intellect, which controls the moral faculties, which control the other faculties.

This is pure Platonism—a revival of the philosophy of men who deplored that they had no other. The mind is controlled by faculties which are apt to go to extremes, and it is in the due balance of these powers that morality is to be found. But what is that balance? Intellect is to tell. But intellect must be enlightened before it can tell. How is it to be enlightened ?

Let us see. Mr Combe says (Constitution of Man, p. 15), in reference to this subject, and in continuation of a passage formerly quoted,—“ The sources of knowledge are observation and reflection—experience—and instruction by books, teachers, and all other means by which the

Creator has provided for the improvement of the human mind. Whenever their dictates, thus combined and enlightened, oppose the solicitations of the propensities, the latter must yield—otherwise, by the constitution of nature, evil will inevitably ensue. This is what I mean by nature being constituted in harmony with the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect.” Among the works will surely be the Bible.

“Phrenology shows that different individuals possess the faculties in very different degrees. I do not mean, therefore, to say, that in each individual, whatever the formation of his organs may be, the dictates of his moral and intellectual powers are rules of conduct not to be disputed. On the contrary, in most individuals, one or several of the moral or intellectual organs are so deficient in size in proportion to the organs of the propensities, that their individual perceptions of duty will be far short of the highest standard. The dictates of the moral and intellectual powers, therefore, which constitute rules of conduct, are the collective dicta of the highest minds illuminated by the greatest knowledge.”

The morality of nature, then, with which Mr Simpson intends to train the young in schools is one which, whatever may be its merits or its defects, admits that to attain certainty a knowledge of religious duty is necessary, and the collective dicta of the highest minds illuminated by the greatest knowledge of religion as well as of science and of morals.

Out of this dilemma Mr Simpson cannot creep. Either he recommends that the training in schools shall be conducted in a manner, on his own showing grossly imperfect, or he gives up the necessity of religion for the illumination of the intellect, in its supremacy over the other faculties, and which is upheld in the “best exposition of his system.”

This is all that I think it necessary to say on the moral system which he recommends. Only, as in the case of natural knowledge examined before, if there are religious

persons who object—*on religious grounds*—to this severment of religion from morality, is not this, on Mr Simpson's own system, a sufficient reason why there should be no such morality taught? We have the more reason to fear this, as Mr Simpson refers to the Constitution of Man as the great text-book of the moral development of his system. Now there are sects that believe in the doctrines of the fall of man, and the corruption of his whole nature,—the necessity of the Holy Spirit to regenerate the moral being,—that disease and misery are the consequences of sin, not merely corrective but punitive,—and in the influence of prayer. They will be startled when they hear that their children are to be trained on a system, whose expounder holds that, if his views be correct, it does not matter what the Bible may be supposed by ignorant people to mean,—these are truth and the necessary consequence of the system which he pursues; and if his views be sound, the Bible must agree with him. Now, the sectarians who believe in these points—and whose prejudices Mr Simpson is bound to consult—will never permit their children to be taught a system of morals which inculcates, that the fall and corruption of human nature are the mere glosses of men ignorant of true philosophy,—that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is a dream of the dark ages,—that disease and misery are easily remediable, and will probably be remedied, as man approaches to perfection, as he is rapidly doing,—and that it is absurd to say that prayer has any influence upon the counsels of Heaven. Suppose that they are wrong in all their notions, still these are the grounds of “wretched religious differences,” and their scruples must be respected, otherwise Mr Simpson treats them as he does religion, when he wishes the minister to teach science without revealed religion, but not revealed religion without science,—when he admits the infidel, but dismisses the preacher. If he does not respect religious prejudices, when brought into contact with his moral philosophy, he must insist on

enforcing conformity in natural morals, even at the expense of religious views, while he attacks all enforcing conformity in religious views, which is to hazard his natural morality.

It may be that Mr Simpson will repudiate Mr Combe's views, or that he may, admitting the insufficiency of his own system, still assert that there is a natural morality, which is independent of religion, although he may concede that, after all, his system of natural morality has somehow or other, unknown to himself, included religious teaching.

It would, at the same time, appear that Mr Simpson does not care much for the teaching of Scripture morality. At least I can draw no other conclusion from the following facts. The children, according to his system, are not to be taught this morality in schools. It is to be expressly excluded, "*because it is revealed.*" (3136.) These same children are handed over for their religious instruction to the pastor. Now, Mr Simpson does not pretend to have any control over them. And the question is, Will they, of their own accord, teach scripture morality? He answers in the negative repeatedly (p. 27). "This is especially true, when the uneducated man's pastor is of a sect that ranks Christian doctrine so far above Christian morality, as nearly to shut the latter out of the pulpit. This has been too much the case with nearly all the Protestant sects; their creeds scarcely allude to the moral precepts of the gospel; some of them seem even to exclude them." (3179.) "Which has the most influence upon the conduct?—The precept certainly; yet we miss the precepts of Christianity in the various creeds." Alas! for poor Christian morality, the door shut in its face by Mr Simpson, and the clergymen of the Protestant sects banging it from them, with their moralless creeds.

But supposing scripture morality taught, it is to be compared with natural morality. "We may *then* advantageously compare them, and use the one as a means of

elucidating our views of the other." (3144.) Well, you ask when is the *then*? You shall see. "Assuming that all sound philosophy and all true religion must harmonize, there is a manifest advantage in cultivating *each by itself*, till its full dimensions, limits, and applications shall be brought clearly to light." (3144.) Sound philosophy includes, of course, natural morality, and the child is not to compare natural morality and revealed till it sees clearly the full dimensions, limits, and applications of each. When that may be, it is impossible to tell. Not in the lifetime, I should think, of most, and certainly not in the instructional period of any. But waving that, and supposing our author to think otherwise, let us see the time when he recommends them to be used. You recollect his recommendation to the pastor, that he is to teach the infant scholars, according to the method pursued in the Edinburgh Model Infant School (p. 105). In these schools "the morality of his" (our Saviour's) "precepts, and the benignity of his example, are easily and beautifully shown to be the very kindness, justice, and truth, which they are taught to exercise in their mutual intercourse. Thus, the natural morality of their every-day conduct, and their habitual love of God, are connected with the morality of Christianity, and associated in their minds as identical with it." *Their habitual love of God!* but we must pass the train of thought which that suggests. "Sound philosophy and true religion" are here "advantageously compared." But they are not advantageously compared till the full dimensions, limits, and applications of each are clearly brought to light. Children attend infant schools from two to six. So that at this age the full dimensions, limits, and applications of revealed and natural morality, are brought fully to light! Mr Simpson must have been anticipating the time, when the perfection of Mr Combe is perfected.

We have however in this passage, from the description of the infant schools, a description of what is done, and

of what the pastor is to do. If the pastor can do it, why should the teacher not? *Because it is revealed!* Even supposing the system of natural morality to be perfect without religion, one would imagine that the teacher might be allowed to use the more authoritative because clearer revelation, to confirm the authority of the other. Mark the following extraordinary words which express the limit of the teacher. (3140.) "I should limit him, when he inculcates morality, to impress upon his pupils natural morality alone, showing them that it has a natural origin in their own constitution, and in the relation of that constitution to external creation." (3149.) "Would you use the Bible at all in secular education?—Certainly not." (3150.) "Not even the stories and parables of the Bible?—Not in secular education." (3168.) "Is there not much Christianity within the province of the secular teacher, which might be employed as confirmatory?—It is better to have the whole of it in the hands of the pastor."

You require your teachers to bestow upon the young committed to their care moral training. They open the Bible. "Shut that book; it contains revealed morality." "May I not use its precepts? Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour?" "No." "Why?" "Because it is revealed." "May I not quote the parable of the prodigal son?" "No." "Why?" "Because it is revealed." "May I quote the fable of the cow and the frog?" "Yes; *it is not revealed.*" "May I tell the story of Jesus in the temple?" "No; it is revealed." "May I quote the story of Bruce and the spider?" "Yes; *it is not revealed.*" "May I use at any time the words of the Bible in school, to confirm the moral lessons given?" "If you do, you will be dismissed." "How can I train to morality then?" "You are to show them that natural morality has a natural origin in their own constitution, and in the relation of that constitution to external creation!"

What is natural morality? What are its uses? By natural morality I understand that knowledge of his moral

nature, and that system of rules for right conduct, which a man may, by dint of his unaided powers, discover for himself. Its uses are manifold and important. And in tracing these, it is necessary to remark, that I do not mean that each child or man formally reflects on his knowledge, or regularly reduces it to a system of rules. In this sense, every human being, who is responsible for his actions, has a natural morality. In the consciousness of his own mind, he discovers that there is a something which tells him what he should do, and forbear from doing. Let us call this something conscience. He feels that he ought always to obey conscience, and that he is wrong if he does not. Hence he passes to the recognition of a moral rule; and conscience, by the punishments which it inflicts, tells him of a moral governor,—God, the Ruler of all. He discerns that this conscience urges him to deeds of justice, benevolence, purity, and temperance. He invests with these qualities the being pointed out to him by conscience. He believes him to be the best of all beings. He feels that he ought to obey him. And this feeling is the foundation of all obedience. But he feels also that he has disobeyed, and daily disobeys him, and, without any reference to him at all, that he disobeys the conscience that tells him of duty. That conscience points to Him, represents him as angry with these instances of disobedience, and appals with threats of punishment. Here conscience stops. And here does natural morality. It has revealed an obligation to follow a certain line of conduct,—it has revealed in part what that is,—it has revealed the character of God,—and it has revealed the approach of doom.

Were the mind of man as it was when it came from the hand of God, with all his laws fresh graven on the heart, the conscience would be an infallible guide, and natural morality would be a system, not only enjoining, but revealing, the right use of all things. But the mind of man is depraved. The conscience still utters mandates

and demands obedience. But she has now a divided sovereignty. Other passions occupy the mind, and sometimes overpower her. Hence she loses her rightful sway. But if she still issued her commands as before, she herself, though dethroned, might suffice to give us an account of what rule she ought to have. But she herself is corrupted. She mingles with the revolvers, learns part of their language and sentiments, and re-echoes them. These mingle with her rescripts, she gets confused, and cannot, at last, tell what is the language of her own native utterance, and what is that which has been dictated by passion. Hence, she speaks often with uncertainty, and she has no fixed rule. She knows that she ought to proclaim what is right,—but she has lost certain knowledge of what that is.

Hence we need not wonder that all systems of natural morality are defective. Some of them in many parts indicate high attainments in thought, reason, and correct feeling. But they want consistency, and they want authority. They all acknowledge that man should follow what is right; but their standards of right are all unworkable, and all imperfect. Of this they who lived in former times were conscious, and in their uncertainty bewailed the confusion of their minds, and desiderated the Deity to unravel what was to them all perplexity.

And thus, in the young mind, as there is a natural theology, to which revealed theology appeals, so there is a natural morality, to which revealed morality appeals. The child feels the force of the word *duty*. If it did not, it were unfit to learn the disclosures of revealed morality.

When the mind is in the state of doubt above described, let the light of revealed morality break in, and what happens? If the preliminary evidence be satisfactory, and the mind receive the revelation as possibly such, it will compare the account of the mind given in revelation with its own consciousness. It will compare the duties enjoined in the revelation, with the duties previously enjoined by the conscience alone. It will compare the character of

God as formed by the conscience, and as revealed. All this it could not do without revelation. But when all this is done, and the evidence is considered as satisfactory, so far as moral instruction goes, natural morality is superseded. All the inquiry that the conscience then makes is not at herself, but, What does the Bible say? Conscience becomes the depository of Bible precept,—she incorporates it into her own archives,—and issues all her behests as so instructed.

This she does, not because the obligation is different,—the obligation is still the same,—but she does it because the nature and extent of the obligation are more clearly revealed. When she saw duty before, she enforced it as far as she could; when she sees duty now, she enforces it as far as she can. But she discerns duty better than before, and her strength is greater. The obligation is now not different. The mind always felt itself bound to obey conscience as conscience, as the ruling principle. But it now feels itself bound to obey conscience, not only on the same principle as before, but because, to the mere feeling of right is added the sense of a specific form of right,—obligation to God, whose revealed will conscience is enforcing.

All this, however, does not happen in the young mind trained in Scripture morality. The results of the former are not so immediately effective as those of the latter. Habits of thinking, as well as of acting, have been formed—associations of right and wrong—to destroy which revelation is ultimately successful, but which make a strong effort to keep their place. The conscience, in such cases, though ready to appeal to the morality of Scripture, will sometimes take counsel from her old associates, and it is long before the maxims of Scripture morality become as intuitive as those of nature. In the child, all that is required is a consciousness of right and wrong—a feeling of a Moral Governor—and so far as his intellect will understand relationships, we can at once proceed to tell

him what God says. This feeling of duty is the foundation of all moral obedience. Give us that, and a knowledge of God, and we have only to add a knowledge of God's will. It were folly to leave his conscience to work out this knowledge so far as it would go, and then supply the rest; for his conscience might be becoming dull, seared, forming improper associations, leading to evil habits of thought as well as of action. By teaching him revealed morality, and teaching it as revealed, if he feel it at all, whatever he feels must have existed in his mind previously to the teaching. It would be in vain for me to say to a child unconscious of property, and of the duty of abstaining from what is not one's own, God hath said, "Thou shalt not steal," with any expectation of producing obedience. His mind must first acquire the notion of property, and his natural conscience must feel the force of the commandment, before he can receive it with any probability of profit. The child thus grows up, associating with morality the command of God. He thus learns clearly, that in an immoral act, he not only disobeys conscience, but God, the enlightener of conscience. This does not create a double obligation,—it merely strengthens that which before existed. Conscience first said, you ought not to steal, for that is wrong; and Scripture says, you ought not to steal, for that is wrong. Conscience said, you ought not to steal, for it is contrary to your nature; Scripture says, appealing to the same nature, Thus saith the Lord, Thou shalt not steal. In obeying conscience unenlightened, the mind is obeying what is right, without a reference to its being the will of God; in obeying revealed morality, the reference is both to what is right, and what is the will of God. But there are not two sources of morality. There is only one, and we must accustom the young to know that there is only one.

The fear of any confusion springing from teaching revealed morality must arise from a want of attention to man's nature. The dictates of conscience,—or, if you will,

of natural morality, are pointed to what is right of itself, irrespectively of God's will. And conscience, enlightened by revelation, never loses sight of this. It at first judges of the morality of revealed religion by this reference. Revealed religion does not alter it. It tells the mind what God's will is, and thus superadds a new knowledge of obligation having the same reference. God's will is, in virtue of this reference, made the standard of what is right. The conscience of a child, or its naturally moral feelings, tell it that it is wrong to steal. God's will adds this to the wrongness of stealing, that there is a violation of duty to God which is in itself wrong, besides doing what is felt to be, irrespectively of that consideration, in itself wrong. Suppose the action to be indifferent. You violate a duty if you violate God's will, because there is a natural feeling of right connected with obedience to God. If you can imagine that a child was taught that it was the will of God that he should steal, there would be a contest between the two forms of obligation, the obligations by which its naturally moral feelings proclaimed that it was bound to respect the law of property, and the obligations by which the same natural feelings told it that it was bound to respect the law of God. When they coincide,—as they do in the revealed morality of Christianity,—there is still the same distinct feeling of rectitude, of regard to what is right in itself, and of respect to the law of God as what is right in itself. The natural feelings of conscience prompt to do what is right, but do not always know what that is; the revealed law excites these feelings with a distinct reference to itself, and declares what right is, with the pre-existing obligation of obedience to God as God, which is also felt to be right. The mind may not be able to trace distinctly how it framed its standard of right,—whence it acquired its knowledge of relationships,—whether from revelation, or natural feeling, or reason drawing deductions from both; but it is always able to make the distinction between what the standard

of right is itself, and what is revealed. Revealed religion elevates the standard of what seems right in itself. But in so doing it does not alter the reference of the mind to this standard. A child accustomed to revealed religion,—to religious training,—has a higher standard of right than another child. But it is surely, to say the least, not less competent to refer an action to this standard, than an uneducated child is to refer to its standard, whatever that may be. There is only one source of moral truth,—even the God of truth. He has implanted in the mind a witness of himself, that tells of moral truth, and the obligation to obey it. That witness has become ignorant, and he has given another witness of truth, to instruct the other in the knowledge of truth, acting on the obligation to listen to this last witness. But the obligation existed before,—you have only called it into exercise. There is at all times an obligation to listen to God's law, and this is distinctly and separately felt when we are listening to it. But there is also an obligation to listen to God's witness in the heart, and this is distinctly and separately felt. When God's witness in the heart speaks, it is in the habit of enforcing its mandates by a reference to God's law, and by the consideration that the law is good,—in other words, it measures the law by its standard of excellence, and pronounces accordingly. Now, it cannot do this if it is unable to separate the law of God from its knowledge of morality, not natural, but enlightened. I appeal to the consciousness of every man, if he is not in the habit of stimulating himself to good, by saying that this is the will of God, and is agreeable to conscience. To teach a child, then, the morality of the Bible, is only to elevate its standard of right, and not to confound the two revelations, the revelation in the heart, and the revelation in God's word. From the first the latter clears away obscurities, renovating its ruins, but not altering its reference to that which is in itself right.

The conclusion, then, to which we come, is that a

knowledge of what is right is, to a certain extent only, furnished by nature,—that the mind of man requires the revelation of the divine will to enlighten it,—and that these two may be so blended that the mind cannot tell whence it derived its knowledge of right, but that the obedience which we give to God's law is prompted by a principle totally distinct and separable from obedience itself, even a conviction arising from comparison, the things compared being God's law and the standard of right, that God's law is holy, and just, and good.

The child may have been told, for instance, that it is right to be kind to every one with whom he comes in contact. He recognises this to be right. He feels an obligation to obey it. You tell him that it is the will of God. The sense of obligation becomes stronger, for a new sense of it is developed. There is no new generic obligation,—there is a new specific obligation. You tell him, moreover, that it is revealed in the Bible. This adds nothing to the obligation in kind, it only adds to it in degree. One part of his standard of right is thus formed. Every new time that he reads this precept in his Bible, there is a reference to the standard of right, and by this standard he judges it. But it surely does not alter the possibility of doing this, that he has acquired his knowledge of it from the Bible. The Bible is nothing more than the revealed will of God, and the deductions of reason are the discovered will of God. They are both the will of God, both tried by the same standard principles which God himself has implanted for that very purpose. I cannot help that abuses may be made of this teaching of Christian morality,—that the conscience may be perverted even by it,—that it may be trained falsely to regard one set of duties as subordinate to another,—that it may confound what is right in itself, with what is right from enactment, without regard had to the principle of right on which the enactment was founded. The same objection applies with hundredfold force to any other species of

moral training whatever. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked." God looked on what he had made, and behold it was very good. Sin entered into the world, and then vanity of vanities, saith the preacher, all is vanity.

It is certainly a befitting exercise for the mind, which has a knowledge of moral science, to go forth to the external world, and by the standard of right furnished from a knowledge of God's will to see whether the arrangements of Providence are in accordance with the dictates of revelation. The discoveries therein made do not add a new obligation, they add force to that which previously existed. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," says the revealed will of God. The philosopher, knowing this, goes forth, and looking at the connexion between man and man, and the mutual dependence of each on each, and the happiness diffused by the observance of this maxim, sees some of the reasons at least on which this principle is founded. These reasons approve themselves to his standard of right, as the law itself had done. The reason adds new light to the obligation, and with this new light, and his standard raised accordingly, he goes forth again. He compares the deductions that his reason has drawn from premises furnished by the Word of God, and he finds them agree exactly—and he is led the more to admit, that the law is holy, and just, and good, loving it now not only for its rectitude, but for its consequences. But both rectitude and consequences are approved of by his standard of right. He feels an obligation to approve of both, and his approval heightens his standard of right. But he knew the law first. Had he not known the law as revealed, he would have had different premises, and a different standard. If he were able to survey the whole nature of things, and to tell what was on the whole most befitting that nature, or most conducive to general happiness, he might draw his deductions with certainty. But he has not this knowledge, and he cannot draw them. This is acknowledged

by all philosophers, and especially by those who, not having the light of revelation, have wandered in the dark. It is not difficult when we have the divine command, to discover that it is productive of certain beneficial results; it has never been effected by man from any knowledge of results, to arrive with certainty at the divine command. Bear witness Greece, and bear witness Rome, where is your deduction from the nature of things, that we should love our neighbour as ourselves, and that even our enemy is our neighbour?

On the proposed system, the process above described is to be reversed. We are to show the young their connexion with the world around, and how certain actions produce certain results, which are approved of by our mental faculties and our intellect. The deductions thence drawn are to be taught them as the will of God, discoverable by mere human reason. Then, we are to take the revealed will of God, and show them the same laws there—the identity furnishing at once evidence, and a new source of obligation.

1. To this I answer—that if we teach them this, we teach them error—these deductions are not discoverable, and have never been discovered, by mere human reason. 2. The will of God is the will of the God of revelation—He is not another, but the same God. 3. The mind so trained will deem revelation unnecessary, on the rational ground, that there was no need to reveal a law already revealed, and the monstrous error will be taught, that there are two sources of morality—Nature and God. 4. If the Scripture morality be not used in training the child, it will be imperfectly trained, and having a lower standard of right, will be far less alive to the beauty of Scripture morality than if it were so trained, just as the child reared in the midst of harmonious music is more alive to the beauties of harmony, utterly unperceived by another. 5. If the Scripture morality be used, the point is conceded—that there is no such thing as perfect natural morality. 6. The

whole argument proceeds on the fallacious assumption, disproved at once by every man's consciousness, that a knowledge of revealed morality and our standard of right are apt to become so blended that we are incapable of comparing them, the fact being, that our standard of right is within ourselves, and the Word of God is without ourselves, and that it is impossible to commit the error supposed ; for the mind, in approving of and acting on the revealed dictates of God, performs the act of comparing the latter with a previously formed standard of right, which is what is meant by natural morality. 7. No new obligation is added in kind. The agreement between God's will and the nature of things adds to specific but not to generic obligation—the obligation is to do what is right. What is right may be made known in various ways, and at each time that these revelations are multiplied, the bond of obligation gets a new strand. 8. If in one sense we may say that obligation is doubled, that is, that each discovery of what is right is in itself an obligation—the truth being, that it is only a discovery of obligation—the same double obligation is felt by the mind trained on Scripture morality—for it has a standard of what is right in itself, a knowledge of natural obligation consciously different from a knowledge of God's law.

The whole system seems to me to be founded in error, unphilosophical, dangerous to truth moral and religious, a nursery of infidels, who will exalt Nature, and forget Nature's God,—the God of revelation. It is theoretically dangerous, not practically. It is utterly impracticable. You will get no teachers who can show that "natural morality has a natural origin in their own constitution, and in the relation of that constitution to external creation,"—meaning by morality a perfect system of morals. Before they can do this, they must be able to draw the deductions for themselves. This would require a knowledge of human nature, of creation, and the connexion between both, which no man ever pretended to possess,

though many have longed to acquire it. Your Herschels, Chalmerses, Brewsters, all will decline the task. Even Mr Combe, whose work "has shed such a flood of light upon Christianity," will not attempt it. Even he requires a knowledge of moral and religious duty. But could you get teachers to attempt it, where are you to get the children to understand? You are to tell the child—and that in the infant school, for he is to be taught natural morality there—that the rule to love his neighbour "has a natural origin in his own constitution, and the relation of that constitution to external creation." Mystify this as you will, in addition to its undeniable impracticability, it involves the absurdity of attempting to arrive, from *data* insufficient, and by imperfect deductions, at a conclusion which is at your hand, dictated by Eternal Wisdom, in most benignant compassion of the very want of power, which, it is now asserted, is not a portion of the existing human constitution.

I have already said that the principle of all true obedience is love to God. I am not here treating of the manner in which that is implanted, but of the fact that this is so. Hence morality and religion are not two, but one; there is no true morality without religion, and no true religion without morality. In the language of Mr Simpson, "Morality and religion are both from God." This was but dimly seen by ancient moralists. Nature cannot disclose it with certainty. Before we can admit that love to God is right, as the great principle of obedience, we must know that he is a Being, not only demanding, but deserving to be loved. And on no point was there greater discrepancy than this. By some supposed to be perfect, and governing the world, subject to some necessity, out of himself,—by others perfect, but caring nothing about the concerns of the world,—by others perfect, but not all-powerful, and opposed by evil almost as powerful as himself, this mighty principle was lost. What nature could not do, revelation has done, not opening up a new obliga-

tion, but, while it acts on a pre-existing obligation of observance to what is right, disclosing a new relationship and a new form of obligation—to do all things to the glory of God. Angels in heaven, actuated in all things by this love, recognise the claim—the spirits of just men made perfect recognise the claim—God's people upon earth recognise the claim—his enemies recognise it, and all are conscious that it is a rightful claim, the very notion of its being rightful implying that they do not confound the source of obligation implanted by God with the principle of true obedience, love to God.

Just as clearly as revealed religion alone discloses the principle of true obedience, does it reveal the foundation of true morality—which is God's will. It will be denied by very few, that it alone reveals clearly what God's will is. But men are apt to lose themselves in speculations as to what is the foundation of God's will, till they forget that whatever that foundation may be it is a part of God's nature and of his will. Why it is God's will, is a speculative question of great interest. It is God's will, is the very foundation of every correct system of practical ethics. By the light of nature, man neither saw, nor wished to see, this truth. They built their systems on nature duly balanced, or on utility, or on any other result, real or supposed, of virtuous conduct. There is, in revealed religion, but one foundation—the will of God; and if we build on any other, we but rear an edifice of vanity and folly, sure to tumble in ruins about our self-devoted heads.

But, above all, the union of morality and religion is seen in this,—that morality, as a system of ethics, is grossly imperfect if it shed no light on our relationship to God. All natural systems of ethics in ancient times attempted this, and failed. In modern times, those who disbelieve revelation have been more successful in appearance, but not in reality. They have borrowed from Scripture some of the attributes of Jehovah, and bestowed them upon him whom they call indifferently Nature or God. But

in casting away revelation, they cast away the only source of light by which we can discover our relationship to God. Nature tells us that there is a relationship, and dimly discloses sometimes a father, sometimes a judge, sometimes a benefactor, sometimes a tyrant. Revelation alone discloses that relationship. But it imposes no new obligation in kind. The relationship opens up new forms of obligation. And it reveals much more—not only God as the Father and the Judge, but God as the Sanctifier and Saviour.

In all these, the mind is able to trace distinctly the standard of right, and that which is measured by that standard. It cannot blend them, if it would. It mingles the elements that form the standard, and the more these are mingled—or rather, the more the divine displaces the human—the better. But the standard exists. And so far is it from being true that they are so blended, that the higher a man advances in holiness the more does he perceive, with growing delight, the beauties of God's law. His perceptions do not get confused; they are rendered more and more clear, because he has a triple reference. He discerns the tendency of his nature, leading him to sin,—he discerns the law of God, leading him to holiness;—the higher his standard with which he compares both, the more clearly does he perceive the surpassing loveliness of Heaven's law, and exult therein.

Revealed religion acts thus with the aid of natural morality in all men. By natural morality men have a sense of right. Revealed discloses what that right is. Moreover, as a branch of what that right is, it opens up a view of relationship to God. Natural morality, thus informed, perceives that it has violated the duty so disclosed, and, utterly impotent, throws itself on revealed morality, exclaiming, "What shall I do to be saved?"

There can be no better illustration of the method in which revealed religion enlightens the mind on the subject of what is right, than the institution of the Sabbath.

There is in all countries a consciousness that some time should be devoted to the worship of God, when the concerns of man should be forgotten. The manner of this worship is not now in question. It is merely its fact. This constitutes a natural obligation, which is universally recognised. I need refer to no more than the *dies fasti* and *nefasti* of the Romans, and the festival days, hideous with blood and suffering, of the Hindoos. Revealed religion discloses the Sabbath, not constituting a new obligation, as some foolishly suppose, but acting on a pre-existing obligation, giving it definiteness, and thus throwing the old obligation into a new form.

A few cases like this have probably misled our author. The obligation to perform acts of outward worship like these is not recognised by the young so readily as the matured mind. Before it has struggled its way into existence, the child trained in Christian morality has been taught to reverence the Sabbath,—and has probably long outwardly revered it without knowing why, except from the general obligation to obey its parents. The natural feeling of right is apt, in this case, to get apparently so blended with the feeling arising from the knowledge of the revealed rule, that we are liable to the error of judging of what is right, as the Pharisees did, because it is revealed, without a reference to the natural standard of right enlightened by religion, as our Lord judged of it, when he said that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. But these exceptions are only apparent. Man is by nature so ignorant of his duty to God, in all its details of worship, that he can never, by any system of instruction, be made capable of comparing these details with a natural standard of morality, however much enlightened, for the natural standard applies only to love, and not to its manifestations in worship. Whatever force there is in this exception applies tenfold to all kinds of instruction. Rear a child in a knowledge only of his natural obligations to God,—and let him be taught that

he is bound to devote a portion of his time to his service—that this is befitting his nature. Do you think that when you have disclosed to him the fact of revelation, that a seventh part of his time is to be so hallowed, he will be better able than the other to compare the enactment of God in revelation with the enactment of God in conscience, and thus yield a more ready obedience? Is habit nothing in deepening the sense of obligation? And think you that there is greater incapacity to distinguish between what is our general duty to God as our Father and this specific manifestation of it on the part of the aged Christian, than on that of the mere moralist? If you think so, by all means separate natural and revealed morality, that they may cast light upon each other.

But you cannot separate them, provided you give revealed religion at all. There is no revealed morality which does not take for granted a natural morality. You may cut away the revealed morality, if you will. You may employ it without acknowledging that it is revealed. You may say that such and such is the will of God. If you do not mean the God of revelation, you are an infidel. If you do, you are giving instruction in revealed religion.

A king, in ancient times, went into a distant land, having erected a mansion, within which he engraved, in perfect and legible characters, the rules which his subjects were to obey in his absence. Their neglect and wanton disrespect occasioned the edifice to fall into ruins. Some of the characters disappeared,—all were distorted, and a new language became common. They almost entirely forgot their king. Still there was an invisible power that led them from time to time to visit this depository of his laws,—some repairing to it oftener than others, many resorting thither at long intervals, and only when driven by the unseen hand that inflicted punishment upon them for their neglect. They could not read aright, partly from want of skill, and partly from the fractured state to which they had reduced the tablets. Some pon-

dered long and made out some parts,—others by similar labours succeeded in deciphering a portion of the remainder. But the want of power to interpret the obsolete characters, and the want of parts, rendered perfection impossible. The great majority cared little about the matter, and the few who did could only bewail their ignorance. A messenger arrived from the great king. They examined his credentials. These were satisfactory. The message which he bore included an account of the state in which the mansion was, exact and complete in every part. It contained also the inscriptions, and instructions in the language in which they were expressed. Delighted they found that they were able to trace the whole range of enactments. “These shattered words,” they said, “are evidently the fragments of the sentence contained in this revelation. Let this letter be raised, and the word before unintelligible is now complete. Our conjectures on this point were wrong,—there we were right. We can now read, understand, and obey. Glory to our great king!” And some obtained the copy, and laid it before their youths, that they might be accustomed to obey it from their infancy. And they led them ever into the ruined hall, and showed them what had been written there, and how both codes agreed. And they told them of the difficulties that the guilt of their forefathers had brought upon them, and of the gratitude which they owed to their king for this new revelation.

But others led their youth to the interior of the mansion, and kept them there long, reading a tongue to them difficult to follow, and training them to obedience on the shattered fragments of the broken law, which they explored in dim obscurity and ever stumbling, while the bright sun was shining on those engaged in perusing the new record. And some of these, languishing, died, and never saw the latter at all. And the rest, all untaught of the goodness of their king in revealing himself to them, were at last led out to behold it. But their eyes were accustomed to the dimness in which they had been so long detained,

and they could not bear the light, and they carped at the meaning, being accustomed to consider themselves as discoverers of hidden things, and, while some gradually got over their difficulties, many more quibbled on and died.

Which, think ye, were the wiser?

CHAPTER XVII.

Difficulties of Plan proposed by the Non-Religionists for Religious Instruction—Pastors—People—Insuperable, hence Non-Religionists—Though not insuperable would not ensure moral Training—Doctrine as well as Morality required—what Objection?—Sectarianism—Statement of Arguments thence deduced—Answer—Abuse of the Word Sect—Instructional Questions, nothing to do with Church Government—Remove that and the Distinction of Sect vanishes—Difficulties in teaching Morals in any Way—Every where Sectarianism—Groundless Notions should be disregarded—Christian Tenets to be taught by Churchman or Dissenter, according to the Catechisms of the Churches of Scotland and England—Objections to the Use of Catechisms—These considered—Attendance on this Class optional—Class for Scripture History and Morality—Attendance optional—Scripture Morality indispensable. •

WHAT scheme, it will naturally be asked, do you yourself propose?

This question cannot be answered without considering how far the objection of sectarianism is a valid one, and how far scriptural instruction is provided for, according to the systems already considered.

Let us glance at the last point first. All parties are agreed that there should be religious lessons. It is true, that the schemes proposed by many in reality shut out religion, but, trusting in their sincerity, we may believe that they would not bestow the one—secular instruction—without the other, religious lessons. “Yet I should shrink,” says Mr O’Connell, in a letter from Derrynane,—“Yet I should shrink with affright from any scheme of education which did not include—which did not necessarily include—religious instruction. The most important of man’s concerns is the eternal salvation of his soul, and it would be a miserable delusion to educate men for

the temporal and transitory business of this life, and to neglect to educate them for the all-important affairs of an eternity." We are entitled therefore, to hold, that if it can be shown that their scheme does not provide for religious instruction, they will abandon it for one which does.

And here let us notice, that these schemes are schemes which are to be adopted by the state, as those which it deems to be right. There enters thus a new element. The state either furnishes religious in connexion with secular instruction, or it does not. That it does not—by these schemes—I think that it will not be difficult to prove. If it does, as it is bound to do, there arises the question, is it right for the state to furnish religious instruction of this particular kind? This subdivides itself into two questions. Is it right for the state to separate religious and secular instruction? And supposing that to be right, is it the duty of the state to furnish to every one instruction in any dogmas, whether scriptural or antiscritptural, whether sound or erroneous?

The system which is proposed proceeds on the assumption that parents are to send their children, who attend the state schools for secular knowledge, to their pastors, from whom they are to receive instruction in divine things. Now, it will be noticed that the state has no control whatever over these pastors—except the ministers of the establishment—and none whatever over the parents, except in so far as the state may admit, or refuse admission, to the national schools.

All instances drawn from other countries are inapplicable to this. The continental governments endow the several pastors whom they enjoin to teach the young. This may be consistent with their duty. I think that it is not. But it proves that no argument as to practicability of the plan can be derived from their practice. Our government may recommend but cannot enjoin the pastors to instruct the young. And, besides, in continental countries the young

receive instructions from their teachers, in the moral and historical parts of Scripture,—and it is only at a certain age that they resort to the pastor.

Hence, the proposed system would throw upon the pastor a duty in this country, which on the continent he has not to discharge. By the proposed plan, the pastor is to teach all—even those from the infant schools. He would have to parcel out his time so as to suit the different ages of those who resort to him for instruction. And, be it remembered that it is a very different thing for the pastor to take for granted that the children are in possession of a knowledge of the elements of religion, and to impart to them, himself, a knowledge of these elements. This last consideration would at least triple his labours. He would have to enjoin the learning not merely of doctrine, but of history, and he would become a teacher of a large and varied school—of all from the age of two to the age of fifteen—with different degrees of acquirement, depending upon him for their sole instruction.

Moreover, this would add one requisite more to the qualifications necessary for a pastor. A man may be sincerely pious, skilled in the Scriptures, apt to communicate, eager to benefit his fellow-men, and yet not be skilled in the art of examining, so requisite to the accomplished teacher. If teaching is one art, and preaching is another,—if it requires so much of training, as most men now agree it does, to form the perfect teacher, you run the risk either of adding one most laborious preparative to the ministerial office, or of having the most important part of instruction—the moral part—inadequately performed.

Supposing that all the pastors were to agree, and that all were well qualified, then if we are to be satisfied with the religious instruction given to the young in this way, we are satisfied with this extraordinary provision,—that the state provides a portion of the young with religious instruction which is full of error. Whatever may be our religious belief, “to this conclusion we must come at last.”

The Unitarian must think that some are teaching idolatry under the sanction of the state, because the young are taught to worship as God one whom they regard as man ; and those who hold the doctrine of the divinity of Christ must believe the state to be sanctioning the monstrous error that God is mere man. Now, it is no answer to this to argue, that we have only to do with the morality of the question. If that be true, then, unless doctrine has nothing to do with morality, the question is not changed, it is only shifted. Those who hold that doctrine has no connexion with and no influence on morals, may so argue. But then, if that be the case, there is no need for teaching doctrine at all. Let such be consistent. Let them meet us face to face, and without a mask. Let us know who those are, that, professing Christianity of any kind, advocate the opinion that secular instruction should be given without religious,—and that too Christian instruction.

I can easily conceive that a man may hold that the state, not being a fit body to judge what religion is true and what false, should not meddle with religious instruction at all. But I confess that I cannot conceive the consistency of arguing that the state should give religious instruction, and yet not care whether the doctrines taught be true or false.

It is no answer that it is only permissive on the part of the state. If it is only permissive on the part of the state, with a view that that permission shall be the sole instrument of furnishing religious instruction, as far as the state goes it gives religious instruction which is utterly erroneous.

A father may judge it improper for him to meddle with the religious tenets of his children. Such fathers I have known. He may proceed two ways : He may say—and we can suppose religious instruction of every kind to be within their reach gratuitously—you may attend my clergyman, or you may attend others ; I give you no instructions to bias you. Go and judge for yourselves.

This, altogether apart from what a father ought to do, is clearly giving them no religious instruction. But if any man says it is, then that man must admit, that, if two of these children attend one the Unitarian and another the Roman Catholic Church, at least one of them is in a gross error—and if placed by his father in these circumstances, he is placed by him in this gross error.

I hold it, therefore, to be altogether wrong for the state to furnish religious instruction of the kind proposed.

The father who judges it wrong to dictate to his children on matters of religion, and yet right to furnish them with the means of religious instruction, may say, "Go any where you like, and I shall approve of it, and deem it perfectly satisfactory—but, go some where you must—make your own choice." This may be said to be an act of parental duty furnishing religious instruction, but it partakes of the same gross error as before.

Take it either way, whether the state furnish religious instruction, by leaving it to the option of the educated, what to receive, or to receive none at all—or leave it to their option simply what to receive, but enacting that they must receive some such instruction—the state sanctions error—an error, fortunately, to which no class of people in this country will submit, in spite of France, Prussia, and Holland.

But then, in addition to the question of the pastor, there comes the question of the people.

Will they send their children to the pastor?

It must be remembered that the greatest difficulties with which we have to deal are connected with our towns, at least in England and Scotland. In both these countries the immense majority of the rural population belongs to the Established Church, and had we only them to deal with, there would be little to perplex us on the subject of instruction. But the perplexity lies in that very quarter, where we should wish to meet with it least. In the rural parts of a country—while ignorance is very

much to be deplored, the general behaviour of the people is not outrageous, except in times of excitement. Congregate the same ignorant people in masses—and demoralization, and vice, and crime, will inevitably ensue. But it is these very masses that are the worst provided with the means of gaining religious knowledge. The people in towns will not seek religious instruction for their children.

Some of them may, and will, and do. But that is not the question. We are treating of a national system. Those of the people who need it most will seek it least.

It is well known that in all our large towns there is a deficiency of the means for religious instruction. This is denied by no man, although there may be a difference as to the details. All then *cannot* have pastors. But, moreover, there is not only a deficiency in those means, but the means actually existing are not used to their full extent. This, too, is admitted, though some account for it in one way, and others in another. Many then *have not* pastors. And these are the very individuals whose children most require religious instruction.

Then there is another element. Are those who have pastors members of their church?

But there is another element more important still—are the majority of those who have pastors, and are members of their church, so impressed with the importance of religious instruction, that they will, at a separate hour and in a separate place as recommended by some, or at a separate hour and in the same place as recommended by others, send their children to the pastor? Those who are so impressed need it least, and those who are not so impressed need it most.

If we consult the records of the history of human nature, we will find that they will not so send them.

One of the greatest difficulties that meets the educationist on the very threshold is, how are we to induce the poor to send their children to school? If with all the

inducements of knowledge, to be made immediately serviceable, and whose existence is palpably perceived, there be this difficulty, what must it be, when we are dealing with attainments, of whose importance they have little or no conception, and which do not present themselves readily to the cognizance?

But if it be said that you are to make liberty of attendance on the secular schools conditional on attendance on religious instruction, you are involved in a heap of absurdities. You thereby, so far as the offer of instruction is a boon, offer a boon for attendance on erroneous religious teaching. You must provide religious accommodation for all first—one of your objects being, in the mean time, to create an appetite which shall lead to a demand for such accommodation. You deny instruction to them who need it most. You, after all, abandon your great principle of providing with secular instruction the whole nation, on terms of which the whole nation will accept, and introduce sectarianism only under a different form.

Have you any guarantee besides, that the instruction given by the pastor will be such as is worthy of the reward? What check have you upon him? He may perform his duty only nominally, provided he undertake it at all. In large towns, where it is most needed, how will you get the members of the several congregations to send their children to church? And, if the pastor go to school, to which of the schools attended by his scattered flock will he go?

The whole scheme is utterly impracticable. It is unsound in principle. It is a virtual denial of religious instruction. The whole reasoning justifies me in saying, that those who propose it, whatever may be their intentions, exclude, so far as they can exclude, the Bible from education.

I say, so far as they can; for, while they forbid it to the teacher, they do not assign more to the pastor than he does already in many cases. He already, presuming on the know-

ledge acquired in the secular schools, often labours among the young of his flock. But he never imagines that to be enough. He knows that he has little enough time to spare to confirm and elucidate the lessons given in school, or at home. It is very true that this practice should be more general than it is. And it will be one happy effect of all this discussion, if pastors are roused to a more active discharge of a most important duty. A pastor will then be brought more into contact with the hope of a future race—he will become better acquainted with their errors, and be better able to advise them in maturer life. He will take his proper place in the educational work—elevating and sanctioning the lessons of school and home morality as the minister of the Most High God.

But supposing it to be practicable and practised, it is not a system of moral training, and this is the thing desiderated. The pastor has no means of seeing the habits of those who come to him for instruction. They repair to him under restraint—the restraint imposed on them by his office, and perhaps the place where they are taught. It is not sufficient merely to teach children what is their duty, and ascertain that they know it, we must accustom them to do it. This the pastor evidently cannot effect. He will have little, if any thing, to do with discipline, and it is only through discipline that the young can be trained to the proper discharge of duty. This is the province of the teacher. It is his to train the young to moral habits. Now, it must be remembered, that while habits are of great importance, principles are of greater, in the case of the young especially. We know not to what temptations they may be exposed—they have not yet fully developed the force of their feelings, and our care must be to give them habits, guided and kept steady by principles. These principles to be effectual must be Christian principles. It is in school that they can be best acquired. In active life men are judged of by their actions, and are not put right by their fellow-men as to the principles that

have actuated them. It is in school that they must learn the connexion between precept and practice. Precept by itself is useless—practice by itself is practice of obedience to school rules, but not of specific precepts. The lie punished is this individual lie punished. The kindness enjoined is this individual kindness enjoined. “Do not lie,” is a precept taught, that may aggravate, but certainly will not prevent guilt. “Do good unto all men,” is a precept delivered, that will no more of itself act upon the will than the waves will retreat at your bidding. You must have precept acting upon practice, and practice referring to precept, till principle is formed, and the will obeys the conscience enlightened.

In life, moreover, all our employments ought to be conducted with a reference to duty. We have it not in our power to teach this in active life. We can, by the ministrations of the pulpit, declare that all things should be done to the glory of God. But diverse as are men's occupations, it is impossible fully to show how this may and can regulate all our proceedings, how each duty performed may be performed with a reference to God's will, each enjoyment partaken of with gratitude to him, each evil inflicted borne with cheerful submission to his wisdom and love. The teacher has the young under his charge, when they are engaged in business to them as important as the busiest statesman's is to him. He has them under his care at a time when they are peculiarly liable to impressions, open and unreserved in mirth and care. He can train them how all things,—all the business, all the pleasures, all the evils of life, may be carried on, enjoyed, and improved, with a reference to their God and Father. The pastor can *teach* them—but the teacher can *train* them.

In truth, the great end of all moral training is, that not one action, but all pursuits shall be subordinate to the moral wellbeing. The teacher is training the intellect, but the intellect must, to be properly regulated, be regulated by the will morally influenced. If this season be

let slip, the same opportunity never recurs. There has been effected a severment between morality and occupation—a severment which goes on for years at the very time that the character is forming. The evil done is incalculable. It is in vain for the pastor to say—"when at school you should do all things to the glory of God"—if the boy when at school is not only not trained to this, but never hears it, nor one allusion to it. It is in vain for the pastor to say, "You should seek the assistance of God in all your undertakings"—when prayer is a thing unknown in the schoolroom—and there is no recognition of any God but Nature.

These truths are of the deepest importance. If the pastor could do all that is wished of him,—and parents would do all that is wished of them, we have not the moral training in schools, that is alone deserving the name. Let us adopt as our maxim of moral training, **THAT THE MORAL TRAINING WHICH BEFITS A CHRISTIAN NATION, IS CHRISTIAN PRECEPT, PRACTICE, AND PRINCIPLE IN UNION, REGULATING AND CONTROLLING ALL THE EMPLOYMENTS, ENJOYMENTS, AND EVENTS OF THE SCHOOL-ROOM AND THE PLAY-GROUND.**

So far have we advanced, I humbly submit, to the truth. The question of doctrines yet remains. It is clearly impossible for me to reason on this part of the subject with those who deem doctrines of little importance in themselves,—or, at least, of little importance as influencing practice. It would require more than one volume to discuss that subject alone. I can merely point out to them one fallacy to which they are liable. They know one or two well educated men in a certain station of society, who hold certain doctrines, and who yet appear to adorn human nature. They look at countries holding certain doctrines, and yet not remarkable for crime. They hence infer that doctrine has little to do with practice. They are wrong. In the first case, circumstances account for the fact. In the second, not only is the absence of crime

no criterion, but there may be more violence in a land where the mass is far more permeated with a Christian, that is, a moral spirit. We must judge of the state of a country's morals not only by crime, but by virtue. Tried by this standard, their reference will fail. The want of crime is dependent on a thousand circumstances,—the presence of virtue indicates the morality. And even as to the absence of crime, Christianity itself,—in its doctrinal effects upon Europe,—furnishes the strongest proofs, that in connexion with certain doctrines, it ever produces natural morality, *where the people are directly or indirectly brought into contact with these doctrines*, and that certain doctrines are ever accompanied with immorality *where the people are left entirely to the influence of these doctrines*. But, above all, morality is surely unnecessarily restricted when it is confined to the duties which we owe to man. And if it be—as it ought to be—extended to the duties which we owe to God, the man cannot be called a moral man who disbelieves that which God has commanded him to believe.

But I am now discussing the question with those who are sincerely impressed with a belief that doctrine has to do with practice, and who, admitting all that has been said as to morality, are staggered by the idea of introducing doctrinal instruction into our schools.

Now, let us bear in mind that we are discussing whether, not the well informed, the instructed at home, but the poor in national schools should receive doctrinal instruction.

I need not dwell long upon this, for it has occupied us before. Only let me remind those who take an interest in the question,—that one doctrine common to all Christians is, that man is a fallen creature, with his heart corrupted, at enmity with God, requiring his mercy to pardon, and his grace to help him. Would that I might here, with burning eloquence, impress a theme higher far,—that we have to do with spirits, whose future happiness or wo

depends upon their belief or disbelief in the Son of God,—that I might kindle into love for undying souls the minds which are now calmly pondering the education of immortals. But I may not if I could. The theme is forbidden me as dangerous ground, wherein lurk thorns of dissension and rancour. Dissent has fettered the hand of hundreds, who would fain point to the city of our God, and yet are compelled to keep the finger directed only to the way thither. There is consolation in the thought that it is a way of pleasantness and peace, and that to glorify God, as he wills, is to enjoy him for ever.

We must take man as he is. And, as he is, we find that precept will not do, that practice will not do, that moral training will not do. We want principle. But principle is dependent upon doctrine, and without doctrine we cannot calculate upon principle.

We are in these circumstances then. We wish to educate all the young of our land; their training must go on principally in school; any thing short of the Christian moral training embodied in our maxim is not for a moment to be thought of nor tolerated; the doctrines of Christianity can, in present circumstances, be taught only in school; these doctrines are essential to morality; and these doctrines can be taught in schools. What is to prevent this?

SECTARIANISM.

Now, in considering the arguments derived thence, and which I approach with fear, naturally arising from the thought that they have hitherto baffled all attempts at the adjustment of this great question,—it is pleasing to reflect that we have not to do with the voluntary argument, which would mightily complicate the whole matter. I take this for granted for three reasons. In the midst of the outcry that has been raised against Church Establishments, not one word has been heard against the Scottish Parochial Schools,—and while foremost in the ranks of

the cause are the Scottish Voluntaries, they avail themselves of these schools without hesitation. The official organ of the Scottish Voluntaries—the Central Board of Dissenters in Edinburgh—has announced its opinion that all education should be based on religion. And my remarks would probably not be satisfactory to our voluntary friends, whose co-operation is essential in this great cause.

The argument, then, apart from the principles of voluntarism, is that doctrinal instruction given in schools necessarily implies the dominancy of one sect, and by instilling its peculiar tenets, necessarily excludes those who do not hold them from the benefits of the national system. Subsidiary arguments are, that a spirit of tyranny is engendered on the one hand, and a sense of wrong on the other—that religious differences are perpetuated, and a spirit of uncharitableness engendered.

I deny that doctrinal instruction given in schools *necessarily* implies the dominancy of one sect, in the ordinary sense of the word sect—or that it necessarily excludes any from the benefits of the national system. The subsidiary arguments partly depend on the other, and if it is answered, they are so far answered—they partly deserve a short incidental notice.

By the word sects, I understand subdivisions of the great body of Christians forming separate communions, to which communions, in church matters, they generally confine themselves. Now, this definition leaves much open. Every subdivision may not belong to the great body of Christians at all—yet is called a sect. Accordingly, a man may, as he views Socinianism, for instance, as a belief consistent with the essentials of Christianity or not, consider it as a sect of Christians or not. But inquiries like this are unnecessary for my purpose, and would detain us too long.

Now I grant that it is perfectly possible that doctrinal instruction may involve the objection before stated, but I maintain that it does not necessarily do so.

The word *sect* is liable to abuse. It does not imply

difference of opinion in matters that are counted essential to salvation, but merely difference of communion.

With reference then to all questions of church communion, the objection of sect may apply. But it does not apply to questions irrespective of this. And I admit that some of these ought not to fall within the province of the Teacher.

But there are certain points on which the great majority of the Protestant world are agreed, and with regard to them the word sect is apt to give us the notion that they differ on leading points of doctrine, when they do not. It is only in reference to the leading points of doctrine that the instructional question arises, and on this point the dangers of sectarianism are apt to be grossly overrated.

Thus it has been said, that there are seventy or eighty sects in this country, which would each press its own doctrines in instruction. If by this be meant the leading doctrines which are deemed essential to salvation, I do not doubt that they would. But the number of sects differing on what they themselves esteem vital points is so far beneath this, that I need only refer to the fallacy, without further exposing it. If it be meant that they would teach the points that separate them from other religious bodies around them, and differing only on these points, the statement is altogether groundless, and can easily be proved to be so.

In Scotland, the great mass of the dissenters separated from the church because it tolerated patronage. The difference then for many years between a member of the established church and his neighbour the dissenter was, that the former belonged to a sect which tolerated patronage, and the latter to a sect which would not submit to it. Yet no one ever heard of the established sect, in whose hands was exclusively, during all that time, the endowed education of the young, inculcating the toleration of patronage. The difference has now been shifted to voluntarism—but I do not think that there is a teacher throughout all

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Scotland, established or voluntary, who would inculcate any dogmas upon the subject.

So, among us Episcopalians attend our schools, where religious instruction is given. The chief difference between the sects is one not essential, but affecting communion—the question of church-government. It was never heard of that a Scottish teacher inculcated sectarianism—that is, his peculiar tenets on church-government.

Shift then the term. The various bodies of Protestant Christians are not sectarian in reference to the question of education—on this question they are not divided from each other—they agree together, and have worked together for centuries. In matters affecting the several communities which are confessedly not essential to salvation, and therefore not essential to morality, there is no sectarianism. The separate communities could not subsist together in church-communion, without ceasing to be sects—and sects have merged together in matters of communion and church-government in our own day. As long therefore as they subsist separately, there must be this subdivision—and the young must be taught such matters by their parents and pastors. With these the state has no right to interfere in any way, for they are not essential to morality. Were there any form of worship which led to immorality—or any form of church-government which subverted the law of the land—doubtless the state would be authorized to interfere. It has a right to use all means within its reach to promote the morality of the people. But a knowledge of forms of church-government—a preference of this or of that—is not essential to belief in Christ—is not essential to morality—and the state has no right to enforce such preference.

The objection of sectarianism, then, is not valid in questions of education, to the same extent to which it is valid in questions of another kind. I do not think that it is valid at all. For while I have no right, and no wish, to judge of the individuals of any communion, I have a right to judge whether their tenets be conformable

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with Scripture or not—and using the word Christian sect, as I am entitled to do in an educational question, without reference to form of church-government, and other unessential points, I would allow any man to teach the doctrines of this sect, altogether irrespective of his belief in these points.

Now this goes the whole length of the objectors. They do not deny that education may be sectarian, so far as sectarian means Christian—they deny that education should be sectarian so far as it excludes the tenets of any body of Christians; so do I. All that I would maintain is, that we should have taught the leading doctrines of the religion of Christ, by those who believe in these doctrines. Give us this; and you may bury, for ever bury, the unhappy questions that sever the Christian world. Do not let them enter the educational question: They have done harm enough elsewhere, without doom-ing to starvation, in the midst of plenty, our soul-famished population.

But I am afraid that the objectors will not be satisfied with this method of settling the difficulty. They will say, “Who are Christians?” and “Who is to settle the point?”

Now I shall show them that the difficulties are not got rid off merely by confining the question to doctrines. There are difficulties in teaching morals, and if these difficulties do not interfere with the duty of teaching the one, as little should they prevent the teaching of the other.

We shall suppose that the teacher, in enforcing the love of truth, and the folly as well as wickedness and profanity of swearing, were to come to the expression “swear not at all.” Here is a moral duty strongly laid down, without reservation. But, in a class at all advanced, while bringing out the meaning of the precept, the teacher will be obliged to advert to the extent of the duty—and, either by implication or expressly, to show that it does not apply to a solemn oath in a court of justice. If he do

not do this, he is doing but half his duty. If he do, he is trenching on a sectarian point.

Again, there are some men who hold that the Sabbath has been abolished as a part of the moral law. Yet I presume that no teacher empowered to teach Scripture morality would hesitate to take for granted that it is not so abolished, if his instructions run for the time in that direction. Here is another sectarian point in morality.

Now, the questions connected with morality, and there are many such, said to be derived from Scripture, as community of goods, and others—must be settled by some one. Who is to settle them? I see no answer—shift your ground as you may, but—the state must in the exercise of its responsibility to God, and consulting the good of the people,—instruct the young in the *truths* of Christianity. It is true that the practical determination of the question, as stated before, will be in the hands of the people, but that does not alter the responsibility of the state—it ought to excite it the more to enlighten the people, who will determine.

There is thus sectarianism every where. Are there Atheists in the land? Then if their children are taught natural theology in school, you have sectarianism. Are there those who think natural theology contrary to Christianity? Then if their children are taught it, you have sectarianism. Are there Deists in the land? Then, if their children are taught Scripture morality, you have sectarianism. Are there those who deem morality adverse to religion? Then, if their children are taught mere morality, you have sectarianism. You can have no moral instruction without sectarianism.

Common sense shows, that if the state is to instruct the poor, it must decide for itself, with a reference to the truth, what it should teach the poor, without submission, although with all respect, to the notions of the poor.

If Christian morality is to be taught in schools, it cannot be helped that this gives superiority to a sect of men,

the Christian sect, and sectarianism is just as much an element of objection to the one scheme as to the other. It is no answer to say that the number is so small—for if the question is to be decided by number, the decision will still—and that is a matter of easy calculation—be on the side of the Protestant doctrines. It is no answer to say, that the state has a right to regulate the moral part of instruction, for you admit that doctrines have an influence upon morals. It is no answer to say, that these supposed objections are absurd. They may be absurd. But who is to judge? The state. Precisely so, the state is to judge. But no one makes some of the objections—the Atheist's for instance. But a principle is a principle. You ought to go through with it. If it be unjust in any case, it is unjust in his; and I do not see how you can carry on your system without injustice to some one, on your own principles.

We need not then hesitate to give the state the power of deciding as to what is essential to a sound system of moral instruction. And the state has already decided that the tenets of the Church of Scotland and of England are consistent with such a system.

Strip, then, these churches of all that separates them from other Protestant sects; in other words, remove from them the points affecting church government, and let their doctrines be taught—and taught abundantly in all our schools, that, with the blessing of God, our population may be nourished in Christian virtue.

I am at the same time aware that there are some—especially connected with the Church of England—who hold certain points of government, in which they differ from us, as essential to Christian Education. They may be essential to the proper maintenance of their church, but they are clearly not so to Christian Education. And as, on the one hand, I deem that the state should do its duty without submission to the groundless notions of some of the poor, I hold that it should do its duty with-

out reference to the groundless notions of some of the rich.

This, this would teach Christian charity a thousand times better than the non-commingling of Christian sects at all. It would teach all to bear with each other on points in which they differ, and to aid each other on points in which they agree.

Let there be, then, in every parish at least one teacher, whether a dissenter or not, who shall inculcate not only Christian morality, but the religious tenets of the Church of England, or the Church of Scotland, as contained in the catechisms of the several churches.

I know that the word *catechism* may alarm some, but there is nothing really alarming in it. If Christian morality is to be taught, we have seen that we must have some test or other of what the teacher intends to inculcate. In any case, then, the very lowest, you must have a test. What matters it whether it be catechism or not? It would be childish to object to a catechism merely because it is a catechism. The objection is to it as fixing the morals or the doctrines to be taught. But we have seen that we must fix the morals in some way. Why not fix the doctrines in the same?

There is an objection here which applies only to the method of teaching. It is that the catechism—especially of the Church of Scotland—is too abstruse for the young. I shall consider that soon in reference to the best method of teaching Scriptural knowledge. I am now treating of it as a test of that which the teacher believes, and, therefore, will inculcate.

There is another, and a more serious objection,—but which is just another form of the general objection of sectarianism, and is held by, I believe, the Independents in Scotland and the Congregationalists in England,—that all tests of any kind are unscriptural, and that the Word of God alone should be taught. But I would respectfully submit that very opposite doctrines are drawn from the

Word of God, and that it behoves the state to see that truth only is inculcated. It cannot be said that the teacher must only enforce what he finds in the Word of God ; for even under this lurks sectarianism. You exclude the Roman Catholics, who will not—however there may be exceptions owing to the liberality of individual rulers in that church—allow the Bible to be read without note or comment, and of course would not permit the comments of any but members of their own church. If the Bible is used at all, then, you have sectarianism. You may have Socinian glosses, bringing out a meaning totally different from the obvious import of the words. I meddle not with individual Socinians, but I cannot see how you are to judge whether a teacher is to act thus or not, unless you use some test, and the best you can use is that of the catechisms of the two churches.

I leave it to some one acquainted with England to state how this would work there. But I know that in Scotland this would open up the door of the profession, as endowed by the state, to nine-tenths of the people. Many a dissenting teacher do I know who would be most usefully employed by any body of Christians, and I see no reason why we should exclude from this field worthy men because they hold opinions that do not interfere in the least with their educational usefulness.

But the use of these catechisms would exclude from the schools, it may be said, many who do not hold the tenets therein contained. Doubtless it would, if attendance on this class were compulsory. But I would propose that, in this respect, the parochial schools be taken as a model, and that attendance on this should be optional.

In other words, I hold it to be the duty of the state to furnish all with the means of sound doctrinal instruction, but to enforce it, directly or indirectly, on none.

I do not think this provision sufficient however. The great majority of those who do not attend the doctrinal department of instruction, might with profit attend a

regular class for instruction in Christian History and Morals. The state having done its duty in offering doctrinal instruction, is still not to be contented with its own efforts. Less than this it would be a betrayal of the sacred trust reposed in it by God to do—but it can do more. All may not choose to receive along with secular instruction the doctrines taught, but many will be inclined so to receive them, and many more to receive that which, next, the state can give, instruction in the literature of the Bible connected with its history and morality. In this class they may be allured to inquire for themselves, and, struck with its excellencies, to seek elsewhere—if not in school—a greater knowledge. In this class there should be no allusion to doctrines. It should be taught on the model of the British and Foreign Society Schools. History should be taught effectively in connexion with sacred geography,—moral lessons should be drawn,—the parts of Scripture should be compared so as to throw light on each other, and profane history should be used as far as connected therewith. No lesson should be taught without a reference to the moral instructions thence derived. And all should be made interesting from its application to the affairs of school and of life.

Still a number would be thus excluded,—Roman Catholics and Socinians especially. The former would object to the religion of the teachers, and the Bible without note or comment, and the latter—fortunately small in number—cannot submit to the obvious grammatical meaning of the words, and object to the retaining of one verse altogether. Shall we then exclude members of these bodies from the schools? I think not.

I should propose that attendance on this Bible class should also be optional. The state is bound to offer the means of instruction, but cannot enforce attendance.

The third branch left is that of Christian morals. This is indispensable. I may have occasion hereafter to consider how far it is safe to bestow secular without religious

instruction. But of this there can be no doubt, that secular without moral instruction is utterly unsafe, and that the state would act most unwarrantably if it were to commit the common interest to such a hazard.

There remains still the question of superintendence. How far inspectorship on the part of the government acting along with the established clergy may be practicable, I shall not take upon me to determine, although I should think it quite practicable, and in many respects desirable. In Scotland, the inspectors would report to the Presbyteries, and through them to the Synods and the General Assembly. In England, I doubt not that it might be done, though I am not prepared to mention any precise way.* But the superintendence of the established clergy is essential to the success of this or any other scheme of instruction. The great pity is that they superintend too little. And this is said without any disrespect to the dissenting clergy. It is not to make the established clergy a dominant body that this is proposed as essential. It is because they are established,—because endowed by the state, it is their duty, and because there must be some permanent body of men to look after the working of the moral part of the educational machinery. In Scotland they are identified with instruction ; and, if we owe any thing to our schools, we owe it to our Established Church. There need be no fear of sectarianism connected herewith. Let the schools be open as the day,—to churchman, dissenter, and infidel. Let the religious instruction be given as in the sight of heaven, and the grand effort of all be, to maintain a race of Christians, trained in Christian precept, and practice, and principle.

* These sentences were written last spring. Since then, inspectors have been appointed by government for both Scotland and England. In the former, the General Assembly have waved all opposition on that ground, and we learn from a statement lately made by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the House of Lords, that the English arrangements are satisfactory to the Church there.

This scheme includes a provision for doctrinal instruction, which does not imply the dominance of one sect in the ordinary sense of the term sect,—it excludes none from the benefits of the national system, or if it does, the few—such as Quakers and Jews—must provide their own schools. So far from fostering a spirit of tyranny or a sense of wrong,—so far from perpetuating religious differences, and engendering uncharitableness, it brings into one educational circle of charity those who, in any other way, would not be brought together at all, or would be brought together so as to know that they differed on points of religion, which, in reality of no essential importance to vital godliness, would be enshrined as part and parcel of Christianity.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Peculiar Necessity for Normal Schools in Scotland—Teachers—Their Qualifications—Discipline—Emulation—Justice—Rules for the Use of the Bible in Discipline—Four Grades of Pupils—Proposed Arrangement for teaching them Revealed Morality, Morality and History, Doctrine—Specimens of teaching Morality and History.

IN order to effect the success of such a system as that which I have ventured to propose, we must attend carefully to the teachers, the discipline, and the instruction given. I can only touch upon a few leading points. The whole efficiency depends upon normal schools. These are essential to the success of any plan for general education. As to England, there is no doubt of this. And in Scotland, the circumstances which somewhat relieved though they did not remove the necessity, are fast disappearing.

In this country it was usual for students, who sought advancement in the church, to aspire to it through means of teaching. They supported themselves either by giving private lessons, or by teaching parish schools, or others, while pursuing their studies, leaving them in the winter season under the care of some substitute, and after they were licensed to preach, teaching till an appointment offered. Many who began their studies for the church, discouraged, or changing their views, stopped midway, after receiving the benefit of the literary classes in our universities. Others, licensed to preach, gradually abandoned all hope of a church appointment, and settled down quietly in their schools. Although all this by no means fulfilled what may be expected from normal schools, it secured a certain *quantum* of scholarship, and, from their habits of private teaching in towns, an acquaintance with methods pursued in the best schools in the country, resorted to by their

private pupils. The new state of things in Scotland, while advantageous to the cause of education if rightly improved, will considerably injure it if proper means be not employed. The course of clerical preparation does not now afford such facilities for chance theological adventurers, and there is more abundant employment, withdrawing from the field of school instruction those who are more inclined to labour in that of the church. This source of supply of well educated men, then, is beginning to be stopped. And we must look around us for a remedy. Much as has been said and even done for education of late, it will be a strange thing if the next generation is positively inferior to this in the race of active and well instructed teachers.

And all this is applicable even though teachers have not a distinct art,—it has a reference principally to the acquirements of teachers as men of learning. But there can be no doubt, that in addition to this we ought to have regard to their acquirements as men of professional skill. The teacher has to do with the most subtle and difficult element, the human mind. He has to do with it in all its parts, and he has immense influence over it. He may, by dint of long practice, learn certain means of acting upon it in the way in which he wishes. But, before he has attained that point, he may have done mischief in a thousand different forms. Teachers, like all other men, are apt to get wedded to their own system, be it good or bad. And it is a point deserving of grave consideration, that diverse as are the arts of procuring intellectual progress, energetic men, of the most opposite methods, may both equally succeed. *It is for the moral influence of instruction that normal schools are principally required.* It is here that we must plant our standard. We do not demand normal schools so much for the purpose of training teachers to impart secular knowledge, that is not so difficult an art as the other; we demand them, that teachers may be trained to impart secular knowledge, so as not to

injure but to improve the moral state of the young. The energetic teacher with the rod may flog into high scholarship the youths about him. They may even be fond of him, and fond of learning. For there is no mistake greater than to suppose, that pupils in general dislike a severe teacher. They dislike an unjust teacher,—and, above all, they dislike teacher and learning, if they do not see him anxious for their progress, or do not feel themselves advancing. But our considerations ought to be directed to something higher than these mere likings. The rod, whose wielder has not been disliked, may have implanted cruelty, cowardice, deceit, malice in the heart. The soothing indulgence may have deadened the energy of moral power, and produced a mediocrity of virtue, a dull contentedness, and paltering with vice. The literature may have been learned, and immorality along with it. It is well to have knowledge, but it is better to have virtue.

A teacher then, may, by repeated trials, arrive at skill in imparting knowledge, who is all the while acting on a system subversive of moral excellence. What mischief may thus be done cannot be calculated. But it behoves us, with this special object in view, to labour for the attainment of normal schools, where teachers shall be trained in the best methods of acting upon the intellect through a sound use of the moral feelings, and on the moral feelings through the intellect.

I submit, therefore, the following brief remarks, only to bring out more fully the nature of the scheme which I have proposed in the preceding chapter. Let us all give in our subscription to the common stock of instructional knowledge, that the time may come when, under God's blessing, intellect and morality and religion shall hand in hand visit with their gifts the remotest hamlets and the most obscure alleys of our country.

For myself, I am aware that this scheme is liable to objections on both sides. I have to fortify my position against those who belong to the church, and those who

belong to the liberal party. 'I have hitherto been labouring against the latter. The cause which I espouse—that of religious instruction—is dear to the former, but they may not acquiesce in my method of disposing finally of the question. In my endeavour to reconcile the two extremes, I may be successful with neither. Some one must. He who succeeds shall be entitled to the praise of being not only a true but a successful lover of his country. This is a noble object, and I shall try.

The provision for religious instruction should be full, and as perfect as it can be made, both in the quantity and quality. The teachers should be men, as far as possible, who not only know their Bible, but who love it, who not only have God's law on their tongues, but his fear in their hearts. We have no security otherwise for the teaching of religion in connexion with morality. Their duty is, not on certain stated occasions to expound the word, but practically to enforce it. They are exposed to the constant, keen, and curious gaze of many inquiring eyes. It is one thing for a man on great occasions to think seriously on God's message, and another to have it always before him as the rule of life. Unless this be the real spirit of the teacher, it will be vain for him to attempt to make it appear so. The control of the tongue—of the passions—of the temper, enjoined by the word of God, is not easy at any time. Still less is it so, when there are so many combining causes, as there are in every school, to take the temper of a teacher by storm. When he is least on his guard, he may require to be most guarded. A word—a look, may lead those whom he is endeavouring to impress with a sense of the importance of divine things, to suspect him, and to lose that confidence in his own belief so essential to induce them to consider as valuable, and worthy to be acted on, the precepts given. It is impossible to maintain a constant conflict of this kind. It is easy enough for a teacher of a given faith to maintain the dogmas of that faith, to which his understanding has given

its assent. But it is not merely this that is required in school. Here our youth are to be trained in the constant exemplification of the rules of the gospel—not only when offences are committed, but in the disciplining of the intellect, in the working of the mind, in the thousand little matters which constitute a schoolboy's life. It may be impossible, in this as in other cases, to tell whether the teacher have or have not the love of God in his heart, but we should aim at securing such teachers. Immorality—open immorality—is of course so utterly out of the question, that it does not require our notice. But in inculcating the spirit of holiness, we should endeavour to procure men who have that spirit themselves.

Seeing that the object of the religious instruction given in schools is to teach the young active morality in life, by principle, by precept, and by practice, we must take care that the whole discipline of the schools has a regard to Scripture rules. It is not my present object to enter into a full exposition of discipline, but there are certain great principles on which it ought to be conducted. Love ought to be the ruling principle breathed into all its enactments, and discoverable by the pupil himself, even in his punishment. But not the mere sentiment or feeling of love—that sickly dislike to probe the wound, or administer the medicine, which rather suffers the sore to gangrene, and the patient to die, than inflict salutary pain. It should be rational, considerate love—not that maudlin, spurious, puling affection which hesitates, and whines, and ruins, but that genuine, prompt, and watchful love, which decides, and acts, and saves. For this, we must have teachers, not only imbued with the love of God, but warm in their affections, possessed of good temper, and prompt and resolute. Give us such teachers, with the requisite intellectual qualities,—information, readiness of expression and illustration, and good sense, and we shall have a band of men who, interesting themselves in the young, will lead the young to be interested in and love and imitate them.

No quantity of theoretical knowledge of the mind will do without those, and with those we shall have a practical knowledge, more valuable far than theory. I am demanding many qualities of teachers, but numerous as those requirements are, they are very insignificant, compared with the pictures of the men, drawn in our books on education as the only fit conductors of the education of the young. Each man seems to sit down, and place before his eyes a philosopher fully equipped with all the apparatus of every science—a scholar armed with the essences of all kinds of literature—an orator wielding at his will a young democracy, and having fashioned him *secundum artem*, he bids him go forth and—teach a national school! Now, this is unwise. If we are to wait till we get these paragons, we shall never have any system at all. Let us confine our hopes to the procuring of men pious, good-tempered, firm, moderately informed, apt at expression and illustration—and we need not despair. Such men, trained to teach on certain great and leading principles, may safely be left to themselves to adapt their instructions and discipline to the capacity and wants of the young, according to the varying circumstances of the various localities in which their schools may be placed.

Much has been written about the propriety and impropriety of admitting emulation into our schools,—a question, though bearing much on the best means of forwarding intellectual education, also intimately connected with moral training. If the inquiry had been how far we should employ emulation, how regulate or how restrain it, I could understand it. But I cannot understand any inquiry as to whether we should employ emulation at all. We cannot help ourselves if we would. Emulation will find its way into all schools, though you shut the door, and prescribe rules to keep it out. It enters in the heart of each pupil. And the only way to have no emulation is to have no pupils—or only one. Schools there have been, even are, where the teachers profess to act upon no-emulation prin-

ciples, and point as examples of their success to the eagerness with which pupils answer questions. "How is that eagerness produced?" By judicious praise. "And they are wishing to gain the judicious praise?" Surely. "May one get more praise than another?" To be sure. "Are they exerting themselves each one to gain the greatest quantity of it?" Exactly so. And this is not emulation! If there be not praise openly expressed, there will be praise shown by the look and the smile. We cannot banish emulation. Why should we? We are training the young to go forth to the world, not with their feelings eradicated, but preserved and directed to right objects in their youth. Our inquiry ought to be—and it is a fair one—how can we best regulate emulation? How can we best restrain it from being turned into the bitterness of hate and envy and despair? We must inculcate love to our fellow-beings,—must strive to inspire such an estimate of moral worth as distinguished from mere intellectual acquirement, as, associated in the minds of the young with their practice, shall enable them to encounter unharmed the endless strife of opposing interests, and while it habituates them to keen intellectual exertion, shall ever combine with it the softening influence of moral peace.

I need not say that justice should preside, not only in reality, but in appearance, in all the actions of the teacher. He should have two great objects in view,—to train the young to obedience, and to habituate them to self-government. By violent means he may secure the show of the former, and by laxity of discipline that of the latter. But it is not the show we wish but the reality,—we wish the ready obedience of love, based on reason, carried on in reason, and ending in the habits of rational subordination. The scholar should be made to know distinctly his place, his duties, his rights, and his privileges. He should acquire the habit—not of sitting in judgment on the rules laid down by his teacher—but of knowing why they are made, and what is their motive. He should often be called upon

to act voluntarily, and no censure should be called forth by his refusing. He should not see in his teacher an ever-prying spy, but a rational and affectionate friend, whose power over him he acknowledges to be reasonable, and he knows will not be exerted except for his good. The great ruling principle that ought to guide the teacher is to view in each pupil a growing soul, with all its affections, passions, conscience, reason, and judgment,—to consider that however undeveloped they may be, they are there,—that he has not a machine before him, which he can beat and drive and injure as he pleases, but a spirit immortal like his own, a fellow-being, capable of happiness, and alas! capable of misery. Let each teacher, thus acting, look to himself, and, becoming identified with the growing man before him, let him respect his pupil, as possessing his Maker's image, and endeavour to cause that pupil to respect himself. The boy should learn to trust himself, and he never can be taught to do so, if his teacher find or resolve to find him in one perpetual lie. He should learn to distrust himself, and he never can acquire this unless he be partly left to the biddings of his own will. The virtues of the placid boy, who through fear would not offend a law—unless by stealth—are not to be depended on in the rough contests of the world. We must harden some and soften others; and we do not know whom to harden and whom to soften, if all are reduced to a dead level by the perpetual lash—or the perpetual task—or even the perpetual frown.

In all our discipline, we must connect the duties of the school with the word of God. But this must be done with caution and skill. If a teacher be guided in his own conduct by the precepts of the gospel, there will be little fear of erring in their application to others. But there are some great principles which, occasionally, even sincere men forget, and in their forgetfulness do mischief. Some of them are these :—

Be consistent in acting upon your own inferences from Scripture rules.—A young friend of mine was present at

the religious instruction given by one of the most eminent teachers of the day. The lesson was the fifth commandment, in the course of explaining which, the duties which we owe to inferiors came to be discussed. One inference which the teacher drew from the commandment, and the divine maxim "to do unto others as we would that others should do unto us," was, that expressions of contempt to inferiors were contrary to the spirit of God's law. He instanced such expressions as not only were opprobrious in themselves, but opprobrious in their intention—such as a master calling an Irish servant by the name of Pat, by way of contempt. My friend was delighted with this method of practical instruction, as well he might. But imagine his surprise at his next visit, when he heard this very teacher exclaiming to an Irish boy, one of the boys who had been so taught—"Get quickly to your place, Pat,"—the angry scowl on the boy's face, indicating his perception of the wrong done him.

Let all your rules be consistent with the Word of God.—In a work containing much useful information, and giving an account of the system pursued in a certain distinguished seminary, we are told by the conductors, that, after a fruitless attempt to abolish pugilistic contests among their pupils, they had thought it better—since it was impossible to put an end to them—to legalize them. They therefore, after attempts made to reconcile the parties, allow them, in presence of a tutor and none else, to end the quarrel by blows. I must dissent from the propriety of this measure, because it is opposed to the will of God. Let nothing in any shape appear, either in enactment or toleration, opposed to that will. You loosen else the bonds of all obligation.

Never make part of school-duty what you cannot enforce.—Most of the errors connected with discipline arise from the neglect of this principle. It does not mean that you are not to recommend any such duties; but you are not to command them, and thereby expose to the evils

of disobedience and deceit. Commands partaking of this error are occasioned by an ignorance of human nature. They end in the express or tacit abandonment of the order. But, previously to this abandonment, there is much moral mischief done. Punishment is inflicted—deceit is perpetrated—and the heart is hardened. The very abandonment inflicts injury, by giving an impression of vacillation in the governing power, and of the effects of passive resistance. In such a case, the best plan is not to give up the matter in silence, but candidly to state the reason, that the pupils may know that there will be no vacillation in cases where the same objection does not apply. Thus a teacher may enforce the reading at home of a portion of the Scriptures, for he can ascertain the fulfilment of that duty by examination on the passage given out to be read. But he cannot enforce secret prayer. He can recommend it, and he can do so by the various illustrations of a child and a father, a subject and a king, a criminal and a judge, and the other topics which the Scriptures suggest. To inquire into the actual performance of this duty would, except in special circumstances and cases, be productive of harm—and to enforce it by punishment of any kind, harshness of look, word, or deed, would be certain to produce hypocrisy and guilt. Many cases must occur to my reader similar to this, which he can apply for himself.

Be cautious in all cases which are connected with doubtful motives.—Your whole object is to implant right motives. But remember that this is not in your power, either in the way of discovering wrong motives in doubtful cases, or in eradicating them, or in forming correct ones. Even in cases that are not doubtful, as when a boy is clearly convicted of a moral offence—for instance a lie—you can hardly, by any possibility, discover the whole, though you may conjecture, with tolerable accuracy, the greater part of that which urged him on. You check moral delinquencies and punish them, not because you know the motive, but because, whatever it may be, it

proves a forgetfulness if not a daring violation of the law of God. If you could implant remembrance of that law, you would. But you cannot, and you do what is in your power; whilst recommending and enjoining it, as far as you can, you command an outward respect to the truth. You give the precept, and you command the practice. You cannot secure the connexion between the precept as guiding the practice. And therefore you must not inquire, in each specific case, if truth were told through a love to God. You may take general cases, and illustrate how it ought to be—and see that it is understood—and acted on so far as you can see that it is acted on, and there your duty ends: if you go farther you are wrong.

Even in cases that seem not to be doubtful, great caution is required in judging of motives. There occurred in a school, on one occasion, the following case of discipline:—A boy complained that his jacket, had been cut in several parts with a knife, by some boy seated behind him. The boys behind all denied the commission of this offence. The teacher was particularly grieved on account of the falsehood, as truth had been a characteristic of that class, up till that time. There was, however, a stranger among the rest, who was seated directly behind the boy; and, on inquiry, there was no doubt as to his guilt. Here, then, was an apparent love of mischief, with no conceivable motive but the love of it, and lying, with the apparent motive of dread of punishment. Strong as the evidence was, and undoubted as was the fact, he was examined, lest any mistake should be made in the punishment. His defence—for he defended himself—was a singular one. He said that he was utterly unconscious of having done it, but that, after the evidence, he could not deny that he had. An investigation took place, which proved to the satisfaction of all, that he was not in the habit of lying, that he was subject to absence of mind, and that his story was in all probability correct. He was properly warned of the folly of neglecting consequences—he was shown, that although

he was not guilty of the graver offences which were seemingly imputable to him, he was not free from blame—he was reminded that a man is as guilty who neglects the use of a talent as he who abuses it. He became sensible of his error, was grateful for the considerateness with which he had been treated, and, when falling into his old fits, awoke himself by the remembrance of the knife and the jacket.

In all cases of doubt, do not attribute bad motives.—Such are cases, where an individual, from a love of order, or a love of slander, that miserable tattling so common to some of the young, reports the faults of others. The motive may be evident, as when the accuser has threatened with revenge the accused, and takes this method of avenging. But, in general, it will be impossible to detect this. Now it will do harm to attribute specific instances to bad motives. Show the duty, *judge not that ye be not judged*, by as many illustrations as you can, and hence teach them by your example,

Not rashly to impute motives to others.

The whole question of motives connected with education is a most interesting one. And it is in endeavouring to implant them, or not attending to them at all, that the grossest errors are committed. We must remember, that the oftener a motive acts upon the mind, the more power it has—and that the oftener it fails, the less.

In all cases of motive, we must remember the limit of our power. The whole is included in our third maxim—never to make a part of school-duty what it is not in our power to enforce. If this rule be kept steadfastly in view, we shall run little risk of erring in the application of the Scriptures. If not, we shall err constantly. I have seen a teacher go round a whole room of 100 boys and girls, and ask each of them, “Do you believe in the Lord Jesus Christ?” The universal answer—as might be expected—was, Yes,—and with great self-satisfaction, the teacher dismissed them, as if he had not taught 100 children to lie, and, to the

manifest effect of hardening their conscience, both asked the question and dictated the answer. But with these cautions, *Use the Bible without abusing it.*

Beware how you use Scripture appeals, so as to harden the conscience, by prematurely taking its place.—Conscience, with its suggestions in the young, prompts to good, and dissuades from evil. If the mind disregard conscience, it will be with a pang, great at first, then gradually less, till evil is indulged in without remorse. Now, your object is to enlighten and stimulate conscience, but not to take its place. You can tell the young how they ought to walk—you can tell them why they ought to walk so—and you can give them tests to know this. You can see that they understand you, and you can habituate them, partly in seeming, and partly in reality, to obey the dictates of conscience. And, if you get them to obey it in reality, at least in as far as it prompts them to respect outwardly the law of God, you have hopes of God's blessing effecting a renewed will, and a conscience sensitive of right and wrong. But if you go further, and usurp an inspection of the heart which you can never have, and act as if you possessed a power which you never can possess, you do irreparable injury. You use a weak right motive, rendered as strong as you can make it, to conquer a strong wrong motive, in ignorance of the strength of motives. You fail. The wrong motive has conquered, has acquired additional strength from your ignorance and from temptation furnished by you—conscience has been disobeyed—clamours—is silenced—and the mind sinks in degradation.

For there is this clear consequence of every fresh deed of guilt committed, that the mind—though the conception of guilt is in itself criminal—has acquired an impulse downwards. The guilt is the same as if it had not actually been perpetrated, but when committed, the consequences follow, dependent on that commission.

I was present at the examination of a boy before his teacher. The boy was accused of stealing a shilling. The

presumptive evidence was strong—brought principally by his father. The young culprit denied the offence vehemently, and as perseveringly did the father insist on his guilt. The teacher, in utter ignorance of the boy's nature, acted prematurely on his conscience; he adjured him, as in the presence of God, to tell the truth. The boy stoutly, as in the presence of God, denied. At last proof was brought, which put the case beyond all doubt, and the boy confessed that he had not only stolen, but lied. There was wrong done here of a serious kind. The boy was self-convicted, not of the simple lying, but of perjury. He had descended one step deeper. As long as he lied to his own conscience, which told him the same truth as the teacher, he was guilty—but his guilt lay in yielding to a strong temptation, with a conscience urging a solemn truth, though with feeble utterance, the presence of God being forgotten in all probability—at all events unfelt.

That solemn truth brought before his conscience was disregarded, and he was advanced by this injudicious procedure one step in the road to crime. He could listen, with great unconcern, after a few such trials, to all appeals to the Scripture truths of God's omniscience. Had he been told of this afterwards, conscience would have urged it home as a truth forgotten, not violated.

In truth, these special appeals are highly dangerous with the young in most cases. The best plan is to make all personal appeals depend on the clearest knowledge—and ever in the most manifest affection—and in private. Some faults require to be checked by public appeals—but then that is best done by cases where the person guilty can feel the appeal, and yet the hardening effects of public exposure are not manifest.

There is a method of abusing the Bible, *by pushing its statements further than they will go*. How much mischief has the story of Ananias and Sapphira done! It was needful in the early days of the church, to make an example of hypocritical professors, as, through them the

safety of the sacred cause was endangered. And they lied not unto men, but unto God. The most, then, which ought to be made of this case is, that God is sore displeased with liars—not that he punishes liars with instantaneous death. Yet how often is it used to instil this! The young mind is thus injured. Lies are told, and death does not follow till the whole incident is considered as one which teachers use to frighten them, as their mothers perhaps were wont to terrify them into good conduct, by the fears of a certain black man, who was to come and carry them away if they were not good. There is, surely, enough of precept and illustration in God's Word, without unnaturally forcing it till it becomes useless in injudicious hands.

In formal moral teaching, and as much as possible in incidental moral teaching, *do not dissever moral lessons from the sanctions with which they are invariably accompanied in the Word of God.*

Look at the most perfect specimen of moral teaching that man has ever known—the wonder of philosophy—the delight of Christianity—the cause of as great a change in moral studies as the revelation of God's creative power has effected in natural—the Sermon on the Mount. You will be able conveniently to divide that into nine parts. The first is the pronouncing of a blessing from on high on those whose hearts are right with God. There is no doubt of the sanction here. The next is the declaration of the duty imposed on all followers of Christ to show themselves as such openly and boldly, and to manifest this in their actions, *that glory may redound to God the Father of all.* The third is an express sanctioning of the moral law. And what says the moral law? "*For I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house of bondage.*" But the third does more, it opens up the spirituality of the law—that it extends to motive—and is enforced by the consideration, "*Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.*" The fourth is unostentatiousness in the dis-

charge of religious duties, "*Thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.*" The fifth is deadness to the inordinate cares of the world, "*Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness.*" The next is charity, enforced by a reference to the judgment of God, "*That ye be not judged.*" The seventh, discretion, enjoined by a respect to what is holy—*divine*—that we should not expose it to pollution. The eighth is prayer, the very essence of which *is a strong wish expressed to and confidence reposed in God.* And the last is, that works are the test of faith and love, "*He that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven.*"

You see that in every part there is a reference from moral duty to God, teaching not natural morality, but moral duty, which is so because it is pleasing in God's sight. Let us be guided by this, and in all our moral teaching refer to the obedience which we owe to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Look to the method in which the apostles inculcated moral duty. Does Paul wish to teach the duty that wives owe to their husbands? he says, "*Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord.*" Does he treat of the respect due by children to their parents? "*Children obey your parents in the Lord.*" Surely this was a duty which of all others natural morality was the best able to teach—but it is taught *in the Lord.* "*Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart, as unto Christ; not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good-will doing service as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free.*" And how does he close? "*Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might.*"

Beware, on the other hand, of ever diminishing the

sense of accountability.—A few years ago, a boy was absent from school for a day, and, when he returned, brought a note as from his father, which his teacher saw at a glance had been written and signed by himself. His teacher told him to repair to an adjoining apartment, and, after pondering in solitude on his conduct, to write an account of how he had been engaged during the previous day, and his own impressions on the subject—giving no hint of his knowledge of the guilt incurred, further than what was furnished by the nature of the order. The boy brought in a short time a note, wherein he stated, that the devil had tempted him, by the beauty of the day, to play truant; that while revolving how he was to conceal this, the devil again suggested to him to forge the note, and thus escape punishment. He confessed that he was guilty, and submitted to any penalty that might be inflicted. Numerous motives might have mingled in this—partly remorse—partly a certainty of detection—and partly fear of exposure to his father. But, though he confessed his guilt, it was clear that he had no distinct notion that he was responsible. He had conjured up the devil as the cause of all, and the case required severe punishment to convince him that man is accountable for yielding to temptation, however strong.

Hence, although it belongs to the doctrinal part, yet we may here introduce a rule of great importance, of which the foregoing rule is but a part, *Never teach doctrine without combining it with precept.* There is no doctrine but has its counterpart, or rather many counterparts. Do you teach original sin? Enforce humility and watchfulness. Do you teach the atonement? Enforce the display of gratitude to the Saviour of man. Do you teach justification? Enforce the duty of loving him who hath procured us pardon, and of showing our love by keeping his commandments. Do you teach sanctification? Enforce the duty of working out our own salvation with fear and trembling. Do you teach the doctrine of adoption? Enforce the duty of walk-

ing worthily of that high vocation whereunto we are called. Do you teach the humiliation of Christ? Enforce the duty of imitating him who for our sakes became poor, that we through his poverty might be rich—in deeds of active beneficence, so far as in our power.

The machinery of the national schools will depend upon local circumstances. Supposing an infant and a juvenile school in each parish, I should suppose that there may be conceived to be four grades of pupils—one in the infant school—one from six to nine,—another from nine to twelve—and another from twelve to fifteen in the juvenile.

I. In the infant schools, where reading is not systematically taught, the moral part must be—and may easily be, as it is at present—taught orally, and applied to the cases which occur in school and in the playground—which latter seems indispensable to all well organized schools, whether infant or juvenile. One day in the week—say Saturday—may be given to the doctrinal instruction, which must be simple, and yet may be easily understood. The great doctrines to be taught should be, that we are all sinners, and that Christ died for our sins. These are easily made intelligible—in a profitable degree—to children, and thus a foundation is laid for more.

II. In the juvenile schools, the pupils may begin to learn the moral law, both as laid down in the decalogue, and unfolded by Christ and his apostles. The parables should be resorted to, care being taken that no attempt is made to insinuate doctrine—this being contrary to the offer made to the parents. But they should be constantly—as before developed—referred to the Lawgiver, the God of revelation, and to his sanctions. With them should commence a class for systematically teaching the history and the morals of the Bible. For this purpose the New Testament should be put into their hands—and while the teacher confines himself in his examination to the obvious meaning of the words, he should not hesitate to draw forth that obvious meaning.

In teaching doctrines to this class, they should begin to get the easier parts of the catechism, that they may be able readily to understand what is meant by such words as adopted, justified, sanctified, the humiliation of Christ, baptism, the Lord's Supper, and others, the understanding of which is necessary to their comprehension of the language of Christians.

III. The teaching of morals will go on in the other two divisions as before, with a reference to the Will of God, but not to doctrine. That it is possible to do this—and also to teach morality and history, as a regular part of a school-course, without trenching on diversities of opinion, with the exceptions made before, has been abundantly proved, in the experience of the British and Foreign Schools. To satisfy my reader, on this point, I shall sub-join at the end of this chapter specimens of instruction, as they actually took place, that he may judge of the value of this kind of teaching. Examples of the same kind are given in other books, but I wish that my reader may have the whole matter at once under his eye.

The morality and history, from nine to twelve, may be taught from the Old Testament, in conjunction with the New, and with geography.

The doctrinal part may now be taught with the aid of the whole catechism.

IV. The morality and history, from twelve to fifteen, may embrace a connected view of the history of the world, especially of the Jews, till the destruction of Jerusalem, with incidental notices from profane history, and references to the history of the Church, and geography.

The doctrinal part may be taught with a fuller explanation of the catechism, and the various points should be proved from Scripture.

I have said nothing of details. As a general rule, whatever is the best method of communicating secular knowledge, is the best method of communicating religious. That the pupils should be interested in their pursuits—

that they should understand, so far as it is possible and profitable, that being the *minimum* standard—what they are learning—are now truisms in all instruction, and should be so in religious. Whether that is to be done by pictures, the elliptical and simultaneous method, the monitorial system, or how, we shall easily be able to settle—if *once we get the schools*. Only, let the Bible be used as a book for teaching to read, and let not the catechism, of any denomination, be employed, till its easier parts can be understood.

And, above all, whatever be our scheme—whether this or any other, let us begin it, carry it on, and end it, with earnest prayer to God for his blessing, “that the generation to come, even the children which shall be born, may set their hope in God, and not forget the works of God, but keep his commandments.”

The following are specimens of the methods in which the instruction above recommended—historical and moral—may be given, and of the possible result. It is only necessary to premise, that the specimens are taken from actual answers, noted down at the time of examination—the age of the children concerned in the first being from six to eight, to whom the passage was first carefully read, and explained *by examination*—and that of those in the second from twelve to fifteen, the extremes having been purposely chosen.

EXAMINATION I.—1 KINGS xvii. 1—7.

(Communicated by a Friend.)

The Facts of the Passage were first examined upon.

What is the name of the person a part of whose history we have now examined? Elijah.

He is called Elijah the —? Tishbite.

Was he an Israelite? Yes, sir.

Do you know his father's name? No, sir.

His mother's? No, sir.

Are we told any thing of his parents, or of his youth?
No, sir.

What is the first thing mentioned of him? That he told the king that there was to be no rain or dew for a long time.

What king? Ahab.

He was king over—? Israel.

What is a king? A man that governs all his folk.

What is to govern? To rule*—to command—to make them do things—to make them obey the laws.

What kind of man should a king be? A right man—a good man—a quiet man—a man who is not angry nor wicked—who keeps God's commandments—a man who sets all his people a good example.

Was Ahab a king of this sort? No, sir—he was a wicked king.

How do you know? Because you told us that he prayed to false gods, and that the Bible says he did more things to make God angry than all the kings before him.

How would you know a man to be a wicked man? If he did bad things he would be a wicked man.

Can you tell me any very wicked thing Ahab had something to do with? Yes—he wanted to get a man's garden, and the man would not sell it to him, and because the man would not sell it he was killed.

Did Ahab kill him? No, sir.

Who? His wife made him be killed.

Whose wife? Ahab's.

Made whom be killed? The man that had the garden.

What was Ahab's wife's name? Jezebel.

But how do you say then that Ahab had any thing to do with killing him? Because he wanted the garden,

* In such passages the answers are put down as given by different pupils.

and it was to please him that the man was killed—for the king took the pet and would not eat his dinner.—Just like if I was wanting something from a boy, and he would not give me it, and my brother was to hit him and take it from him, and then that would be my fault.

Well, we have seen that Ahab was a wicked king; would he set his people a good example? No, sir.

Would they be good do you think? No, sir.

Right. But why? Because they would just do wicked things like the king, and say,—Oh! what need we care? that's what the king does.

Would this be right in them? No, sir—we should not do ill because we see other folk do it.

Do you think you could find out any lesson that we may learn from the people doing wicked things because the king did so? We should not do wicked things, because we may make other persons do the same.

We have seen that Ahab was a wicked person, and so was his wife Jezebel—What is the name of the other person we mentioned? Elijah.

What did he tell Ahab? That there would be no rain.

Had that taken place at the time when he told Ahab? No, sir.

Was it to happen some time after? Yes, sir.

This was telling something that—? Was going to happen.

What do you call a man who tells things that are to happen? A prophet.

Well, if I tell you that the sun is going to rise to-morrow, do you think I am a prophet? No, sir.

Why not? Because you don't know if the sun will rise or not.

But if the sun does rise after I have told you so, am not I a prophet? No, sir,—you just guess because the sun rises every day; but you are not sure if it will rise to-morrow.

Then a prophet must tell something that we would not expect to — ? Happen.

And something that who alone could tell ? God.

Was this thing that Elijah told Ahab, a thing that we would expect to happen, and that a man could tell ? No, sir.

How did Elijah know then ? God told him.

Was there any danger do you think in telling Ahab that there would be no rain ? Yes, sir.

Why ? Because Ahab would maybe kill him ?

Did he kill him ? No, sir.

Why ? Because Elijah fled.

Why did he flee ? God bade him.

Did it happen as Elijah had said ? Yes, sir.

Then there would be no — ? Rain.

Would not that be fine ? Yes, sir : it would be fine, for we could always play out and not get wet.

But what would you do for water ? We could get plenty in the rivers and in the sea.—Here a boy, who had been thinking over the previous question, said,—No, sir, it would not be fine, for we would get no corn to grow, and no potatoes,—and we would not get our faces and hands washed.

But we have just been told that we could get plenty of water in the sea and in the rivers.—But the rivers would be dried up, for it says the brook Cherith was dried up.

Well, but then the sea ? We could not make ready our meat with it.

Why ? Because it has a nasty taste—it is salt—for when I was down at Gullane* I tasted it.

There was something besides rain mentioned ? Dew.

What is that ? The wet we see on the grass in the mornings.

You recollect I told you where it comes from ? The heat out of the ground.

* A bathing-place on the coast of East Lothian.

How does it become water? The cold air makes it. Just like the lesson we were reading last Tuesday about the steam from the kettle turning into water when Willy held the cold teaspoon to it.

In what kind of nights have we dew? When it is clear and there are no clouds.

What do you expect when you see dark clouds? Rain. When there are no clouds? Dew.

In the daytime? No, sir.

When? At night.

Well, if there are no clouds there will be no—? Rain.

But there will likely be—? Dew.

If there be clouds there will likely be—? Rain.

And—? No dew.

In this case, whether was there to be rain or dew? Neither.

What was the reason that there was to be neither rain nor dew? Because the king and the people were wicked.

Then this was a what for their sin? A punishment.

I have often told you that people who break laws may expect to be punished, and you see how Ahab and the people were punished. Do you remember any persons' names of whom we have read in our Bible Lessons who were punished for disobedience and doing what was wrong? Yes, sir—Jonah—Jacob—Moses.

You recollect one very wicked thing Jacob did? He cheated his father, who was very old and could not see.

How? He, &c. (*narrating the story in their own simple way.*)

With what did he cheat his father? With kids.

Do you remember how his sons afterwards cheated him? Yes, sir—they, &c.

With what did they cheat him? A kid.

You see that Jacob's punishment was just to be cheated in the same way that he had cheated his—? Father.

What should we learn from all these persons being punished? That if we do ill we'll be punished too.

Does the punishment come always close after the sin ?
No, sir.

When of you do something wrong, do you get punished immediately ? No—not till Saturday.

Notice then, that although when you have done wrong you may not be punished immediately, the punishment is sure to come some time.

You told me a little ago that it happened as Elijah had said, and there was neither dew nor rain for how long ?
Three years and a half.

What would be the consequence ? Nothing would grow.

Then there would be a want of — ? Meat.

What do you call that ? A famine.

Had Elijah any food ? Yes, sir.

How did he get it ? God told him to go and live beside a brook called Cherith, and he would send ravens to feed him.

Was not this something strange—to be fed by ravens ?
Yes, sir.

Why ? Because they are greedy birds.

Did Elijah obey ? Yes, sir.

Did the ravens feed him ? Yes, sir—they brought bits of flesh and bread to him in the morning and at night.

If he had not obeyed, what do you think would have happened to him ? He would not have got any meat, and he would have died for want.

What should we learn from this ? To do what God bids us.

Why ? Because it's the best.

But was there not something more than bread and flesh needed ? Yes—water to drink.

Where did Elijah get water ? From the brook.

You see how kind God was to this good man, he gave him flesh and — ? Bread.

And — ? Water.

(Here a boy recollecting a paraphrase which he had some time before committed to memory, said—Sir, I know where God promises good people bread and water. He then repeated—

“ His dwelling ’midst the strength of rocks
Shall ever stand secure ;
His father will provide his bread,
His water shall be sure.”)

Then you see that Elijah got bread and water and something more. What should we learn from this? That God will take care of good people.

Now before we go farther, let us see if we recollect the lessons we should learn from this part of the history?

(Various pupils.) That when we do wrong we may expect to be punished.

Not to show others a bad example.

Not to bother our neighbours to give us anything which they do not wish to give away.

Not to take anything from our neighbours by force.

Not to do wicked things because others do.

But if you were to see big persons, or rich persons, or kings, doing them, might you not? No, sir.

Why? Because God forbids us.

Any other reason? That it is best to do what God bids us.

EXAMINATION II.—*Age about from 12 to 15.*

Subject—9th Chapter of John.—Cure of the man blind from his birth.

An examination first to ascertain the pupils' knowledge of the events.

What feeling ought we to entertain towards God for the enjoyment of sight? Gratitude.

Should our gratitude be merely felt? No, expressed.

Any thing more? We should keep his commandments.

What feelings ought we to entertain towards the blind? Pity.

Should we do no more? We should help them.

How can we do that? We can keep them from danger if we see them falling into it—we can keep people from mocking them.

Nothing more? We can instruct them.

Can you instruct them? No; but we can help societies that instruct them.

What are they instructed in by such societies? Reading, and writing, and arithmetic, and geography, and a knowledge of the Bible; and they make things for sale.

Have any blind people shown that they can be so instructed? A great many.

Have any been distinguished men? Homer, and Milton, and Blacklock, and others.

Are there any blind men in this town? Two.

Are they ever insulted? Yes; the boys sometimes insult them.

I will not ask you if you are among the boys who have insulted them; but I will remind you that you are violating God's law if you do. What is the great law that ought to guide us in all our intercourse with our fellow-men? To do unto others as we would wish them to do unto us.

Acting upon that law, I trust that you will be humane to all about you, and love your neighbour as yourselves.

Was Milton born blind? No; but Dr Blacklock was.

Why, do you think, is there notice of the man's being born blind taken here? To make the subsequent miracle more striking.

Why did the disciples ask if this man's parents had sinned, that he was born blind? Because it was the belief of the Jews that a man was punished for the sins of his parents.

Whence did they derive that doctrine? From the second commandment.

Repeat the words. "For I am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of fathers upon their children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."

Quite correct. They overstrained these words. What was one of God's objects in selecting the Jews? To keep his worship upon the earth.

What was the nature of his dispensation towards them? He visited them with affliction when they behaved ill, and with blessings when they behaved well.

What sort of blessings? Outward blessings.

Then does that method of dealing with men continue? Not always.

You say not always: is there any reason to suppose that it continues at all? Yes.

How? Good men behave better, and are healthier, and are more trusted.

Right. My dear young friends, you will soon go forth to the world, and you must first seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness, knowing that then—what? All else will be administered unto us.

With this feeling it is right that you should know that there are many temptations to which you will be exposed, and the most upright conduct will neither secure you against affliction nor misfortune. But you may assure yourselves that the true way even to worldly prosperity is in keeping the law of God. Do you remember any proverb that expresses this as to one part of duty? Honesty is the best policy.

What are we to think when affliction visits a man—that he has been a great sinner? No. That it is God's will, for his good.

On what authority do you state this? Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth.

Do you recollect any incident where our Lord reprehended the same spirit in his disciples? Yes. When

Pilate mingled the blood of the Galileans with their sacrifice.

What did he say on that occasion? He said that they were not greater sinners than the rest.

Did he refer to any accident that had happened? Yes. The tower of Siloam fell, and killed a good number.

What lesson did he draw from it? That they should repent.

Yes. This is one lesson that we may draw from an accident. You have heard of people being suddenly cut off—and you pitied them. And that was right. You should be warned. You and I cannot tell the manner of our death, and we should repent, lest—what? We all likewise perish.

We shall see immediately another lesson; but in the mean time, why did they ask if the man had sinned? How could he sin before he was born? Because the Jews believed in the transmigration of souls.

All of them? No; some of them.

What do you mean by the transmigration of souls? That the soul of a dead man passed into the body of a child, and lived there again.

Who held that doctrine among the ancient philosophers? The philosopher Pythagoras.

Who hold it now? The Hindoos.

Some of our Latin friends will tell us of a Latin poet who embodies it in a poem? Virgil, in the sixth book of the *Æneid*.

Express the transmigration of souls in one word.—The metempsychosis.

Did the Jews ever express the same opinion before? Yes, they asked if Jesus were Moses, or Elias, or that prophet.

What prophet did they mean? A prophet like Moses that they expected.

Quote the words. “A prophet like unto me shall the Lord your God raise unto you. Hear ye him.”

To whom does Moses refer? To Jesus.

How was Jesus like Moses? He wrought miracles, he taught the people, he prophesied, and he made laws.

Did he differ from him in any respect? Yes, he was greater than he. He was the Son of God.

Quote from this chapter. "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?"

Who was Elias? A prophet—Elijah the Tishbite.

How is he called sometimes Elias and sometimes Elijah? Because the Old Testament was written in Hebrew, and the New in Greek, and names are changed.

Mention any that you know. Noah is changed to Noe—Joshua to Jesus—Isaiah to Esaias.

You say that all the Jews did not hold the doctrine of the transmigration of souls? No, only the Pharisees.

Who were they? A sect among the Jews, very strict.

What is the meaning of the word Pharisee? A man separated from the rest.

Were they so? Yes—they fasted often, and prayed in public, and pretended to be holier than other people.

Does Christ praise or blame them? He blames them.

For what? Because they did it to be praised by men, and get money.

Yes—there is nothing more dangerous than to deceive ourselves. We are apt to think that we are better than other people, if we are more attentive than they to the mere outward observance of religion. Now it is right to attend to that, and I trust that you all do so. But your heart must be right with God, otherwise your seeming devotion is vain. If you are vain of being good, you are not good. The Pharisees judged others and despised them for not being so strict as themselves. But this was wrong. To our own master we stand or fall. Do you remember a parable of our Lord's showing the difference between a proud and a humble worshipper? Yes—the Pharisee and the Publican.

What was a Publican? A man that farmed the public revenue, or was hired to collect it.

What do you mean by a man that farmed the public revenue? The taxes were set up to auction like our tolls, and the man that offered the highest got them.

How did he gain? If he collected more than he paid, he gained; if not, he lost.

What effect had this on them? They tried to get as much as they could, and they were very much hated.

Is there any thing like that in this country? No—the tax-gatherers just get the money that they are bid.

Did you ever hear of tax-gatherers being ill-used? Often—they are often scolded.

Is that right or wrong? Very wrong.

Why? They are just doing their duty.

Very well. Now there are many people in the world who perform offices not agreeable to the community at large, but it is not their fault that they have sometimes to do disagreeable things. Cultivate the spirit of putting yourself in the place of such a man. The thing cannot be pleasing to him. Probably he does it from necessity—and it must be done. Never engage in such absurd conduct, remembering that we are all placed in life according to God's will. Let us submit to our own lot, and help others to do the same.

What other sect was there among the Jews? The Sadducees.

But this will be enough. The whole chapter was in this manner most minutely examined. The examinations having taken place nearly as they are given, they are not presented as any thing extraordinary, either in skill of examination or in profundity of answer. The questions were not all answered by all—but most of them could be. Much of the information was previously communicated—and care was taken that the moral lessons taught were understood, and so fixed in the mind that

the teacher could apply it in any case occurring in the course of discipline. The writer of this has spent many of his happiest hours in sitting among the young, and drawing forth their knowledge of the Bible, and fostering their feelings of morality, fixing their desires upon things divine. There are occasional discouragements. But he has always found, that, if the matter in its leading points was not remembered after one revisal, he had taken too high ground—had presumed too much on the seemingly matured intellects of those around him. But this and all other errors will be avoided by the judicious teacher after a little experience, when he is guided by a sincere love of God, and seeks his aid, and the teaching of his Spirit, at the throne of grace.

I have mentioned already that we should employ in religious instruction all the appliances that are used to further the progress of youth in secular knowledge. Among the most effectual of these is that of composition. The pupils, at the proper age, should be encouraged to write out their recollections of the instructions given, and any remarks that may occur to themselves from their own reading, or their own meditations. This is a most valuable engine in fixing truth on the memory, disciplining the intellect, and leading to serious thought. As a specimen, I subjoin an Exercise—written by a female pupil, fourteen years old—short, but sufficient to indicate its nature and use. It is not selected for any particular merit, but because I have just received it—and it is printed *verbatim* from the writer's copy.

THE LXXX. PSALM.—FIRST FIFTEEN VERSES.

THE psalmist commences with a prayer, addressing God as the Shepherd of Israel, and as Him who led Joseph as a flock. The Israelites being a pastoral people, there are many allusions to this occupation in Scripture. The flocks in the East are taught to follow the shepherd, and here

we find God represented as *leading* Joseph like a flock. It is to this practice that our Lord alluded, when he said, "My sheep know my voice, and they *follow* me." (John x. 27.) In the third verse the psalmist, confident that if God would condescend to give them a sense of his love, they should be safe, prays, "Turn thou us, and cause thy face to shine on us, and we shall be saved." The psalmist next expostulates with God, "How long wilt thou be angry against the prayer of thy people?" God's own people sometimes imagine that their prayers are not heard, because they do not receive an immediate answer to their petitions. But we know that if we ask aright what is in accordance with God's will, our petitions will be heard, and answered in His own time. Sometimes, however, God answers prayer in a different manner. Sometimes the believer's petitions are heard, but God withholds the grant of these requests, in order to confer greater blessings. But we have the authority of Scripture, that "all things work together for good to them that love God." The afflictions of the Israelites were so great, that the psalmist here represents them as being fed with the bread of tears, and being derided and mocked by their enemies. The psalmist next represents the Israelites under the allegory of a vine. The former inhabitants of the land were rooted out, in order to make room for this vine. The vine is a creeping plant, and stretches out its branches on all sides. It is much cultivated in the East, and wherever there was any shelvy rock, the people with much labour got earth conveyed to the top of it, with which they formed terraces, and on these terraces they cultivated the vine. It is to this practice that the psalmist alludes, when the vine is said to cover the hills with its shadow. The dominion of the Israelites is here represented by the branches of the vine as extending from the river, namely, the Euphrates (which is known in Scripture by this name) to the Mediterranean Sea. But the children of Israel having rebelled against God, the country was desolated by the

kings of other nations, Syria became, as it were, a thoroughfare, and was trodden down by the neighbouring people. The psalmist next beseeches God to look down from heaven upon the inroads which had been made upon this vine, which had been planted by God himself; and we find a particular branch referred to, namely, the house of David, from whom it was promised that the Messiah should be descended.

CHAPTER XIX.

Necessity of Union to effect a proper Scheme of National Instruction—Duty of the State—Address to Non-Instructionists—Example of Edinburgh—Seven Grades of Instructional State—Sixth, the lowest possible Moral Grade deserving of Trust—Seventh, the most to be desired—Question between the Sixth and Seventh—Attempt to unite Friends of National Instruction to offer the Seventh, and to offer also the Sixth, to satisfy all parties—Conclusion.

IN order to accomplish this great object of a national system of instruction, we have seen that the co-operation of all parties is required. A man *may* be sincere who insists on a measure, and appends to it conditions which are impracticable, but we have good grounds for doubting his sincerity. We must see how much of our favourite provisions we can give up without a sacrifice of principle, and all exclusive of it we should be ready to abandon, in order to attain a great certain good. The charge of party spirit is too often deserved, but surely, in a question of this sort, we should endeavour to make it groundless. It will not do to demand the very most that we would wish, but we should be contented with the very least that will satisfy our wishes. Let us meet half-way, and, adjusting our differences on common ground, go to the legislature, with the voice of a united people, stating our request, and that in definite terms.

While I speak of a united people, it were too much to expect that all should join. There will always be some on both sides, who will adhere to the utmost requirement of their own views. Without imputing motives, it is to be feared, that in addition to the tendency which the mind has to cling to a proposition once laid down, and incapable of demonstrable refutation, there are other springs of action at work. Some would rather not have the people instructed at all. Others bear an invincible dislike to the

control of religion. Others are indifferent on the subject, and are easily led to support the views of misguided leaders. Whatever be the motives, we must endeavour to convince them of their error, and "if we fail—we fail." But we must appeal to those who are really anxious about the thing itself in general, though they differ as to that of which it should consist. A few considerations directed to them in their great separate divisions may assist in effecting this.

As to the duty of the state, I think that it is clear in its essence, though we may pardon or excuse their past hesitancy, on the ground before explained. It is their prerogative as well as their duty to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves, *the best possible* means of instruction. He who holds that the state ought to look forward to the interests of the young, as connected with a future world, will not doubt that such instruction ought to include religion. He who holds that the state has only to do with the concerns of this life, will not hesitate—if the statements made throughout this work be true—to acknowledge, that religion is the only source of that morality which is essential to national and individual prosperity, and that to be effectual, it must be taught in schools. But, in either way, the duty of the state is clear. It is very true, that constituted as the government of this country is, the practical determination of this and all other great questions lies ultimately in the hands of the people. But those who undertake the duties of the state are bound by the responsibility which they have voluntarily incurred. It is for us simply to state the fact: it is for them to discharge the duty. The state cannot plead ignorance. This is a question to which attention has been turned at all times, and which, of late, has been pressed upon them by all parties, on considerations evidently affecting the national interests. It is their duty, certainly, to inquire. But there are great leading principles on which it is not difficult to make up the mind. Let us embody

these principles and act upon them, that we may no longer be the wonder of surrounding lands.

If this be not done soon voluntarily, it will be done ere long compulsorily. Education is going on among all ranks,—a bad education among most, and that without instruction of any kind to counteract it. The evils are accumulating, and will, one day or other, burst upon our devoted heads. The population increasing,—temptation increasing,—the chances of reverse both in the agricultural and commercial world increasing, if instruction do not increase along with them, what can we expect? The rule of the bayonet will suffice no longer, and if it could, should we prefer it to the rule of knowledge? The city of Edinburgh furnishes an apt illustration of what is going on at this moment throughout our empire.

Edinburgh, like the other towns of Scotland, had not very long ago but a small population, and, though unblest with parochial schools, was yet supplied by charitable institutions and private teachers with the means of instruction. For a while the desire of the poorest inhabitants to bestow this on their children kept up the old Scottish character. But the population increased far beyond the actual means of instruction,—less shame was felt at the want of it,—and gradually there came a diminution in attendance and in general morality. The lower orders were educating themselves in vice, and that most vigorously and successfully. The upper ranks instructed their children, and punished criminals, and slumbered over the great question of the general morals. There was no particular temptation, till an opportunity occurred when all ranks were engaged in festivity. Then the youths, well educated in the school of crime, proved the effect of such lessons. Organized bands of desperadoes patrolled the streets of the metropolis,—robbed, maltreated, and murdered. The scaffold bore the bodies of three youths so trained,—the hulks, Botany Bay, and the jails received many more, and the citizens roused as if from a trance. They then did what

they should have done before, and organized schools to secure their own safety. Yet this did not atone for the mischief done,—blood spilt,—souls sent to meet their God by the hands of their fellow-men,—terror diffused,—vice ingrained,—and families in scores mourning over sons doubly lost.

And shall we coolly sit with our hands folded while a similar train of circumstances is going on throughout the whole empire? Shall we contemplate unmoved the up-rising of ignorance, and misery, and crime, because we have powder enough, and shot enough, and soldiers enough, and jails enough? Shall we look forward, without one effort, to a reverse in trade, or to the irregular movements of sedition, or to the systematic arts of demagoguism, any one of them sufficient to set in a blaze the mass of our ignorant fellow-citizens, and kindle a conflagration, which may be extinguished, but which, before that time, may scathe the altar and the throne, and can only be slaked by blood—blood shed because we were too indolent, or too bigoted to our own pet scheme of instruction. We have the means within our reach of reclaiming a whole population—from brutal ignorance, and its accompaniment vice—endeared to us by every patriotic tie. We know that there are hundreds and thousands encompassed by the seas that wash our shores who never heard of the name of Jesus but in derision, or in the foul oath of the ruffian demoralized by our negligence. Is this safe? Is this the part of Christians? Is it the part of men? We *can* instruct, and we *will* not. While the serpent Vice is proceeding to gnaw away the very vitals of our country, we look supinely on,—it has not yet reached the vitals. Vice, to be sure, is so very harmless, contented a thing, that it will proceed no further. If we are men, if we are Christians, let us unite not to scotch the snake, but kill him.

We have seen how this is to be effected. Not by the absurdity of checking the vices of the heart through the

head, but of going to the root of all evil—of checking the vices of the heart through the heart. We must be vigorous in our procedure, and prompt in the execution of our plans. On us, the present generation, depends the character of the next. Let each man reflect that he carries with him, in his ongoings, responsibilities that affect not only the present but the future. We have all the materials wherewith to build a glorious structure. In that temple dedicated to God—rich with the spoils of science, and literature, and art—the effulgence of heaven shining upon the massive scrolls, may our posterity congregate, and learn of earth as the pathway to heaven. Shall we allow them to wander about the desert-waste like wild Arabs, with their hand against every man, and every man's hand against them, or ever and anon creeping into their clay huts where sleeps for ever the night of moral ignorance? We may bequeath them manacles and scaffolds, and act upon act against crime, as each new loathsome form arises wherein it develops itself, or we may leave them the instruments of instruction—the Bible, the teacher, and the code of instructional provision. We may present the spectacle of ignorance most profound in the mass, and knowledge most exalted in the few, as in those lands where the marble palace and the clay hovel rise side by side,—or we may afford the view of knowledge universal, and the knowledge of the few towering aloft, like the stately monument which smiles on a city of palaces. At the bar pleads Posterity—not for steamboats, nor railways, nor letter-bags, nor magnetic telegraphs—but for all we can do in this way, and for her birthright—Instruction. She urges on us her claims to be reared so as to endure the prosperity or the reverses with which she is threatened. She tells that in the olden time, when men had little to manage, they were trained to manage it; while she, likely to be richer far, is to be left untaught the duty of directing the expenditure of the outward wealth bequeathed her. Heaven approves and

T

ratifies the claim, exclaiming, "Train up a child in the way he should go;" and a voice is heard, gentle as the voice of Eternal Love, and commanding as that of the King of kings—even the voice of the Prince of Peace—"Suffer little children to come unto ME, AND FORBID THEM NOT."

Ye who, smitten with the fear of the people, look with apprehension to any addition made to their acquirements, as so much added to their power of overthrowing the pillar of the state, consider if you have more to dread from a people taught to fear God and honour the king, when the hour of trial comes, than from a nation inflamed with angry passions, and throwing their naked souls upon the sword's edge, with no rational fear of an hereafter. Ye dread lest when the mass of men shall know that they have like minds with yourselves, they shall rush to despoil you of your possessions. Know ye not that virtuous knowledge gives contentment, and that the humble cottage, where the pure lustre of the Bible is thrown upon the happy group as they pore over the page that history or science unfolds, shelters men who will not bow the knee in slavish fear, but who will not wield the assassin's knife, nor the incendiary's torch—for their home is happiness, and they feel that they owe this to you. Ye deem them unable, while ignorant, to combine. The conspiracy of ignorance is fearful, for it is banded together by ferocious purpose; and while the conspiracy of half knowledge is much to be dreaded, true knowledge will never conspire. Ye deem that knowledge is an instrument too dangerous to be put into the hands of the poor, for it teaches its own use, and that it may be directed to advance self. Knowledge directed to the head is indeed dangerous, but directed to head and heart, it teaches that self can only be, in reality, advanced by proper—that is, virtuous means. Ye fear the confusion of ranks. So all ranks will be confounded, but not confounded as ye fear. They will rather be blended. One spirit will mingle

itself through the whole mass of men—the spirit of Christian knowledge, which shall teach each man—the peer and the peasant—to know his duties and his place. Ye think that abstinence from enactment will keep instruction from spreading through the land, but it will not keep the people from being educated. They will not receive lessons from the national teachers, but from the national destroyers—from Gin, Swing, and lawless Despair. Listen, in time, to the counsels of wisdom, and learn that for a nation to “be without knowledge is not good.”

There seem to be seven states in which a community may be placed in reference to knowledge—and these states may be variously blended. Our inquiry must be twofold. Which is most safe, and most productive of good? Which is the lowest in the scale of safety, and of probable good? It is clear that we should aim at the former, but that we should never rest till we get the latter, not partial, but universal, and as far as possible, with the addition of the former state. These seven states are:—

No knowledge of any kind may be formally communicated.

Intellectual knowledge may be communicated without moral or religious.

Religious knowledge may be communicated without intellectual.

Intellectual and moral knowledge may be communicated—without any reference to Christian ethics.

Intellectual and moral knowledge may be communicated with a reference to Christian ethics in the mind of the teacher.

Intellectual and moral knowledge may be communicated—the latter by Christian ethics.

Intellectual and moral and religious knowledge may be communicated—the moral and religious being the knowledge of the blessed gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Farther than this last, man cannot go. The spirit of all grace alone teacheth savingly and to profit. All that man

can do is to employ the instrumentality which God hath appointed to bring sinners to holiness. We are thus saved from presumption and from despair. We cannot expect to see a virtuous and a moral race of men without instruction—and with instruction, rightly and prayerfully used, we can calculate upon God's blessing, and the saving influence of the Spirit, the Comforter. The waste and howling wilderness will never of itself produce the rose and the waving grain—all our culture will be useless without the refreshing dew and the genial sun. We must unite the fervency of spirit with the "not slothful in business," then shall our land "serve the Lord." This highest condition we must aim at. But we are bounded by the *possible*. And it is impossible to reach this.

Let this be pondered by those who would shut the gate of knowledge unless the way is fenced so that all admitted must advance through Christian doctrine. If the question lay between a want of secular, accompanied by a possession of religious knowledge, and the terms reversed, there would be no question at all. Perish all knowledge which interferes with moral wellbeing. But the question affects the very lowest grade—the semi-brutal state of deep, dark, dangerous ignorance, wherein men are born, and live, and die like the beasts of the field—ignorant of God, and regardless of man—save in fear.—Let the man stand forth to view, and let us see him, who ventures in a Christian land to doom—so far as he can doom—his fellow-men, his fellow-countrymen, bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh, to wallow in the sty of swinish ignorance, grubbing his daily meals from the hard earth, and laying his bones in that earth, as if his soul descended with his carcass to the senseless dust. Let us hear him raise his voice—and defend the monstrous lie by false maxims of state policy. Let us with firm voice reply, "If the thrones of the earth, and the pillars of the state, are to be ever founded on souls left wilfully to perish, we must remove the thrones, and uproot the pillars, for it is not the will of

God that any should perish. Tottering is the throne, and certain to fall the columns, whose foundation is ignorance of God, of judgment, and of eternity."

There is only one defence of the second order of instruction, and it is, that the intellect cannot be disciplined, without, to a certain extent, cultivating the moral powers. So far as this goes it is good. There is no doubt, that by bestowing on a man knowledge of any kind, regularly communicated, we discipline, to a certain extent, his morals, and we open up new sources of gratification, which may break the force of animal craving for mere brutal enjoyment. But this is too precarious a state for us to trust ourselves to. It is better than the former, because it opens up a hope of moral renovation—but it is worse than the former, in that it opens up fresh sources of selfish enjoyment. It calls into existence pride, self-conceit, contempt of restraint, and a knowledge of evil means, as before there was a desire of evil ends. This state, likewise, has now no open defenders. It has those who prefer it to the former—and it were indeed a difficult thing to say, whether the advantages of this knowledge do or do not counterbalance its certain evils. Individual instances we have in abundance, and they seem all to tend towards the proof, that both states are equally unsafe. It can only be from the tendency, indeed, of knowledge to seek gratification that there can be any doubt. This tendency may possibly, in some cases, lead to moral inquiries, and thence to gospel light. But, however this may be, it is palpably not the state in which to rest, when we can get something higher. This truly were a dangerous experiment. Teach all our people secular knowledge, and give them no moral lessons, and how long, think you, would Great Britain be a regularly organized nation? Just till the so-taught generation were able to unfurl the standard of blood, to the deep-mouthed sound of intellectual equality.

The third state we cannot realize. If we could, we

might stop here, and leave the rest to the exertions of individuals and bodies of men. Or, if we could, there were no need to stop here, for religion sanctifies all, and renders safe all knowledge. Our great object is to induce men to seek religious knowledge. In former times this was felt, and only one method was thought of—Force. The human mind recoiled from force, as it always does in the long-run from that which is unnatural. Religion has to do with motives, and no human power can implant them. But the whole object of religion is to do this. Law can prevent the outward manifestation of motives which are injurious to society, but it can never, in the long-run, prevent the manifestation of beneficial or indifferent motives; and, above all, it cannot enforce motives themselves. This was long unheeded, and this heedlessness has been productive of much error and misery. But we have come to the practical conclusion at last, that it is impolitic, and needless, and wicked, to force the conscience. Hence, we cannot secure this third state of society. We cannot drive the young of those who hold certain religious opinions to learn the opinions of others,—and there is manifest absurdity in forcing them to acquire instruction in that which is false. It may be a question, and is entertained as a question by some, whether it is not better that a man should be trained in a false religion, than not trained in religion at all. We need not puzzle ourselves about that question; whether it be better or not, it cannot be our duty to offer to train a man in what is false, merely because he wills it, when we can offer to train him in what is true; and thus, let churches be extended throughout our land as much as you will, you must induce the *youth-head* to frequent these churches, before you can expect extended good to be done. You cannot force them, and you must abandon all thoughts of the possibility of this third state, till you take another where the element of instruction shall enter.

The fourth requires but short notice. In this country,

however some men may dream, and their dreams render notice necessary, it is impossible to impart moral knowledge without a reference to Christian ethics. All modern systems of ethics are founded on those of Christianity in their practical parts. They too often disregard them in their speculations, whether these speculations refer to merely speculative points, or points where speculation blends with practice. But be the appropriation acknowledged or not—be it openly avowed or stolen and passed off as the possessor's own—the modern moralist who would inculcate any thing opposed to Christian morality as a specific rule of life, would meet with the execration not only of good but of bad men. Selfishness is not necessarily a part of self—but it is so in the case of the bad, and very selfishness would shrink from exposure to a moralist who taught some of the maxims even of Socrates and of Plato.

The fifth is decidedly a better state of things. It secures the purity of the morals taught—but it does not secure their effect, nor tend to that security. We should wish the young to know not only that this is the system of morality best adapted to their nature as beings living on the earth—but as beings who shall live when this earth is passed away,—not only the promulgation of the will of God, but of the will of the God of revelation. If they are not thus taught, we want all sanction of morality. The teaching wants authority. Their rebellious nature rises up against it, and as man's will, they will practically disown and disregard it. As the will of that unknown God—the God of Nature—they will raise ten thousand cavils which their cultivated intellect will supply. They will acquire no knowledge of the connexion between God the moral Governor and Judge, and God the Saviour of the world. They will rest in Nature: and such nature! The God fashioned by themselves will be their God. They will end in infidelity or atheism, conducted thereto by a Christian state!

The sixth is the least provision that I think can be

made with safety,—and that safety depends chiefly on its tendency to lead to the seventh.

It is between the sixth and seventh that there is any doubt on the part of sincere and religious instructionists,—some holding that none but the seventh is safe or profitable, others stoutly maintaining that the *state* should only furnish the sixth.

Would that we could realize the seventh! If it lay within the range of our *possible*, it should certainly be our only aim. But we cannot. It is clearly impossible for us to enforce the highest order of instruction, for it includes that which it is beyond our power to enforce,—doctrinal instruction. We may offer it,—it is our duty to offer it,—but we cannot use force, nor should we if we could compel. But let it be steadily borne in mind, that we can offer—at least I should fain hope so—the sixth, with a certainty of its being accepted by many now, and by all after time shall have taught us to conquer the difficulties of an incipient system. Let it be remembered that the question is not between religion and secular knowledge, but between knowledge and no knowledge. If we do not instruct the people as they will be instructed, we must leave them without it at all. To insist on the seventh, is to shut the door of hope on tens of thousands of our countrymen. We surely cannot hesitate between a race of men blind,—utterly blind, without God and hope in the world,—and a race with their minds opened up to derive the light of instruction, trained in Christian morals, accustomed to the sanctions of religion, and so far—and is it not much?—open to religious impressions. Even dismiss the thoughts of the world to come, and is there not much to soften and humanize in the influence of knowledge on the mind? where every step taken has been so under the guidance of a recognised law, the law of Christ, proclaimed as his, as drawn from the revelation of his will, which is spoken of before them with reverence, and ever referred to as possessed of autho-

rity supreme? I do not maintain that this is enough—I maintain that this is not enough. But this is all that we can do. We must take our option, whether the masses shall be left to the chance of stray instruction, relieving here and there utter ignorance, or whether we shall allure them on to know of God's plan for their salvation. Individualize the difference. Take that boy, who has no amusement but wanton mischief, no employment but idleness or vicious enjoyment, who knows not and cares not what letters are, and thinks of nothing, morning, noon, or night, but how he may gratify his sensual propensities, or his proneness to destroy. Follow him to the workshop, at first buffeting, then buffeted, with the ferocity of the wolf, and the cunning of the fox, spending his days in toil, and his evenings in gross vice, giving his Sabbath to the gin-shop, and his whole heart to debauchery. Tell him of church. He understands not why he should go there. He may go once. He does not catch one glimpse of the meaning of the procedure in any of its parts. God's name is known but as part of a profane oath, and His book but as something whereon he may be called to swear in a court of justice, should his comrade's guilt be discovered. He marries. Frightful is it to contemplate woman in this state of mournful ignorance. Let us keep by the man. His children are reared by an effort of natural love, not all extinct, as he himself was reared. They pursue the same course. He sickens and dies,—God neither in his heart nor on his lips. And this is the life of comparatively innocent men,—and it is the life of thousands. Individualize the other picture. He spends his youthful days under the eye of his watchful teacher,—he learns to love restraint,—he practises the duties of the moral law,—he is trained to respect the property and the feelings of others,—he hears the name of Christ mentioned with reverence and love,—he can read the Bible,—it is associated with all his duties. I need not follow him further. He may err and sin,—many so trained will err and sin,—

outrageously sin,—but have we done this youth no good? This good we can do,—this good we are bound to do, for it is possible. Add to individual considerations the thoughts of those several men in masses. “As iron sharpeneth iron,” so will they act upon each other. If well trained, then will the instrument be for good,—if ill, for evil.

But principally do I value the sixth, as leading to the seventh. If any man ask whether this is with the design to proselytize, I answer him that it is. It is with the design to proselytize to truth. I do fear the tendency of the ill trained mind to shut the ear to the voice of religion; I do not fear the tendency of the well trained. Ply a population so reared with the lessons of the gospel, and let their lessons come from what quarter they will, we have reason to hope for their success.

It is in vain to insist upon the seventh alone. Be it a good or a bad state of the community, it is folly for any man who is sincere as to his hope of national instruction to expect the realization of this exclusively. A man may not desire the aid of the nation, and he may think that his object can be attained by the united efforts of the benevolent. Such a man has a right to construct such a system as will please his fellow-members in the society which he joins. But no man who desires and hopes for the aid of the nation can expect, with the remotest chance of success, any scheme in which attendance on doctrinal instruction shall be made imperative as a condition for admission to the secular knowledge communicated. But supposing the state to consent, you still leave uninstructed vast numbers. These very children might be attending the classes otherwise organized, and those who are now attending the doctrinal classes would still be attending them. You gain nothing by the restriction, but you lose the probable benefits derived from the moral training of all.

At the same time, it is equally clear that the state can-

not found a system on the sixth plan exclusively, shutting out the teaching of Christian doctrine. No man can entertain this hope. It is abandoned by even Lord Brougham. "Then," says his lordship (Letter to the Duke of Bedford, pp. 16 and 33), "let us be well assured that no government in this country ever can carry a plan of national education, in which a perfect absolute equality between all sects of religious professors shall be established, according to your principles and mine,—according to what I humbly presume to think the only sound and just principles. So far we must make up our minds, looking our position steadily in the face, to admit that we are completely defeated, and defeated without any hope of a favourable reverse of fortune another time."—"Do we really and honestly desire to see the people universally taught? that is the question. If we do, then we shall show it, not by crying 'Teach! teach!' but by supporting whatever plan for teaching is attainable in the circumstances of our present situation, provided no violence is done to any of those great principles which we have no right to abandon. But if, with the words of wisdom and benevolence on our lips, we refuse a scheme of general education, merely because it sins against our own preconceived opinions upon some matter not essential; if we reject it merely because it gives a rival sect the preference; if we turn away from it merely because its adoption would be a defeat of our own party,—then we plainly show that victory, not beneficence, is our object, and that, though we may be well enough disposed to teach the poor, we are much more anxious to defeat an adversary or outstrip a rival."

Neither party, then, can carry either scheme exclusively. Yet both—in one shape or another—would. To be successful in procuring national instruction they must adopt some great common principles. It is the duty of the state to proffer the one, it is the duty of the state to proffer not less than the other.

When the conqueror of nations turned his longing eyes

towards Great Britain—when the sound of his naval preparations, and of the trumpet mustering his victorious troops to arm against the sole land of European liberty rung over an expectant world, the voice of party was heard not in our senate as to the duty of opposing the invader, and he who entertained or doubts or fears was fain to creep into the solitude of his own thoughts, lest the multitude in their patriotic zeal should brand him as a traitor to God and his country. Party strife might rage on other points, but the nation's heart beat with but one common feeling as to this. The trial came not—nor can we tell how far it was averted by the unexpected union of all men formed into one common band. Let us act upon the lesson thence derived. Let us merge all differences in one great effort to repel ignorance, intellectual, moral, and religious, from our shores. Let the banner of our host be inscribed with the glorious words that angels chanted when our King came upon earth, “GLORY TO GOD IN THE HIGHEST, AND ON EARTH PEACE, GOOD WILL TOWARD MEN.”

THE END.

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